Chapter V
	CONCLUSION
	The story told in this study resembles nothing else in the history of the Army Air Forces.  The Antisubmarine Command grew out of a combination of necessity and confused jurisdiction.  It came into being essentially because no adequate preparation had been made to meet the submarine emergency.  Its forerunner, the I Bomber Command, had been asked suddenly to assume responsibility for a kid of patrol activity hitherto jealously guarded by the Navy as one of its own peculiar functions, and one for which the air unit had no special training.  It possessed an air striking force and that was immediately thrown into the gap made by the U-boats in the scheme of Western Hemisphere defense.  It was to give this extraordinary mission something like precise organization, and in a sense to legalize it as a function of the Army Air Forces, that the command was created.  In an effort to fulfill its mission, the Army Air Forces, through its Antisubmarine Command, planned to carry the fight as soon as practicable to the enemy.  On both the legal and strategical ground this command became the center of a controversy which overshadowed in importance its actual operations.
	Those operations, nevertheless, contributed significantly to the defeat of the U-boat in the Atlantic.  It is more than possible that they might have contributed considerably more had they been controlled
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	by AAF agencies.  As it was, much of the strength of the command remained tied to areas of defensive patrols, lacking the kind of hunting for which the squadrons were being trained and equipped.  Most significant is the fact that at the time of its dissolution the Antisubmarine Command was for the first time nearing a level of experience, equipment, and general efficiency toward which its personnel had been working since the days of the I Bomber Command.  Many antisubmarine authorities therefore viewed with regret its withdrawal from the Battle of the Atlantic, especially at a time then the enemy appeared to be on the verge of defeat.  It was felt that, regardless of the quality of Navy pilots or the nature of naval strategic doctrine, months would pass before the Navy could hope to build up a force of long-range antisubmarine aircraft as powerful and as experienced as that of the AAF Antisubmarine Command.  And the ugly fact persisted that the enemy, though beaten, still possessed large numbers of U-boats in the fall of 1943, and his capabilities for inflicting damage on Allied shipping remained substantial.
	Yet it would be romantic to suggest that the decision to eliminate the Antisubmarine Command was an operational decision, or even one arising from the basic controversy concerning the strategic value of antisubmarine air forces.  The final deliberations turned not on the record of this command or its potentialities nor on the doctrine of the strategic offensive, toward which the Navy was itself gradually tending, but on the question of jurisdiction over long-range, land-based air striking forces engaged in overwater operations.  On this

 

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	level the controversy came close to testing the raison d'etre of the Army Air Forces itself.
	On this level of policy, the antisubmarine controversy points to certain lessons of long-term importance.  It emphasizes, of course, the need for closely integrated and clearly defined command in joint operations.  It also illustrates the essential unity of air power.  The chief characteristics of air power are its adaptability and its fluidity.  Plans laid on the basis of rigid distinctions of area and function are likely to end in confusion and frustration, a fact proved by the experience of the I Bomber Command during the early months of the war when it found itself handicapped by training which had been carefully restricted to overland operations and inshore patrol.  And air power must be employed to suit its peculiar character rather than borrowed from older military theory.  In the light of these conclusions the settlement embodied in the Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement appears to be a compromise, logically unsound, in which the division of air power into naval and Army branches was artificially perpetuated.  Yet it was the only way around a problem which at the moment could not be eliminated, and it contained an element of reason in that it reinvested the Navy with a responsibility, originally and normally naval, namely, the protection of shipping.  Yet it undoubtedly left the question of the ultimate control of strategic air power unanswered.

 

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	On the level of actual operations, the story of the Antisubmarine Command is less rewarding.  Except for the activity of the 479th and 480th Groups in the eastern Atlantic, it is a story of hard work and frustration, in which is told how a great deal of effort and material was expended in an effort to build up a powerful fighting machine which was never allowed to function as its creators meant it to, and which was disassembled just when it was about to become for the first time fully operational.  It is a story of much promise and relatively little fulfillment of great but largely unrealized potentialities.  In August 1943, AAFAC equipment was nearing completion, the research program was about to provide the command with special weapons and devices which would greatly have enhanced its effectiveness, the training program was on the point to realizing the high plans laid down for it, and the entire organization was on the verge of becoming the mobile, air striking force which General Marshall had hoped to see deployed on a broad, aggressive strategic plan.  In this sense the story is a brilliant prelude to anticlimax.

 

	G L O S S A R Y
	AAFAC Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command ACC Atlantic Convoy Conference ACV Auxiliary carrier AFABI AC/AS, Intelligence AFAEP AC/AS, Plans AFDTS Director of Technical Service AFRDB Director of Bombardment AFREQ Requirements Division, AC/AS, Operations, Commitments and Requirements AMSA Ammunition Supply Authorities AOC Air Officer Commanding ASC Air Service Command ASF Air Service Forces ASWORG Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group AWIG Antisubmarine Wing     CAP Civil Air Patrol CPS Combined Staff Planners     DC/S Deputy Chief of Staff DF Direction Finder     EDC Eastern Defense Command ESF Eastern Sea Frontier ETO European Theater of Operations     GSF Gulf Sea Frontier     JCNW Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff     LR Long Range     MAD Magnetic Airborne Detector MIR Monthly Intelligence Report     OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff OTU Operational Training Unit     RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force RCN Royal Canadian Navy RDF Radio Direction Finder     SCR Signal Corps Radio Equipment SDC Southern Defense Command     VLR Very Long Range VP Navy Patrol (squadron)     WDGS War Department General Staff
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	FOOTNOTES
	Chapter I
	1. Excerpts from Eastern Sea Frontier War Diary, Dec. 1941, in Three Historical Essays Relating to Army Antisubmarine Activities [Three Essays], 26 April 1944, Tab I H, in AAFAC files; Report by Maj. A. Standish to Secretary of War for Air [Standish Report], 1 Dec. 1943, 3 in AAFAC file 100.01.     2. Standish Report, 5.  The following table of shipping losses is taken from memo to CG AAFAC from Maj. W. Jackson, Assistant A-3, AAFAC, 7 March 1943, in Three Essays, Tab I I.     ESF GSF TOTAL   SHIPS TONNAGE SHIPS TONNAGE SHIPS TONNAGE Jan. 13   92,995 -- -- 13   92,995 Feb. 14   94,054   5   34,531 19 128,585 March 27 167,257   3   26,221 30 193,478 April 24 133,265   2     5,256 26 138,521 May   5   23,326 42 226,415 47 249,741 June 13   73,585 20   88,705 33 162,290 July   3   17,563 15   56,137 18   73,700 Aug. -- --   3   9,489   3     9,489 Sep. -- --   1   6,511   1     6,511 Oct. -- -- -- -- -- -- Nov. -- -- -- -- -- -- Dec. -- -- -- -- -- --     3. Standish Report, 2.     4. Later designated Eastern Sea Frontier.     5. Ltr., Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier to Chief of Naval Operations, 22 Dec. 1941, in Three Essays, Tab I A.  Cf. Standish Report, 3.     6. The convoy system was inaugurated formally 15 May 1942.  Ltr., Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier to Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 14 May 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I N.     7. Standish Report, 6.     8. War Diary, Dec. 1941, quoted in Three Essays, Tab I B.     9. Ibid., Jan. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I E.

 

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	10. Ltr., Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier to COMINCH, 14 Jan. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I C.     11. Extract from ESF War Diary, Jan. 1942, in Three Essays Tab I D.     12. Col. D. R. Lyon "History & Organization of the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command" [Lyon History], n.d., in AAFAC files 100.031, Monthly Antisubmarine Summary, Jan. 1943, 32.  According to this account, the squadrons principally involved were the 20th, 43rd, and 96th Bombardment Squadrons.     13. When activated, on 5 September 1941, the I Bomber Command consisted of a headquarters squadron, three heavy and one medium bombardment groups, a similar number of reconnaissance squadrons, and a single pursuit group.     14. Lyon History.     15. Ltr., Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier to COMINCH, 14 Jan. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I C.     16. ESF War Diary, in Three Essays, Tabs I F and I G.     17. Lyon History.     18. Ltr., Hq. I Bomber Command to CG 1st AF, 14 Jan. 1942, in AAFAC file 112.     19. See Below, 13-14.     20 Col. C. A. McHenry, "The Antisubmarine Command of the Army Air Forces" [McHenry History], 13 Oct. 1943, prepared for release in the Army and Navy Journal.  In AAFAC file 100.031.     21. Report from W/C P. F. Canning, RAF, to Capt. J. T. G. Stapler, USN, Col H. D. Smith, 1st AF, and Lt. Col. R. B. Williamson, I Bomber Comd., 17 Feb. 1942 in AAFAC file 001.  See also file 115.51.     22. The following table is from Standish Report:   I BOMBER COMMAND AND ENEMY ACTIVITY   EASTERN AND GULF SEA FRONTIERS       _____________I BOMCM_____________________Ships Sunk_________________       HOURS FLOWN U-BOATS ATTACKED NO. TONNAGE EST., AVERAGE DAILY U/B DENSITY Jan. 42 3,134 1 13   92,955 3.4 Feb. 4,766 3 19 128.585 5.9 March 7,247 4 30 193,478 5.7

 

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	_____________I BOMCM_____________________Ships Sunk_________________       HOURS FLOWN U-BOATS ATTACKED NO. TONNAGE EST., AVERAGE DAILY U/B DENSITY April 6,328 11 26 138,521   8.1 May 6,618 20 47 249,741 11.1 June 5,439 21 33 162,290   9.0 July 6,799 11 18   73, 700 14.9 Aug. 5,685   6   3     9,489   8.5 Sep. 6,822   3   1     6,511   4.7 Oct. 6,410  1   0 0   2.2   59,248  81 190 1,055,270       23. Ibid., 10.     24. Established shortly before Pearl Harbor, the CAP felt that it could be of service in the work of coastal patrol, and in February had submitted a plan for the employment of its forces.  Memo, Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon, C/AS, to Lt. Gen. L. F. McNair, C/S GHQ, U. S. Army, 11 Feb. 1942 in AAFAC file 280.  Originally under the operational control of the I Air Support Command, the CAP wa placed under that of the I Bomber Command 19 August 1942.  See AAFAC file 280.012.     25. See below, Chap. IV.     26. See below, n. 52.     27. Reference data attached to memo, Arnold to Marshall, 21 Feb. 1942 in Plans III-R-Bk. 1.  Reference is made here to Act of 5 June 1920 (41 Stat.954) as amended by Sec. 1, Act of 2 July 1923 (44 Stat. 780).  Congress was declared competent to limit the jurisdiction of the armed forces in memo from Secretary of War, 28 August 1929.     28. Copy in Office of AC/As Plans.     29. Ibid., par. 19 e, f, g.     30. Ibid., par. 20 c.     31. Ibid., par. 32 f.     32. Ibid., par. 20 and 23.     33. See correspondence in Plans III-R Book 1, under November and December 1941, for discussion concerning proposed revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow #5, and of Joint Action.

 

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	34. Ltr., Hq. 1st AF to CG I Bomber Comd., 5 Nov. 1941, in AAFAC files.     35. Joint Action, Chap. V, Sec. III, par. f.  THe last really effective opportunity for joint exercises was in connection with "Minor Joint Air Exercise No. 1," 17-22 April 1939.  Prior to that maneuver, the 100-mile limit had been relaxed, but not in time for any practice to be undertaken; and subsequent practice flights of this sort were rendered impracticable by a regulation stating that permission for each must be received from the Navy 15 days ahead of time.  Joint exercises in 1940-41 involved very small participation on the part of the First Air Force, owing to the general Air Corps policy of concentrating for the time being primarily on expansion.  This entire subject is developed in Chapter IV, History of the I Bomber Command, Part One, page 256, received, in draft, from the unit historian [Draft History], in AAFAC file 001.2.     36. Ltr., Hq. I Bomber Comd. to CG 1st AF, 8 Nov. 1941, in AAFAC file 001.  See also other correspondence in folder, "Joint Army Navy Plans before Pearl Harbor."     37. Joint Action, Chap. III, par. 8 (1) (d) and Chap. V, Sec. II., par. j (2).     38. Report of Minor Joint Exercise No. 1 New England and New York Sectors, 17-21 April 1939, analyzed in Draft History.     39. Memo, Adm. E. J. King to Gen. Arnold, 20 Feb. 1942, in Plans III-R, Bk. 1; ltr., King to Arnold, 5 March 1942 in Plans III-R, Bk. 2.     40. Memo, King to Arnold, 20 Feb. 1942, and memo for Arnold, 15 Jan. 1942, in Plans III-R Bk.1.  By 1 July 1944, 200 additional B-24's and 500 B-25's were to be made available to the Navy.     41. Review of correspondence, ltr., C/S, to COMINCH, 17 July 1942 and attached memo for record, in Plans III-R Bk. 1.  In 1942, the Navy received 51.  By August 1943, the AAFAC planned to have a force of 240 heavy bombers, including the two squadrons partially equipped with B-17's.  Memorandum Report to the Secretary of War "The Acute Problem of Ocean-borne Transport and Supply" [Bowles Report], by Dr. E. L. Bowles, 3 March 1943, 5, copy at present in AAFAC files.  A report from the Chief, Statistical Control Air Staff, Management Control, 19 March 1943, attached to memo from the President to Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and COMINCH, 18 March 1943, in AAFAC file 575.6, puts at 52 the number of B-24's delivered to the Navy.     42. Ltr., Arnold to King, 25 Feb, 1942, Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     43. Memo for Mr. R. A. Lovett, entitled "Unity of Command vested in the Army for Coastal Frontiers," n.d., in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

 

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	44. Ltr., Arnold to King, 9 May 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 2.     45. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, CG 1st AF, to Brig. Gen. W. T. Larsen, CG, I Bomber Comd, 26 May 1942.     46. See below, n. 52.     47. Ltr., Arnold to Maj. Gen. W. H. Frank, CG, 3rd AF, 29 May 1942, in AAF 384. 7-A.     48. Ltr., Col. F. L. Anderson, Acting Dir., AFRDB to Bradley, 1 July 1942, in AAG 384.7-A.     49. Draft in AAFAC files, entitled "I Bomber Command."  Cf. Standish Report, 2.     50. Ibid., Conclusion, 13.  See Monthly Intelligence Report, AAFAC, July 1943, 14, for charts illustrating expansion and relocation.     51. Joint Action, Chap. II, Par. 8 (a) and (b).  Cf. Draft History.     52. Rad. from C/S, 25 March 1942, in AAFAC file 001.     53. Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney's notes on trip to 1st AF and I Bomber Comd., 23 April 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     54. Memo for Arnold, 20 May 1942 from AFRDB; memo for TAG from OPD, 27 May 1942; ltr., Hq. 3rd AF to CG AAF, 15 June 1942; all in Plans III-R-3 Bk. 1.     55.  Memo for Col. Glantzberry from Col. F. R. Pitts, 20 Aug. 1942; McNarney's notes, cited above, n. 53; both in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     56. The I Bomber Command still, theoretically, had the job of general coastal defense in addition to its antisubmarine duties.  See below, Chap. IV.     57. Memo AC/S, OPD to CG EDC, 20 May 1942; AC/S, OPD to CG AAF, 20 May 1942; both in AAFAC file 113.3.  The latter is roughly the same as the former, except that it alone contains the directive requesting a reorganized bomber command.     58. Memo AC/S to CG AAF, 20 May 1942, and attached memo for CG AAF from Acting AC/S, 22 May 1942, in AAFAC file 113.3.     59. See AAFAC files 115.51 and 115.52.     60. Report, "The Coastal Command System of Operational Control,"  17 Feb. 1942, in AAFAC 115.51.  See conference with Comdr. R. B. Martinean, RAF Coastal Command, 17 July 1942, in AAFAC

 

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	file 115.52 for additional information on the English system.     61. Report by W/C S. R. Gibbs, RAF "on visits to units of the First Air Forces," in AAFAC file 115.51.     62. Draft plans, n. d., unsigned, in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.     63. Notes for conference on improvement in antisubmarine operations, 1 June 1942, in AAFAC file 113.3 and 001.  Cf. memo for AC/S, OPD from AC/S Plans, 4 June 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1, which is virtually the same plan.     64. See draft plans.     65. Ibid.  In the patrolled area an airplane density of 1:15,000 square miles should be maintained.     66. Ibid.     67. Document, unsigned, 19 Dec. 1942, "The Strategic Control of our Antisubmarine Campaign." in AAFAC file 575.201.     68. Ltr., Air Marshall P. B. Joubert, RAF, to Lord Halifax, 16 Aug. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab II B.  This letter was sent in answer to Lord Halifax's request for information concerning British experience which might be of help to the United States in its antisubmarine problem.     69. Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942, in AAFAC 001.     70. Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June 1942; ltr., King to Comdrs. ESF and GSF, 10 June 1943; both in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.     71. Memo, Marshal to King, 19 June 1942, in AAFAC file 001.     72. Memo, King to Marshall, 21 June 1942 to Bowles Report (see above, n. 41), Tab XII B.  This reference to an increase in allocation of Army planes was a repetition of an earlier suggestion,  Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June 1942, in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.     73. See above, n. 22; Standish Report, 9-10.     74. Ibid., 10-11.  Figures taken from COMINCH assessments.     75. Ibid.     76. See above, n. 2.     77. See Charts in Monthly Intelligence Summary, AAFAC, Nov. 1942, 8-9.

 

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	78. Analysis of U. S. Aircraft Attacks on U/Boats, Memo 20, prefaced by Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Gp., 7 Dec. 1942, p. 4.  In this connection it should be noted that half, or a significantly larger proportion, of the radar contacts were made by Army planes.     79. History, 1st Search Attack Gp. Langley Field, Va. Chap II, 21 and App. 19 B.     80. At least one German U-boat commander agreed with this interpretation.  Early in June 1942, when the force of the U. S. antisubmarine measures was just beginning to be felt, the rescued captain of a U-boat sunk by a I Bomber Command plane off Cape Hatteras stated that he did not believe German submarine successes in American waters could be maintained, owing to the frequency of depth-bomb attacks.  McHenry History.     81. Estimated at 859,000 tons for November, as compared to 575,885 for October.  Monthly Intelligence Summary, AAFAC, Nov. and Dec. 1942.     82. See review of SADU activities in memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, AC/S, 27 June 1942; memo for S/W from Dr. Bowles, 7 Aug. 1942; both in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.     83. Ibid.  See also another plan submitted 22 August 1942 and constructed on roughly similar lines.  Attached to Ltr., Lt. Col. P. C. Ashworth to Col. R. L. Harper, 22 Aug. 1942, in AAFAC files 113.4 and 001.     84. Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sep. 1942, in Bowles Report, Tab XIV A.     85. Ltr., King to Marshall, 17 Sep. 1942, in Bowles Report, Tab XIV B.     86. Memo for CG AAF from McNarney, 22 Sep. 1942 in Bowles Report, Tab XIV C.     87. GO No. 84, 1st AF, 15 Oct. 1942, in AAFAC file 210.  The original title, "Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command," was changed to Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command on 20 Nov. 1942.  Memo from Maj. F. E. Bauer, 20 Nov. 1942 AAFAC file 212.  Although given prior approval by Navy authorities, the command was welcomed by Admiral King with marked lack of enthusiasm.  In the 38th meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 Oct. 1942, he asked whether the announcement by the War Department of the constitution of the AAFAC, "now a fait accompli," was meant to convey the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Notes on JCS, 38th meeting, attached to JCS 93/1, in J/CCS Div., AFAEP.     88. Ltr., Col. F. C. Milner, CG, AAFAC, 28 Dec. 1942; memo from Milner, 28 Dec. 1942; ltr., Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer to Air Marshal L. S. Breadner, Ottawa, Canada, 9 June 1943; all in AAFAC files 211, 211.1, 212.

 

	Chapter II
	1. Monthly Intelligence Summary, AAFAC, Nov. 1942; Standish Report, 18.  In October 1942, I Bomber Command reported 22 DB-7 B's and A-20's, 19 A-29's 12 B-17's, 14 B-18's, 3 B-24's, 35 B-25's, 43 B-34's.  Of these aircraft, only 27 were listed as radar equipped.  Ibid., 8  See App. 5 for station lists.     2. See n. 84 Chap. I     3. See n. 83 Chap. I.     4. Bowles Report, Tab XIII.     5. Ltr., AAG to Larson, 28 Dec. 1942, quoted in Standish Report, 17.     6. In JCS 93, considered in 31st meeting of JCS, 1 September 1942, information was requested on 500 additional aircraft which the Navy wished provided for antisubmarine patrol.  In JCS 93/1, (19 October 1942) General Arnold outlined a plan for the ultimate deployment of 416 Army planes.  This plan was approved in the 38th Meeting of JCS.     6a. Ltr., TAG, to CG AAF, 17 Nov. 1942 in AG 320.5 (11-15-42); Ltr., Maj. Bower to CG AAF, 6 Jan. 1943, copies in AAFAC files 212 and 215.  THe figure 19 is taken from JCS 93/1.     7 Ltr., CG AAFAC to CG AAF, 6 Jan. 1943, copies in AAFAC files 215 and 001.1.     7a. Ibid.     8. Ibid., 1st ind., n.d.     9. R&R, Dir. of Technical Services [AFDTS] to AC/AS, A-3, 6 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     10. Memo, Dr. P. M. Morse, ASWORG, to AFDTS, 20 Jan. 1943, in PLans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     11. After a detailed analysis, he set 6,000 as an upper and 800 as a lower limit, leaving 1,000 to 2,000 as a compromise, provided they could be moved easily from base to base to follow U-boat concentrations.  Ibid.     12. Memo ("unofficial") Dr. Morse to Larson, 5 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC files 001.1 and 591.     13. Memo for JCS from Joint U. S. Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, (JCNW), 4 Jan. 1943, memo from JCNW to Deputy C/S, 6 Jan. 1943,
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	both in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.  The latter document closely resembles Dr. Morse's report in the number of aircraft considered necessary in the North Atlantic.  A similar opinion was experienced by Brig. Gen. H. H. McCelland, AFDTS, in memo for McNarney, 23 Jan. 1943, in AAG, Bulk file, Antisubmarine Command correspondence prior to 1 April 1943.     14. Memo for CG AAF, from Brig. Gen. C. W. Russel, 3 Nov. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab II C.     15. He estimated that 105 enemy submarines were operating in the Atlantic and that Germany was building between 20 to 25 a month.     16. Memo for CG AAF, n.d. (probably January 1943), in AAFAC file 001.1.     17. 1st ind., Hq. AAF to Russel, 6 FEb, 1943 to brief of memo for CG AAF from Russel, n.d., in AAG 384, 7-A.  See also ltr., C/S to COMINCH, 17 July 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk.1, in which a similar viewpoint is foreshadowed.  In a memo for the Chief of Staff, 5 October 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Book 1, Lt. Gen. B. H. Somervell, Commanding General, ASF, had urged the bombing of submarine bases and yards as the principal target for the Eighth Air Force, and a necessary prerequisite to successful logistical operations in the European theatre.  Arnold, summing up a discussion of the problem during the course of which he and Air Vice Marshal Slessor, RAF, had experienced divergent views, wrote in December what may be considered the official AAF position at the time:       The submarine right now is a terrible menace and it must be a target for our bombers.  Their destruction is one of our primary problems.  I am convinced therefore that we must hit them first where their component parts are made; second, where they are assembled; third, at their operating bases; and fourth, in the open sea.       Ltr., Arnold to Slessor, 4 Dec. 1942, in SAS 370.31 (Office of the Air Secretary.)     18. R&R, AFAEP to AFABI, 28 Dec. 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     19. An Evaluation of the Air Effort against submarines, to 1 Jan. 1943, compiled by Intelligence Service, AAF, 8 Mar. 1943, in A-2 Library, US 9950 Shipping, K-17802.     20. Ibid.  Cf. memo for CG AAF from Col. D. R. Lyon and Col. Adrian Williamson, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     21. Minority report submitted by Col. Williamson, one of two AAFAC members of Special Committee on Measures for Combating the Submarine Menace.  CPS 56/3, 1 March 1943, Annex B to App. C.

 

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	22. Memo for CG AAF from AFAEP, 21 Dec. 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1; ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG 25th Antisubmarine Wing/AWIG, 3 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     23. Memo for Brig. en. Upston, unsigned, n.d., (probably early in Feb. 1942, because in answer to a letter of 8 Feb. 1943), in AAFAC file 001.1.  British ASV-2 equipment had been seriously compromised by the German detecting devices.     24. See below.     25. Memo, for Marshall from King, 8 Feb. 1943, in Three Essays, Tab II F.     26. Memo for Upston.  (See note 23 above.)     27. Supplementary Report on the Air Effort against Submarines, prepared by A-5, 8th AF, 28 Feb. 1943.     28. See Monthly Intelligence Report, AAFAC, April 1943, 13.  Memo for CG AAFAC from Maj. W. Jackson, n.d., AAFAC file 001.1.     29. Minutes of the Atlantic Convoy Conference, 4, in AAFAC file 575.5.  On this score, the conference made some important recommendations which resulted in materially strengthening the convoy routes both in number of VLR aircraft and in the international organization.  See ACC 3 and 3/1; Three Essays, II, 37-40.     30. Minutes of ACC.2-3.     31. Memo for CG AAF from Cols. Lyon and Wiliamson, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.  In the course of the discussions of the subcommittee of the CPS on the submarine menace, it came out that the total strength in VLR aircraft planned by Britain, Canada, and the United States exceeded the number considered necessary by 208 (260 were required, 468 planned by all agencies).  Ibid.     32. Memo for CG AAF from Russell, n.d., in AAFAC file 001.1.     33. Memo for DC/S from JGNW, n.d., in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1, under 6 Jan. 1943.     34. Ibid.  See also ltr., CG AAFAC to CG AAF, 22 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1;  Memo, Dr. Bowles to Marshall, 3 March 1943, prefaced to Bowles Report.     35. Ltr., Lt. Col. Jack Roberts to Air Vice Marshal Lloyd, AOC, NW African Coastal AF, 6 April 1943, in Letters of Col. Roberts, AAFAC files.  Other references to this problem may be found throughout Col. Robert's letters.  See also Ltr., CG AAFAC, to CG AAF, 5 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.0.

 

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	36. "Proposed Reorganization of ASW Forces,"  AAFAC Liaison Office, 21 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     37. Memo. King to Marshall, 8 Feb. 1943, in Three Essays, Tab II F.     38. Notes on 54th Meeting, CCS, 31 Dec. 1942, attached to CPS 56/D.     39. Subcommittee created 5 Jan. 1943 as a result of CPS 56/D, dated 2 Jan. 1943.  Memo for CG AAFAC from Cols. Lyon and Williamson, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.  Representatives were present from the following agencies:  RAF, RN, USN, RCAF, and RCN.     40. Ibid.     41. CPS 56/3, Annex B to App. C.     42. Plan attached to memo, Cols. Lyon and Williamson to CG, AAF, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     43. "Proposed Reorganization of ASW Forces,"  issued by AAFAC Liaison Office, 21 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     44. Memo for DC/S from JCEW, in Plans III-R-2, Bk. 1, under 6 Jan. 1943.     45. Notes on 76th Meeting, JCS, 27 April 1943 and on 82nd Meeting, CCS, 30 April 1943, attached to CCS 203.     46. Minutes of AAC, 3.     47. Ibid., 11.     48. Ltr., the Present to C/S, and COMINCH, 18 March 1943, copies in AAFAC file 575, 6 and 001.1.  Specifically, the President asked for a statement as to the number of B-24's the two services could operate at once from Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland, how soon the maximum number would be operating from each of these bases, how many ACV's were in use, and at what rate they might be increased.  See below, n. 70.     49. For status of foreign squadrons, as of 1 April 1943, see App. 7, this study.  Memo for Arnold from Giles, 2 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     50. Ltr., Chief of Bomb. Br., AFREQ to CG AAFAC, 2 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     51. Memo, Arnold to Stratemeyer, 29 March 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.  This subject had received much attention in CCS and CPS deliberations.  In CCS 189, 16 March 1943, a recommendation had been made to CCS from JCS to the effect that the urgent need for an immediate increase

 

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	in VLR aircraft in the antisubmarine campaign should be met by diverting 128 heavy bombers from the bombing of Germany.  On 25 March 1943, Air Commander Strafford pointed out that only 8 VLR aircraft were available in the North Atlantic where heavy losses in shipping had occurred in the previous 2 weeks.  Notes on CPS 49th Meeting, attached to CPS 49/D, 20 March 1943.  In CCS 189/2, it was recommended that during April and May 1943, first priority in equipment and labor at all ASV modification centers be given to B-24's for antisubmarine service, and that the entire VLR, ASV-equipped B-24 output from modification centers during these months be similarly allocated, even at the expense of other theatres.  These recommendations were accepted, substantially, in CCS 189/3.     52. Ibid.     53. R&R, comment 2, AFCCR to AFAEP, 29 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.  Planned allocations of VLR B-24 aircraft to the AAFAC were listed as follows.       April 40 September 67 May 26 October 52 June 21 November 54 July 31 December 36 August 56         54. Memo for King from Marshall, 16 April 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     55. JCS 268, 19 April 1943, memo by C/S.     56. Bowles Report, 20-21.  The over-all average of attacks against submarines indicated that one sighting in 40 was fatal to the enemy.  In England, the average had been considerably better than this; in America, considerably less.  Ibid., 28.  Dr. Bowles proposed using the British Coastal Command system of operational control, in which submarine positions and predictions would be given to the AAFAC each day, whereupon the command itself would then lay out its plans for the next day's operations.  He depreciated the restrictions imposed on antisubmarine activity by the Navy's insistence on adhering to arbitrary sea frontier boundaries, both at home and abroad.  Ibid., 20 and 21.     57. Memo for Marshall and McNarney, 3 March 1943, attached to Bowles Report.  For 1943, production schedules called for 6,400 B-24's in all.  In 1942 the Navy had received 51 B-24's, and 343 were scheduled to go to the Navy in 1943.  By August 1943 the AAFAC could only count on 175 additional long-range planes for its operational force.  Ibid., 5. Cf. n. 55, above.     58. Memo for Marshall from S/W Stimson, 14 March 1943.  Copies in AAG 384.7 and AAFAC 1001.1.

 

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	59. Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 11 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     60. Memo for JCS from AC/S, (JCS 268).     61. Memo for King from Marshall, 11 May 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.     62. Notes on 75th Meeting, JCS, 20 April 1943.     63. JCS 268/1, 3 May 1943.     64. Notes on 77th Meeting, JCS, 4 May 1943.     65. Memo for Marshall from King, 30 April 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.  He suggested that since the convoy systems in the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific should be the same as that in the Atlantic, the Commander, Tenth Fleet should control it.     66. Notes on 77th Meeting, JCS.     67. Ibid.     68. Memo fir King from Marshall, 11 May 1943 in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.  It appears, however, that pending a decision on the Tenth Fleet proposal, antisubmarine forces were, in fact, administered by the JCS with COMINCH as their executive, a procedure which, in the above memo, General Marshall had admitted would cause complications.  See Joint Directive from JCS to Comdr., S. Atlantic Force, and CG, S. Atlantic, 4 June 1943, in AAFAC file, OPerations, Ascension Island.     69. Memo for C/S from OPD, 8 May 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     70. Memo for King from Marshall, 11 May 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.  General Marshall also nominated the man for the job, Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, then air Chief in Hawaii.     71. Rad. issued by King, 19 May 1943, in AAFAC file 218.1.  The organization became effective 20 May 1943.     72. See Chap. III, n. 219 for figures on Navy allocations.     73.  Memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. B. W. Childlaw, 13 June 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 4.     74. Memo for King from Marshall, 28 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     75. See above, n. 30.     76. Memo, Stimson to Marshall, 14 March 1943, in AAFAC 001.1.

 

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	77. Ltr., Allied Antisubmarine Survey Board to COMINCH, 29 April 1943, in AAFAC 001.1.     78. Notes on 79th Meeting, JCS, 10 May 1943.     79. CCS 241, 21 May 1943.     80. Minutes, 93rd Meeting, CCS, 22 May 1943, ref. CCS 241/1.     81. Minutes, 88th Meeting, JCS, 22 May 1943, ref. CCS 241.     82. Notes on 98th Meeting CCS, 14 June 1943, ref. CCD 241/5.     83. Memo for Col. W. C. Sweeney, OPD from Larson, 10 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.     84. Memo for DC/S from Acting AC/S, OPD, 7 June 1943.  Cf.  attached draft memo for King from DC/S; both in AAFAC file 001.1.     85. It was officially concurred in by General Marshall, 14 June 1943, on the basis of the informal concurrence of General Arnold, 12 June 1943.  Notes on 98th Meeting, CCS; R&R, AFAEP to CG AAF, 12 June 1943, in Plans III-2-R Bk. 1.     86. Memo "for discussion with Gen. Arnold" from Lt. Col. P. C. Crowen, in AAG Bulk file, AAFAC correspondence since 1 April 1943, I.     87. Memo AC/S, OPD for CG AAF, 10 July 1943, in Dissolution of the Antisubmarine Command [Dissolution], Annex A-2, in AAFAC files.     88. Memo for Marshall from King, 14 June 1943 in Dissolution, Annex A-1.     89. Ltr., Stimson to McNarney, 25 June 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 2.     90. Ibid.     91. R&R, Chief of Air Staff to AFABI, 1 July 1943, in AAFAC file file 001.1  General Stratemeyer ordered that the attached memo from General Marshall be "incorporated in our historical record."     92. Memo for King from Marshall, 28 June 1943, copy in App. 1.     92a. See Dissolution for details regarding this transaction.     93. Memo for Col. Gross from Lt. Col. Reynolds, AFRDB, in Plans III-R Bk. 4.     94. Dissolution, Annex A-13.

 

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	95. Memo for all AC/AS from AFREQ, 27 Oct. 1943, in AAG 384. 7-B.     96. See papers filed for October 1943 in AAG 384.7-B;  Dissolution, 19 ff.

 

	CHAPTER III
	1. Memo for King from Marshall, 19 June 1943, in Bowles Report, Tab XII A.     2. Memo for Marshall and McNarney, 3 March 1943, attached to Bowles Report.     3. Ibid.  The higher figures came from report entitled "The Strategic Aerial Bombardment of Europe" [Strategic Bombardment], AFABI, 10 Sep. 1943, in AFIHI files, 1641-2.  These figures were originally taken from tabulations made by the Office of Strategic Services.     4. Monthly Intelligence Report, [MIR] AAFAC, Aug. 1943, 6 and 10.     5. Strategic Bombardment, 10 Dec. 1943.     6. Ibid.     7. Ibid., 10 Sep. 1943; MIR, Aug. 1943, 20.     8. Strategic Bombardment, 19 Dec. 1943.     9. Ibid., MIR, July 1943.     10. Some put the number of U-boats having to cross the transit area as high as 120.  MIR Aug. 1943, 13.     11. About 70 per cent of the total Atlantic fleet was estimated to be operating at one time, each cruise lasting about 2 months.  Paper, Air Offensive against the U-boats in Transit, filed under 10 March 1943 in AAFAC file 597.1.     12. MIR, June 1943, 20; Air Offensive against the U-boats in Transit.     13. MIR, June 1943, 20.     14. Air Offensive against the U-boats in Transit.     15. Ibid.     16. Ibid.  The following statements, complete to the end of June 1943, give some idea of the persuasiveness of the argument in favor of the Bay offensive.       Month Approx. Flying Hours U-boats sighted U-boats attacked Flying Hours per sighting % of Transit U-boats Attacked. March 4100 42 24 97 20 April 3600 52 28 69 23

 

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	Month Approx. Flying Hours U-boats sighted U-boats attacked Flying Hours per sighting % of Transit U-boats Attacked. May 4600 99 65 46 54 June (27-1/3 days) 4700 52 25 76 23   17000 255 142 67 30       There is a sharp contrast between this rate of sighting U-boats and the number of hours of flying which experience showed were required to obtain a sighting in other operational areas.       Area Hours per sighting Jan. - Apr. 1943 Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 753   San Juan Sector 790   Trinidad Sector 2175   Guantanamo Sector 12194   Eastern Sea Frontier 20563   Gulf Sea Frontier 59216         It must, of course, be remembered that many of the planes used in these areas would not have been suitable for such operations as those in the Bay.  MIR, June 1943, 20-21.     17. These two squadrons were diverted from the western Atlantic in the first instance for the purpose of protecting TORCH shipping.  Rad. NCXF (1) to Admiralty, 12 Feb. 1942, in Historical Documents of the 480th Antisubmarine Group (Annex to History of the 480th Antisubmarine Group [History, 480th Gp.] ) in AAFAC files.     18. Memo for Maj. W. H. Jackson, AAF from Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor,. Comdr., RAF Coastal Command, 11 Oct. 1943, quoted in extenso in Three Essays, II, 15.  Outer Gondola lay between 45-1/2° and 50° N and from 15° to 22° W.  Inner Gondola lay between 45° and 48-1/2° N. and from 7° to 10° W.     19. Ibid.     20. See History, 480th Gp. for data on movement of units.     21 Letters of Col. Jack Roberts [Roberts ltrs.], Tabs 1 and 2, in AAFAC files.  See also History, 480th Gp., Tab 2, 7-8.     22. History, 480th Gp.,  Tab 2, 2.  The unit, on 1 March 1943, became known as the 2037th Wing (Prov.), under direct control of the AAFAC.

 

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