U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30322

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 April 1943

PG30322

16.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DQ 27	U 181	-	FM 66	U 358	-	BE 64	U 532	-	AJ 96
	71	-	Op(AJ 98)	182	-	GQ 63	376	-	BE	533	-	AO
	84	-	Op(BC 31)	183	-	DO 61	377	-	BF 54	552	-	AJ 96
	86	-	BF 28	185	-	DQ 13	378	-	AE 66	563	-	BE 37
	92	-	BE 61	188	-	Op(AJ 98)	381	-	Op(BC 39)	571	-	Op(BC 32)
	105	-	Op(FE 30)	189	-	AD 80	382	-	BE 19	572	-	BF 46
	108	-	Op(BC 63)	191	-	AK 59	386	-	AO	584	-	AK 94
	117	-	DH 44	192	-	AN 31	404	-	Op(BC 32)	592	-	BF 40
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	195	-	DT 86	413	-	Op(BC 35)	598	-	Op(BC 36)
	125	-	BE 66	196	-	FE 24	415	-	Op(BC 32)	610	-	Op(BD 41)
	126	-	Op(FF 20)	197	-	AL 16	438	-	Op(BC 36)	613	-	Op(BC 32)
	128	-	CF 81	198	-	FM 61	455	-	DH 44	614	-	BE 67
	129	-	Op(CH 85)	203	-	AK 75	462	-	BD 25	615	-	BE 29
	134	-	Op(AJ 94)	209	-	AE 59	463	-	BF 91	618	-	Op(BC 39)
	154	-	Op(FF 40)	223	-	BF 56	487	-	BD 45	628	-	BE 12
	155	-	DE 47	226	-	BE 29	506	-	ET 14	630	-	AL 74
	159	-	DH 44	229	-	BF 67	509	-	FN 18	631	-	Op(AJ 39)
	160	-	FM 38	231	-	AN 31	510	-	BF 61	634	-	BF 54
	161	-	Op(CA 63)	257	-	Op(AJ 98)	514	-	BD 54	648	-	AL 24
	168	-	AK 83	258	-	Op(BD 41)	515	-	Op(ET 50)	650	-	Bergen
	172	-	BF 40	260	-	BD 23	516	-	ET 41	662	-	Op(BC 39)
	174	-	Op(BB 79)	262	-	BD 69	518	-	DH 44	706	-	BD 25
	175	-	BE 54	264	-	BE 15	523	-	BF 61	707	-	BE 65
	176	-	CE 69	266	-	BF 49	525	-	BF 54	709	-	BF 54
	177	-	EJ 39	267	-	Op(AJ 97)	528	-	AO	710	-	AO
	178	-	ET 44	270	-	AK 95	530	-	BE 34	732	-	AE 65
	180	-	KZ 76	306	-	Op(AJ 95)	531	-	AN 31	954	-	AE 65

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 86 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 229 - 306 - 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 510 - 516 - 518 - 523 - 530 - 563 - 572 - 592 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 86 - Brest; U 510 - 523 - Lorient.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 27 see paragraph IVa.
		2)	U 176 sighted an armed steamer of C 2 type on a northerly course, speed 15 knots in CE 6816. Pursuit was abandoned after 8 hours as the heavy sea made it impossible to over haul.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CB 2427, EF 45, AE 8557, AE 8275, FE 38, KL 87, CB 24. There are several sightings from unknown positions. English aircraft reported ineffectual depth charge attack (No information of grid).
	d)	According to special Radio Intelligence reports, the SC 126 convoy was in BC 8485 at 2100 on 12.4 and is to have carried

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		out a change of course.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 27:
		U 262 was beaten off at 0606 by destroyers and pursued with depth charges, and contact was thereby lost. Last position of convoy: BD 9356, course N.E., speed 9 knots. 12 large ships were identified. The boat continued its westward passage as the special duties must be carried out punctually. The boats deployed on the previous day - U 264, 628, 258, 175 and 226 received orders to continue the search independently. U 175 sighted destroyers in BE 4542 at 2330. U 382 reported the convoy again at 0641 in BE 4537, course 90⁰ speed 8 knots. In order to exploit the chance thus provided all outward bound boats able to reach the convoy during the night or ready to attack during the day, were deployed. U 628 also established contact before 0800. The operation continues.
	b)	1)	The recently received special Radio Intelligence report of 12.4 gives a convoy position much further to the S than previously conjectured.
			From this, the convoy should have passed the line on about the afternoon of the 13.4 in very bad visibility. It is not out of the question, however, that the lines were circumvented to the S. 5 adjacent boats reported convoy R/T of varying S/S during the day, and in the night 2 other boats, 180 sea miles to the north, similarly experienced R/T. It is impossible to form a clear picture of the approximate convoy area or course, especially as it is not certain whether the R/T heard was actually convoy traffic. According to the earlier isolated boats messages received up to now, the R/T wave was heard up to a distance of 50 to 60 seamiles. Knowledge and experience of the spread of critical frequencies do not permit conjecture as to the distance, to be made from the signal strength.
			Communications Experimental Command is working on the development of a critical frequency D/F apparatus for U-boats which promises speedy results in the evolution of a practical useful nature.
			However, in order to exploit every chance, and be ahead of the convoy on the following day, if it should still appear, Group "Meise" took up position in reconnaissance channels on a course of 50⁰, speed 7 knots at 2100, and will remain in patrol channels from AJ 6782 via BD 1154 to BD 4231 at 1000 on 17.4. No further messages have been received.
		2)	The following passage routes in the South Atlantic are ordered for research into the traffic conditions there.
			U 198 via FU 47 - GP 32 - GZ 49 and JJ 8210.
			U 181 via FU 58 - CQ 13 - GZ 5240 and JK 2870.
			U 178 via FU 68 - CQ 22 - GZ 2680 and JK 2280.
			U 196 via FV 48 - CQ 31 - GZ 31 and KZ 7410.
			These boats are to be deployed in the area round Madagascar.

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	c)	1)	U 518 has been replenished from U 117.
		2)	A meeting has taken place between U 154, 159 and 518. The crew of U 167 has been evenly distributed among the boats.
	d)	1)	Since U 376 put out of La Pallice on 6.4 it has not reported. The boat was detailed to search for the crew of "Irene". Apart from aircraft sightings of U-boats, there is no information of any kind whatsoever from the Biscay area or W. of it. Several requests for a situation report remained unanswered. The boat must be presumed lost.
		2)	U 177 reports on "Bachstelze" (observation device).
			On the southbound passage from 33 N there were two take offs daily. Successful operation up to seaway 4 and medium swell. Critical point when landing, pitching of boat is no great hindrance as the landing platform is midships and static. It is advisable to wind in the last meter of wire by hand.
			The Commander considers more discrimination in the choice of personnel and better training in engine maintenance necessary.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

VI.	General:
	Convoy warfare in March has led to a considerable using up of U-boats. A large number of boats have returned owing to fuel and torpedo exhaustion and damage. The gaps thus produced must be filled as quickly as possible, if the monthly sinking figures are to be increased. On 6.4, therefore all boats of type IX about to put out were ordered to proceed to the North Atlantic in order to make up the number of U-boats needed there to intercept convoys.
	The fact that sinking results (as far as can be seen) in the southern operational area have decreased (owing to absence of traffic caused by withdrawal of ships for operations in North Africa, and the frequent changes in isolated vessel and convoy traffic.) makes this order timely. Whether future events will justify it remains to be seen.

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17.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DQ 34	U 181	-	FN 74	U 306	-	Op(AJ 67)	U 533	-	AN 36
	71	-	Op(AJ 96)	182	-	GQ 37	358	-	BE 28	552	-	Op(AJ 92)
	84	-	Op(AK 77)	183	-	DP 17	377	-	BF 45	563	-	BE 63
	92	-	BE 28	185	-	DE 98	378	-	AE 67	571	-	Op(AK 77)
	105	-	Op(FF 30)	188	-	Op(AJ 96)	381	-	Op(BD 15)	572	-	BF 40
	108	-	Op(BD 18)	189	-	AL 80	382	-	BE 42	584	-	BD 22
	117	-	DH 44	191	-	AK 73	386	-	AN 36	592	-	BF 58
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	192	-	AF 87	404	-	Op(AK 77)	598	-	Op(BD 11)
	125	-	BE 61	195	-	EJ 31	413	-	Op(BD 11)	610	-	Op(BD 42)
	126	-	Op(FF 20)	196	-	FE 56	415	-	Op(BD 15)	613	-	Op(AK 77)
	128	-	CF 79	197	-	AL 23	438	-	Op(BD 14)	614	-	BE 55
	129	-	Op(CA 80)	198	-	FM 93	455	-	DH 44	615	-	BE 63
	134	-	Op(AJ 67)	203	-	Op(AJ 92)	462	-	BD 25	618	-	Op(BD 18)
	154	-	Op(FF 40)	209	-	AE 82	463	-	BF 93	628	-	BE 17
	155	-	DE 46	223	-	BF 49	487	-	BD 27	630	-	AK 97
	159	-	DH 44	226	-	BE 19	506	-	EK 74	631	-	Op(AJ 92)
	160	-	FE 99	229	-	BF 64	509	-	FM 32	634	-	BF 46
	161	-	Op(CA 63)	231	-	AF 87	514	-	BF 49	648	-	AL 14
	168	-	AK 89	257	-	Op(AJ 96)	515	-	Op(ET 50)	650	-	Bergen
	172	-	BF 61	258	-	Op(BD 18)	516	-	EJ 98	662	-	Op(BD 14)
	174	-	Op(BB 79)	260	-	BD 25	518	-	DH 44	706	-	BD 11
	175	-	BE 42	262	-	BD 92	525	-	BF 46	707	-	BE 28
	176	-	CE 67	264	-	BE 17	528	-	AN 36	709	-	BF 45
	177	-	EJ 97	266	-	BF 47	530	-	BE 63	710	-	AN 36
	178	-	FT 75	267	-	Op(AJ 96)	531	-	AN 24	732	-	AE 59
	180	-	KZ 82	270	-	AK 97	532	-	Op(AJ 92)	954	-	AE 59

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 172 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 229 - 306 - 415 - 463 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 563 - 572 - 592 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 172 - Lorient; U 229 - St. Nazaire; U 463 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 383 - Brest; U 186 - Lorient; U 455 - 448 - St Nazaire; U 466 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 27 (see paragraph IVa).
		2)	U 129 operated off the Bermudas from 6 - 8.4 and did not find any traffic. Land-based radar, daylight air activity and extensive surface patrols were confirmed.
		3)	Apart from Halifax convoy section in BB 7955 U 174 sighted nothing in the operations area BB 79 and 87. Weather conditions and defence made torpedo shot impossible. On the average visibility was good. There was sudden and continuous daylight and night air activity in cooperation with search groups, two days before the sighting of the convoy.
			Before this there was slight patrol activity.
			The boat will operate during the full moon period on the southern edge of BB 79 and 87 to take up position at the convoy assembly point.

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		4)	U 506 reported an unidentified U-boat in EJ 4550, which afterwards turned out to be U 195.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: In DN 76, DM 99, CG 4826 and 3 other reports from an unknown position including a report of a depth charge attack.
		A U-boat had been and was being attacked in BB 77.
		English aircraft were reported by an HX convoy from an undecyphered position. Whether this refers to Convoy No. 26 has not yet been ascertained.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 27:
		On the 17th and in the night of the 18th there were high pressure weather conditions in the convoy area. A boat reported wind N.W. 1 seaway 0, so that the boats anticipated particularly effective enemy defence as a result of the calm conditions.
		3 more boats established contact with the convoy after U 382 had rediscovered it in BE 4537, course 90⁰ at 0640 (U 628, 264 and 175). After 0910 then, no other contact messages were received. Not until 2050 did U 614 again sight the convoy; it maintained contact, but was beaten off by destroyers and aircraft in BE 2795 at 2200. There were no further messages giving the convoy's position. There were heavy depth charge attacks as the result of the calm weather conditions. U 264 reported being attacked for 5 hours. External fuel tank manhole cover 2 on the port side leaking. Large oil track. U 226 reported being observed by the convoy at 0750 and being depth charged until midnight. U 382 reported being depth charged for 16 hours and that the boat has been forced to return owing to damage sustained.
		2 boats were able to score hits. U 628 reported scoring 2 hits on two fully loaded freighters. One of the two torpedoed ships - a 5,000 GRT freighter - was later sunk with a finishing shot. U 226 reported sinking a damaged ship of 7,000 GRT. This was probably U 628's second ship. Operations were broken off on the morning of the 18th owing to the unfavorable weather conditions and the anticipated intensified air activity on that day. All boats will report on withdrawal. Except for U 175 - a large boat - they have done so.
		Final summary. Convoy No. 27:
		Operations on this England bound convoy were not originally planned, so that it was not until the 17th that additional boats were detailed for this. Actual convoy warfare did not begin then, until the morning of the 17th with, in all, 8 boats after U 262, which had first sighted the convoy, received instructions to withdraw to the W. and proceed on special duties. Calm weather conditions (seaway 0) more than anything prevented successful operations. The convoy must have assumed from the area in which the action took place,

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		that only local boats, and not an entire group were engaged, and that therefore the number of boats was small. The enemy's defence against the intercepted boats was therefore persistent, and, owing to the glass like calm of the water, successful. 3 boats were attacked for a long time with depth charges whereby one was forced to return owing to the damage sustained. It must be presumed that U 175 was lost in this action as it reported contacting the convoy on the morning of the 17th. It was not possible to fight a long drawn out action under the prevailing conditions. The sinking of 2 ships may be considered cheering. This operation has shown that there is not much that one can do to a convoy in such weather conditions.
	b)	1)	It can no longer be considered possible to intercept SC 126 with Group "Meise". It is possible that the convoy sailed through the center of the line in the bad visibility of the last few days. As visibility has improved since yesterday and these conditions are likely to continue for some time, Group "Meise" is to remain in this area, but further to the N. The reason for this is the assumption that the HX and SC convoys expected in the next few days will again use the northern route.
			Order: The new Group "Meise" will take up patrol lines from AJ 8216 via AJ 9491 to BC 3536 at 0800 on 19.4 in the following order: U 134 - 306 - 631 - 203 - 552 - 267 - 706 - 415 - 413 - 598 - 191 - 438 - 188 - 613 - 404 - 571 - 381 - 108 - 258 - 610 - 257 - 618 and 84.
			U 662 is proceeding to supply ship owing to shortage of lubricating oil and U 71 is returning home owing to multiple damages sustained in a collision with U 631.
		2)	After execution of special duties (see paragraph d.) U 180 is to operate in the lower third of KP and KQ and the upper third of KZ and JA, with central point off Durban. E.W. traffic is presumed in the vicinity of this port.
		3)	Contrary to previous instructions, U 382, 264, 175, 628, 226, 92, 707, 614, 125, 358 are to proceed to BD 51 after the breaking off of operations on Convoy No. 26.
	c)	None.
	d)	U 180 and the Japanese U-boat are ordered to meet at 0600 on 23.4 in JA 2432.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 628 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.
	U 226 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT

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18.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DR 14	U 182	-	GQ 22	U 358	-	Op(BE 27)	U 531	-	AF 87
	71	-	AK 71	183	-	DP 27	377	-	BE 66	532	-	Op(AJ 82)
	84	-	Op(BC 35)	185	-	DP 77	378	-	AE 82	533	-	AN 31
	92	-	Op(BE 52)	186	-	BF 54	381	-	Op(AJ 98)	552	-	Op(AJ 82)
	105	-	Op(FE 30)	188	-	Op(AJ 98)	382	-	Op(BE 24)	563	-	BF 52
	108	-	Op(BC 31)	189	-	AD 80	383	-	BF 46	571	-	Op(AJ 98)
	117	-	DG 86	191	-	AK 71	386	-	AN 31	572	-	BF 68
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	192	-	AF 73	404	-	Op(AJ 98)	584	-	BD 25
	125	-	BE 48	195	-	EJ 73	413	-	Op(AJ 94)	592	-	BF 64
	126	-	Op(FF 20)	196	-	FE 92	415	-	Op(AJ 86)	598	-	Op(AJ 94)
	128	-	DG 38	197	-	AL 51	438	-	Op(AJ 94)	610	-	Op(BC 32)
	129	-	Op(DC 45)	198	-	FU 11	448	-	BF 58	613	-	Op(AJ 98)
	134	-	Op(AJ 57)	203	-	Op(AJ 82)	454	-	BF 58	614	-	Op(BE 19)
	154	-	Op(FF 40)	209	-	AE 76	455	-	CF 88	615	-	BF 44
	155	-	DE 52	223	-	BF 47	462	-	BD 25	618	-	Op(BC 32)
	159	-	DH 13	226	-	Op(BE 42)	466	-	BF 91	628	-	Op(BE 25)
	160	-	FE 92	231	-	AF 76	487	-	BD 25	630	-	BD 22
	161	-	Op(CA 66)	257	-	Op(BC 32)	506	-	EJ 65	631	-	Op(AJ 82)
	168	-	BD 25	258	-	Op(BC 32)	509	-	FE 96	634	-	BF 44
	174	-	Op(CB 24)	260	-	BD 25	514	-	BF 47	648	-	Op(AL 13)
	175	-	Op(BE 24)	262	-	BD 82	515	-	Op(ET 50)	650	-	Bergen
	176	-	CF 82	264	-	Op(BE 24)	516	-	EJ 23	662	-	BD 16
	177	-	ES 26	266	-	BE 65	518	-	DH 13	706	-	Op(AJ 86)
	178	-	FE 21	267	-	Op(AJ 83	525	-	BF 47	707	-	Op(BE 24)
	180	-	KZ 72	270	-	BD 25	528	-	AN 31	709	-	BE 66
	181	-	FN 12	306	-	Op(AJ 81)	530	-	BF 44	710	-	AN 31
							954	-	AE 82	732	-	AE 82

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 306 - 415 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 563 - 572 - 592 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 563 - Brest; U 592 - St. Nazaire; U 572 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See para. IVa) for convoy report U 707 and 732.
		2)	U 226 sighted auxiliary cruiser and destroyer at 1204 in BE 4275. Northerly course. The boat was forced to submerge by aircraft and lost contact. It continued its outward bound passage.
		3)	U 129 sighted tanker on course of 175⁰ in CA 7998 on 14.4. Attack impossible owing to bad weather.
		4)	U 123 situation report: Aircraft with flying boat sighted on 11.4 in EU 4773, and on 14.4 Spanish passenger steamer on a south-easterly course in EU 4851. No traffic sighted on passage along 200 meter line N. of EU 81. 3 misses on warship of 800 GRT, course 130⁰, speed 11 knots. An escort U-boat approximate type "Triton" class was sunk in ET 6537. A freighter similar to "Rapido" of 5,500 GRT was also sunk in ET 66543. The boat withdrew to the S.W. to charge batteries.

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	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: DM 26, DN 87, DM 32, DM 31, BC 24, EF 58 also 4 undecyphered reports.
		2)	U-boat had been or was being attacked in BB 8727 (U 174).
		3)	Aircraft of 19 Group reported: Dive bombing attack on U-boat, possibly 4 hits. Boat is now on the surface. Probable position DJ 2457. There is, however, no German U-boat in the vicinity.
		4)	SSS report from an unidentified American steamer from ET 6527 (U 123).
	d)	For special Radio Intelligence report see paragraph IVb.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Outward bound U 732 sighted 5 steamers in AE 78 at 1954. According to later reports the convoy was steering a course of 220⁰, speed 8 knots. The boats U 209 and U 648 in the vicinity according to reckoning were detailed to operate.
			U 732 attacked towards 0100 and sank an ammunition ship of 5,000 GRT in AE 7792. The boat was forced to submerge by aircraft and destroyers and was attacked with bombs and depth charges. In AE 7768 the enemy altered course to 150⁰. There was no contact by the boats engaged. Further reports have not been received. The ships probably belong to the Reykjavik section of the ON convoy at present at sea. But in any case, the presence of an ammunition ship contradicts this supposition. The operation continues.
		2)	U 707 reported a convoy at 2255 in BE 1947. When it was ascertained that this referred to an isolated vessel operations were called off. U 707 was to attack in the event of favorable firing conditions. The boat, however, was forced to submerge for a long time by heavy air and destroyer escort at 0300 and proceeded on its way. The operation is broken off. Considering the moon and the exceptionally calm weather conditions also U 707's experience, deployment of boats in the vicinity would scarcely have come to anything. It is more important for them to proceed to the west to take up position on about the 21st against an SC convoy. The unusual disproportionate losses were also a discouraging factor.
	b)	The convoy reported by U 262 on 15.4 (No. 27) is according to Radar locations of the aircraft listening group, HX 233; the convoy intercepted by U 707 today is confirmed from its cover name, to be HX 233. According to this both convoys proceeded very far to the south, contrary to previous experience, so that they cannot be intercepted by the Group "Meise". The reason for this southerly course probably links up with a U-boat situation report now received in which it was stated that the American presumed the patrolling of 20 U-boats in the area 48 - 54⁰ N and 38 - 45⁰ W. Actually Group "Meise" had 18 boats in this area. The present disposition

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		of the "Meise" patrol channel took place on the assumption that further HX and SC convoys would again sail along the more northerly convoy routes. As, however, there is no concrete evidence of this, the boats available, are if possible, to patrol the route last used as well. The boats U 270, 260, 168, 584, 630 and 662 (in the order in which they leave the tanker starting out from the S.) are to occupy a patrol channel from BD 4669 to BD 4335. A convoy should be encountered from 1200 on 20.4. The boats should possibly have occupied this channel at this time.
		In addition U 226, 614, 264, 358, 707, 628, 92 and 125 at present outward bound, are to be disposed in a reconnaissance line from BD 8644 to 5677 at 2000 on 20.4, course 270⁰ speed 7 knots. These boats form the Group "Specht".
	c)	1)	U 462 began its return passage after handing over the remaining binoculars and Fu.M.B. (anti-radar) gear to U 487.
		2)	For the boats operating on the American coast (U 174, 161 and 129) supply is planned to take place on the return passage in BD 50. Until then boats have freedom of movement.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 123 - 1 U-boat
	1 ship 5,500 GRT
	U 732 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT

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19.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DR 21	U 182	-	GG 96	U 358	-	BE 41	U 531	-	AF 73
	71	-	AK 57	183	-	DP 34	377	-	BE 64	532	-	Op(AJ 32)
	84	-	Op(BC 35)	185	-	DF 87	378	-	AE 84	533	-	AN 23
	92	-	BE 43	186	-	BF 45	381	-	Op(AJ 98)	552	-	Op(AJ 82)
	105	-	Op(FE 30)	188	-	Op(AJ 98)	382	-	BE 58	571	-	Op(AJ 98)
	108	-	Op(BC 31)	189	-	AD 74	383	-	BF 44	584	-	BD 25
	117	-	DG 85	191	-	Op(AJ 94)	386	-	AN 23	598	-	Op(AJ 94)
	123	-	Op(ET 67)	192	-	AF 48	404	-	Op(AJ 98)	610	-	Op(BC 32)
	125	-	BE 51	195	-	ES 31	413	-	Op(AJ 94)	613	-	Op(AJ 98)
	126	-	Op(FF 20)	196	-	FM 23	415	-	Op(AJ 86)	614	-	BD 63
	128	-	DG 64	197	-	AL 72	438	-	Op(AJ 94)	615	-	BF 46
	129	-	Op(DC 45)	198	-	FU 18	448	-	BF 49	618	-	Op(BC 32)
	134	-	Op(AJ 82)	203	-	Op(AJ 94)	454	-	BF 49	628	-	BE 42
	154	-	Op(FF 40)	209	-	AL 21	455	-	CF 59	630	-	BD 25
	155	-	DE 35	223	-	BE 68	462	-	BD 25	631	-	Op(AJ 82)
	159	-	CF 82	226	-	BD 63	466	-	BF 82	634	-	BE 65
	160	-	ET 44	231	-	AF 48	487	-	BD 25	648	-	Op(AL 13)
	161	-	Op(CA 40)	257	-	Op(BC 32)	506	-	EJ 11	650	-	Bergen
	168	-	BD 25	258	-	Op(BC 32)	509	-	FE 67	662	-	BD 16
	174	-	Op(BB 70)	260	-	BD 25	514	-	BE 68	706	-	Op(AJ 86)
	175	-	BE 10	262	-	BC 99	515	-	Op(ET 70)	707	-	BE 19


- 265 -

176	-	CE 75	264	-	BD 17	516	-	DS 69	709	-	BE 56
177	-	ES 64	266	-	BE 59	518	-	CF 82	710	-	AN 23
178	-	FE 53	267	-	Op(AJ 83)	525	-	BE 65	732	-	AE 77
180	-	(KZ 58)	270	-	BD 25	528	-	AN 23	954	-	AE 84
181	-	FU 51	306	-	Op(AJ 81)	530	-	BF 46

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 462 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 217 - 403 - Brest; U 616 - 359 - St. Nazaire; U 468 - 569 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: West of Portugal.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	See paragraph IVa) see convoy report U 732.
		2)	After a long chase U 108 (in Group "Meise" 's patrol channel) sank a unit freighter of type C 2, cargo partly ammunition. General course 50⁰, speed 13 knots.
		3)	U 226 reported a fast isolated vessel in BD 6368 at 1140, zig-zagging on a north-easterly course. The ship was later recognized as being Irish and was sighted again by U 628 at 2000. The name of the ship is "Irish Rose". In spite of the incorrect behavior on the part of the Irish, the boat was forbidden to attack.
		4)	U 634 had a machine gun action with a "Sunderland" aircraft. The boat submerged after the second bombing attack. No damage.
		5)	U 378 was attacked in AE 8357 on 16.4.
		6)	U 954 proceeded through Iceland Passage via AF 44, AE 68, 83, 87 to AL 22. Apart from slight aircraft activity, no defences were confirmed.
		7)	According to a report from U 189 the loose drift ice boundary round Iceland runs from AE 2222 via 1665, 1712, AD 4814 to 6880. Permanent ice boundary is not accessible for U-boats. Search for blockade breaker "Regensburg" possibly iced up, without success. Land-based aircraft sighted in AE 1575 on 15.4. Surprised by destroyers in AD 2929 on 16.4 during snow squalls. 5 depth charges - no damage. Radar locations were not confirmed.
	b)	Our own aircraft sighted a convoy consisting of 30 merchant ships, 4 escort vessels and 4 destroyers, course 360⁰, speed 7 - 10 knots in BE 9592 at 1205.
	c)	U-boat sightings: In DM 23, BF 1834, BE 6792. Further, several U-boats were sighted, their positions could not be deciphered.

- 266 -

		U-boat had been and was being attacked in BC 31 and BB 74.
		Aircraft attacked U-boat with depth charges in AE 7887. No report of success.
		Unidentified aircraft reported that U-boat had sunk a merchant ship at 1030 on 18.4. No details of position.
		According to Radio Intelligence report, an unidentified unit was located in AD 8810.
	d)	none.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	The boats U 648 and 209 detailed for operations on U 732's report, have received orders to continue operations if conditions make surprise enemy attacks appear unlikely and success probable. Up to 1900 all boats including U 954 which also went after the convoy, had broken off operations owing to air activity and unfavorable weather conditions. The operation is therefore broken off.
		2)	Boats in the vicinity of the convoy reported by aircraft are to exploit all favorable opportunities of attack. A more extensive operation is not intended.
	b)	1)	The HX 234 convoy expected by Group "Meise" should arrive at 1900. There was, however, no contact up to dusk. Owing to the small distance between the boats (15 sea miles) and bright moonlight, the groups remained in the former patrol channels. The present uncertainty concerning the convoy cycle still makes the appearance of the HX convoy possible.
		2)	The following temporary operations area are to be occupied until the disposition of reconnaissance channel: U 209 : AL 15, U 954 : AL 11, U 378 : AD 88, U 732 : AK 31, U 648 : AK 84. The boats from Western France U 266, 709, 377, 514, 525, 223, 634, 383 and 186 receive AL 15 as position.
		3)	Owing to excessive distance the position for U 125 in patrol channel "Specht" is unoccupied. U 125 proceeds to BD 51. After the arrival of another boat the ordered patrol channel for the boats near U 487 now extends from BD 4933 to BD 4335.
		4)	Operations against isolated traffic may now take place in the Sector "D" on Route "A". The unsuccessful boats which have been several days in the Guinea Bay are to be detailed for this. The following areas are to be occupied at a depth of 180 seamiles: U 126 : FD 15, U 154 : FD 57, U 105 : FD 62, U 515 : FE 15. U 123 is to continue freelance operations in the Freetown area. FOr the new moon period, U 515 receives freedom of movement from its present area to the N.E. as far as the coast. Replenishment of fuel from U 460 is intended for all boats from about 15.5.

- 267 -

	c)	1)	In order to exchange experiences of defences and traffic conditions in the Caribbean, U 155 and U 176 are to meet in CD 9585 at 1600 on 20.4.
	d)	2)	The operational area in southern waters is to be extended immediately. The new boundary now runs from GZ 7644 via JK 8254, KT 4745, KJ 4772, LM 2456, to the W. as far as the coast. Outside this area all attacks on unescorted isolated vessels are forbidden.
		3)	U 175 put out of Nazaire on 10.4 and was detailed to operate on Convoy No. 27 immediately on leaving the Biscay area. The boat reported for the last time at 1057 on 17.4 with a short contact signal. Position at this time was about BE 46. As repeated requests have not been answered its loss must be presumed. The convoy was heavily escorted by air and surface forces.
		4)	U 217 has put out on special duties (Minelaying off Lands End). See appendix.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 108 - 1 ship 6,100 GRT

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20.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DR 13	U 185	-	DF 99	U 377	-	BE 56	U 531	-	AF 48
	71	-	AK 03	186	-	BE 66	378	-	AL 11	532	-	Op(AJ 82)
	84	-	Op(BC 35)	188	-	Op(AJ 98)	381	-	Op(AJ 98)	533	-	AF 76
	92	-	BD 67	189	-	AD 93	382	-	BE 68	552	-	Op(AJ 83)
	105	-	Op(FF 10)	191	-	Op(AJ 94)	383	-	BE 65	569	-	BF 58
	108	-	Op(BC 31)	192	-	AE 66	386	-	AF 76	571	-	Op(AJ 98)
	117	-	DG 85	195	-	ES 53	403	-	BF 54	584	-	BD 27
	123	-	Op(ET 90)	196	-	FM 38	404	-	Op(AJ 98)	598	-	Op(AJ 94)
	125	-	BE 44	197	-	BE 11	413	-	Op(AJ 94)	610	-	Op(BC 32)
	126	-	Op(FF 10)	198	-	FU 47	415	-	Op(AJ 86)	613	-	Op(AJ 98)
	128	-	DG 86	203	-	Op(AJ 82)	438	-	Op(AJ 94)	614	-	BD 83
	129	-	Op(DC 40)	217	-	BF 54	448	-	BF 47	615	-	BF 68
	134	-	Op(AJ 82)	209	-	AL 14	454	-	BF 47	616	-	BF 58
	154	-	Op(FE 60)	223	-	BE 64	455	-	CF 62	618	-	Op(BC 32)
	155	-	DF 14	226	-	BD 91	462	-	BD 36	628	-	BD 68
	159	-	CF 64	231	-	AE 66	466	-	BF 48	630	-	BD 27
	160	-	ES 36	257	-	Op(BC 32)	468	-	BF 58	631	-	Op(AJ 82)
	161	-	Op(CB 44)	258	-	Op(BC 32)	487	-	BD 25	634	-	BE 55
	168	-	BD 27	259	-	BF 58	506	-	DS 96	648	-	Op(AL 34)
	174	-	Op(BB 79)	260	-	BD 27	509	-	FE 52	650	-	Bergen
	176	-	CD 99	262	-	BC 89	514	-	BE 52	662	-	BD 27
	177	-	ES 96	264	-	BD 67	515	-	Op(ET 80)	706	-	Op(AJ 86)
	178	-	FE 69	266	-	BE 54	516	-	DS 39	707	-	BD 62
	180	-	KZ 64	267	-	Op(AJ 83)	518	-	CF 65	709	-	BE 52
	181	-	FU 58	270	-	BD 27	525	-	BE 56	710	-	AF 76
	182	-	GG 56	306	-	Op(AJ 82)	528	-	AF 76	732	-	AL 13
	183	-	DQ 11	358	-	BD 67	530	-	BF 40	954	-	AE 68

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598 - 610 - 615 - 618 - 631.

- 268 -

	Entered Port: U 615 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: U 218 - Brest; U 461 - St. Nazaire; U 402 - 638 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 188 reported aircraft in AJ 9578.
		2)	U 176 sighted large two funnel ship course 80⁰, speed 18 knots in CD 9574.
		3)	U 180 sank tanker "Corbis" of 8,132 GRT, course 230⁰ in KZ 6568 on 18.4 bound for Cape Town. During an attack on a steamer on a course of 280⁰ in KQ 7764, on 20.4. the e-boat was thrown up by the swell and observed. Pursuit was broken off owing to inferior speed. The Commander reported that the boat "smoked like an old coal boat". Type IXd.1 with E-boat engines.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DM 23, DN 84, DN 7665. 4-6 reports have been received but the positions could not be deciphered.
		A report from a U-boat of an attack in BA 9596 (unlikely).
	d)	Special Radio Intelligence report of HX 234 and SC 127 see paragraph IVb.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	According to a special Radio Intelligence report received today, the HX 234 convoy was in BB 9653 at 2100 on 17.4 and had orders to proceed on a course of 359 degrees to approximately BC 4110. This proportionately large detour might mean that the enemy was aware (as a result of aircraft location) of the disposition of the Group "Meise". Probably, however, this ties up with a U-boat situation report of 18.4 in which the Americans presumed the presence of 10 U-boats in the area between 53 and 58⁰ N and 35 - 41⁰ W. Group "Meise" will therefore, be withdrawn to the N. at high speed and disposed in patrol channels from AJ 1684 via AJ 6117 to AJ 6982 at 1000 on 21.4.
			According to reckoning the convoy may be expected with speed of 9.5 knots from 1200. As the boats are proceeding in quarter line formation an earlier interception of an eastward bound convoy is possible. If U 404, 618, 257 and 84 - all of which have only 20 - 30 cubic meters of fuel - are not taken into account and U 188 is on the return passage, Group "Meise" still consists of 19 boats.
		2)	Another special Radio Intelligence report has been received from SC 127. According to this the convoy was in BC 4985 at 1700 on 20.4. As this position is considerably far to the S, it is assumed contrary to earlier experiences, that the convoy is keeping to the previously used easterly course. It is planned to dispose a channel of 15 boats from 22.4 to intercept it. The former "Meise" boats U 404, 257, 618,

- 269 -

			84 are to be disposed in patrol lines from BD 1713 to 4116 until the arrival of the boats approaching from the E. These boats are still able to operate for a further 7 - 14 days, are then to be replenished by U 487 for the return passage.
		3)	U 197 is ordered to proceed in the Cape Town area.
	c)	1)	U 155 and 176 have met for the purpose of exchanging experiences.
		2)	U 509 took over cypher material from U 178.
	d)	U 218 has put out for special duties (Minelaying in North Channel). See appendix.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 180 - 1 ship 8,132 GRT.

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21.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DF 98	U 186	-	BE 61	U 378	-	Op(AD 88)	U 531	-	AF 57
	71	-	AL 16	188	-	AK 77	381	-	Op(AJ 65)	532	-	Op(AJ 27)
	84	-	BC 39	189	-	AJ 33	382	-	BF 47	533	-	AF 48
	92	-	Op(BD 57)	191	-	Op(AJ 61)	383	-	BE 61	552	-	Op(AJ 27)
	105	-	Op(FE 10)	192	-	AE 68	386	-	AF 48	569	-	BF 49
	108	-	Op(AJ 68)	195	-	ES 91	402	-	BF 91	571	-	Op(AJ 65)
	117	-	DG 85	196	-	FN 47	403	-	BF 44	584	-	Op(BD 64)
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	197	-	BD 65	404	-	BC 35	598	-	Op(AJ 61)
	125	-	BE 45	198	-	FU 78	413	-	Op(AJ 67)	610	-	Op(AJ 69)
	126	-	Op(FE 30)	203	-	Op(AJ 27)	415	-	Op(AJ 53)	613	-	Op(AJ 65)
	128	-	DT 14	209	-	Op(AL 15)	438	-	Op(AJ 64)	614	-	Op(BD 84)
	129	-	Op(DC 10)	217	-	BF 45	448	-	BE 69	616	-	BF 81
	134	-	Op(AJ 16)	218	-	BF 54	454	-	BE 69	618	-	BC 36
	154	-	Op(FE 50)	223	-	BE 24	455	-	CF 33	628	-	BD 58
	155	-	CD 95	226	-	Op(BD 84)	461	-	BF 58	630	-	BD 25
	159	-	CF 36	231	-	AE 68	462	-	BE 52	631	-	Op(AJ 19)
	160	-	EJ 88	257	-	BC 35	466	-	BE 69	634	-	BE 21
	161	-	Op(CB 44)	258	-	Op(AJ 69)	468	-	BF 49	638	-	BF 91
	168	-	Op(BD 54)	260	-	Op(BD 49)	487	-	BD 25	648	-	Op(AK 34)
	174	-	Op(CB 31)	262	-	BE 52	506	-	DS 66	650	-	Bergen
	176	-	CD 94	264	-	Op(BD 81)	509	-	ES 34	662	-	BD 25
	177	-	FE 11	266	-	BE 16	514	-	BE 21	706	-	Op(AJ 28)
	178	-	FE 92	267	-	Op(AJ 28)	515	-	Op(FE 10)	707	-	Op(BD 81)
	180	-	KQ 78	270	-	Op(BD 54)	516	-	DG 85	709	-	BE 28
	181	-	FU 94	306	-	Op(AJ 16)	518	-	CF 36	710	-	AF 48
	182	-	CG 27	358	-	Op(BD 81)	525	-	BE 53	732	-	Op(AL 31)
	183	-	DQ 22	359	-	BF 49	528	-	AF 48	954	-	Op(AL 11)
	185	-	DF 96	377	-	BE 25	530	-	BF 40

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598 - 610 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 504 - Lorient; U 459 - Bordeaux.

- 270 -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: West of Biscay.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 266 reported 3 large funnel vessel, presumably "Queen Mary" in BE 2159, course 15⁰, speed 28 knots. Chased without success. Boats in a favorable position received orders to operate. No further report.
		2)	U 160 fired double miss on fast freighter in ES 2146, course 270⁰.
	b)	Our own aircraft reported a northward bound convoy consisting of 43 ships, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers in CG 1115. (for deployment see paragraph IVa.)
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: AE 92, AJ 5283, AE 6886, EO 43, ED 73.
			There were six more sightings in the North Atlantic, unknown position and 4 depth charge attacks.
		2)	U-boat had been or was being attacked in DC 46. SOS message from unknown steamer in KZ 61.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	No operation is planned for the convoy reported by aircraft. Outward boats received orders to exploit all chances of attack during the night, however, contact was not established. U 454 searched during the night without success, and continued outward passage at dawn.
			At 2004, U 466 sighted several U-boat chasers in BE 6565 presumably stationed there in order to pick up the convoy. It was pursued with depth charges for three hours. There was no damage. The operation is broken off.
		2)	Convoy No. 28:
			At 0600 on the morning of the 21st, U 306 (Northern section of Group "Meise") sighted a northeast-bound convoy in AJ 2771. The first message from the convoy was not received until 0930. The boats belonging to the Group "Meise" were detailed to operate on the convoy if they were not more favorably placed to attack the southwestward-bound convoy further to the E.
			U 306 continually reported contact with the convoy up to 0200 in the morning, in AJ 2696. This boat sank a ship of the type "Sibajack" (12.000 GRT) at this time and lost contact. U 598 reported a convoy hydrophone bearing at 0100. Other boats did not come up. 2 boats reported flying boats with the convoy. Visibility deteriorated during the night and fog and snow drifts came with a N.N.E. wind strength 8.
			Up to now 7 U-boats are operating on the convoy, U 306, 631, 108, 598, 134, 552 and 189. In addition, a group of 5 more boats in waiting positions further to the E, are detailed for this - U 378, 732, 648, 209 and 934.

- 271 -

		Operations on the convoy continue. According to the plot and convoy reckoning this should be the expected HX convoy No. 234.
	3)	Convoy No. 29:
		At 1100 on the morning of the 21st, U 706 reported a south-westward-bound convoy in AJ 5382. Shortly afterwards, U 415 also reported contact with this convoy. This boat reported that owing to bad wireless communications it was unable to report on the convoy. As it assumed that still more boats belonging to Group "Meise" will operate on the convoy, the boats more favorably placed in relation to this convoy than to the northeastward-bound convoy, are to continue operations to the S.W. After U 706 lost contact at 1300, only U 415 reported up to 2000. The convoy was then in AJ 5644. At 2300 the boat sighted another isolated destroyer, but nothing more was seen of the convoy.
		At 1530 in the afternoon, U 438 sighted another S.W.-bound convoy consisting of up to 5 steamers in AJ 6151 80 miles behind the first convoy. U 613 also reported this convoy.At 2300 this convoy was also lost owing to thick fog and snow drifts which made it more difficult for the boats to maintain contact.
		The first S.W.-bound convoy is according to the convoy plot ONS 178. The second possibly the ON convoy. According to the plotting chart the first convoy is proceeding at a speed of 5 knots, the second at a speed of 7 knots.
		U 415 reported having sunk 2 freighters of altogether 12,000 GRT at 0800. After a double miss on a freighter 2 detonations were heard after 3 minutes 20 seconds and subsequently sinking noises also a possible hit on a ship in the rear column. Up to now U 415, 706, 203, 613, 438 and 191 have operated on these 2 convoys.
b)	1)	As intended Group "Specht" was reinforced and will take up position in reconnaissance lines at 1200 on 22.4 from BD 1482 to BD 7455 to intercept "SC 127". Order: U 630 - 662 - 404 - 257 - 618 - 84 - 584 - 168 - 270 - 260 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 and 226.
		The convoy is expected in the course of the afternoon. Boats have been ordered to maintain wireless silence except for tactical messages.
	2)	AK 53 is ordered as the new position for U 448, 466, 403, 468, 359, 569 and 454. Boats are to operate on the E. or W.-bound convoys according to circumstances.
	3)	U 217 receives freedom of movement in BE. The boat is to withdraw from this area in good time so that the special duty can be carried out when the moon is in a favorable quarter.

- 272 -

	c)	U 662 and 630 replenished supplies from U 487 for further operations (Join Group "Specht").
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 306 - 1 ship 12,200 GRT
	U 415 - 2 ships 12,000 GRT
	U 191 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT

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22.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DG 78	U 186	-	BE 53	U 378	-	AK 22	U 528	-	AE 69
	71	-	AL 22	188	-	BD 13	381	-	Op(AJ 65)	530	-	BF 52
	84	-	Op(BD 41)	189	-	Op(AJ 34)	382	-	BF 49	531	-	AE 68
	92	-	Op(BD 48)	191	-	Op(AJ 59)	383	-	BE 26	532	-	Op(AJ 27)
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	192	-	AE 59	386	-	AF 47	533	-	AF 47
	108	-	Op(AJ 37)	195	-	FD 33	402	-	BF 82	552	-	Op(AJ 34)
	117	-	DG 85	196	-	FN 84	403	-	BE 66	569	-	BE 48
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	197	-	BD 95	404	-	Op(BD 17)	571	-	Op(AJ 65)
	125	-	BD 69	198	-	GF 34	413	-	Op(AJ 61)	584	-	Op(BD 42)
	126	-	Op(FE 27)	203	-	Op(AJ 59)	415	-	Op(AJ 59)	598	-	Op(AJ 37)
	128	-	DT 44	209	-	AK 26	438	-	Op(AJ 59)	610	-	Op(AJ 69)
	129	-	Op(DC 10)	217	-	BE 66	448	-	BE 28	613	-	AJ 64
	134	-	Op(AJ 37)	218	-	BF 45	454	-	BE 94	614	-	Op(BD 74)
	154	-	Op(FE 48)	223	-	AL 88	455	-	BF 58	616	-	BF 72
	155	-	CE 72	226	-	Op(BD 75)	459	-	BF 91	618	-	Op(BD 41)
	159	-	BE 96	231	-	AE 59	461	-	BF 57	628	-	Op(BD 48)
	160	-	EJ 73	257	-	Op(BD 17)	462	-	BE 62	630	-	Op(BD 14)
	161	-	Op(CB 44)	258	-	Op(AJ 69)	466	-	BE 28	631	-	AJ 34
	168	-	Op(BD 45)	260	-	BD 45	468	-	BF 48	634	-	AL 85
	174	-	Op(CB 27)	262	-	BC 77	487	-	BD 13	638	-	BF 82
	176	-	CD 87	264	-	Op(BD 72)	504	-	BF 54	648	-	AK 26
	177	-	FE 46	266	-	AL 88	506	-	DS 35	650	-	AF 47
	178	-	FE 99	267	-	Op(AJ 28)	509	-	EJ 85	662	-	Op(BD 17)
	180	-	JA 24	270	-	Op(BD 45)	514	-	AL 88	706	-	Op(AJ 58)
	181	-	GG 16	306	-	Op(AJ 34)	515	-	Op(FE 10)	707	-	Op(BD 48)
	182	-	GG 82	358	-	Op(BD 72)	516	-	DG 85	709	-	BE 27
	183	-	DQ 32	359	-	BF 48	518	-	BE 96	710	-	AF 47
	185	-	DG 75	377	-	AL 88	525	-	BE 19	732	-	AK 23
										954	-	AK 35

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 530 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 621 - 604 - Brest; U 752 - 575 - St. Nazaire; U 952 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: West of Portugal.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	Convoy No. 28 and 29 see paragraph IVa.

- 273 -

	b)	According to an aircraft report a convoy consisting of 36 merchant ships and 7 escort vessels was in CG 4661, course 350⁰, speed 8 knots at 2125.
	c)	U-boat sightings: BF 4836, BF 4957, AJ 3291, AJ 23, AJ 35, AJ 39, AJ 32, BF 46, DM 51, AJ 59.
		4 other boats were sighted, and 3 attacked with depth charges in an undecyphered position. U-boat attack in AJ 5675, 5725 and 2696.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	No operations on the convoy reported by aircraft. All the same, the boats are to exploit every chance of attack.
		2)	Convoy No. 28:
			Weather conditions in the convoy area are reported as wind N.W. 5, visibility 10 seamiles on 22nd. Contact, which was broken off at 2000, was not reestablished during the day. Only 2 steamers on a course of 60, a destroyer and an aircraft were reported by U 413 in the evening. U 306 resumed contact with the convoy, lost it again and then reported the convoy in AJ 3361 at 0800. This boat also reported aircraft with the convoy.
			U 134 began the return passage owing to heavy damage. No enemy activity. 18 boats are now operating on the convoy.
		3)	Convoy No. 29:
			Contact with this convoy was not reestablished. The boats were informed that if they did not receive any more reports of the Neide convoy, they were to operate on the convoy section about 80 seamiles astern. There is no information however, of this either.
			OPerations were broken off on the morning of the 23rd, as there appeared little prospect of finding the convoy in the poor visibility caused by fog and snow. Apart from this, several boats reported heavy air convoy escort, so that conditions would deteriorate in every respect on nearing the Newfoundland Bank.
			Operations on this convoy suffered from unfavorable weather conditions and bad visibility and the 5 boats engaged could achieve little in the face of heavy air escort.
			3 ships were sunk. No boats were lost.
	b)	If contact has not already been established, Group "Specht" was to take up position in the line reached at 2400 as patrol channel. The expected convoy was not intercepted by morning. It is presumed that according to the cycle the convoy has chosen the northern route and therefore avoided the lines.

- 274 -

		In order to form a clear picture of the convoy's future route, a further channel is to be disposed to the N, with outward bound boats, in order to intercept it.
		Order: U 634, 514, 223, 266, 377, 383, 525, 709, 448, 466 and 166 are to take up position in reconnaissance channels from AK 2966 to AK 6799 on a course of 260 at 0800 on 25.4 as Group "Amsel". Daily reckoning 150 seamiles.
		An eastbound convoy could be attacked for about 2 days from this area.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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23.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DG 84	U 188	-	BD 21	U 382	-	BF 58	U 533	-	AE 68
	71	-	AE 84	189	-	Op(AK 18)	383	-	AL 97	552	-	Op(AK 17)
	84	-	Op(BC 63)	191	-	Op(AK 17)	386	-	AE 68	569	-	BE 69
	92	-	Op(BC 69)	192	-	AE 82	402	-	BF 48	571	-	AK 44
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	195	-	FE 18	403	-	BE 61	575	-	BF 58
	108	-	Op(AK 17)	196	-	FU 23	404	-	Op(BC 39)	584	-	Op(BC 63)
	117	-	DG 85	197	-	CE 34	413	-	Op(AK 15)	598	-	Op(AK 18)
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	198	-	GF 63	415	-	AJ 59	604	-	BF 54
	125	-	BD 56	203	-	Op(AJ 85)	438	-	Op(AJ 83)	610	-	Op(AK 18)
	126	-	Op(FE 17)	209	-	Op(AK 18)	448	-	BE 21	613	-	AK 47
	128	-	DT 74	217	-	BE 64	454	-	BE 55	614	-	Op(BC 96)
	129	-	Op(DC 10)	218	-	BE 66	455	-	BF 64	616	-	BE 86
	134	-	AJ 38	223	-	AL 81	459	-	BF 82	618	-	Op(BC 63)
	154	-	Op(FD 68)	226	-	BC 96	461	-	BF 48	621	-	BF 54
	155	-	CE 57	231	-	AE 85	462	-	BF 45	628	-	Op(BC 69)
	159	-	BF 48	257	-	Op(BC 39)	466	-	BE 21	630	-	Op(BC 36)
	160	-	EJ 41	258	-	Op(AK 15)	468	-	BE 69	631	-	Op(AK 18)
	161	-	Op(CB 40)	260	-	Op(BC 66)	487	-	BD 21	634	-	AL 72
	168	-	Op(BC 66)	262	-	CC 13	504	-	BF 45	638	-	BF 48
	174	-	Op(CB 18)	264	-	Op(BC 93)	506	-	DG 88	648	-	Op(AK 18)
	176	-	DE 33	266	-	AL 81	509	-	EJ 49	650	-	AE 68
	177	-	FE 82	267	-	Op(AK 17)	514	-	AL 48	662	-	Op(BC 39)
	178	-	FM 38	270	-	Op(BC 66)	515	-	Op(FE 10)	706	-	Op(AJ 82)
	180	-	JA 24	306	-	Op(AK 15)	516	-	DG 85	707	-	Op(BC 69)
	181	-	GG 52	358	-	Op(BC 93)	518	-	BF 48	709	-	BE 13
	182	-	FU 86	359	-	BE 69	525	-	BE 12	710	-	AE 68
	183	-	DF 79	377	-	AL 81	528	-	AE 68	732	-	Op(AK 18)
	185	-	DG 84	378	-	Op(AK 18	531	-	AE 59	752	-	BF 58
	186	-	BE 20	381	-	Op(AK 17)	532	-	Op(AK 17)	952	-	AO
										954	-	Op(AK 18)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 306 - 382 - 415 - 455 - 462 - 487 - 506 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631 - 509.
	Entered Port: U 455 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

- 275 -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 415 sighted a "Q-boat" with chaser group, northerly course, zig-zagging heavily in AJ 59 on 22.4. Steamer, one funnel, thick pole mast, high four-sided bridge, two ventilators in the stern. Radar activity by motor (U-boat) chaser lasting 3 hours in the night of the 23rd. Impulse like echo containing 5 explosive sounding devices. After releasing "Bolde" decoys the location became increasingly faint. Pursuer almost continually stopped. Renewed location on surfacing shaken off at high speed.
		2)	U 531 reported heavy air activity in AE 83 and 85. Four bombs some damage.
		3)	U 415 sighted aircraft in AJ 9396, course 30 at 0430 (see paragraph III a 1).
		4)	Convoy No. 28 and 30 see paragraph IVa.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: In BB 7823. 4 boats were sighted by English reconnaissance units in an unspecified position. 4 reports from presumably one aircraft in Iceland area of enemy U-boat (possibly not more than 2 boats) in corrupt position, attacked once with depth charges.
		Presumably convoy unit reported 2 U-boats on the surface.
		Distance 12 sea miles. (Convoy No. 28)?
		Torpedoing reports: DC 5657 (U 129).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 28:
			Weather conditions in the convoy area were reported as wind W.N.W. 5, visibility 15 sea miles at 1700 on 23rd. A boat reported wind N.W. 2, seaway 1 at 0200.
			U 306 reported the convoy in AJ 3361 on the morning of the 23rd. Contact was reported throughout the day in such an exemplary fashion that 11 more boats were able to approach during the day and night owing to the good messages. U 306 reported the convoy in AK 2443 at 0700 on the morning of the 24th. Various boats again lost contact. In spite of this 7 boats were in the convoy area in the night. Not until 1900 was the convoy escorted by aircraft. The Command found it difficult to form a clear picture of the surface defence as only a few boats reported depth charge attacks. 4 boats were attacked with depth charges, one sustained considerable damage. One boat was attacked by aerial bombs. The mass attack on the convoy did not have the desired results. U 306 sank a steamer of 7,000 GRT at 1500 in an underwater attack. U 954 also scored a hit in a daylight attack on a

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			large steamer at 1600. U 610 scored a "FAT" hit at 0635 on the 24th.
			15 boats are now operating on the convoy, as 3 boats are attacking the recently intercepted S.W.-bound convoy.
		2)	Convoy No. 30:
			U 732 sighted a convoy, course 180⁰ at 1000 in AK 1866. Only boats ahead are to operate on this convoy. U 732 received permission to attack. According to short signals received, U 108, 404, 191 and 514 are engaged. At 1415, U 732 was forced to submerge by the appearance of a bi-plane (catapult aircraft?) and lost contact, but this was reestablished at 1730 by U 191. The convoy on a course of 190⁰, speed 8 knots, was in AK 0165 at 1830. For the most part tankers, broad formation. U 191 fired 4 misses during a daylight attack. The last contact message received was from U 108 in AK 0159 at 1920. Weather conditions: wind W.S.W. 4, seaway 3, very good visibility, occasional snow fall.
	b)	On receipt of U 732's convoy message (probably the ONS 4) Group "Specht" was ordered to steer a course of 335⁰, daily reckoning 150 seamiles, from 1130. The boats U 84, 257, 618 and 404 (low in fuel) received instructions to refuel and therefore left the group. U 404 whose fuel supply was greater than the Command had anticipated, began freelance operations until the exhaustion of fuel supplies. In the event of contact with Convoy No. 30 being lost, Group "Specht" including recently joined boats, received orders to take up position in reconnaissance lines from AJ 6762 to AK 7791, course 40⁰, daily reckoning 150 seamiles, in the following new order: U 203 - 438 - 706 - 630 - 662 - 584 - 168 - 270 - 260 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 - 226 - 125.
	c)	Up to now, the special duties assigned to U 262 and U 180 have been executed according to plan.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 306 - 1 ship 7,800 GRT
	U 954 - 1 ship torpedoed
	U 610 - 1 ship torpedoed.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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24.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DG 85	U 188	-	BD 21	U 382	-	BF 40	U 571	-	AK 76
	71	-	AF 72	189	-	Op(AK 24)	383	-	AL 74	575	-	BF 49
	84	-	BD 15	191	-	Op(AK 43)	386	-	AE 59	584	-	AJ 99
	92	-	BC 35	192	-	AE 76	402	-	BF 47	598	-	Op(AK 22)
	105	-	Op(FC 60)	195	-	FE 49	403	-	BE 26	604	-	BF 45
	108	-	Op(AK 43)	196	-	FU 62	404	-	BD 15	610	-	Op(AK 31)
	117	-	DG 85	197	-	CF 68	413	-	Op(AK 22)	613	-	AK 78
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	198	-	GG 72	415	-	AJ 96	614	-	BC 39
	125	-	BD 19	203	-	Op(AJ 67)	438	-	Op(AJ 67)	616	-	CF 36
	126	-	OP(FD 29)	209	-	Op(AK 22)	448	-	AL 74	618	-	BD 15
	128	-	EH 36	217	-	Op(BE 56)	454	-	BE 43	621	-	BF 45
	129	-	Op(DC 10)	218	-	BE 64	459	-	BF 72	628	-	BC 35
	134	-	AK 46	223	-	AK 66	461	-	BE 68	630	-	AJ 99
	154	-	Op(FD 50)	226	-	BC 63	462	-	BF 90	631	-	Op(AK 22)
	155	-	CE 39	231	-	AE 76	466	-	AL 78	634	-	AK 65
	159	-	BF 40	257	-	BD 15	468	-	BE 64	638	-	BF 47
	160	-	DS 99	258	-	Op(AK 22)	487	-	BD 21	648	-	Op(AK 22)
	161	-	Op(CB 40)	260	-	BC 32	504	-	BF 44	650	-	AE 59
	168	-	BC 32	262	-	BB 86	506	-	DG 85	662	-	AJ 99
	174	-	Op(CB 10)	264	-	BC 39	509	-	EJ 17	706	-	Op(AJ 68)
	176	-	DE 31	266	-	AK 69	514	-	AK 59	707	-	BC 36
	177	-	FM 21	267	-	Op(AK 24)	515	-	Op(FE 10)	709	-	AK 96
	178	-	FN 47	270	-	BC 32	516	-	DG 85	710	-	AE 59
	180	-	JA 24	306	-	Op(AK 22)	518	-	BF 40	732	-	Op(AK 51)
	181	-	GG 59	358	-	BC 39	525	-	AK 96	752	-	BF 59
	182	-	FU 54	359	-	BE 27	528	-	AE 59	952	-	AN 36
	183	-	DF 89	377	-	AK 69	531	-	AL 23	954	-	Op(AK 22)
	185	-	DG 85	378	-	Op(AK 16)	532	-	Op(AK 22)
	186	-	BE 25	381	-	Op(AK 17)	533	-	AE 59
							569	-	BE 64
							552	-	Op(AK 22)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 306 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 382 - St. Nazaire; U 462 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 456 - Brest; U 107 - 103 - Lorient; U 607 - St. Nazaire; U 460 - Bordeaux; U 418 - 645 - 227 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 28, 30 and 31 see paragraph IVa.
		2)	U 129 sighted a convoy in DC 4657 at 0400, southerly course, high speed, probably a cruiser among ships. A 7,000 ton ship was sunk in 5693.
		3)	U 188 reported a periscope in BD 2559 and gave warning to supply group U 487 in BD 2145.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: In BB 7822 (U 174?). Approximately 6 sighting reports, presumably in Iceland area. (Convoy No. 28?) and AE 8848 (outward bound U-boats). About 10 more sightings reports from Group

- 278 -

		"Meise" 's areas (Convoy No. 28) including several results of hits. (Loss of U 189?)
		Reports of attacks: AK 5980, DC 10 - 50 (U 129?).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 28:
			While weather conditions in the convoy area on the day of the 24th were fairly mild, on the night of the 25th, the wind freshened considerably. A boat reported wind N.N.E. 9, seaway 8, visibility 500 meters at 0200.
			Contact was maintained until 1500, at this time the convoy was in AK 3361. Contact was then lost and it was not until 2300 that U 267 again sighted the convoy in AK 3493. This boat again reported at 2330, but then lost contact once more. Since then the convoy has not been sighted.
			In spite of the fact that altogether 12 boats were operating on the convoy on the night of 24th, and that at dawn several boats were still in contact, this could not be maintained during the day. The reason for this was the appearance of strong air escort with the beginning of daylight. The boats were beaten off in the course of the day, therefore, and the convoy was lost.
			As intensified air activity was anticipated in the vicinity of Iceland on the 25th, these operations were broken off on the morning of that day.
			Final summing up of operations on Convoy No. 28 see KTB of 25.4.
		2)	Convoy No. 30:
			U 404 reported several craft in AK 4875 at 0454, westerly course. This was subsequently confirmed to be an aircraft carrier with escort. A report from U 108 at 0700 gave the last actual enemy position as AK 4568, westerly course at 2315 on 24.4. After a fairly long depth charge attack, the boat continued the pursuit. Weather conditions: Wind W 1, seaway 1, occasional snow fall.
			U 108, 514, 191 and 732 are for the time being operating on a message from U 404 as a S.W. bound convoy is expected here. The last enemy report from U 404 gave the position at 0710 as AK 4766, north-westerly course.
		3)	U 386 sighted a convoy in AE 8478, course 130⁰, slow speed at 1300 (probably Iceland to England convoy). U 528 sighted 2 land-based aircraft and was pursued by 2 escort vessels in AE 8728 at 1930 with depth charges.

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			(Presumably Convoy No. 31's escort). The boats received orders to operate on request, if it was still possible to establish contact during the night. The last convoy report was received from U 386 in AE 8882 at 0143. A steamer of 3,500 GRT was sunk. The boat continued its outward passage. The operation is therefore concluded.
	b)	1)	On information in reports from several boats, Group "Amsel" received instructions to occupy the ordered patrol channels at a cruising speed determined by the weather conditions. Deployment against the "SC" convoy is therefore no longer possible for the time being. Further operations by this group will be determined by the situation.
		2)	U 531 received orders to operate on Convoy No. 28.
		3)	U 378 : AK 35, U 381 : AK 37 as temporary operational areas.
	c)	U 180 reported: Met at 0620 on 23.4. Exchange has so far been impossible owing to weather conditions. Boat accompanying until improvement in weather. (Trans. note: no indication of what U 180 is going to exchange etc.)
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 129 - 1 ship 7,000 GRT
	U 386 - 1 ship 3,500 GRT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

25.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DG 85	U 188	-	BD 34	U 386	-	AE 87	U 571	-	BD 21
	71	-	AF 24	189	-	Op(AL 10)	402	-	BE 68	575	-	BF 47
	84	-	BD 21	191	-	Op(AK 45)	403	-	BE 21	584	-	Op(AJ 92)
	92	-	Op(AJ 96)	192	-	AK 34	404	-	Op(AK 47)	598	-	Op(AL 10)
	103	-	BF 54	195	-	FE 84	413	-	Op(AL 10)	604	-	BF 54
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	196	-	FV 48	415	-	AK 79	607	-	BF 58
	107	-	BF 54	197	-	CE 95	418	-	AO	610	-	Op(AL 10)
	108	-	Op(AK 45)	198	-	GG 79	438	-	Op(AJ 67)	613	-	BD 27
	117	-	DG 85	203	-	Op(AJ 67)	448	-	Op(AK 67)	614	-	Op(AK 77)
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	209	-	Op(AL 10)	454	-	BE 11	616	-	CG 44
	125	-	Op(AK 77)	217	-	BE 51	456	-	BF 46	618	-	BD 21
	126	-	Op(ES 20)	218	-	BE 28	459	-	BE 68	621	-	BE 65
	128	-	EH 66	223	-	Op(AK 53)	460	-	BF 91	628	-	Op(AJ 96)
	129	-	Op(DC 55)	226	-	Op(AK 77)	461	-	BE 56	630	-	Op(AJ 92)
	134	-	AK 83	227	-	AO	466	-	Op(AK 96)	631	-	Op(AL 10)
	154	-	Op(FD 50)	231	-	AL 21	468	-	BE 28	634	-	Op(AK 02)
	155	-	CF 22	257	-	BD 21	487	-	BD 21	638	-	BE 64
	159	-	BF 61	258	-	Op(AL 10)	504	-	BE 65	645	-	AO
	160	-	DS 93	260	-	Op(AJ 96)	506	-	DG 85	648	-	Op(AL 10)
	161	-	Op(CA 60)	262	-	BB 50	509	-	DT 77	650	-	AE 85
	168	-	Op(AJ 93)	264	-	Op(AK 77)	514	-	AK 72	662	-	Op(AJ 92)
	174	-	Op(CB 10)	266	-	Op(AK 53)	515	-	Op(FE 10)	706	-	Op(AK 69)
	176	-	DE 27	267	-	Op(AL 10)	516	-	DG 37	707	-	Op(AJ 96)
	177	-	FM 28	270	-	Op(AJ 93)	518	-	BF 40	709	-	Op(AK 66)
	178	-	FN 75	306	-	Op(AL 10)	525	-	Op(AK 96)	710	-	AE 85
	180	-	(KQ 99)	358	-	Op(AK 74)	528	-	AE 79	732	-	Op(AK 45)


- 280 -

181	-	GG 95	359	-	BE 12	531	-	Op(AL 10)	752	-	BF 47
182	-	FU 18	377	-	Op(AK 53	532	-	Op(AL 10)	952	-	AN 43
183	-	DF 96	378	-	AK 35	533	-	AE 85	954	-	Op(AL 10)
185	-	DG 85	381	-	AK 27	552	-	Op(AL 10)
186	-	BE 13	383	-	Op(AK 64)	569	-	BE 55

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 159 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 306 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 159 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 659 - 230 - Brest; U 436 - St. Nazaire; U 600 - 89 - La Pallice; U 119 - 406 - Bordeaux.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 28, 30 and 32 see paragraph IVa.
		2)	U 134 operating on a steamer, according to a Radio Intelligence report, abandoned by its crew in BE 11, reported not yet sighting anything.
		3)	U 177 reported experiences with "Bachstelze" (observation kite).
		4)	U 413 sighted 2 steamers on a southeasterly course, speed 9 knots in AL 1478 at 1420. Quadruple spread on a modern type large freighter. 2 detonations. Presumably end of run detonation. Flying boat.
		5)	U 231 report of passage between Iceland and Faroes: Via AF 44, AE 83, 88 to AL 12, heavy air activity in AE 83, 86, 88, 87. Aerial bombs. Chief Quartermaster overboard.
		6)	U 438 sighted a passenger ship as well as a destroyer on a course of 300⁰, high speed, in AJ 6588 at 1800. At 1900 this boat reported sound spread, true course 320 - 340⁰. U 203 has been detailed to cooperate for the time being.
		7)	U 404 (see Convoy No. 30 of 24.4) reported: Aircraft carrier at 0817, escort of 4 destroyers in AK 4737. 2 "FAT" 2 electrical, and one Pi 2 on carrier. 4 hits heard. 2 tongues of flame observed. Several very heavy vibrations felt while making off on the surface. "Ranger" possible. Presume sinking as no air or surface defence. Search unsuccessful. Return passage via supply.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: 3 sightings with unknown position, 2 probably in Iceland area. (Group "Meise" ?) In CB 52 (U 161, 174 ?) In DN 83 (not one of ours).
	d)	None.

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IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Final summary: Convoy No. 28:
			The England bound convoy, HX 234, was pursued from the morning of the 21st to the morning of the 25th over a distance of 700 seamiles by altogether 19 boats. 4 boats broke off operations on the second day, so that when the convoy was intercepted with certainty and continuous contact messages were being received, 15 boats were engaged.
			It was U 306, who from the beginning of the operation reported the convoy with persistence and efficiency worthy of recognition, and who every time, also found it again after temporary loss.
			It was not until 2 days after the beginning of the operation on the morning of the 23rd, that more boats came up to the convoy and this was made possible , as is obvious from the position reports, by the boats good fixes. This meant that during the day and the following night, altogether 12 boats came up to the convoy. Although the boats had about 7 hours of darkness, 2 hours without moonlight, there was nothing achieved. U 306, requested to give a situation report on the following day, reported that during the night when numerous boats were in position, there was very unfavorable weather, hail, fog, rain, snow squalls with variable visibility. The convoy exploited this very cleverly for his zig zags. The enemy sailed in line ahead with about 10 ships, and destroyers or escort vessels were disposed in the gaps.
			The main reason for the failure can be attributed to the extremely changeable visibility experienced during the night. The Commanders, for the most part inexperienced and fresh from home waters, were unable to cope with these conditions.
			Air activity was so intense on the following day, the 24th that all boats were beaten off and the convoy lost. On the following morning, the 25th, operations were broken off.
			Altogether 2 ships of 19,500 GRT were sunk and 2 ships torpedoed.
			The slight success achieved, in an operation lasting four days and with a fairly large numbers of boats, may be explained as follows: The conditions of convoy warfare are becoming increasingly difficult, above all the case of convoys in the N., where the nights are especially short, and the enemy is able to provide protection with strong air forces from Greenland, and to an even greater extent from Iceland. Boats usually choose a night when a large number of boats are in contact with the convoy, and the not disproportionately strong defence makes success appear likely. The night of 23/24 in this case. Before this, only one boat was in contact and afterwards the air protection was too strong. This night was the only chance. It could not be exploited owing to the very unfavorable weather conditions in conjunction with the inexperience of the large number of new Commanders who were not equal to the situation.

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		On the next to last day the convoy air escort was particularly strong and all hopes of success had to be abandoned. Surface protection was of normal strength. 4 boats were attacked by depth charges by the convoy. One boat U 189, was sunk by the convoy after reporting contact for the last time on the afternoon of the 23rd.
	2)	Convoy No. 30:
		U 108's enemy position report was the last received. Group "Specht" was detailed to operate temporarily on U 404's report (see IVa) 2) of 24.4) When it had been ascertained that U 404 was in contact with the aircraft carrier group, Group "Specht"received orders to proceed on a course of 40⁰, speed 10 knots at 1400, from the reconnaissance lines previously ordered. If no contact was established, the group was to turn back at 0030 on 26.4; course 220⁰, speed 6 knots, and to take up position in the line reached at 0900 as patrol channel. If the convoy maintained a southwesterly general course, it would have to pass through "Specht" 's reconnaissance channel in the course of the late afternoon. An advance in a southwesterly direction from AK 4792 by U 514 was unsuccessful. Operations broken off at nightfall.
	3)	Convoy No. 32:
		U 509 sighted a convoy on a northerly course speed 9 to 13 knots in DT 7514 at 1945 (probably Trinidad - Gibraltar convoy).
		U 509 received permission to attack. The position of the convoy at 2000 was DT 7275. Contact lost owing to general zig zag during rain squalls. Search to the E. as far as DT 7622 and subsequently to the N. was without success.
b)	1)	After the discontinuation of operations on Convoy No. 28, Group "Meise" - together with recently arrived boats received orders to take up position in a line from AK 2386 to 0347 in the following order: U 532 - 378 - 381 - 192 - 258 - 552 - 954 - 648 - 209 - 531 - 413 - 598 - 610 - 306 - 631 - 267. A short operation on an SC convoy according to reconnaissance in this area, is intended. Later, reconnaissance lines against an HX convoy proceeding on a northern route are planned. U 598, 610, 306, 631 and 267 are to withdraw from Group "Meise" after reaching their positions in the given line and to begin the return passage via supply boat.
	2)	U 638, 504, 402, 621, 752, 575, 107 and 103 receive AJ 99 as position. A disposition is intended against northeast-bound convoys on the southern route cycle.
	3)	Temporary operations areas: U 456 : BE 83, U 566 : BE 91, U 230 : BE 94, U 607 : BE 95. It is intended to operate with these, and other outward bound boats on the England - Gibraltar traffic. Reasons for decision to operate thus in this tricky area are:

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1)	The difficult situation in the Mediterranean,
2)	Possibility of success by opportune surprise attacks quite possible according to experiences of the last months.

U 506 and 68 have taken on supplies from U 117 and proceed on their return passage.

The repeated sighting of a periscope in BD 2288 by U 571 has resulted in the transference of U 487's supply point from BD 2145 to AK 8759.

U 119 has put out for special duties. (see mining order Halifax).

The loss of U 191 (Convoy No. 30) and U 189 (Convoy No. 28) must be presumed. The boats reported for the last time on 23.4 from AK 01 and AK 15 respectively.

Reports of Success:

U 404 - 1 aircraft carrier

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

26.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DG 85	U 188	-	BD 39	U 402	-	BE 59	U 571	-	BD 26
	71	-	Bergen	192	-	Op(AK 33)	403	-	AL 87	575	-	BE 65
	84	-	BD 21	195	-	FM 15	404	-	AK 72	584	-	Op(AK 40)
	89	-	BF 90	196	-	FV 84	406	-	BF 94	598	-	Op(AK 36)
	92	-	Op(AK 40)	197	-	DG 34	413	-	Op(AK 36)	600	-	BF 91
	103	-	BF 40	198	-	GP 39	415	-	BD 21	604	-	BF 52
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	203	-	Op(AK 40)	418	-	AN 30	607	-	BF 40
	107	-	BF 40	209	-	Op(AK 36)	436	-	BF 58	610	-	Op(AK 36)
	108	-	Op(AK 40)	217	-	Op(BE 51)	438	-	Op(AJ 68)	613	-	BD 31
	117	-	DG 85	218	-	BE 34	448	-	Op(AK 67)	614	-	Op(AK 40)
	119	-	BF 94	223	-	Op(AK 53)	454	-	AL 77	616	-	CG 75
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	226	-	Op(AK 40)	456	-	BF 40	618	-	BD 21
	125	-	Op(AK 81)	227	-	AN 30	459	-	BE 56	621	-	BE 53
	126	-	Op(FD 10)	230	-	BF 54	460	-	BF 80	628	-	Op(AK 40)
	128	-	EH 95	231	-	AL 20	461	-	BE 51	630	-	Op(AK 40)
	129	-	Op(DC 50)	257	-	BD 21	466	-	Op(AK 92)	631	-	Op(AL 15)
	134	-	BE 88	258	-	Op(AK 35)	468	-	BE 16	634	-	Op(AK 02)
	154	-	Op(FD 50)	260	-	Op(AK 40)	487	-	BD 21	638	-	BE 55
	155	-	BE 88	262	-	BB 50	504	-	BE 56	645	-	AN 30
	160	-	DS 63	264	-	OP(AK 40)	506	-	DG 85	648	-	Op(AK 36)
	161	-	Op(CA 40)	266	-	Op(AK 64)	509	-	DT 45	650	-	AE 87
	168	-	Op(AK 40)	267	-	Op(AL 17)	514	-	AK 44	659	-	BF 54
	174	-	Op(CB 16)	270	-	Op(AK 40)	515	-	Op(FE 10)	662	-	Op(AK 40)
	176	-	DE 42	306	-	Op(AL 15)	516	-	DG 33	706	-	Op(AK 40)
	177	-	FM 64	358	-	Op(AK 50)	518	-	BF 54	707	-	Op(AK 40)
	178	-	FU 22	359	-	AL 77	525	-	Op(AK 92)	709	-	Op(AK 64)
	180	-	KQ 90	377	-	Op(AK 53)	528	-	AL 20	710	-	AE 79
	181	-	GQ 24	378	-	Op(AK 25)	531	-	Op(AK 36)	732	-	Op(AK 44)
	182	-	FU 11	381	-	Op(AK 25)	532	-	Op(AK 24)	952	-	Bergen
	183	-	DF 76	752	-	BE 68	533	-	AL 31	954	-	Op(AK 35)
	185	-	CF 79	383	-	Op(AK 65)	552	-	Op(AK 35)
	186	-	AL 78	386	-	AL 30	569	-	BE 27


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	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 604 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 410 - Lorient; U 437 - St. Nazaire; U 332 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 161 reported convoy in CB 2154, 60⁰, speed 8 - 10 knots, at 0248. The boat received permission to attack.
		2)	U 569 sighted a fast freighter in BE 1891, course 180⁰, speed 16 knots at 2100.
		3)	U 468 sighted a large isolated vessel in BE 1353 course 20⁰, speed 17 knots, at 2000.
		4)	U 108 (Convoy No. 30 !) forced to submerge for 10 1/2 hours in AK 4810 and 4570 by stationary fast search groups.
		5)	U 532 sighted an isolated vessel in AK 2615, northeasterly course at 0645.
		6)	U 702 sighted a U-boat chaser in AJ 6591 at 2231 (Convoy No. 30 - aircraft carrier group ?).
		7)	U 650 reported passing Faroe Islands. Air patrol in AE 8387.
		8)	U 533 reported passing Faroe Islands. Two attacks by Sunderland aircraft were beaten off, at 2330 on 25.4. Three men were wounded. Strong air activity in AL 23 and 14.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: AL 3185, DB 61 - 64 (not one of ours) 3 sighting reports with unknown positions including one in Iceland area.
		U-boat attacks: In DJ 2196 (probably hit mine) (U 117) In KX 9190 (Italian ?).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	Group "Amsel" including recently joined boats, received orders to take up position in reconnaissance channels from AK 5535 to 9576 at 0800 on 27.4: U 634, 233, 266, 377, 383, 525, 709, 448, 466, 454, 359, 186, 403 and pass a position line from AK 8183 to BD 2621 on a course of 205 at 0800 on 28.4. This is to extend the area covered by Group "Specht" for the expected HX convoy, to the E. and S.E.

- 285 -

		2)	After breaking off operations on Convoy No. 30, Group "Specht", with the boats recently allocated to it, received orders to take up position in patrol channels from AJ 5593 via 9264 and AK 7467 to 7883 at 0900 on 27.4 in the following order: U 438 - 662 - 630 - 584 - 168 - 203 - 706 - 108 - 514 - 270 - 260 - 732 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 - 226 - 125. Operations on the northeast bound HX convoy are intended.
		3)	New position: U 569, 468 = AJ 98 (imminent northern route cycle). U 231, 528, 386, 710, 650, 533 = AK 22 also AD 79 (Ops. plan: Against ONS convoys with remaining Group "Meise").
	c)	None.
	d)	U 566 experienced a sharp depth charge attack at 2325 in BF 4599. Unable to submerge, return passage. Close escort by 4 Ju 88's from daylight, also escort by F.O.I.C. Western Defences.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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27.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	DG 36	U 188	-	BE 43	U 402	-	BE 59	U 552	-	Op(AK 26)
	71	-	AN 31	192	-	Op(AK 26)	403	-	AK 95	569	-	BE 17
	84	-	AK 87	195	-	FM 51	404	-	AK 87	571	-	BD 36
	89	-	BF 82	196	-	GG 33	406	-	BF 81	575	-	BE 64
	92	-	Op(AJ 96)	197	-	DG 64	410	-	BF 54	584	-	Op(AJ 59)
	103	-	BF 44	198	-	GQ 45	413	-	Op(AK 37)	598	-	Op(AK 37)
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	203	-	Op(AJ 67)	415	-	AK 87	600	-	BF 82
	107	-	BE 66	209	-	Op(AK 28)	418	-	AN 34	607	-	BF 71
	108	-	Op(AJ 92)	217	-	BE 16	436	-	BF 49	610	-	Op(AK 39)
	117	-	DG 85	218	-	AM 77	437	-	BF 58	613	-	BD 36
	119	-	BF 85	223	-	OP(AK 53)	438	-	Op(AJ 55)	614	-	Op(AK 78)
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	226	-	Op(AK 78)	448	-	Op(AK 67)	616	-	CG 84
	125	-	Op(AK 78)	227	-	AN 31	454	-	AK 92	618	-	BD 61
	126	-	Op(FD 10)	230	-	BF 54	456	-	BE 69	621	-	BE 51
	128	-	ER 31	231	-	AK 34	459	-	BE 54	628	-	Op(AJ 96)
	129	-	Op(DC 50)	257	-	AK 87	460	-	BF 72	630	-	Op(AJ 59)
	134	-	BE 25	258	-	Op(AK 26)	461	-	BE 55	631	-	Op(AK 39)
	154	-	Op(FD 50)	260	-	Op(AJ 93)	466	-	Op(AK 67)	634	-	Op(AK 02)
	155	-	BE 94	262	-	BB 40	468	-	BE 12	638	-	BE 46
	160	-	DS 33	264	-	Op(AK 74)	487	-	AK 87	645	-	AN 31
	161	-	Op(CB 21)	266	-	Op(AK 53)	504	-	BE 51	648	-	Op(AK 28)
	168	-	Op(AJ 67)	267	-	Op(AK 39)	506	-	DG 38	650	-	AL 11
	174	-	Op(CB 10)	270	-	Op(AJ 92)	509	-	DT 18	659	-	BF 45
	176	-	DD 66	306	-	Op(AK 37)	514	-	Op(AJ 92)	662	-	Op(AJ 56)
	177	-	FN 41	332	-	BF 91	515	-	Op(FE 10)	706	-	Op(AJ 67)
	178	-	FU 37	358	-	Op(AK 74)	516	-	CE 84	707	-	Op(AK 74)
	180	-	KR	359	-	AK 95	518	-	BF 61	709	-	Op(AK 64)
	181	-	GQ 55	377	-	Op(AK 53)	525	-	Op(AK 64)	710	-	AE 77
	182	-	FM 79	378	-	OP(AK 25)	528	-	AL 12	732	-	Op(AJ 93)
	183	-	DF 82	381	-	Op(AK 25)	531	-	Op(AK 38)	752	-	BE 55
	185	-	CF 82	383	-	Op(AK 64)	532	-	Op(AK 23)	952	-	Bergen
	186	-	AK 95	386	-	AL 12	533	-	AK 32	954	-	Op(AK 26)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 518 - 566 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 518 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 439 - 447 - Brest; U 445 - St. Nazaire; U 304 - Kiel.

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II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 161 was unable to follow the convoy reported yesterday owing to engine trouble.
		2)	U 185 sighted the reported Red Cross ship "Caritas I" course 260⁰, speed 9 knots.
		3)	U 155 was attacked with bombs on the night of 27.4. The boat defended itself with machine gun fire and intends to continue its passage by day.
		4)	U 129 sighted 3 escort vessels on a northeasterly course in CA 9418 on 25.4. and on 26.4. fired a triple miss on an American U-boat of type "Narwhal" in CA 9951. The boat withdrew on account of oil tracks and began the passage to the N.W. after charging batteries.
		5)	U 168 reported 3 destroyers in AJ 6724 at 1455 (Group "Specht"). As destroyer groups have been reported in this area for several days - lastly in AJ 6591 on 26.4, it is assumed that a search group is referred to. Apart from this, a convoy in the vicinity would have been heard by the boats. For this reason no action was taken.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: In FK 43, AJ 67 and another in an unknown position. A U-boat had been and was being attacked in CB 13 and BB 9718. Depth charge attack by aircraft in BF 7316.
	d)	1)	According to a special Radio Intelligence report the SC 127 convoy should have been in BC 5447 at 2100 on 20.4, from there to a point BC 5278 and then on a course of 35⁰ degrees.
			According to a new decoded report, the convoy was actually in BC 4372 on the evening of 21.4. It therefore curved prematurely to the N., probably to avoid a suspected U-boat disposition. At this time Group "Meise" with 19 boats, was in channels from AJ 1690 to AJ 6980.
		2)	According to an American U-boat situation report the enemy suspected 15 boats in the area 50 - 55⁰ N and 39 - 45⁰ W on 25.4. Actually Group "Specht" had 16 boats in this area. In spite of the fact that on the previous days numerous wireless messages were sent and U-boats sighted, the very exact dividing line of this channel is significant, especially as up to then Group "Specht" was on the move and took up the present disposition from the south, only shortly beforehand. This confirms, more than ever, the suspicion that the enemy has at his disposal a radar device especially effective for aircraft, which our boats are powerless to intercept.
		3)	Further, 5 boats were reported within 150 seamile circumference of 50⁰ N, 34⁰ W. Supplies have taken place here for a long time. Unfortunately, the boats

- 287 -

			have often inaugurated radio concerts here and this had led to the interception of the supply point. It is, however, significant that this was suspected in the area where there has been no wireless activity for several days.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	An extension to the S.E. of the "Specht" channel near the Newfoundland Bank was planned with Group "Amsel", in order to intercept the suspected HX 235 convoy on the southern route if necessary. U 377 on the outward passage, reported a convoy at 0358, according to hydrophone bearing in AK 8118. As according to reckoning only the HX convoy can be in the vicinity (which then in any case would have had to pass Group "Specht" 's patrol line unobserved on about 26.4 at 1000) a more northeasterly course is presumed. The boats nearby belonging to group "Amsel": U 223, 266, 377, 383 and 709 received orders to operate on Köhler's report (Commander of U 377) at high speed and to report position as soon as possible. The remaining Group "Amsel" boats were temporarily retained, however, several hours later they were ordered to proceed on a course of 30⁰ as no course reports had been received.
		The boats U 306, 610, 598, 631 and 267 in the N.W. bound for supply area are also to operate on the convoy on a N.E. course.
		At 0800 U 377 reported having had a first class hydrophone bearing on the convoy at 0409, visibility 300 meters. Contact was not reestablished until morning. If the convoy is not sighted at dawn, the search is to be abandoned and boats will proceed with Group "Amsel" to the west.
	b)	1)	As it is assumed that the expected HX and SC convoys are sailing very far to the W. (see also paragraph III d) 1)), Group "Specht" is to be withdrawn to the N.W. and will occupy the new patrol channels from AJ 4378 via 5913 to AJ 9386, cruising speed 9 knots. Channels must be occupied before 0900 on 28.4. Another N.E. bound convoy (SC) is expected.
		2)	For quite a time it has been possible to dispose a patrol channel with boats from home waters and Western France, between Iceland and Greenland. The object of this is the interception of the next ONS convoy at present proceeding in the N.
			The following boats form the new Group "Star": U 710 - 650 - 533 - 386 - 528 - 231 - 532 - 378 - 381 - 192 - 258 - 552 - 954 - 648 - 209 - 413. They are to take up position in patrol channels from AD 8731 via AK 3523 to AK 0329 at 0900 on 28.4.
			A slower S.W. bound convoy is expected here from 28.4.
		3)	A patrol channel from BE 8615 to BE 9536 is ordered for 0800 on 30.4 to intercept the next S-bound W.S. convoy from England. Order: U 607 - 456 - 230 - 659 - 436 - 406 - 600 - 89 - 437 - 332. The boats given are on the outward passage.

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			In the event of an early arrival, the boats are to operate to the N. and S. of the channel, but to remain if possible unobserved and unlocated, so that the channel is not suspected. Air Force Command Atlantic will be reconnoitering in the area N. of the channel as far as 48⁰ N with strong forces from the 29th. U 445, 439 and 447 are to make for BE 97 at high cruising speed and are to be detailed to operate on the convoy probably intercepted before this.
	c)	1)	U 571, 415, 84, 618, 257 and 404 have taken on supplies from U 487. The tanker is therefore empty and begins its return passage.
		2)	U 180 has taken on the anticipated apparatus from the Japanese U-boat. It is operating as ordered in the area off Durban.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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28.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	CF 76	U 192	-	Op(AK 35)	U 403	-	Op(BD 21)	U 552	-	Op(AK 36)
	71	-	AN 36	195	-	FM 82	404	-	BD 26	569	-	BD 35
	84	-	AK 87	196	-	GH 17	406	-	BF 75	571	-	BE 18
	89	-	BF 72	197	-	DG 94	410	-	BF 48	575	-	BE 51
	92	-	Op(AJ 67)	198	-	GQ 73	413	-	Op(AK 03)	584	-	Op(AJ 54)
	103	-	BE 64	203	-	Op(AJ 54)	415	-	AK 87	598	-	AK 53
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	209	-	Op(AK 38)	418	-	AN 34	600	-	BF 72
	107	-	BE 61	217	-	AL 78	436	-	BF 47	607	-	BE 95
	108	-	Op(AJ 55)	218	-	AM 77	437	-	BF 57	610	-	AK 56
	117	-	DG 85	223	-	Op(AK 49)	438	-	Op(AJ 46)	613	-	BE 15
	119	-	BF 71	226	-	Op(AJ 93)	439	-	BF 54	614	-	Op(AJ 92)
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	227	-	AN 43	445	-	BF 91	616	-	CG 90
	125	-	Op(AJ 93)	230	-	BE 66	447	-	BF 56	618	-	BD 63
	126	-	Op(FD 10)	231	-	Op(AK 31)	448	-	OP(AK 84)	621	-	BE 53
	128	-	ER 53	257	-	AK 87	454	-	Op(AK 87)	628	-	Op(AJ 67)
	129	-	Op(CA 96)	258	-	Op(AK 35)	456	-	BE 91	630	-	Op(AJ 46)
	134	-	BE 37	260	-	Op(AJ 55)	459	-	BE 27	631	-	AK 67
	154	-	Op(FD 50)	262	-	BB 40	460	-	BE 94	634	-	Op(AK 48)
	155	-	BE 96	264	-	Op(AJ 92)	461	-	BE 19	638	-	BE 51
	160	-	DG 84	266	-	Op(AK 73)	466	-	Op(AK 84)	645	-	AN 31
	161	-	Op(CB 20)	267	-	AK 64	468	-	BD 32	648	-	Op(AK 58)
	168	-	Op(AJ 54)	270	-	Op(AJ 55)	487	-	AK 97	650	-	Op(AD 87)
	174	-	Op(BE 97)	304	-	AO	504	-	BE 17	659	-	BE 65
	176	-	DD 59	306	-	AK 64	506	-	CF 78	662	-	Op(AJ 46)
	177	-	FN 48	332	-	BF 81	509	-	DS 32	706	-	Op(AJ 55)
	178	-	FU 65	358	-	Op(AJ 92)	514	-	Op(AJ 55)	707	-	Op(AJ 67)
	180	-	KR 52	359	-	Op(AK 88)	515	-	Op(FE 11)	709	-	Op(AK 73)
	181	-	GQ 83	377	-	Op(AK 57)	516	-	CF 58	710	-	Op(AD 87)
	182	-	FM 48	378	-	Op(AK 33)	525	-	Op(AK 84)	732	-	Op(AJ 55)
	183	-	DF 91	381	-	Op(AK 33)	528	-	Op(AK 31)	752	-	BE 43
	185	-	CF 56	383	-	Op(AK 73)	531	-	AK 28	952	-	AF 76
	186	-	Op(AK 88)	386	-	Op(AK 31)	532	-	Op(AK 32)	954	-	Op(AK 36)
	188	-	BE 52	402	-	BE 54	533	-	Op(AD 87)


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	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 109 - Lorient.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 33, see paragraph IVa).
		2)	U 515 sighted a cruiser of "London" type putting in to Freetown in ET 3778, also 4 destroyers and 2 large transport ships. Smoke trails in ET 6113 on 27.4. Submerged on account of Sunderland aircraft.
		3)	U 504 was attacked by aircraft without previous radar location in BF 49 after a suspicious looking trawler group had passed. The boat presumes cooperation.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	2 U-boat sightings in unknown position.
		2)	Enemy U-boat in AF 7668 at 1810 on 28.4 and shot up one of our boats.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 33:
		U 650 reported a westbound convoy in AD 8739 at 0942 on the morning of the 28th. According to a later message this consisted of 6 steamers. It is therefore probably not the ONS 6 convoy itself, but only a section of it.
		As the weather was variable during the day, visibility sometimes as much as 2000 meters, no boats with the exception of U 650 were able to approach the convoy. The boats messages were also very inaccurate and they had overestimated the convoy speed. The boat was requested to send D/F signals about 2 - 3 hours before darkness. 2 other boats then came up shortly before dusk on the D/F signal, U 386 and 378. Both reported the enemy's position: U 378 at 0232 in AD 7941, and U 386 at 0155 in AD 7864. As these positions are so far apart from one another, the boats were requested to examine the grid given. However, no other messages have been received since 0300 on the morning of the 29th.
		As there was still no messages at 1000, not even the requested weather report, it must be presumed that interference is preventing the messages from coming through.
		There is no information as to the strength of the escort. U 650 only reported twice that there was a Sunderland aircraft over the convoy.

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		The operation on the convoy continues. The entire Group "Star" (15 boats) is engaged. U 650 - 533 - 386 - 528 - 231 - 532 - 378 - 381 - 192 - 258 - 552 - 954 - 648 - 209 and 413.
	b)	1)	Group "Amsel" 's operation has been broken off without success having been achieved.The boats have received orders to pass the position line from AK 4866 to BD 2123 and subsequently, occupy patrol channels from AJ 9634 to BD 1555 in conjunction with Group "Specht" at a speed of 7 knots. There are therefore, 32 boats in a large channel covering all convoy routes so far used.
		2)	U 108 (Group "Specht" channel) began return passage on account of fuel shortage. The boats to the W. therefore move up one position to the E.
		3)	BE 97 is ordered as new position for U 439, 447 and 445. Three boats are requested to report the position reached at 1700 on 29.4. One boat is to act as beacon for the Condor aircraft.
	c)	None.
	d)	1)	U 437 was heavily bombed during the night in BF 7281. The boat is temporarily out of control and submerging is restricted. Help is urgently needed. All boats in the vicinity are ordered to proceed at high speed to this area to render assistance. Destroyer and fighter protection is requested.
			The night attacks repeatedly reported recently make it necessary for the boats in the Biscay area to be given permission to proceed on the surface during the day only to recharge batteries, and submerged at night.
			Every effort is being made to produce apparatus able to intercept the radar equipment presumably used by the enemy.
		2)	U 710 has not reported since it sailed from Kiel on 15.4. There have been numerous sighting and attack messages recently from the area of the Iceland Passage, so that its loss through aircraft must be presumed.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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29.April 1943.

I.	U 68	-	CF 57	U 188	-	BE 61	U 402	-	BE 45	U 533	-	Op(AK 12)
	71	-	AO	192	-	Op(AK 12)	403	-	Op(BD 13)	552	-	Op(AK 12)
	84	-	BE 19	195	-	FM 97	404	-	BD 39	569	-	BD 22
	89	-	BE 94	196	-	GH 49	406	-	BE 92	571	-	BE 51
	92	-	Op(AJ 67)	197	-	DT 15	410	-	BE 93	575	-	BE 51
	103	-	BE 52	198	-	GQ 85	413	-	Op(AK 12)	584	-	Op(AJ 54)
	105	-	Op(FD 60)	203	-	Op(AJ 54)	415	-	BE 27	598	-	AK 59
	107	-	BE 52	209	-	Op(AK 12)	418	-	AF 76	600	-	BE 92
	108	-	Op(AJ 55)	217	-	BE 26	436	-	BE 92	607	-	Op(BE 86)
	109	-	BF 54	218	-	AL 93	437	-	BF 72	610	-	AK 83
	117	-	DG 85	223	-	Op(AK 72	438	-	Op(AJ 46)	613	-	BE 28
	119	-	BE 92	226	-	Op(AJ 93)	439	-	BF 44	614	-	Op(AJ 92)
	123	-	Op(ET 60)	227	-	AF 76	445	-	BF 49	616	-	CG 90
	125	-	Op(AJ 93)	230	-	Op(BE 86)	447	-	BF 44	618	-	BE 42
	126	-	Op(FD 10)	231	-	Op(AK 12)	448	-	Op(AK 79)	621	-	BE 43
	128	-	ER 83	257	-	BE 17	454	-	Op(AK 79)	628	-	Op(AJ 67)
	129	-	Op(CA 90)	258	-	Op(AK 12)	456	-	Op(BE 56)	630	-	Op(AJ 46)
	134	-	BE 63	260	-	Op(AJ 55)	459	-	BE 17	631	-	AK 86
	154	-	OP(FD 50)	262	-	BB 40	460	-	CF 31	634	-	Op(AK 71)
	155	-	BF 40	264	-	Op(AJ 92)	461	-	BD 39	638	-	BE 42
	160	-	DG 85	266	-	Op(AK 75)	466	-	Op(AK 79)	645	-	AF 76
	161	-	Op(CB 20)	267	-	AK 83	468	-	BD 23	648	-	Op(AK 12)
	168	-	Op(AJ 54)	270	-	Op(AJ 55)	487	-	BD 35	650	-	Op(AK 71)
	174	-	Op(BB 90)	304	-	AO 35	504	-	BE 18	659	-	Op(BE 86)
	176	-	DD 81	306	-	AK 83	506	-	CF 81	662	-	Op(AJ 46)
	177	-	FN 79	332	-	BF 72	509	-	DG 85	706	-	OP(AJ 55)
	178	-	FU 96	358	-	Op(AJ 92)	514	-	Op(AJ 55)	707	-	Op(AJ 67)
	180	-	KR 40	359	-	Op(BD 13)	515	-	Op(ET 53)	709	-	Op(AK 75)
	181	-	GQ 98	377	-	Op(AK 75)	516	-	CF 61	710	-	Op(AK 12)
	182	-	FM 41	378	-	Op(AD 78)	525	-	Op(AK 79)	732	-	Op(AJ 55)
	183	-	DG 74	381	-	Op(AK 12)	528	-	Op(AK 12)	752	-	BE 54
	185	-	CF 31	383	-	Op(AK 75)	531	-	AK 28	952	-	AF 48
	186	-	Op(BD 13)	386	-	Op(AD 78)	532	-	Op(AD 78)	954	-	OP(AK 12)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 202 - Brest; U 91 - 66 - 664 - Lorient; U 465 - St. Nazaire; U 340 - 760 - 731 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: In center third of BE against England - Gibraltar traffic.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 33 see paragraph IVa.
		2)	U 123 reported sinking 7,000 GRT freighter on a northwesterly course in EJ 9788.
		3)	U 752 reported scoring a hit on ship of type "Winchester Castle" ar 1200. Subsequent loud dull explosion. Depth charges followed.
		4)	U 126 reported sighting A Spanish ship of 4 to 5,000 tons at 0230 on 29.4 in FD 1169. Course 40⁰.

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		5)	U 119 reported having submerged after unsuccessful bombing and machine gun attack at 1130 in BF 7175 by "Sunderland" and "Lerwick" aircraft. Smoke buoys at submerging point. A Petty Officer of the watch was killed.
	b)	Aircraft reported convoy consisting of 13 steamers, and 6 escort vessels at 2050 in BE 5280, course 360⁰, a light cruiser in BE 5346, course 40⁰.
	c)	U-boat sightings: In DD 32, EE 81. 4 sightings in unknown position, one in Iceland area (U 952?).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 33:
		The weather conditions showed no improvement on the 29th. Wind S.S.W. 6, seaway 4, snow squalls and poor visibility were reported owing to W/T interference, boats were unable to communicate with the Command on the night of 28/29 and it was not until midday on the 30th, that messages were again received from the boats. According to these, the last convoy contact message originated at 1150, in AK 1236 on a course of 240⁰. U 650 attempted to attack the convoy in this position, but was picked up by a destroyer using radar before the attack. The same boat reported having fired a triple miss on a destroyer at 0410. Contact with the convoy was not reestablished. U 386 reported difficulty in submerging after depth charge attack, and withdrew for repairs.
		U 258 reported having scored 3 hits on 2 ships of 4 and 6,000 GRT in a convoy of at least 30 steamers sailing in loose, wide formation at 0720 according to morning position in AD 7852. In a later message the boat reported the sinking of a 7,000 GRT ship with 2 finishing shots, probably one of the ships torpedoed earlier.
		The operation on the convoy continues. As there has been no contact since 1200, the boat is to continue the search assuming the enemy's course to be from 205 - 250⁰ and enemy speed to be 4 - 7 knots according to the weather.
	b)	1)	The Groups "Specht" and "Amsel" are transferred further to the S.W., this means: for Group "Specht" from AJ 7575 via 8824 to BC 2381 at 0800 for the 1.5, in the following order: U 438 - 662 - 630 - 584 - 168 - 514 - 270 - 260 - 732 - 92 - 628 - 707 - 358 - 264 - 614 - 226 - 125 and for Group "Amsel" from BC 2622 via 3875 to 1853 in the following order: U 634 - 223 - 266 - 377 - 383 - 709 - 569 - 525 - 468 - 448 - 466 - 454 - 359 - 186 - 403. U 569 and 468 are to join Group "Specht" owing to fuel shortage.
		2)	Group "Drossel" receives order of disposal from BE 8615 to 9526 in patrol channels for 0800 on 30.4 in the following order: U 607 - 456 - 230 - 659 - 436 - 406 - 600 - 89 - 332. U 439 and 447 are each to extend the "Drossel" channel 20 seamiles to the E, after rendering assistance to U 437.

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U 154 receives FC 70 - 80 and south of this as far as the lower edge of FK 40; U 128, FJ 80 - 90 and south of this as far as the lower edge of FQ 20. Both boats have received directions on the traffic situation with fast ships. Convoys at a distance of 60 seamiles from the coast to and from Bahia about every 10 days, spasmodic isolated traffic from Bahia to South Africa, weak surface, strong day, and medium night air activity, radar activity. Numerous neutral vessels.

Position for U 126 and 105 : ET 60. U 160 and 509 have taken on supplies from U 117 and continue return passage. U 437 able to submerge only with difficulty after bombing attack in BF 7371. Speed 7 knots, course 80⁰. 2 waves of 4 Ju. 88's. Only aerial protection. U 437 reported at 1450. Speed 14 knots. Boats approaching to render assistance are ordered to proceed on their course, U 571 on the return passage is to follow the damaged U 437 to render assistance if necessary.

The loss of U 174 must be presumed, as this boat has not answered numerous requests to report. Last message from convoy area in BB 8689 on 27.4.

Reports of Success:

U 123	1 ship	7,000 GRT
U 752	1 ship	20,000 GRT	torpedoed
U 258	2 ships	11,000 GRT
	1 ship		torpedoed.

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30.April 1943.

I.	U 66	-	BF 54	U 188	-	BE 66	U 402	-	BD 65	U 552	-	Op(AD 90)
	68	-	CF 61	192	-	Op(AD 90)	403	-	Op(BD 41)	569	-	Op(BD 18)
	71	-	AO	195	-	ET 38	404	-	BE 65	571	-	BE 81
	84	-	BE 52	196	-	GH 84	406	-	Op(BE 94)	575	-	BE 41
	89	-	Op(BE 94)	197	-	DT 45	410	-	CG 12	584	-	Op(AJ 73)
	91	-	BF 54	198	-	GZ 11	413	-	Op(AD 90)	598	-	AK 86
	92	-	Op(AJ 86)	202	-	BF 54	415	-	BE 53	600	-	Op(BE 95)
	103	-	BE 55	203	-	Op(AJ 67)	418	-	AF 48	607	-	Op(BE 86)
	105	-	Op(FD 39)	209	-	Op(AD 90)	436	-	Op(BE 94)	610	-	AK 85
	107	-	BE 43	217	-	BE 33	437	-	BF 83	613	-	BE 61
	108	-	AJ 68	218	-	AM 42	438	-	Op(AJ 48)	614	-	Op(AJ 97)
	109	-	BF 45	223	-	Op(AJ 32)	439	-	BE 93	616	-	CG 95
	117	-	DG 85	226	-	Op(AJ 98)	445	-	BF 64	618	-	BE 42
	119	-	BE 91	227	-	AF 48	447	-	BE 93	621	-	BD 39
	123	-	Op(ET 11)	230	-	Op(BE 86)	448	-	Op(BC 39)	628	-	Op(AJ 86)
	125	-	Op(BC 31)	231	-	OP(AD 90)	454	-	Op(BD 17)	630	-	Op(AJ 73)
	126	-	Op(FD 21)	257	-	BE 51	456	-	Op(BE 56)	631	-	AK 85
	128	-	FC 23	258	-	Op(AD 90)	459	-	BD 33	634	-	Op(AJ 99)
	129	-	Op(CA 90)	260	-	Op(AJ 85)	460	-	CF 25	638	-	BD 35
	134	-	BF 45	262	-	Op(BB 40)	461	-	BD 31	645	-	AF 48
	154	-	Op(FD 73)	264	-	Op(AJ 97)	465	-	BF 58	648	-	Op(AD 90)
	155	-	BF 61	266	-	Op(BC 32)	466	-	Op(BD 17)	650	-	Op(AD 90)
	160	-	DG 68	267	-	AK 86	468	-	Op(BD 15)	659	-	Op(BE 86)
	161	-	Op(CB 10)	270	-	Op(AJ 82)	487	-	BE 14	662	-	Op(AJ 73)
	168	-	Op(AJ 81)	304	-	AN 31	504	-	BE 17	664	-	BF 54
	174	-	Op(BB 90)	306	-	AK 89	506	-	CF 53	706	-	Op(AJ 67)
	176	-	DD 74	332	-	Op(BE 95)	509	-	DG 85	707	-	Op(AJ 86)
	177	-	FU 25	340	-	AO	514	-	Op(AJ 81)	709	-	Op(BC 36)
	178	-	GG 23	358	-	Op(AJ 97)	515	-	Op(ET 51)	731	-	AO


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180	-	Op(KR 70)	359	-	Op(BD 17)	516	-	CF 36	732	-	Op(AJ 85)
181	-	GZ 24	377	-	Op(BC 32)	525	-	Op(BC 36)	752	-	BE 44
182	-	FL 33	378	-	Op(AD 90)	528	-	Op(AD 90)	760	-	AO
183	-	DG 75	381	-	Op(AD 90)	531	-	Op(AD 90)	952	-	AE 69
185	-	BE 89	383	-	Op(BC 33)	532	-	Op(AD 90)	954	-	Op(AD 90)
186	-	Op(BD 31)	386	-	Op(AD 90)	533	-	Op(AD 90)

	On Return Passage: U 68 - 71 - 84 - 108 - 134 - 155 - 160 - 182 - 183 - 185 - 188 - 257 - 267 - 306 - 404 - 415 - 487 - 506 - 509 - 516 - 571 - 598 - 610 - 613 - 618 - 631.
	Entered Port: U 155 Lorient; U 437 - 455 - St. Nazaire; U 71 - Kiel.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Against England - Gibraltar convoy traffic N. of "Drossel" disposition.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 33 see paragraph IVa.
		2)	U 107 sank a refrigeration ship of 12,000 GRT in BE 4511 course 40⁰, speed 16 knots, at 0100 on 1.5.
		3)	U 515 sank 5 ships including a tanker of altogether 31,000 GRT, from a convoy on a course of 310, speed 7 knots in ET 6433 at 2300. A hit on another ship is probable.
		4)	U 178 reported short range observation of St. Helena, on 27.4. No ship, no aircraft, no D/F.
	b)	Aircraft reported convoy consisting of 13 merchant ships and 6 escort vessels in BE 5282 at 2050 on 29.4, course 360, medium speed (MKF 12/13).
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: In BF 7188, EP 75 (not U-boat). A report from Iceland area without position. One report presumably from Iceland area with details of observed hit.
		2)	Torpedoing report: In BE 4266 (U 107).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 33:
		The weather conditions in the convoy area were also unfavorable on the 30th. Wind S.W. 7, visibility 4 seamiles high, steep waves running against the boat.
		U 381 reported the convoy in AD 9853, speed 5 knots, course 220⁰ at 1600 according to hydrophone and depth charges. It was able to maintain contact until 1700, but then lost it owing to bad visibility.
		There have been no further reports of the convoy.
		U 386 and 528 began return passage owing to considerable damage to boats caused by aerial bombs and depth charges. The operation continues.

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	b)	1)	After receiving a special Radio Intelligence report according to which the expected convoy in BC 5489 is to alter course to "Unknown" (probably between 0 and 90⁰) patrol channels are to be transferred as follows: Group "Specht" from AJ 7679 via 8824 to BC 2666, Group "Amsel" from BC 4372 via 3875 to 9264. The entire disposition is therefore transferred to the S.
		2)	Patrol channel of Group "Drossel" is to be transferred 60 seamiles to the W. Reason: Position of convoy intercepted by aircraft which lies further to the W. than given in latest course directions.
		3)	New position for U 638, 621, 402, 575 and 504 is AK 77. Daily reckoning 200 seamiles. Deployment on the convoy awaited by Groups "Specht" and "Amsel" is intended.
		4)	U 267 receives position AJ 99 after replenishment of supplies.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 107 - 1 ship 12,000 GRT
	U 515 - 5 ships 31,000 GRT
1 ship torpedoed.


			For B.d.U. Chief of Operations Division

			(Signed): GODT.


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- 296 -

Mining Instructions "Lands End" for U 217

1.	Task:
	An extensive minelaying operation is to be carried out S.W. of Lands End. The mines are to be widely scattered in groups of 4 to 6. A diagram is provided (only for the boat) to indicate the disposition of the mines.

2.	Gear:
	15 shaft mines A ("Schachtmine A") with 400 meters mooring rope, time setting 80 days. Set to flood in shortest period. Delay clockwork 6 hours, depth setting minus 15 meters, mine fitting tally I. Maximum depth at which mines may be laid is 350 meters minimum depth 50 meters, distance apart 400 meters.

3.	Enemy situation:
	English shipping routes, minefields and closed areas are drawn on the diagram. U 404's (v. Bülow) experiences of the operational area are as follows:
	The sketch of the route is drawn in the diagram. The surface passage was so arranged that the boat lay in a line with the Scilly's at dawn, during submerged passage, boat's position was confirmed at periscope depth by bearings on the light houses "Wolf Rocks" and "Long Ships". Both lights showed peacetime characteristics at night. Surfaced in the darkness and observed shore station searching through 360 - complete circuit - 10 to 15 seconds, in Fu. M.B. (anti radar device). Rotating radar gear. Altogether 8 stations with continuous note heard one after the other. Withdrew on a course of 300, high speed. Altogether 8 stations were intercepted with different wavelengths or modulation, apparently working from time to time in groups. Submerged owing to 3 aircraft searchlights. Contact with bottom, tanks therefore filled and broke surface - surface passage continued. Radar bearings were only faintly heard near "Seven Stones". Only 3 hydrophone bearings en route, originating from medium freighters and small craft.

4.	Execution:
	The situation given in the mining scheme is only to serve as an indication. The Commander is free to modify this according to observations and the enemy situation transmitted.
	It appears advisable to arrange the passage so that the boat is as near the coast as possible - until it is forced to submerge owing to radar. During the day carry out task beneath the surface, subsequently withdrawing to the S.W. and at night proceeding at high speed in the same direction. Avoid laying mines at points with sharply sloping sea bed, or large breakers. Single minefield sections are to be laid about 2 to 3 seamiles apart, so that only one mine is picked up at a time in the event of enemy sweeping operations.
	The time for laying mines is to be decided by the Commander after a survey of the area.

5.	Geographical boundary:
	The mines are to be laid in an area within 5⁰ 35' W, 5⁰ 50' W and 49⁰ 55' N, 50⁰ 05' N.

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6.	Report:
	A report is to be made with the short signal AFMR, as soon as possible after the minelaying operation has been carried out at a distance of 100 seamiles, however, AFMR means here: "Mining off Lands End carried out".


		(Signed): GODT.


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Mining Instructions "Nordkanal" for U 218

1.	Task:
	An extensive minelaying operation is to be carried out on the convoy routes at the approaches to the North Channel. The mines are to be widely scattered in groups of 4 to 6. A diagram is provided (only for the boat) to indicate the disposition of the mines.

2.	Gear:
	15 shaftmines A ("SMA") with 400 meters of mooring rope, time setting 80 days. Set to flood in shortest period. Delay clock work 6 hours. Depth setting minus 15 meters. Mine fitting tally I. Maximum depth at which mines may be laid is 350 meters, minimum depth 50 meters. Distance apart 400 meters.

3.	Enemy situation:
	A radio intelligence report has revealed that there is busy English convoy traffic to the N. and along the minefield QZX 209. At least 6 convoys have been confirmed outward and homeward bound, within 10 days. The coastal traffic proceeds along the line drawn in blue.
	S.W. of "Islay" there is a large convoy assembly point for outgoing convoys. There is a fixed convoy position point between the outer and inner North Channel on 7⁰ W. (Red point).
	Air and surface patrol must be expected. Shore based radar is to be expected at several points on the coast, according to previous experience.

4.	Execution:
	After putting out, the boat will be for the time being allocated to a convoy group and released in good time so that it is able to carry out the ordered task during the new moon period. The situation shown in the mining scheme serves only as a framework. The Commander is free to modify this according to the enemy situation observed by or transmitted to him. Single minefield sections are if possible to be laid 3 seamiles apart, so that in the event of enemy sweeping operations, always only one section is discovered.
	It appears advisable to arrange the passage in such a way that the boat approaches as close to the minelaying area as possible at night, and then lays the mines underwater during the day, afterwards withdrawing to the N.W. and making off in the same direction during the night, on the surface at high speed.

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5.	Geographical boundaries:
	The mines are to be laid within the following limits: 56⁰ N, 56⁰ 35' N, and 7⁰ W, 8⁰ 50' W.

6.	Reports:
	A report is to be sent immediately on execution of minelaying, not however from a point less than 100 seamiles from the mined area, in a short signal AFKP. AFKP means here: "Minelaying in North Channel carried out".


			(Signed): GODT.


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Operational order "St. George's Channel" for U 214
(pencil note: carried out by U 217)

I.	Task:
	The mining of the northern barrier gap (see sketch) in St. George's Channel is to be carried out.

II.	Enemy situation:
	1)	Reports of ships movements and density of traffic in the St. George's Channel originate almost without exception on sighting reports from our own aircraft and contact reports transmitted by English convoys on the appearance of our own aircraft.
	2)	According to reports received convoy traffic is entirely spasmodic. Convoys from the Caribbean and from Sierra Leone have been observed putting in. Apart from this unintercepted isolated traffic through the northern barrier gap, can be expected.

III.	Gear:
	15 shaftmines A (SMA) with 400 meters of mooring rope, time setting 80 days, set to flood in shortest period, delay clock work 24 hours. Depth setting minus 15 meters. Mine fitting tally I. Maximum depth at which mines may be laid in 350 meters, minimum depth 50 meters. Distance apart 400 meters.

IV.	Execution:
	1)	The boat is to put out when ready for action. The boat will be allocated to a convoy group for the time being and released in time to carry out the task ordered during the new moon period.
	2)	Geographical boundary is as follows:
		The mines are to be laid in groups of from 5 to 6 between 51⁰ 37' N, 51⁰ 47' N and 7⁰ 30' W, 7⁰ 50' W in front of the barrier gap. Each minefield section is to lie about 3 - 4 seamiles apart so that in enemy sweeping operations one section only is always discovered.

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		The boat is provided with a diagram indicating the disposition of the mines.
	3)	The Commander is free to use his own discretion as to the placing of the mines off the barrier gap - according to observations made or intelligence received by him. The time of minelaying is also left to the Commander's discretion after a survey of the area.
	4)	It appears advisable to arrange the passage in such a way that the boat leaves the English minefield to port according to standing order 481 paragraph VII, approaching as close as possible to the minelaying area, until forced to submerge by radar. Carrying out operations by day submerged, and then withdrawing by the same route.

V.	Report:
	Report by means of a short signal AFKP as soon as minelaying has been carried out, not, however, until the boat is at least 100 seamiles from the minefield. AFKP means here "minelaying carried out".

VI.	General:
	Special attention is drawn to the preparations for the destruction of confidential books according to Standing Orders No. 231.


			(Signed): GODT.


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