F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 August 1943

PG30329

     
     
 
1.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DG 47
U 190
-
BD 78
U 404
-
BE 85
U 571
-
EJ 79
 
66
-
CD 77
196
-
Op(KE 50)
406
-
Op(EO 30)
572
-
EO 87
 
84
-
DN 77
197
-
Op(KQ 77)
415
-
Op(EE 70)
598
-
Op(FJ 30)
 
86
-
Op(ET 80)
198
-
Op(KP 30)
445
-
EH 35
600
-
Op(ET 60)
 
106
-
BE 69
199
-
Op(GB 40)
454
-
BF 73
604
-
FK 40
 
107
-
BF 69
218
-
BE 45
461
-
BE 91
614
-
BE 85
 
117
-
CE 42
230
-
Op(CA 73)
462
-
BE 91
615
-
Op(ED 70)
 
129
-
BE 68
257
-
Op(EU 90)
466
-
DR 27
618
-
Op(EV 70)
 
134
-
DO 32
262
-
BE 76
468
-
Op(ET 40)
634
-
Op(ED 10)
 
155
-
CE 42
306
-
CE 32
489
-
AE 67
647
-
AE 82
 
168
-
FD 23
333
-
EJ 79
504
-
BE 91
648
-
BE 75
 
172
-
Op(FR 10)
340
-
Op(ET 90)
508
-
Op(EU 90)
653
-
Op(EO 20)
 
177
-
Op(JB 10)
358
-
Op(EU 90)
510
-
Op(EP 10)
664
-
BD 95
 
178
-
JK 50
359
-
Op(EC 60)
516
-
EG 52
706
-
BF 73
 
181
-
Op(KG 70)
373
-
BD 97
525
-
BE 68
732
-
Op(DN 70)
 
183
-
FD 38
382
-
Op(EU 90)
532
-
ES 74
757
-
Op(ET 70)
 
185
-
Op(FJ 91)
383
-
BE 45
533
-
ER 92
760
-
BE 76
 
188
-
FD 35
403
-
DG 47
566
-
Op(CA 73)
847
-
AF 72
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 178 - 190 - 305 - 333 - 373 - 466 - 516 - 571 - 572 - 604 - 647.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 68 - 123 - 523 - 505 - Lorient;  U 437 - 448 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Reconnaissance in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 382 reported at 0720 from EU 9625:  Forced to dive by a destroyer.  Contact lost.  This boat was in reconnaissance line in EU and probably made contact with a convoy there.  All boats in that area were ordered to attack.  U 382 was ordered to make a more detailed report.
    2) U 572 sighted a steamer with air escort on an E. course in EE 2151.  No contact.
    3) U 198 sank a steamer of 7,000 tons from a convoy in KP 3755, course 2450, 9 knots.  Return passage.
    4) U 106 was attacked by an aircraft in BE 69 and reported that the aircraft was still shadowing after the attack had been beaten off.
  b) Our own aircraft reported 3 destroyers, course N. high speed in AE 8610 at 0745/1/8.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BF 4870, BE 4858, EO 64, BF 4783.
      Another aircraft reported a U-boat in an undecyphered position and later made S.O.S. (U 383?)
    2) In EO 64 a U-boat either attacked or was attacked.
    3) An English unit was located in BE 5610 and one in 6350.
    4) Torpedo report from an unidentified Allied steamer in KP 3750 (U 198?).
  d)  None.
       
- 88 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 177 - 181 - 196 - 197 - 198 have been given freedom of action in the sea area between Capetown and Madagascar.
    2) U 566 will occupy the coastal area in CA as attack area.  She is however free to move off according to anti-submarine activity.
    3) U 647 is to make for AK 50 provisionally, U 489 for AK 97.
  c)  From 2000/3/8 U 66 will supply in CD 6750 from U 117 for economical return passage to Bergen.
  d) 1) U 230 has successfully carried out minelaying operation Norfolk.
    2) After several previous aircraft attacks U 383 was rendered unable to dive and out of control by a stick of bombs at 2130 in BF 4453.  U 218, proceeding in company with U 383, and U 454 and 706 were ordered there immediately to give assistance.  Aircraft assistance was promised for 0830.  3 large torpedo boats were also sent out, which could arrive by about 1500.  No further report from U 383 by morning.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 185 1 ship
5,000 GRT
 
U 198 1 ship
7,000 GRT.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DG 74
U 190
-
BD 87
U 415
-
Op(ED 90)
U 571
-
EJ 72
 
66
-
CD 76
196
-
LT 97
437
-
BF 91
572
-
EE 80
 
68
-
BF 54
197
-
Op(KQ 70)
445
-
ET 45
598
-
Op(FJ 30)
 
84
-
DN 84
198
-
Op(KP 37)
448
-
BF 91
600
-
Op(ET 60)
 
86
-
Op(ET 80)
199
-
Op(GB 40)
454
-
BF 47
604
-
FK 54
 
106
-
BB 68
218
-
BE 66
461
-
BE 86
614
-
BE 87
 
107
-
BE 68
230
-
Op(CA 73)
462
-
BE 86
615
-
Op(ED 70)
 
117
-
CE 44
257
-
Op(EU 90)
466
-
DF 85
618
-
Op(EV 70)
 
123
-
BF 54
262
-
BE 77
468
-
Op(ET 40)
634
-
Op(ED 40)
 
129
-
BE 67
306
-
BE 78
489
-
AE 82
647
-
AE 84
 
134
-
DD 59
333
-
EJ 72
504
-
BE 86
648
-
BE 81
 
155
-
BE 78
340
-
Op(ET 90)
505
-
BF 54
653
-
Op(EO 20)
 
168
-
FD 38
358
-
Op(EU 90)
508
-
Op(EU 90)
664
-
BD 89
 
172
-
Op(FQ 60)
359
-
Op(EC 60)
510
-
Op(EP 10)
760
-
BF 47
 
177
-
Op(JB 10)
373
-
BD 95
516
-
EG 52
732
-
Op(DN 70)
 
178
-
JK 50
382
-
Op(EU 90)
523
-
BF 54
757
-
Op(ET 70)
 
181
-
Op(EG 70)
383
-
BE 66
525
-
BE 67
760
-
BE 77
 
183
-
FE 47
403
-
DG 78
532
-
FD 13
847
-
AE 69
 
185
-
Op(FK 46)
404
-
BE 87
533
-
ES 77      
 
188
-
FD 66
406
-
Op(EE 90)
566
-
Op(CA 80)      
 
       
- 89 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 178 - 190 - 198 - 306 - 333 - 373 - 466 - 516 - 571 - 572 - 604 - 647.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  Support for inward and outward bound U-boats in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 653 was attacked in EO 3721 by a 4-engined bomber.  Boat scored a hit and dived after the first run-in.
    2) U 178 sighted a freighter, course 2700, in JK 3194.  Torpedoes ran under.
  b) Aircraft report numerous enemy warships and attacked them.  Assistance for U 383 and U 106 did not materialize.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BE 5597, CA 62, FA 35, BF 44, BE 66, BF 47, also 3 boats in BF 4823 and three different sightings in an unidentified position.
    2) English units were located in BF 49, BF 47 and BE 66 - 69.
    3) Attack on U-boat probably by aircraft and surface vessel in EC 6990.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 445 will occupy EU 70 as attack area.
    2) As no further report was received from U 382 on the convoy which she probably sighted, the reconnaissance line was dissolved and the boats received the following order:
      If no contact is made by 2400, U 257, 508 and 618 are to return, also U 358 if her fuel stocks are below 45 cbm.  U 382 has freedom of action in the whole area (for reasons for order for return passage see situation review in the War Log of 5.8.42.
  c)  U 178 abandoned the attempt to deliver fuel to J 9 owing to bad weather.  Both boats are proceeding to JA 22.
  d) 1) U 706 was also attacked, towards 0900, by an aircraft near U 383's position.  At 0920 she reported that the aircraft was still shadowing.  U 218 was obliged to dive by destroyers at 0700/2 in BF 4454 and started on her return passage towards 1800 owing to some casualties.  Air reconnaissance sighted a large patch of oil in BF 4450 and several English vessels making off in the vicinity.  It must therefore be assumed that U 383 sank.  No wreckage or survivors were found.  The 3 T-boats covered the sinking position at about
       
- 90 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      1600 in broad formation on a W. course.   Nothing further was found of U 383.  U 706 was ordered to continue on her outward passage.  The same goes for U 454, who has not so far reported.
    2) U 106 was again attacked by aircraft at 0937 in BE 69.  She was temporarily unable to dive and several times urgently requested air assistance.  The 3 torpedo boats sent out to search for U 383 were making for BE 6940 at maximum speed, after they had covered the position where U 383 sank, and could have arrived there by 1900.  At 2000 U 106 reported another air attack.  The torpedo boats were shadowed and reported on all day by English aircraft, but were still able to reach the position of U 106, which had meanwhile sunk and rescued 36 members of the crew, including the Commanding Officer.  Their return passage was without incident until morning.  The aircraft detailed did not materialize in time.
    3) U 404 and 614 were outward-bound in company through Biscay.  According to U 404 the group was attacked by aircraft on 28/7 in BF 47.  Their passage report has not so far been received and today is the 11th day. Both boats must therefore be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  Enemy air and surface craft activity in Biscay is at present very strong and effective and losses have been heavy during the last days.  U 68, 123, 505, 523 which have only been at sea a short time, have therefore been ordered to return to their ports.
   It has also turned out that boats proceeding in groups are sometimes completely destroyed after being detected by aircraft or surface vessels, which must be attributed to large numbers of anti-submarine forces working in good cooperation.  Orders have therefore been given for the immediate dispersal of all groups on passage.  Boats are to proceed alone, independently of the courses ordered.
    U 648, 155, 306, 190 have orders to proceed along the Spanish coast close inshore without regard for territorial waters, submerged by day, surfaced by night.  Metox is to be switched off owing to danger of radiation.  (For intentions and general situation review see War Log of 5.8.43.)
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
- 91 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
3.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DS 25
U 190
-
BD 86
U 437
-
BF 86
U 566
-
Op(CA 80)
 
66
-
CD 76
196
-
Op(KE 50)
445
-
Op(ET 40)
571
-
EH 69
 
68
-
BF 49
197
-
Op(KQ 70)
448
-
BF 86
572
-
EO 21
 
84
-
DN 55
198
-
Op(KP 30)
454
-
BF 40
598
-
Op(FJ 30)
 
86
-
Op(ET 80)
199
-
Op(GB 40)
461
-
BE 80
600
-
Op(ET 60)
 
107
-
BE 67
218
-
BF 45
462
-
BE 80
604
-
FK 54
 
117
-
CD 68
230
-
CA 80
466
-
DF 56
615
-
ED 40
 
123
-
BF 49
257
-
Op(EU 90)
468
-
Op(ET 50)
618
-
Op(EU 90)
 
129
-
BE 83
262
-
CE 32
489
-
AE 81
634
-
Op(ED 40)
 
134
-
DD 65
306
-
BE 76
504
-
BE 80
647
-
AE 78
 
155
-
BE 76
333
-
EH 69
505
-
BF 46
648
-
BE 83
 
168
-
FD 69
340
-
Op(ET 90)
508
-
Op(EU 90)
653
-
Op(EE 99)
 
172
-
Op(FQ 60)
358
-
Op(EU 90)
510
-
Op(EP 10)
664
-
CE 22
 
177
-
Op(JB 10)
359
-
Op(EC 60)
516
-
EG 23
706
-
BF 40
 
178
-
JK 50
373
-
Op(FD 96
523
-
BF 46
732
-
Op(EC 10)
 
181
-
Op(KG 70)
382
-
Op(EU 90)
525
-
BE 83
757
-
Op(ET 70)
 
183
-
FE 76
403
-
DS 46
532
-
FD 52
760
-
CE 32
 
185
-
Op(FK 54)
406
-
EC 20
533
-
FD 19
847
-
AE 68
 
188
-
FE 71
415
-
Op(ED 90)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 68 - 84 - 123 - 134 - 155 - 178 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 373 - 437 - 448 - 466 - 508 - 516 - 571 - 572 - 604 - 618 - 648 - 653.
  Entered Port:  U 437 - 448 - St. Nazaire.;  U 68 - 505 - 523 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 956 - 960 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
    Against warships in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 196 sank a 10,000 GRT steamer from a N-bound convoy, consisting of 3 ships with 4 destroyers and escort vessels in LT 8582. Another 10,000 tonner was left on fire.  There was an explosion inside this ship, which probably sank.
    2) U 406 sighted a light cruiser of the Concord class in BE 9338, course 3100, speed 20 knots.
  b) Our own aircraft reported 2 destroyers, course 2400 high speed at 0830 in BF 4824, a heavy cruiser and 4 destroyers at 0920 in BE 6965, course 1100, medium speed and a light cruiser at 0930 in BE 4744, course 900.
  c) 1) English units were picked up in BE 3560, BF 27, BF 1850, BF 72 (Gibson formation), AK 37, AM 1790, BF 47, BF 17, BF 49, BF 45, BE 68, BE 69, BF 42, BE 66.
    2) U-boat sightings:  AE 8682 (U 847?), CA 38, BF 4556.  3 boats course 2300 in an undecyphered position.
    3) U-boat attacked or was attacked in EO 27, EE 95 and DN 75.
    4) A U-boat was reported stationary on the surface in FK 54 (U 185, U 604).
       
- 92 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 525 and 129 are to make for DR 50.   They will then be detailed according to the situation.
    2) U 600, 172, 510, 185, 257, 508, 618, 333, 571, 84, 572, 653 are to start or continue on their return passages in the direction of DF 30.  If necessary they can supply there from U 117.
      Owing to the strained supply situation all boats have been ordered to economize in fuel and provisions as much as possible.   For reasons for order to return see Situation Review in War Log of 5.8.43.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) U 66 was attacked at 2130 in CD 8298 by 2 fighters with bombs and aircraft armament, from the direction of the sun.  The boat's ability to dive was reduced and she suffered heavy casualties in personnel.  The C.O. received an abdominal wound.  A rendezvous was ordered immediately in CD 5565 for 2000/4/8 with U 117, who has a medical officer on board.
      Boat is to report whether she can continue her return passage.
    2) U 461, 462 and 504 were on outward passage in company.  The group was attacked on 30.7. in BF 7127 by 5 aircraft.  (See War Log of 30.7.).  As no further reports were received, it was assumed that the boats had evaded the attack by diving.  So far the boats have not replied to several orders to report their position nor have they made a passage report, and they must therefore be presumed lost.  Enemy units were several times located on 30.7. in BF 44 and BE 66.  It is possible that the boats beat off the attack by the 5 aircraft, but were afterwards picked up and sunk by groups of patrol vessels.  There is however no further information.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 196 2 ships 20,000 GRT.  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
- 93 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
4.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DS 64
U 190
-
BD 95
U 415
-
Op(ED 90)
U 598
-
Op(FJ 30)
 
66
-
CD 55
196
-
Op(LT 89)
445
-
Op(ET 90)
600
-
ET 60
 
84
-
DN 37
197
-
Op(KQ 70)
454
-
BE 92
604
-
FK 50
 
86
-
Op(ET 80)
198
-
KP 67
461
-
BE 80
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
107
-
BE 59
199
-
Op(KP 67)
462
-
BE 80
618
-
EU 80
 
117
-
CD 67
218
-
BF 46
466
-
CE 66
634
-
Op(ED 40)
 
123
-
BE 50
230
-
CA 93
468
-
Op(ET 50)
647
-
AE 77
 
129
-
BF 85
257
-
EU 85
489
-
AE 76
648
-
BE 92
 
134
-
DE 17
262
-
CE 23
504
-
BE 80
653
-
BF 48
 
155
-
BE 85
306
-
BE 85
508
-
EU 80
664
-
CE 24
 
168
-
FE 75
333
-
EH 53
510
-
EP 10
706
-
BE 65
 
172
-
FQ 69
340
-
Op(ET 90)
516
-
DR 91
732
-
Op(EC 10)
 
177
-
Op(JB 10)
358
-
Op(EV 70)
525
-
BE 85
757
-
Op(ET 70)
 
178
-
KZ 83
359
-
Op(EC 60)
532
-
FD 67
760
-
CE 23
 
181
-
Op(KQ 70)
373
-
BE 74
533
-
FD 55
847
-
AE 83
 
183
-
FM 11
382
-
Op(EV 70)
566
-
Op(CA 80)
956
-
AO 74
 
185
-
FK 50
403
-
DS 64
571
-
EH 53
960
-
AO 74
 
188
-
FL 23
406
-
Op(EF 48)
572
-
EC 21      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 106 - 123 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 373 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 571 - 572 - 604 - 618 - 648 - 653.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 181 situation:  English "Dalfram", 4,458 GRT, sunk in KG 8555.  Ship was coming from Lourenco and was to proceed to the Mediterranean via Mauritius.  4.8. attacked a steamer leaving Port Louis on a course of 2100.  Boat picked up by searchlights and pursued by hydrophones.  Nothing seen in KR 14 via 55 to 92 and in St. Paul and St. Pierre.  18.7. chased a fast steamer in vain for 16 hours in KR 1390, course 100.
    2) U 415 was off Martinique for about 3 days and found no traffic.  On 2.8. fast convoy sighted in ED 9493, course E.  Observed by corvette when attacking.  Depth charges at periscope depth.  Return passage because of fuel.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BE 6380, DC 63, CB 91.
    2) English units were located in BF 4280, BE 92, BC 2780, AM 7919, BE 6955.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  As at present no further supply is possible, all boats now in the operations area must start on their return passage so that
       
- 94 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     they can reach port without refueling or taking over provisions.
     Boats which are already short are to return immediately.  Supply will be available for them.
  c) 1) U 262 and 706 will refuel to capacity from U 664 from 1200/7/8 in CD 3455.
      U 664's hydrophones are out of order.  An attempt will be made to deliver a spare set by an outward bound boat and send her enough fuel via the tanker U 489 so that she can still continue with her operation.
    2) U 190 and 373 were to rendezvous in BD 9656 at 2000/4/8.  U 373 was to take over as many medical supplies as possible and at least two men, so that she can start on her return passage in spite of reduced crew.
    3) U 333 is to attempt an exchange with U 571 so that both boats have at least one serviceable compressor.  U 618 and 600 will also not be able to get spare parts and must start their return passage with one compressor each.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 181 1 ship 4,458 GRT.  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
DS 92
U 188
-
FM 18
U 403
-
DS 98
U 598
-
Op(FJ 30)
 
66
-
CD 55
190
-
BD 96
406
-
Op(EE 93)
600
-
ET 27
 
84
-
DO 14
196
-
Op(LT 90)
415
-
Op(ED 90)
604
-
FK 50
 
86
-
Op(ET 80)
197
-
Op(KQ 70)
445
-
Op(EU 70)
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
107
-
BE 73
198
-
KZ 26
454
-
BE 91
618
-
EU 76
 
117
-
CD 55
199
-
Op(GB 40)
466
-
CF 19
634
-
Op(ED 40)
 
123
-
BF 50
218
-
BF 50
468
-
Op(ET 50)
647
-
AL 13
 
129
-
BE 79
230
-
GB 72
489
-
AL 21
648
-
BE 93
 
134
-
DE 13
257
-
EU 75
508
-
FF 12
653
-
EF 43
 
155
-
BE 94
262
-
CE 13
510
-
EF 76
664
-
CE 14
 
168
-
FM 14
306
-
BE 94
516
-
DR 62
760
-
BE 67
 
172
-
FR 41
333
-
EH 22
525
-
BE 79
732
-
Op(EC 10)
 
177
-
Op(JB 10)
340
-
Op(ET 90)
532
-
FD 96
757
-
Op(ET 70)
 
178
-
KZ 64
358
-
Op(EU 90)
533
-
FD 91
760
-
CE 16
 
181
-
KG 87
359
-
Op(EC 60)
566
-
Op(CA 80)
847
-
AE 85
 
183
-
FM 43
373
-
BD 96
571
-
EH 22
956
-
AN 30
 
185
-
FK 50
382
-
EV 76
572
-
EE 93
960
-
AN 30
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 123 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 373 - 382 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 571 - 572 - 604 - 618 - 648 - 653.
  Entered Port:  U 123 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 95 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 760 examined the North-bound Swedish "Bali" in CE 1347.  As her papers were in order, the ship was set free.
    2) U 732 sank a 7,000 GRT steamer on 2.8. in DN 7361 from a convoy course 1700.  Another ship was torpedoed and 2 more hits heard.  Boat is returning because of fuel.
  b) Nothing to report.
  c) 1) English units were located:  AL 9665, BF 1926, AM 23, BF 4170, BE 6760.
    2) U-boat sightings:  BF 7697, DN 77.  In ED 84 a U-boat either attacked or was attacked.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 847, 647 and 489 have been ordered to report their position and fuel stocks when passing the latitude of AL 15.
    2) U 760 and 262 are to steer for CA 90 after refueling from U 664.
    3) Present operations areas off Freetown are cancelled.  U 468, 86, 757, 340 and 455 have been given freedom of action to the north as far as Dakar and east as far as their fuel stocks permit.
    4) U 406 will occupy the sea area between EE 52, EO 22, EP 21, EF 51 as attack area.
  c) None.
  d) 1) U 406 did not encounter U 572 at the rendezvous.  U 572 has been ordered to report her position.  U 406 is continuing to operate without replenishing ammunition and gun grease.
    2) The rendezvous ordered between U 117 and U 66 for refueling and medical assistance has not so far taken place.  U 66 has suggested another rendezvous for 1200/6/8 in CD 6464.  She urgently requires medical assistance for the C.O. and 5 other men.
      As U 117 had meanwhile reported, the order for U 760 to go to the rendezvous as well was cancelled.  U 117 will provide an experienced officer as acting C.O. for U 66.
       
- 96 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) U 190 has not delivered medical supplies and men to U 373 as planned.  Boats are proceeding to W. France individually.
    4) U 185 was bombed by a Liberator in FK 5438.  Boat dived.  She has one man seriously wounded and urgently needs bandages.
      U 604 reported that she was hunted for some time on 3.8 in FK 4455 and on 4.8 in FK 5511 with depth charges and hydrophones.  She suffered a number of casualties and is so badly damaged that it seems doubtful if she can reach W. France.  The C.O. has been told to give his views.  U 185 and 172 have been ordered to steer for FK 3955 to give assistance, as well as U 604.  Further steps will be taken when the C.O. has reported.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 732 1 ship
7,000 GRT
 
  2 ships
torpedoed.
 
       
VI. General:
  1) According to latest experiences, carrier-borne aircraft must be expected everywhere in the North and Central Atlantic, with immediate effect, therefore, the order of 21.7 is cancelled and boats are free to proceed E. of the Azores.
  2) General U-boat situation:
     The outstanding feature of the situation in U-boat warfare continues to be the unusually high losses, which are not balanced by corresponding successes.
     
Lost during July:  
 
Biscay :
13
boats
Square CG :
3
boats
Open Atlantic area :
6
boats
Operations areas off the American & African coasts :
8
boats
Mediterranean :
3
boats
Northern Waters (air attack in Trondheim) :
1
boat
Total
:
34
boats
     The majority of these losses must be attributed to enemy superiority in the air.  In this connection, the inferiority of our radar interception gear has probably played a large part.
     In addition to the defects already noted in the gear, it has recently been discovered that Metox sets radiate to a far greater extent than was hitherto known.  It is conceivable, though it cannot be stated for certain at present, that in many cases the boats have given themselves away to enemy aircraft by using their Radar Interception gear and have relieved the enemy of the necessity of using his own Radar.  Details in this connection are discussed elsewhere.  The uncertainty on this subject has made it necessary to cancel the sailing of all boats until they are
 
 
 
- 97 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    fitted out with the new Hagenuk set.
    It is also suspected that the enemy is using new weapons about there there is no further information.  So far it has only been proved, from Radio Intelligence reports, that a Hedgehog gear is in use.
     Numerous unexplained losses have brought suspicion of sabotage into the foreground again, but no proof of this has been found.  Flotillas and fitting out stations concerned have again been directed to exercise the greatest vigilance.
    Biscay:
    The situation in Biscay became particularly critical towards the end of July.  Of the last 13 boats which left and did not break off their outward passage right at the beginning, 7 were definitely lost and 2 most probably and one other boat had to return after receiving damage in an air attack.
    It is to be assumed that these losses are mainly due to close cooperation between enemy anti-submarine aircraft and the surface forces (cruisers, destroyers, submarine chasers) which have recently been active in Biscay in increasing strength.  The enemy appears to have taken advantage of the situation in the North Atlantic by withdrawing his defence forces from there and using them to block the approaches to Biscay.  The aircraft tactics which have recently frequently been observed, whereby one aircraft, having detected a U-boat, endeavors to prevent her diving and to bring up other aircraft, are presumably connected with this.  It is not yet known for certain that the aircraft then bring up surface vessels, but it is extremely likely.
    Steps taken on our part have not led to success.  They consisted mainly in introducing passage by groups and in restricting passage on the surface to the time absolutely essential for charging underway.  Torpedo boat and destroyer escort have been provided as far as the fuel situation and the forces available permitted.  The value of passage in company has been under constant reconsideration by the authorities concerned since it was first introduced.  Its advantages are greater firepower, a theoretically better look-out organization, the possibility of sharing the Radar interception bands between the individual boats so that each band is better covered, and the possibility of mutual assistance if one boat is lost or damaged.  Finally, the psychological effect on the crews plays a part.
    There are, however, considerable disadvantages.  Passage in company in itself, for which the boats are not trained, requires a large part of the crew's attention.  It is easier for a single boat to take quick advantage of a sudden, favorable chance to dive after an attack, than for a group.  2 boats naturally attract the enemy more than one.  There is the risk of losing 2 boats at once.  The chances of rendering assistance are reduced by the increased danger.  The attempt to assist a damaged boat has only once been successful and has certainly also led to losses.
 
 
 
- 98 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Losses so far on independent passage and passage in company do not give any clear idea of the relative advantages and disadvantages because, in many cases, it is only known that loss has occurred, not however whether it was attributable to the peculiarities of independent passage or passage in company.  The enemy's new tactics of shadowing and bringing up other aircraft and the presence of enemy surface forces have now emphasized the disadvantages of passage in company more and have led to the order for all groups at sea to disperse.  It is not intended to resume passage in company.
     Destroyer and torpedo boat escort has only a limited value.  The escort can only cover the boundary of the area in which enemy air and surface craft activity are concentrated.  The escort is not likely to remain undetected by the enemy and will cause him to take countermeasures on the assumption that these are particularly valuable targets.  Such countermeasures were already in evidence the last time destroyers and torpedo boats sailed.  Also the fuel situation makes it necessary to restrict the use of destroyers and torpedo boats to assistance to damaged boats.  The last time they were used for this purpose they were able to rescue a large number of the crew of U 106.  Improvement in the present situation is expected when the new Hagenuk gear is introduced.  Use is also to be made of the Spanish coast for boats returning from sea, as this presumably provides some protection from location.
    When the boats sail after fitting out with new Radar interception sets they will proceed independently and be scattered over the whole of Biscay.  Over and above this, a radical change could only be effected if our own Air Force operates against enemy anti-submarine aircraft and against blockading forces.  G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces' forces are not however adequate for this at the moment, though there is the prospect of his getting further aircraft (DO 217).  The anti-submarine aircraft ME 410, which had been allocated to him, had to be recalled to the home area after they had operated once.
     The situation will also be greatly eased when it is possible for the boats to pass through the whole of Biscay submerged.  The "Schnorchel" for Diesel air intake while submerged offers this prospect and, looking farther ahead, the new types of boat (type XXI).
    The mining situation off the harbors and in the approach routes is still under control.  The use of very varied firing units has however, made it necessary to compose each individual escort of several escort vessels and the situation with regard to defence forces has thus become strained in the extreme.
    North Atlantic:
    The intention to resume convoy operations during the new moon period at the beginning of September has been frustrated by the canceling of all sailings.  The new Radar interception gear will not be delivered until it is too late for the boats to reach the operations area in time.  The resumption of operations is therefore postponed until the end of September.  The new weapons available for these operations are the Zaunkönig torpedo the reinforced Flak armament, the new Radar interception gear and the new Radar decoy device Aphrodite.  The Commanding Officers
 
 
 
- 99 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     have been specially trained.  Notes on the execution of these operations are set out in Appendix 1.
    Open Atlantic area:
     There have been several (at least 6) losses.  They can only be attributed to increased activity by carrier-borne aircraft.  Boats have reported sighting of carrier-borne aircraft and there have been neutral reports of the sighting of aircraft carriers.  The only countermeasure at the moment is increased vigilance on passage.
    Operations off the American and African coasts, after a good start, have not continued to bring corresponding results.
     There have been 33 sinkings, 20 at the beginning of operations up to 11.7., 13 only since that date.
     
Details:
     
In the Caribbean
5 sinkings
  2 after 11.7.
Off Brazil
20 sinkings
  5 after 11.7.
In the Freetown area
8 sinkings
  5 after 11.7.
    The losses (2 in the Caribbean and 5 off the Brazilian coast) are high and show how difficult it has become to resist enemy air activity even in these areas.  Nevertheless, in the present state of affairs, it would not have been possible to use the boats elsewhere.  The fact that the 3 tankers which were to have supplied boats operating in these areas for their return passage were lost in Biscay has had a considerable effect on operations.  The result has been that many boats which could otherwise have remained much longer in their operations areas are now forced to return.  The area Capetown - Madagascar has continued to prove favorable for operations.  It cannot be exploited to the full however, as all boats except type IXd2 have to be supplied.
     It remains to be seen how soon traffic in this area will be affected by the reopening of the Mediterranean.  There are already signs that enemy merchant ships are making increasing use of the Mediterranean.
    The supply situation has already had its effect on operations in the American and African areas, owing to the loss of the tankers.  It has only been possible to supply the Far East boats and boats on return passage from other operations areas by withdrawing several IXC boats.
    In the present state of affairs in Biscay, it will no longer be possible in future to plan operations on the assumption that supply will be available on return passage, as it cannot be known whether the necessary tankers will actually get through Biscay.  There are no more reserve tankers available.  The only tankers actually available are:  three type XIV operational, 1 on trials, i minelayer XB operational and 2 on trials.  With these numbers only the most essential supply operations can be carried out and then only on outward passage.
    To balance the absence of offensive action a larger number of minelaying operations has been planned.  So far however, of the
 
 
 
- 100 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    11 operations planned, only 2 have been carried out.  Of the boats intended to carry out the other 9, 2 are still on their way, 3 are lost, 3 had to return owing to damage, 1 (U 117) had to be used as a tanker and her minelaying operation abandoned.
    Even though the situation for U-boat warfare is very serious and strained, the Commanding Officers and crews remain keen and determined.  This has been shown particularly in the attitude of the crews of boats sunk, when their chances of being rescued  at first seemed hopeless.  The battle in the main operations area, which is at present interrupted will be resumed by the C.O.'s and crews with new weapons in the old spirit.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 101 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   
Most Secret
S.O. Only
Copy No. 24.
       
For Personal use of Commanding Officer only.
(to be returned to B.d.U. Op. after the operation)
Note on Convoy Operations with Weapons at Present Available.
       
A. In principle, present considerations and present tactics must remain as the basis for convoy actions even in the altered circumstances.  In the end, the main object remains:  to approach the main formation of ships, as far as possible unnoticed.  The escort must only be engaged if this becomes impossible owing to air activity.  It is essential however, to aim at a surprise attack, as before, before engaging the escort force.
  Principle:  do not engage the enemy air or surface escort unless it is impossible to approach the ships in any other way.
  Procedure adopted by the boats will therefore be dependent on the strength of the escort which, in its turn, will depend partly on the sea area and partly on the time when the attack is made.  3 separate stages can be distinguished in a convoy action:  firstly the start of the operation, when the enemy is still unprepared, secondly action after the boat has been observed by a medium air escort and finally action when there is activity by aircraft and surface vessels.
  I. Start of every convoy operation:
     The attack on a convoy will always take the enemy by surprise at first.  Generally the vessels have already been at sea for 8 or 10 days without sighting the enemy.   Attention is relaxed, as the monotony of the uneventful passage affects the look-outs and the operators of the location gear.  At the beginning, also, the convoy will only have the absolutely essential air and surface escort, as the enemy needs his forces everywhere.
    In future therefore in convoy operations every boat must aim at reaching the convoy as early as possible, in order to take the enemy by surprise if possible during the first night.  This sometimes has an astonishing effect:
    Example:  In the largest convoy operation so far (Raubgraf) 38 boats operated altogether and sank a total of 200,000 GRT.  Of these 38 boats, 8 reached the convoy during the first night and 6 of them sank almost half the total, about 100,000 GRT.  During the following 4 days and 4 nights, four times that number of boats sank only the same number of ships and each day they sank less.  The first surprise success was due to the fact that the escort was still slack and was taken by surprise, the fall in sinkings after that was the result of the constantly increasing strength of the escort.
 
 
 
- 102 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     The boat's tactics in this first stage of the action have not changed.  The boat must be on  no account be sighted. It is to be assumed that air escort will be slight at the beginning and boats should therefore dive if possible whenever an aircraft is observed.  If the aircraft is seen too late and the boat can no longer reach the prescribed depth of A + 20, her own safety naturally comes first.  In this case the undetected approach must be abandoned.
    Principle:  Everything depends on the first unobserved approach to the convoy.  Therefore keep the sharpest look-out.
    This also goes in particular for the passage to the disposition and while in disposition.  If the enemy discovers our intentions by sighting boats on their way or boats in the patrol line, the chance of a surprise attack is prejudiced.
    Close watch must also be kept on the Radar interception gear, so that boats can dive in good time if locating aircraft or vessels are observed.  If the boat does not want to come too close within range of enemy Radar to shadow mastheads or smoke clouds, it is possible to shadow from further off with the aid of the Radar interception set.  This has already been done successfully in many cases.  A boat which is approaching the convoy must behave in much the same way as, in nature, an animal in search of its prey.  She must approach the convoy slowly and cautiously, use her Radar interception gear and, as it were, smell out the strength of the air escort, the strength of the surface escort and the danger of being located, when she has a clear idea of the situation, she should think of a quick surprise attack.
  II. Action after being detected by escort of medium strength:
     When the enemy has once detected the presence of U-boats, either by sighting or because of a torpedo, this does not yet mean that the whole escort machinery is set in operation.  The escort forces and aircraft will of course be warned and vigilance will be increased.  But further air and escort forces cannot be raised at one stroke.  On an average, fresh forces do not arrive for at least a day, as has been shown in all past convoy operations.
    Even at this stage of the action it is not necessary to abandon all idea of the U-boat being observed.  If the boat succeeds in hauling ahead out of sight of the air escort, without being constantly forced to dive and thus dropping astern, this is of greater tactical value than if the boat's position is known due to constant shadowing by aircraft.  The boat then has the advantage of being able to find a diving position ahead of the convoy without being seen and can attack without the escort knowing anything about a boat about to attack or a danger zone.
    If a boat cannot get ahead because the air escort is too strong, then she must decide to engage the air and surface forces.   This decision must be made in good time, not only when the boat is dropping further astern, but as soon as the situation has been realized.
 
 
 
- 103 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     The decision depends on the position of the aircraft and the boat's own position in relation to the convoy.  If the boat has discovered that the aircraft are concentrated over a certain place, she must, if possible, avoid this concentration.  Her own position in relation to the convoy is therefore important, because, for instance, a boat which is astern of the convoy and cannot get ahead because of the strong air escort, will have to decide on a surfaced action in order to gain headway by proceeding surfaced.  On the other hand, a boat which is in a position ahead or abreast and does not encounter unduly strong air escort ahead of the convoy, should cover the last stretch to the diving position unobserved so as not to spoil her chances of a surprise attack by being sighted at the last minute.
  III. Action with strong air and surface escort:
     The last and most difficult stage of the convoy operation is reached when there is strong air and surface escort, as is likely to be the case today in the North Atlantic after the first day or the second, it is an open battle with aircraft and destroyers.  This action must precede the attack on the ships, as otherwise the boat will never reach a firing position or will be prevented from completing any attack by the numbers of escort vessels.  The boats must attempt to decimate the escort by sinking escort vessels and cause a general relaxation of the escort system.  The sinking of a few destroyers or corvettes can make things much easier for the U-boat pack, firstly because the absence of those vessels makes gaps in the screen and secondly because the loss of escort vessels has considerable moral effect on the enemy.  The fact will become known among destroyer crews and attacks on U-boats will be made with greater caution if the destroyer knows that there is a danger to herself in approaching the boat's diving position and not just good hunting.
    a) By day:
      The fight with the escort forces will take approximately the following course by day:  the boat which is attempting to get ahead and has therefore to fight off the aircraft with her Flak armament will not remain unchallenged by the surface escort.  The shadowing aircraft will bring up the destroyer and the boat will have to engage the destroyer.  In the ordinary way the destroyer, having received the boat's position from the aircraft, will approach her at inclination 0.  The boat must make use of this for her attack.  As inclination 0 is the most favorable position for firing at an approaching destroyer, it is correct for the boat to allow herself to be seen for a while as the destroyer appears on the horizon so that the latter will make directly for the diving position.  The submerged boat must then move away with some speed from the diving position, preferably in the direction of the destroyer, as the aircraft is sure to suspect her of sheering away from the destroyer.  It is important to steer a deceptive course when diving in order to divert the aircraft from the boat's actual course.  When the boat is sufficiently far off the diving position that the aircraft cannot detect her periscope she should slowly approach the destroyer to attack.
 
 
 
- 104 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      By day the boat will always have time to make a complete turning circle and then cover a certain straight distance under water before the destroyer is within firing range.
      There will be other chances of attacking destroyers when an escort vessel or a searching group are encountered by chance without their having been brought up by a shadowing aircraft.  In these cases the enemy will generally have had no previous warning and the U-boat has the chance to make a surprise attack.  Here the destroyer may approach at any inclination, but this should not present  any difficulty for the U-boat with the weapon now available.  The first and unavoidable necessity at this stage of the convoy action is to sink destroyers and boat must therefore decide to attack at all costs and must not take defensive action by diving to greater depths.
      Principle:  Every destroyer sunk makes it easier for the U-boats to achieve their ultimate aim, the attack on the ships.
      Procedure for underwater attacks by day depends on the boat's firing position.  If there is any prospect of torpedoing the ships, this takes first place, regardless of the escort.  But if the boat can only succeed in getting near the remote wing escort, then she must always aim at torpedoing an escort vessel.  In general in future every chance to attack the escort must be taken, as the boats are now equipped with the necessary weapon.  Only if at the same time, there is a chance to torpedo the ships, the attack on the destroyer takes second place.
    b) By night:
      Approximately the same situations will arise by night as by day.  So far, in past convoy operations, air escort has only very seldom been observed, so that effective interference from aircraft need not be expected.  If in future there should be intensive air reconnaissance by night, the danger involved would preclude a surfaced operation by the U-boat.  In such cases the boats should endeavor to haul ahead out of range of the close air escort, at a distance off of about 20 - 30 miles.  If a boat has sighted the convoy she must at all costs attack at once.  But air activity is not likely to be so strong in the immediate future that boats will not be able to haul ahead above water.  The aircraft take off from carriers by night and a reconnaissance of several aircraft always means a risk for the individual plane.  For this reason the aircraft usually fly with lights if there are several machines present.
      Destroyers which approach a boat by night by Radar must always be attacked on the surface.  Often, if the boat sees the approaching destroyer in time, she will be able to fire from inclination 0.  If this is not successful, she will still have a chance to move away, without diving as the minimum Radar range of the enemy destroyer is approximately 1000 to 1500 meters.  She will then have an opportunity to attack the destroyer with a second torpedo.  If she dives
 
 
 
- 105 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      on the other hand, there is no further hope of attacking the destroyer and she will most probably also lose contact with the convoy.
      In attacking the convoy the ship is the more important target by night as well as by day.  The boat must on no account even give herself away to the bulk of the ships by firing at a destroyer if this is not unavoidable.  If the boat can fire an anti-destroyer from her stern tube at the same time as attacking the convoy with her bow tubes, this is always useful.  The main thing here is to fire the shots approximately simultaneously.
    In conclusion, the following should be noted on the 3 different stages in the convoy operation.  The boat must start the action unobserved.  As the escort becomes stronger escort forces will have to be engaged to an increasing extent, the attempt to remain undetected will decrease in importance until finally the climax of the operation is reached in an open battle with the escort forces.  The day is likely to be the time for action with the escort, as most probably the destroyers, in cooperation with observer aircraft, will endeavor to prevent the boats from reaching an attacking position ahead, while at night, use must be made of the day's successful action for the attack on the ships.
    Uniform procedure on the part of all the boats in the various stages of the convoy operation is of particular importance.  If a boat remains above water in the first stage and fires her Flak guns she spoils other boats' chances of making a surprise attack.   Or if, in the last stage, a boat dives away from aircraft, she takes away from the success of the whole group, as all boats must aim at defending themselves against the aircraft and so attracting the escort away from the convoy.
  At the beginning of the third stage all boats should go over to surface action against aircraft as far as possible at the same time, the first boat which believes that hauling ahead submerged is no longer possible should make the short signal UJT1, meaning "I am remaining surfaced and using Flak".  This is the signal for all boats to remain surfaced and fire.  If all boats take the same action the enemy aircraft and escort vessels cannot take care of them all at once.
  In every recent convoy operation as many as 10 boats have grouped together.  In future an attempt must be made to avoid this.  Passage in company gives greater Flak protection, but when the enemy observes this grouping he can concentrate in one direction.  What we want to achieve, however, is an equal action all around the convoy so that the escort forces are dispersed.   If the escort detects a bunch of several boats they should all dive and abandon the attack for the present.  But if 4 - 5 individual boats are sighted or several groups of 2 - 3 boats it means that at least 6 - 8 escort vessels will be lured away from the convoy.
  Principle:  The attack must be made concentrically from all sides.  Therefore, do not form groups of more than 2 or at most 3 boats. 2 boats proceeding in company provide good Flak
 
 
 
- 106 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    protection and can give each other mutual assistance in an action against a destroyer.
       
B. For tactics to be employed in action against aircraft the guiding principles laid down in the Standing War Orders, the Special Orders and the Notes for Commanding Officers apply, for the use of the anti-destroyer torpedo, instruction given at the Torpedo Trials Command and the Firing Instructions for this torpedo.
  Individual tactical points are here once more discussed briefly.
  1) Aircraft:
     Procedure against aircraft depends largely on the type of aircraft encountered.  Before the enemy has been engaged, reconnaissance is usually flown by flying boats, Sunderlands, Catalinas and Lerwicks.  They are not very fast and are clumsy to handle and they represent the least danger for U-boats, as has been shown by previous experience mainly in Biscay.
     If the convoy's air escort is reinforced after U-boats have attacked the reinforcements will usually consist of 4-engined land-based aircraft, such as Boeings, Sterlings, Halifaxes, Lancasters and Liberators.  These are faster and easier to maneuver than flying boats but not nearly as dangerous as the Beaufighter which was so successful in Biscay.
    Recently carrier-borne aircraft have several times been reported with a convoy.   For past operations Commanding Officers have often spoken of these as "tired crows" - obviously the sinking of an aircraft carrier is of greatest importance.  If a boat sights a carrier she should attack at all costs; the carrier is always the most important target.
    The most essential thing to remember when aircraft are encountered is not to dive in any circumstances if the boat cannot reach a depth of at least A + 20 before the aircraft makes its run-in.  Any intermediate depth is dangerous, as the enemy is certain to use new, more dangerous bombs to attack a U-boat crash diving.  The Commanding Officer cannot emphasize this too strongly to his watchkeeping officers.
    If 2 or more aircraft attack, the Commanding Officer must consider carefully whether to dive or remain on the surface.   If he has the impression that he is in control of the situation and will not be surprised by cleaver flying on the part of the enemy, it is preferable to remain on the surface.  Good organization on the bridge is necessary above all things.  One man must be responsible for each aircraft.  From this observer's report the Commanding Officer must be able to form a clear idea all the time, as he himself will be concerned with handling the boat and keeping a lookout.  Order transmission plays an important part here.
    In general, any aircraft in the center of the Atlantic will only be able to make a few bombing runs at the beginning of its operation, because it is not possible to carry a large load of bombs over these vast distances owing to the fuel problem.   The aircraft will also endeavor not to have to start on its return flight with severe damage.
 
 
 
- 107 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Principle: An aircraft with a convoy will not press home its attack in the same way as do A/S aircraft in Biscay.
  2) Escort:
     With regard to firing at destroyers, it should be noted that the Commanding Officer should act with greater sang-froid than hitherto.  By day he always has time to reach the protective depth after the shot and by night to sheer off above water.  In any case the danger from depth charges is small as compared with danger from aircraft.
    At night it is always necessary to have anti-destroyer torpedoes ready to fire, as most situations by night necessitate very quick firing.
    The best solution with regard to carrying the torpedoes will probably be to have one in the tube forward and aft and one in a quick loading position.  Then the boat always has the chance of firing a second torpedo if the first attack fails.
     This question is discussed in greater detail here as the Torpedo Trials Command is instructing Commanding Officers in the technical use of this torpedo, assisted by an experienced U-boat officer.
  3)  Boats will be fitted out with 12 torpedoes altogether:
      4    Zaunkönig
      4   G 7A F.A.T. 1
      4 T 3 (with Pi 2), 2 of these F.A.T. II.
     They should be loaded as follows, whenever possible:
     
Day and night: No. II and No. V tube one Zaunkönig each and one reserve behind it.
By day: No. I and IV tubes one T III each.
By night: No. I and IV tubes one F.A.T. I each
  No. III tube one T 3 (F.A.T. II).
     The loading is left to the discretion of the C.O. because of the difficulties of reloading when there are still 2 torpedoes below the floor plates.  The 2 floor plate torpedoes cannot be dispensed with.  At all events however there must be at least 1 T 3 in the tube by day and one F.A.T. I by night.
  4) Location:
     To protect them against surprise attacks boats have been fitted out with the Hagenuk type of Radar interception gear; this indicates all location transmission, including short location transmissions, in the wave band so far observed.  Mention has been made earlier of the use of Radar interception gear for shadowing.
 
 
 
- 108 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     The use of the Radar decoy device Aphrodite is also most strongly recommended.  It gives one boat the opportunity of Dissembling a whole group, for instance by letting several Aphrodites drift past the convoy at night and so make a gap in the escort before she attacks.  Or if the boat wishes to attack from a certain quarter and the escort there is too strong, she can precede her attack by a group of scattered decoys so that the escort vessels will occupy themselves with them and thus make things easier for the boat.   (For details see Aphrodite Instructions)
  5) Radio:
    New weapons and new tactical procedure make it essential that, at the beginning, reports concerning these should reach other boats during actual operation.  This includes successes against aircraft and destroyers, failures for particular reasons, in so far as this information is important for other boats while the operation is still in progress.  A/c attacking and shadowing tactics, aircraft which have dropped all their bombs, concentration of air escort etc. are also important.
     In order not to overload the wave too much, Commanding Officers must consider each time if these matters are really of value for the others.  On no account must every little detail of damage to his own boat etc. be reported.  All reports which are of interest to Operational Control only should be made on both wavelengths.
    Do not report too much bad news, so as not to depress the other boats; every radio message goes the rounds of the crew in every boat.  If necessary report matters which ratings do not need to know by officer's cipher.
  Conclusion:
  In general is must be stated that this convoy operation will make greater demands on the boats than previously as regards courage and tactical efficiency.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
- 109 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
6.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
EH 33
U 190
-
BF 74
U 406
-
Op(EE 90)
U 600
-
ET 14
 
66
-
CD 64
196
-
Op(LT 90)
415
-
EE 16
604
-
FK 64
 
84
-
DO 21
197
-
Op(KQ 70)
454
-
BE 82
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
86
-
Op(ET 80)
198
-
KZ 55
466
-
CF 21
618
-
ET 93
 
107
-
BE 75
199
-
Op(GB 40)
468
-
Op(ET 50)
634
-
Op(ED 40)
 
117
-
CD 55
218
-
BF 52
489
-
AL 12
647
-
AK 34
 
129
-
CF 15
230
-
CB 58
508
-
ET 99
648
-
CG 21
 
134
-
CC 94
257
-
ET 98
510
-
EF 38
653
-
EF 22
 
155
-
BE 99
262
-
CE 14
51
-
DR 36
664
-
CD 35
 
168
-
FM 43
306
-
BE 99
525
-
CF 15
706
-
BE 59
 
172
-
FR 13
333
-
DS 81
532
-
FL 32
732
-
DN 76
 
177
-
Op(JB 10)
340
-
Op(ET 90)
533
-
FD 99
757
-
Op(ET 70)
 
178
-
KZ 39
358
-
Op(FE 36)
566
-
Op(CA 80)
760
-
CE 12
 
181
-
Op(KG 70)
359
-
Op(EC 60)
571
-
DS 81
847
-
AE 84
 
183
-
FM 58
373
-
BE 74
572
-
EF 40
956
-
AN 31
 
185
-
FK 50
382
-
EU 96
598
-
Op(FJ 30)
960
-
AN 31
 
188
-
FM 54
403
-
DT 79
445
-
Op(EU 70)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 571 - 572 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 648 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  U 218 - Brest;  U 956 - 960 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 185 torpedoed a 5,000 GRT freighter in FK 6272 and sank her later by gunfire.
    2) U 566 sank a "Somers" class destroyer on 5.8. in CA 8152 and then started on her return passage because of fuel.
    3) U 752 sank S.S. "Fernhill", 4,116 GRT, in ET 4418, proceeding from Liverpool to Buenos Aires, course 2100, 10 knots.
    4) U 177 sighted "Efthalia Mari", 4,195 GRT in KR 1543 and sank her.  Cargo:  coal from Durban to Acon, course 250.  Boat is starting on a protracted return passage with one torpedo left.
  b) Our own aircraft reported 4 destroyers at 1108 in BE 9616, course 2100.  Anti-submarine group possible.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BF 7911, FK 62, FK 6296, ED 1437 and one in an unidentified position.  A U-boat attacked or was attacked in ED 8251.
    2) English units were located in BE 3880, BF 4980, BF 77, AL 5460, BF 74, BE 2470.
  d)  None.
       
- 110 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 403 is to occupy the sea area off Dakar as attack area.  Boat has been informed of the situation there according to the experiences of U 515 and 306.
  c) U 333 and 571 now have one serviceable compressor each after exchanging spare parts.
  d) 1) C.O. of U 604 reported that he could not complete the return passage owing to damage received.  U 185 and 172 have been ordered to rendezvous in FL 12 and take over the crew, fuel and provisions.
    2) U 598 has not replied to several calls.  She refueled from U 487 on about 10.7. in DF 6882 and was then allocated as attack area the sea area off Pernambuco.  It is not known whether she arrived there as she did not report again after supplying.  She must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 185 1 ship
5,000 GRT
 
U 757 1 ship
4,116 GRT
 
U 177 1 ship
4,195 GRT
 
U 566 1 destroyer.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
EJ 41
U 188
-
FM 86
U 403
-
EJ 25
U 572
-
EE 93
 
66
-
CD 64
190
-
BE 72
406
-
Op(EE 70)
600
-
ET 17
 
84
-
DC 86
196
-
Op(LE 30)
415
-
DP 88
604
-
FK 39
 
86
-
Op(ET)
197
-
Op(KQ 70)
445
-
Op(ET)
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
107
-
BD 99
198
-
KZ 72
454
-
BE 80
618
-
ET 89
 
117
-
CD 64
199
-
Op(GB 40)
466
-
CF 31
634
-
Op(EC 36)
 
129
-
CE 63
230
-
CB 67
468
-
Op(ET)
647
-
AK 36
 
134
-
CC 93
257
-
ET 45
489
-
AL 15
648
-
BF 84
 
155
-
BF 78
262
-
CD 35
508
-
ET 97
653
-
DQ 93
 
168
-
FM 81
306
-
BF 78
510
-
DQ 99
664
-
CD 34
 
172
-
FK 85
333
-
DS 51
516
-
DF 96
706
-
BE 80
 
177
-
KR 15
340
-
Op(ET)
525
-
CE 62
732
-
DN 55
 
178
-
JA 11
358
-
FE 26
532
-
FM 41
757
-
Op(ES 63)
 
181
-
Op(KG 70)
359
-
Op(EC 50)
533
-
FL 37
760
-
CD 36
 
183
-
FM 97
373
-
BE 75
566
-
Op(CA 82)
847
-
AL 22
 
185
-
FL 17
382
-
EU 97
571
-
DS 51      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 572 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 634 - 648 - 653 - 732 - 757.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 111 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 66 was unsuccessfully attacked by carrier-borne aircraft while supplying in CD 6464.  She suggests a new rendezvous with U 117 in CD 3483 at 1200/8/8.
    2) U 181 sank a 4,000 GRT steamer, course 500, in KG 5878.
  b) Aircraft sighted a merchant ship and a torpedo boat at 1935 in BF 7129, course 200, medium speed.
  c) 1) English units were located in:  AK 6760, AM 1230, AM 2160, AL 05, BF 4863, AL 9630, BF 4940, BD 1920.
    2) U-boat sightings:  DC 3341, EB 9146.
    3) A U-boat attacked or was attacked in CA 9134, DC 3165, DC 9558.
    4) Torpedo report from an unidentified steamer from KG 8130 (U 181).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) After delivering fuel to U 66 and giving medical assistance, U 117 will steer for DF 62. All boats on return passage requiring fuel will proceed in the direction of this square.  All boats are to keep radio silence within a radius of 400 miles except for messages of tactical importance.
    2) As it seems hopeless for U 604 to attempt the return passage, the C.O. has been ordered to sink her.  U 604 and U 185 will rendezvous for this purpose in FK 3955 and proceed to FL 1255.  There U 604 will hand over all her fuel, half her provisions and important items of equipment as space permits.  U 172 will make for the latter square and take over the remaining provisions.  The crew of U 604 will then be shared between the 2 boats.
  c)  U 178 has not met the Italian boat at the new rendezvous JA 15.  A further rendezvous has been ordered for 0800/12/8 in KR 7855.
     U 178 also reported that she was fit for further operations after her overhaul in Penang base.
  d) 1) U 706 and 454 have not so far made passage reports due some days ago.  Both received orders on 1.8. to go to BF 4453 to assist U 383.  In approximately this position, U 706 was attacked by an aircraft.  She later reported that the aircraft was still shadowing.  Since then there has been no news of her.
       
- 112 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      U 454 on 30.7. suggested a rendezvous with U 706 in BF 8335.  Boats did not meet however.  Since then there has been no news of U 454.  She must be presumed lost due to air activity in Biscay.
    2) U 572 was to rendezvous on 3.8. in EE 9333 with U 406.  The latter reported however that U 572 had not arrived.  According to a Radio Intelligence report, a U-boat was attacked by an aircraft on 3.8. in EE 95.  There was no other boat in the vicinity, so this must have been U 572, which was probably sunk.  She must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 181 1 ship 4,000 GRT.  
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
EJ 49
U 185
-
FL 12
U 359
-
Op(EC 50)
U 532
-
FM 72
 
66
-
CD 37
188
-
FT 34
373
-
BE 84
533
-
FL 66
 
84
-
DC 92
190
-
BE 84
382
-
EU 87
566
-
CA 68
 
86
-
Op(ET)
196
-
Op(KE 30)
403
-
EJ 38
571
-
DS 16
 
117
-
CD 64
197
-
Op(JA 10)
406
-
Op(EE 90)
600
-
ES 32
 
129
-
CE 67
198
-
KY 95
415
-
DP 91
604
-
FL 12
 
134
-
CD 45
199
-
Op(GB 40)
445
-
Op(ET)
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
155
-
BF 84
230
-
CC 59
466
-
BE 97
618
-
ET 76
 
168
-
FT 23
257
-
ET 73
468
-
Op(ET)
634
-
DO 78
 
172
-
FK 67
262
-
CD 34
489
-
AL 15
647
-
AK 30
 
177
-
KQ 66
306
-
BF 84
508
-
ET 84
648
-
BF 89
 
178
-
JA 12
333
-
DS 16
510
-
DR 71
653
-
DQ 65
 
181
-
Op(KG 66)
340
-
Op(ET 12)
516
-
DG 48
664
-
CD 34
 
183
-
FT 38
358
-
FE 21
525
-
CE 67
732
-
DN 62
 
107
-
BD 97
757
-
Op(ET 40)
760
-
CD 34
847
-
AL 14
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 634 - 648 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 161 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  DN 7888, CC 3940, EC 11 and CD 3498 (American tanker "Gulf Dawn")
    2) Attacks on U-boats in DM 1986, DN 1964.
    3) Unidentified U.S.A. steamer reported a U-boat attack in CB 7163.
       
- 113 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    4) An English unit was located in BE 3590.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  U 604 had to leave the rendezvous in FK 3955 because of air activity.  She suggested a new rendezvous in FD 9555 at 0800/11/8.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
EJ 87
U 183
-
FU 44
U 359
-
Op(EC 50)
U 533
-
FM 75
 
66
-
CD 34
185
-
FU 12
373
-
BE 86
566
-
CB 47
 
84
-
DD 47
188
-
FT 66
382
-
FF 11
571
-
DF 99
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
190
-
BE 86
403
-
Op(EK 40)
600
-
EJ 86
 
107
-
CE 13
196
-
Op(KE 30)
406
-
Op(EE 90)
604
-
FL 12
 
117
-
CD 34
197
-
Op(KP 90)
415
-
DP 65
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
129
-
CE 85
198
-
JJ 13
445
-
Op(EU 70)
618
-
ET 71
 
134
-
CD 55
199
-
Op(GB 40)
466
-
BE 99
634
-
DO 84
 
155
-
BF 89
230
-
CC 65
468
-
Op(ET 60)
647
-
AK 30
 
161
-
BF 54
257
-
ES 69
489
-
AK 30
648
-
BF 83
 
168
-
FT 37
262
-
CD 34
508
-
ET 75
653
-
DR 17
 
172
-
FL 14
306
-
BF 89
510
-
DR 46
664
-
CD 34
 
177
-
KQ 92
333
-
DF 99
516
-
DG 43
732
-
DO 17
 
178
-
JA 25
340
-
EK 74
525
-
CE 85
757
-
Op(ET 40)
 
181
-
Op(KG 60)
358
-
ET 47
532
-
FM 87
760
-
CD 34
                   
847
-
AL 15
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 634 - 648 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  ED 2798, DM 2671.  An American tanker sighted a U-boat in CD 3498.
       
- 114 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) A U-boat attacked or was attacked in CB 4851.
    3) English units were located in BE 2690, BE 2740.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U 262 was attacked by 2 carrier-borne aircraft and damaged before she had started refueling from U 664.  One aircraft was certainly shot down and the other probably.  As there is no question of U 262 continuing her patrol because of considerable damage, she received orders to deliver her fuel and provisions to U 664 and U 760.  New rendezvous for this purpose is CD 2455.  After taking over a mains unit from U 161, U 664 will operate in the American area.  U 262 is returning.
    2) U 66 was forced to dive by patrol vessels, destroyers and aircraft at the rendezvous in CD 3485.  The C.O. reported that passage home was impossible owing to the condition of the wounded and damage to the boat.  She suggests putting into El Ferrol.  She has been ordered to supply as soon as possible from U 117, as the tanker is urgently needed.  U 66 is then to return to W. France.  She is only to put into El Ferrol if absolutely necessary and only for one night.  If she returns directly she will be picked up by a destroyer and aircraft in Biscay.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
  U 262                2 aircraft.
       
VI. General:        Serial Order No. 33.
    By using long-range reconnaissance aircraft and carriers, it is now possible for the enemy to cover not only areas off the coast, but the whole of the North and Central Atlantic by aircraft.  The danger of U-boats being depth charged when using their radio has therefore increased.  Aircraft Radar compensates for the errors of 50 - 60 miles in the bearings.  Note Standing War Order 273.  Also:
  1) When definitely detected by the enemy (sighting, attack) take the opportunity to send messages.
  2) If it is necessary to use radio at other times keep a special look-out and Radar interception watch afterwards.  If there is danger of being surprised, remain submerged for several hours if possible.
  3) Supervise the handling of the radio sets, tune them free of radiation.
 
 
 
- 115 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  4) There is less danger of being D/f''d on alternative frequencies.  For their use see Standing War Order No. 208.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
ES 26
U 185
-
FL 16
U 373
-
BE 98
U 566
-
CB 57
 
66
-
CE 17
188
-
FU 72
382
-
ET 97
571
-
DF 92
 
84
-
DD 46
190
-
BE 97
403
-
Op(EK 40)
600
-
EJ 93
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
196
-
Op(KE 30)
406
-
Op(EE 90)
604
-
FL 16
 
107
-
CE 14
197
-
Op(KP 90)
415
-
DQ 41
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
117
-
CD 39
198
-
GR 88
445
-
Op(EU 70)
618
-
ES 67
 
129
-
DG 13
199
-
Op(GB 40)
466
-
BF 78
634
-
DO 59
 
134
-
CD 61
230
-
CD 44
468
-
Op(ET 60)
647
-
AK 30
 
155
-
BF 80
257
-
ES 64
489
-
AK 30
648
-
BF 64
 
161
-
BF 49
262
-
CD 26
508
-
ES 93
653
-
DR 13
 
168
-
FU 44
306
-
BF 80
510
-
DR 27
664
-
CD 25
 
172
-
FD 13
333
-
DF 92
516
-
DG 25
732
-
DO 24
 
177
-
KQ 89
340
-
EJ 69
525
-
DG 13
757
-
Op(ET 40)
 
178
-
JA 31
358
-
ES 94
532
-
FT 26
760
-
CC 39
 
181
-
Op(KG 60)
359
-
Op(EC 50)
533
-
FT 21
847
-
AK 49
 
183
-
FU 81                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 634 - 648 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  U 648 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 525 and 129 as well as all boats on passage to the supply boat are to wait in the southern half of DF until U 117 arrives.
     U 230 is to steer for DF 62 to supply.
  c)  U 198 will deliver 40 cbm fuel to U 847.  They are expected to rendezvous on the Equator.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- 116 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
11.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
ES 62
U 183
-
FU 89
U 359
-
Op(EC 50)
U 533
-
FT 29
 
66
-
BF 76
185
-
FD 95
373
-
BF 77
566
-
CB 56
 
84
-
DD 55
188
-
FU 87
382
-
ET 84
571
-
DF 60
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
190
-
BE 99
403
-
Op(EK 40)
600
-
EJ 44
 
107
-
CD 37
196
-
Op(KE 30)
406
-
Op(EE 90)
604
-
FD 95
 
117
-
CE 45
197
-
Op(KP 90)
415
-
DQ 24
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
129
-
DG 18
198
-
GR 75
445
-
Op(EU 70)
618
-
ES 52
 
134
-
CD 39
199
-
Op(GB 40)
466
-
BF 76
634
-
DO 62
 
155
-
BF 55
230
-
CD 73
468
-
Op(ET 60)
647
-
AK 30
 
161
-
BF 47
257
-
ES 28
489
-
AK 30
653
-
DF 85
 
168
-
FU 79
262
-
CD 24
508
-
ES 64
664
-
CD 24
 
172
-
FD 95
306
-
BF 61
510
-
DF 88
732
-
DD 87
 
177
-
JA 21
333
-
DF 60
516
-
CE 98
757
-
Op(ET 40)
 
178
-
JB 11
340
-
EJ 39
525
-
DG 17
760
-
CC 61
 
181
-
Op(KH 40)
358
-
ES 59
532
-
FT 65
847
-
AL 75
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 155 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 306 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 634 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  U 155 - 306 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  Fighter sweeps in Biscay and reconnaissance flight in the Iceland area.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 181 sank the British S.S. "Glen MacArthur" 10,528 GRT with 3 hits in KR 2213, main course 550.  Boat is starting on her return passage with one air-driven torpedo.
  b)  Aircraft sighted 4 destroyers on varying courses at 0825 in AE 8560.
  c) U-boat sightings: CC 5868.
     English units were located in BF 4870, BE 3350, BE 32.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  U 178 has orders to continue on her passage via KJ 27 to LE 6636, if the Italian boat J 9 has not appeared by midday on 15.8. in KR 7855.
  d) 1) U 455 reported from FP 1495 that the medical officer was suffering from a serious abdominal disease.  A rendezvous was ordered immediately with U 86 or 468, but the order was
       
- 117 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      cancelled shortly after as the officer had meanwhile died.
    2) U 185, 172 and 604 were attacked and bombed by a Liberator at the rendezvous in FD 9555.  The aircraft was shot down.  Boats suffered only slight damage.  U 172 suspected a searching group in the vicinity.  Afterwards the whole crew of U 604 was taken over by U 185.  Orders had been given to sink U 604 because of damage suffered on 6.8.  There is no report of this yet.  U 172 and 185 are proceeding north and will meet again later to exchange personnel.
    3) So far U 489 and 647 have not reported passing the latitude of AL 15; the report was due several days ago.  Both last reported on 28.7. from AF 7369 and AF 4848 respectively.  On 29.7. they were informed that the crew of an aircraft, which had been shot down from a carrier-borne formation, were in the water in AF 70.  It is not impossible that both boats were destroyed by the same formation.  There were also 5 destroyers in the Iceland Passage on the 10th and 11th, so that they may also have been picked up by a patrol.  Both must be presumed lost.
    4) 3 boats, including U 155 and 306, have now passed through Biscay along the Spanish coast without being detected by Radar or aircraft.  It remains to be seen how long the enemy will continue in ignorance of this route.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 181 1 ship 10,528 GRT  
U 185 1 aircraft.    
       
VI. General:
  a) With the loss of U 489 the last fuel reserves for boats coming from the south are exhausted.  All boats will now have to be refueled from U 117, which is at present still with U 66.   They are:  U 84, 415, 653, 510, 333, 571, 600, 257, 508, 358, 618, 185, 172 and 230.
  b) U 525 and 129, on their way out, will be kept back in DF, in order to provide a reserve of supply.
  c) U 359 and 615 (Caribbean) and U 86, 445 and 468 (Freetown) will also have to return within the next few days, so that there will be no boats left in the operations areas in the Central Atlantic, except for U 403 off Dakar and U 43 off Lagos.  There is some anxiety about U 199 (Rio).  She has not replied to several orders to report.
  d) U 196 and 197 are still in the sea area between Madagascar and Africa. U 198, 177 and 181 are on return passage to Western France, U 178 on passage to Penang (IXD2 boats).  As these numbers show, successes can hardly be expected in August.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 118 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
12.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
ET 48
U 183
-
GG 17
U 359
-
Op(EC 50)
U 533
-
FT 65
 
66
-
CE 45
185
-
BE 74
373
-
BF 78
566
-
CB 65
 
84
-
DD 65
188
-
GF 38
382
-
ET 72
571
-
DF 60
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
190
-
CG 22
403
-
Op(EK 40)
600
-
EH 39
 
107
-
CD 52
196
-
Op(KE 30)
406
-
Op(EE 90)
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
117
-
CE 45
197
-
Op(KP 90)
415
-
DQ 23
618
-
EH 96
 
129
-
DF 60
198
-
GQ 93
445
-
Op(FF 14)
634
-
DP 15
 
134
-
CE 16
199
-
Op(GB 40)
466
-
BF 88
653
-
DF 83
 
161
-
BF 78
230
-
CD 88
468
-
Op(ET 60)
664
-
CD 24
 
168
-
GF 31
257
-
ES 46
508
-
ES 27
732
-
DD 86
 
172
-
FD 93
262
-
CD 24
510
-
DF 83
757
-
Op(ET 40)
 
177
-
JA 18
333
-
DF 60
516
-
CF 72
760
-
CC 54
 
178
-
KR 77
340
-
DT 99
525
-
DF 60
847
-
BD 36
 
181
-
KR 24
358
-
ES 43
532
-
FU 72      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 604 - 618 - 634 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 238 - 274 - 275 - 422 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance
    Against patrol activity in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 757 pursued an escort steamer and tug, course 1100, speed 18 knots, as far as EK 7998. She broke off the chase because of fuel, but was ordered to continue shadowing as supply was planned.
  b)  Our own aircraft reported:
    1) 1830 in BF 7239 3 small cruisers and 3 destroyers in line abreast, course 900, slow speed.
    2) 1950 in CF 3964 convoy consisting of 36 merchant ships, 9 escort vessels, one cruiser, course N, medium speed.
    3) 1937 in BE 9335 two N-bound destroyers.
    4) 202 in BF 7137 two destroyers, course 1100.
  c) 1) English units were located in BF 4898, AM 21, AK 8360, BF 4920.
    2) U-boat sightings:  BF 7334, DN 8446, BF 7263, CJ 9887.
      U-boat warning for KR 2212.
      U-boat attacked or was attacked in CC 5463.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 119 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) U 117 has been ordered to steer for DF 3742 as soon as she has finished with U 66.  Next supply operation will be there.
  c) 1) U 178 reported refueling of J 9 in KR 7855 carried out.  Boat would arrive off Penang at 0100/24/8.  She received orders not to be there until one hour after sunrise on 26.8.
    2) U 172 has suggested a new rendezvous with U 185 for the evening of 13.8. in FD 2763.  She will take over part of Höltring's crew.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
ET 81
U 185
-
FD 66
U 358
-
ES 15
U 532
-
GF 23
 
66
-
CE 45
188
-
GG 42
359
-
Op(EC 50)
533
-
FT 93
 
84
-
DE 44
190
-
BF 84
373
-
BF 84
566
-
CC 42
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
196
-
Op(KE 30)
382
-
ES 66
571
-
DF 56
 
107
-
CD 43
197
-
Op(KP 90)
403
-
Op(EK 40)
600
-
EH 31
 
117
-
CE 45
198
-
GQ 56
406
-
Op(EE 90)
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
129
-
DF 68
199
-
Op(GB 40)
415
-
DF 74
618
-
EH 68
 
134
-
CE 22
230
-
DF 25
422
-
AO
634
-
DD 99
 
161
-
CG 21
238
-
AO
445
-
Op(FF 10)
653
-
DF 83
 
168
-
GF 39
257
-
ES 17
466
-
BF 80
664
-
CD 24
 
172
-
FD 64
262
-
CD 24
468
-
Op(ET 60)
732
-
DD 44
 
177
-
JA 44
274
-
AO
508
-
ES 13
757
-
Op(ET 13)
 
178
-
KP 79
275
-
AO
510
-
DF 83
760
-
CC 45
 
181
-
KR 43
333
-
CF 56
516
-
CF 54
847
-
BD 66
 
183
-
GG 46
340
-
DT 68
525
-
DF 68      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 618 - 634 - 653 - 732.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance
    Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 757 broke off operations against the steamer she reported yesterday as they seemed unlikely to be successful.  She is starting on her return passage.
    2) U 406 situation:  6 - 14.8. in EF 40 and 70 northern half no enemy traffic, slight air activity by day, none at night.  One neutral seen on 9.8. and one on 13.8.  12.8. evaded 2
       
- 120 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      single and 2 quadruple fans in EF 4750.  Return passage because of fuel.
    3) U 566 was attacked by 3 aircraft on 7.8. in CA 6885 and shot down one Mitchell.
    4) U 760 beat off an attack by a Consolidated in CC 5186 on 12.8.  Three bombs fell just off her bows and she cannot continue operations owing to severe damage.  For further details see War Log of 14.8.
  b) Aircraft reported at 1328 6 destroyers, course 200, medium speed in BF 4790.  One flying boat with them.  The convoy reported yesterday was in CF 3620 at 1340.
  c) 1) English unit was located in BE 2530.
    2) U-boat sightings: in EP 4753, EB 3596 and CA 6122.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) U 760 was to have occupied squares CA 70 - 90 as operations area.  (The order is cancelled as U 760 is returning owing to damage).
  c) U 664 is to make for square CE 70 after supplying from U 262 and to take over a mains unit from U 161 in approximately that position.
  d) 1) Owing to the acute supply situation U 117 was ordered to report progress in refueling U 66 or when she would arrive at the new rendezvous.  U 66 replied that she had been waiting for 2 days for U 117 in CE 4555.  U 117 did not report and it must be assumed that she too is lost.  At 1153/7/8 U 66 and U 117 were unsuccessfully attacked by carrier-borne aircraft in CD 6464.  The boats then lost contact with one another and did not meet again.  It is probable that U 117 was picked up again by the carrier-borne aircraft and destroyed.
    2) There have been several Radio Intelligence reports during the last few days of attacks on U-boats in the area CB and CC.   It is assumed that carriers are stationed permanently also in this area.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 566                1 aircraft.
       
VI. General:                Cipher Security:
    (See next page)
       
    (Translator's note:  Nothing about cipher security on the next page.  3 pages of original missing here.)
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
       
       
- 121 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
14.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
ET 44
U 188
-
GG 57
U 359
-
Op(EC 50)
U 532
-
GF 38
 
66
-
CE 45
190
-
BF 89
373
-
BF 89
533
-
GF 22
 
84
-
DE 46
196
-
Op(KE 30)
382
-
ES 36
566
-
CC 27
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
197
-
Op(KP 90)
403
-
Op(EK 40)
571
-
DF 60
 
107
-
CC 66
198
-
CQ 51
406
-
Op(EE 90)
600
-
DS 85
 
129
-
DF 60
199
-
Op(GB 40)
415
-
DF 73
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
134
-
BD 98
230
-
DF 37
422
-
AN 30
618
-
EH 29
 
161
-
CG 12
238
-
AN 30
445
-
Op(FF 10)
634
-
DE 75
 
168
-
GG 45
257
-
EH 99
466
-
BF 80
653
-
DF 60
 
172
-
FD 28
262
-
CD 24
468
-
Op(ET 60)
664
-
CD 24
 
177
-
KZ 91
274
-
AN 30
508
-
EJ 74
732
-
DE 47
 
178
-
KR 67
275
-
AN 30
510
-
DF 60
757
-
EK 74
 
181
-
KR 47
333
-
DF 60
516
-
CF 29
760
-
CC 51
 
183
-
GG 82
340
-
DT 62
525
-
DF 60
847
-
BD 93
 
185
-
FD 28
358
-
EH 96            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 415 - 466 - 518 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 618 - 634 - 653 - 732 - 757 - 760.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  None.
  b) Aircraft reported a cruiser, course 00, medium speed, in BE 9413 at 1146.  2010 in BE 8398 convoy course 300, speed 7 knots.
  c) 1) Unidentified English units were located in BF 7420 - 7760 - 7570 - BE 9140.
    2) U-boat warning for KP 8320.
    3) U-boat sighting in AE 8943.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U 198, 181 and 196 have not got the new cipher setting Bellatrix.  They have been at sea since March.  U 533 will therefore rendezvous with U 198 on 18.8. in CG 4437, U 197 and 181 with U 196 from 17.8. in KQ 5855.
       
- 122 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Now that U 117 is lost, U 523 and 129 will be used as tankers and U 760 and 847 will also have to give up fuel.  The following supply operations have been ordered.
     
1) U 847 will deliver 15 - 20 cbm fuel to U 66 on 16.8 in CE 2652.
2) U 760 will refuel U 84 on about 18.8. in CD 7925 for economical return passage.
  U 760 will then return to Western French because of damage.
3) U 525 will supply U 230, 653, 415 from 15.8. in DF 5935.
  U 129 will supply U 634, 571, 333 from 15.8. in DG 4475.  All boats will received fuel and provisions for return passage at most economical speed.
4) Subsequently U 525 will steer for DF 9555 and U 129 for DG 7535.  The remaining boats are to be supplied in these positions.  Orders so far have been given for U 600 to make for U 525 and U 618 for U 129.
5) Approximately 400 cbm will be required to supply all boats on return passage.
  U 847, a Far Eastern boat, is to carry out her operation at all costs and cannot therefore deliver any fuel.  Another operational boat will probably have to be used as tanker to provide the remaining 60 cbm.
  d) 1) U 161 and Flieder are to rendezvous at 1200/20/8 in CE 4652 upper edge center.  U 161 will transfer one German Executive Officer, 1 Hagenuk set and the necessary radio personnel.
    2) U 199 last reported on 25.7. from GB 45.  She was to have met U 513 there but the rendezvous did not take place.  Afterwards U 199 operated in the sea area off Rio.  Since 7.8. she has several times been ordered to give her position and has not replied.   She must be presumed lost.
      The loss may possibly be connected with an American radio report, according to which the Brazilian S.S. "Bage" was sunk off the Brazilian coast on 31.7. and the attacking boat was also sunk.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:                Results of further investigation into the question of Metox radiation.
    Further investigations into the question of Metox receiver radiation (See War Log of 31.7) have shown:
  a) In the opinion of the technical authorities it is quite conceivable that a U-boat could be detected and approached by means of radiation of the Metox receiver when tuned to a
 
 
 
- 123 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    fixed frequency, though they doubt if the enemy actually makes use of this fact.  They consider that, when a searching watch is kept, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for an aircraft to make a target run-in.
     Examination of the boats' reports shows that there are few cases which provide any evidence of the enemy's making use of Metox.  The increasingly frequent short location transmission, numerous cases of constant radiation of enemy sets and various runs-in at boats which had not got their Metox receiver on, speak for the contrary.
  b)  Group Command West's Radar Experimental and Instructional Detachment has carried out further experiments.  The first experiments were made with Metox on shore.  Later experiments with Metox receivers with round dipole in U-boats showed the same range of radiation as in the first experiments.  Similar results were obtained with the receiver made by the firm of Grandin.  After further investigations with the receiver searching Group Command West considers that even in this case an expert enemy aircraft could detect and approach a U-boat.
  c) The head of the Naval Communications Bureau stated on 13.8.:
    A captured English pilot, when interrogated by an officer of the Communications Department in Oberursel Transit Camp, stated that English aircraft no hardly used their ASV for anti-submarine hunts, as the boats themselves radiated the frequency and made it possible for the aircraft to make a target run-in. ASV sets were only switched on for short periods to check the range.  Receiver radiation from U-boats could be detected at ranges up to 90 miles at a flying height of 240 - 1000 meters.
    Special importance must be attached to this statement by the English pilot in view of the most recent results of experiments and the events and losses in the Atlantic during recent months.  It is, of course, possible that the prisoner is deliberately attempting to mislead, especially as the ranges mentioned are most unlikely and could probably only be achieved with special highly sensitive receivers, but nevertheless, in view of the present situation, his statements must be accepted as true in as far as they affect future measures and decisions.   It is uncertain to what extent a searching receiver makes it more difficult for the enemy to detect and exploit radiation.
  Situation:
  Use of Metox and Grandin Radar interception gear means considerable risk for the U-boat, the full extent of which cannot at present be determined.   The risks run by a U-boat without Radar interception gear are known.  (Location and run-in by a Radar-fitted enemy without warning).  It is possible that by making use of Metox radiation the enemy can achieve greater ranges and, in heavy seas, a better run-in than he can with his ASV set.  Losses during the last few weeks cannot be fully explained, even taking into account the enemy Radar sets which are known to be available to the numerous aircraft which have operated.
 
 
 
- 124 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Decision:
  It is better to accept a known danger rather than risk the boats to an unforeseeable extent.
  Order:
    Radio message 2315/13 on all U-boat waves:
  "The suspicion that the enemy makes use of Metox radiation is further confirmed.  Use of Metox and Grandin receivers is now forbidden in all sea areas, as it is thought that enemy makes use of the receiver radiation to approach the U-boat from a great distance without himself using location gear.  All previous orders to the contrary are cancelled."
  Further Steps:
    It is now of the greatest importance to test the new Hagenuk receiver which is now coming into operational use, for radiation.  The range of radiation from the Hagenuk set is quite definitely less than that of the Metox receiver because of its construction.  Communications Experimental Command's first experiments (between 2 surface craft) place the range of this radiation on an average at one fifth that of Metox.   The reaction produced in the enemy's receiver unit by Hagenuk radiation is different from that produced by Metox.   It is to be expected that the enemy will not immediately recognize the radiation from the Hagenuk receiver as such if he detects it at all.
  After consultation with the head of the Naval Communications Department, everything is to be done to speed up these experiments with the Hagenuk receiver, including experiments with aircraft with sensitive receiver units, so that Operational Control will shortly have definite information.
    At the same time experiments are being carried out to improve the Hagenuk receiver.  It is hoped that, by quite simple methods, it will be possible practically to eliminate radiation from the receiver. The results are expected by the middle of next week.
  After these set-backs with the Metox receiver, the question of radiation from other short and long wave receivers used in U-boats will have to be carefully examined.  Arrangements have been made with the head of the Naval Communications Department.
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 125 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
15.August 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
EU 77
U 188
-
GC 88
U 359
-
Op(EC 50)
U 532
-
GG 44
 
66
-
CE 51
190
-
BF 85
373
-
BF 86
533
-
GF 18
 
84
-
DE 29
196
-
Op(KE 80)
382
-
EJ 96
566
-
CC 37
 
86
-
Op(EU 70)
197
-
Op(KP 90)
403
-
Op(EU 40)
571
-
DC 44
 
107
-
CC 67
198
-
GG 69
406
-
Op(EE 60)
600
-
DS 57
 
129
-
DG 44
230
-
DF 59
415
-
DF 82
615
-
Op(ED 40)
 
134
-
CF 13
238
-
AN 31
422
-
AN 31
618
-
DS 88
 
161
-
CF 37
257
-
EH 92
445
-
Op(EU 70)
634
-
DF 78
 
168
-
GG 81
262
-
CD 24
466
-
BF 82
653
-
DF 59
 
172
-
FD 27
274
-
AN 31
468
-
BF 82
664
-
CD 24
 
177
-
KZ 85
275
-
AN 31
508
-
EH 66
732
-
DE 43
 
178
-
KS 18
333
-
DG 33
510
-
CE 88
757
-
EJ 66
 
181
-
KQ 69
340
-
DT 32
516
-
CF 38
760
-
CC 66
 
183
-
GG 17
358
-
EH 64
525
-
DF 69
847
-
CE 31
 
185
-
FD 27                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 66 - 84 - 134 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 190 - 198 - 230 - 257 - 333 - 340 - 358 - 373 - 382 - 406 - 415 - 466 - 508 - 510 - 516 - 566 - 571 - 600 - 618 - 634 - 653 - 732 - 757 - 760.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay and attack on England-Gibraltar convoy traffic.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  None.
  b)  Aircraft reported:  1140 in CG 4218 convoy consisting of 30 merchant ships, 6 escort vessels and one cruiser, course 1600, medium speed. 1510 in BF 4118 2 corvettes, course 200.  1525 in BE 6365 one light cruiser, course 2700.
  c) 1) English units were located in BE 28, AL 7570, BF 1680, BF 1767, CG 1680.
    2) U-boat sightings:  EO 1423, BE 3355, BE 63 and one other in an unidentified position.
    3) English aircraft reported at 0344: have an ASV location. At 0355:  have abandoned the attack.
    4) Wreckage was sighted in ED 1149.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
       
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  d)  U 359 has not replied to several enquiries.  According to U 466, U 359 refueled on 12.7. in DF 9595 from U 487 and started on her passage to the Caribbean operations area as ordered.  As there has been no news of her since, it is not known whether she actually reached the Caribbean. There are several Radio Intelligence reports for this area, indicating that she may have been sunk by aircraft.   She must be presumed lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  The present situation in Biscay has been described in Serial Order No. 10 and radioed to the boats:
  1) Aircraft:
     Anti-submarine aircraft fly W. of 80 W., especially between the longitudes of 9 and 130 W., distributed evenly over the whole of the breadth of Biscay.  There is no fixed patrol system.  At present there are many aircraft operating by day, fewer by night.  Particularly few aircraft have been observed on moonless nights.
    When there are enemy convoys off Biscay air activity increases and covers area E. and W. of the route taken by convoys between 13 and 170.
    Attacking tactics:  After sighting a U-boat aircraft immediately make a surprise attack regardless of defences.  Sticks of 6 to 10 bombs at right angles to the boat's course.  It then shadows from first outside Flak range and brings up other aircraft.  From then on there will be continuous strong air activity in that area, at least by day.
  2) Surface craft:
     There are permanent anti-submarine groups at sea W. of 80 W.  The number and type of vessels varies and is not known.  Vessels concentrate according to the most recent U-boat sightings.  During August they were observed in BF 44, 45, 47, 48 to BF 75.  They are operated at short notice after a U-boat has been detected by anti-submarine aircraft.  Aircraft carriers and cruisers are to be expected W. of 90 W. when there are enemy convoys off Biscay.
       
       
                                                                    (Signed):  GODT. 
                                                                    Chief of Operations Department.
                                                                    For B.d.U.           
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 127 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U. Op.
Ref. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 343 ING.
     
7.August 1943.
       
U-boats as of 1 August 1943.
       
I
In Commission on 1 July 1943 :  
415
Commissioned during July:  
22
   
437
Losses on operations during July:
33
Trondheim:
1
Handed over to Japanese:
1
   
35
   
402
        plus foreigners:  
8
        Handed over to Italians  
5
       
II
Losses in July:      
In the Atlantic:
Type VIIC:
U 628 - 607 - 135 - 232 - 435 - 951 - 590 - 558 - 613 - 591 - 759 - 662 - 614 - 404 - 598
15
 
Type IXC:
U 126 - 535 - 514 - 506 - 527 - 509 - 513 - 504 - 67 - 160 - 159
11
 
Type XIV:
U 459 - 461 - 462 - 487
4
 
Type XB:
U 188 - 119
2
In the Mediterranean:
Type VIIC:
U 409 - 375 - 561
3
In Northern Waters
 
(Trondheim) Type VIIC: U 622
1
To be handed over to Japanese Type IXC: U 511
1
 
 
35
  For details of losses see Appendix.
       
III. Distribution of boats:
 
II
VIIa
VIIb/c
VIId
VIIf
IXb/c
IXD1
IXD2
Xb
XIV
Total
Operational:
6
-
123
2
-
31
2
8
1
3
176
Trials:
-
-
  110  
-
3
24
-
6
2
1
146
Training:
33
4
     39*     
-
-
4**
-
-
-
-
80
 
  39  
4
272
2
3
59
2
14
3
4
402
* = 21of these temporarily detached for training.    
** = 1 of these (U 532) temporarily detached for training.
   
       
  During July:
    
Became operational :   +
4
Total number decreased by:   -
8
Number of operational boats decreased by:   -
31
Number of boats on trials increased by:   +
17
Number of School boats increased by:   +
1
 
 
 
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IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1/8/1943:
    
Atlantic
137
 
Mediterranean
14
   
Northern Waters
19
   
Black Sea
6
   
176
       
V. During July in the Atlantic:
    
Daily average at sea:
84
Of these, in operations areas:
34
On passage:
50
Of the latter, on return passage:
14
       
VI. Sailed for the Atlantic during July:
    
From home
3
From W. France
45
       
       
                                                            (Signed):  GODT. 
                                                                Chief of Operations Department.
                                                                    For B.d.U.           
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 129 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Appendix to Naval War Staff (2nd Division) Most Secret S.O. Only 343 ING.
   
  Appendix to II (Details of losses):
   
 
U 628 Experience boat.  Last report 2.7.  Loss probably due to aircraft or aircraft groups in Biscay
   
U 607 Second patrol.  Last report 13.7. Biscay.  Loss presumed due to aircraft in Biscay.
   
U 135 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol.  Last report from U 193 2.7. W. of Canary Islands.  Loss presumed due to aircraft.
   
U 232 First patrol.  Last report 5.7. Azores.  Loss almost certainly due to aircraft.
   
U 590 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol.  Last report 5.7. Brazil.  Loss by aircraft certain.
   
U 558 Experienced boat.  Last report 20.7. Biscay.  Loss definitely due to aircraft, as boat was unable to dive after an air attack and severely damaged.
   
U 613 Experienced boat.  Last report 18.7. after passing through Biscay. Loss probably due to carrier-borne aircraft.
   
U 591 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol.  Last report 2.7. between the Azores and Portugal.  Loss presumable due to air attack.
   
U 759 Experienced boat.  Last report 11.7. Caribbean.   Loss presumed due to air attack.
   
U 662 Experienced boat.  Last report 21.7. Brazil.  Loss presumed due to air attack.
   
U 614 Experienced boat.  Last report 28.7. via U 404 Biscay.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or anti-submarine groups in Biscay.
   
U 404 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol.  Last report 28.7. Biscay.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or anti-submarine groups in Biscay.
   
U 598 Experienced boat.  Was to have proceeded to Pernambuco sea area after supply 10.7.  No report.  Loss presumed due to aircraft.
   
U 126 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol.  Last report 3.7. from U 154.  Loss due to aircraft in Biscay.
   
U 535 First patrol.  Last report from U 536 from Biscay re air attack.  Lost by air attack.
 
 
 
- 130 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
U 435 Experienced boat.  Last report 8.7 west of Portugal.  Loss due to air attack fairly certain.
   
U 951 First patrol. Last report 8.6. Atlantic.   Loss due to air attack fairly certain.
   
U 514 Experienced boat.  No report after leaving port.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or anti-submarine groups in Biscay.
   
U 506 Experienced boat.  No report after leaving port.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or anti-submarine groups in Biscay.
   
U 527 Second patrol.  Last report 21.7. W. of Canary Islands.  Loss by aircraft.
   
U 513 Experienced boat.  Last report 15.7. Brazil.  Loss presumed due to aircraft.
   
U 509 Experienced boat.  Last report 12.7. W. of Gibraltar.  Loss presumed due to carrier-borne aircraft.
   
U 504 Experienced boat.  Last report 30.7.  Air attack in Biscay.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or anti-submarine groups in Biscay.
   
U 67 Experienced boat.  Last report 13.7. Atlantic.  Loss presumed due to carrier-borne aircraft.
   
U 160 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol. Last report 10.7. W. of Spain.   Loss presumed due to carrier-borne aircraft.
   
U 159 Experienced boat.  C.O.'s first patrol.  Last report 29.6. Atlantic.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or surface forces.
   
U 459 Experienced boat.  Last report parting from destroyer escort in Biscay.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or surface vessels in Biscay.
   
U 461 Experienced boat.  Last report air attack in Biscay, 30.7.  Loss presumed due to aircraft or anti-submarine groups in Biscay.
   
U 462 As U 461.
   
U 487 First patrol.  Last report 11.7. Atlantic.  Loss presumed due to aircraft.
   
U 409 Experienced boat.  Last report 12.7. North Africa.  Cause of loss unknown.
   
U 375 Experienced boat.  Last report 25.7. E. coast of Sicily.  Cause of loss unknown.