U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30332

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 September 1943

PG30332

16.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 58	U 229	-	BE 14	U 413	-	BF 40	U 621	-	Op(BE 73)
	107	-	CD 59	238	-	AL 12	419	-	AF 82	641	-	BE 18
	123	-	Op(EE)	260	-	AK 98	422	-	AE 81	643	-	AF 76
	161	-	Op(FQ)	270	-	AL 78	426	-	AN 36	645	-	BD 26
	168	-	KH 45	275	-	AE 82	448	-	BF 82	666	-	BE 15
	170	-	BD 97	279	-	AE 52	460	-	BD 88	731	-	BD 23
	177	-	ES 57	281	-	AN 36	468	-	CF 34	758	-	BE 73
	181	-	FT 62	305	-	BD 35	518	-	DO 22	842	-	AN 36
	183	-	KF 69	309	-	AF 72	532	-	KH 57	844	-	AN 36
	188	-	KG 72	336	-	BF 46	533	-	KG 57	952	-	BE 43
	196	-	FT 37	341	-	AL 77	536	-	BC 98	963	-	AF 10
	198	-	DG 38	377	-	BE 56	539	-	AF 76	338	-	AK 99
	214	-	DG 79	378	-	BE 27	584	-	BD 39
	220	-	AE 84	386	-	AL 77	603	-	BE 59
	223	-	BF 83	402	-	BE 14	610	-	BF 48

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 309 - 413 - 963.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Bay of Biscay.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 488 sighted at 1115 in CF 2922 a British U-boat of medium size.
	b)	Our own aircraft sighted at 0940 in BF 1694 two destroyers and two minesweepers, with streamed search gear, course 95⁰.
	c)	1)	British units were located in BF 4580, BF 1640, CG 52.
		2)	Allied vessel twice sighted periscope in CC 5267 (not one of ours).
		3)	SOS message from unknown vessel in position not deciphered.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Group "Leuthen" has received the following order: Operations only on W-bound convoys. As from 21 September ONS convoy is expected, as from 23 September ON convoy. Both W-bound. They may be late. If E-bound convoys are sighted no operation, but utilize any favorable opportunity for attack. Only report if boat is noticed by the enemy; after utilizing any chance for attack return as quickly as possible to position in patrol line.
	b)	New objective for U 68, after rendezvous with U 621 is EH 10. In about this position refuel from U 488 further operations intended in the eastern half of the Guinea Bay.

- 184 -

	c)	1)	The intended reprovisioning for U 181 - 196 and 177 is not necessary since the boats have sufficient supplies on board.
		2)	In view of intended operations by U 170 off Rio, refueling from U 460 has been cancelled. The boat will take over fuel from south-bound tanker U 488, in about EH 10.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

VI.	General:
	Admonitory Radio Message:
	1)	There is no longer any area in which surprise attacks by aircraft may not be expected.
	2)	Aircraft in the North Atlantic usually fly low; in mid-Atlantic generally at about 2,000 m., and are therefore not sighted until they have reached a height of 30 to 40 degrees, instead of being observed on the horizon.
	3)	Therefore, in normal areas there are to be 4 lookouts to sea and 2 for aircraft on the bridge. In areas in which aircraft are very active, even at night, 4 lookouts for aircraft and 2 lookouts to sea.
	4)	For aircraft lookouts, sun-glasses of normal strength should be unscrewed or raised so that the field of vision is greater. Use strong sun-glasses for looking into the sun. If the sun is low 1 aircraft lookout with sun-glasses on the side toward the sun, without sun-glasses on the side away from the sun.
	5)	When proceeding on the surface Flak guns always ready to fire, i.e. cocked and secured, magazine in firing position directed high.
	6)	Even in mid-Atlantic only the personnel most necessary on the bridge. The Commanding Officer decides on the necessary number. Only in exceptional circumstances come on to upper deck during daytime. No "Kraft durch Freude" exercises.
	7)	When refueling, during which the boat is in a particularly unfavorable condition for diving because of oil pipes, lines, proceeding on main engines and personnel working on deck, have guns loaded with time fuze 0, if available, and directed outward. Waiting boats no longer form an all-round screen to the limits of visibility but form an all-round screen at 500 m. for Flak protection. Strict lookout to be kept and not to be diverted by Commanding Officer's orders to turn ship about.

- 185 -

	8)	Never be stopped by day, patrol slowly up and down in waiting positions with 1 Diesel, boat must always be quickly maneuverable.
	9)	Only boats which determine every possible defence situation beforehand, adjust their actions accordingly, continually practice and improve them and carry them out automatically, will overcome successfully enemy defence and be able to attack with complete readiness for operations and achieve good results.

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17.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 47	U 229	-	AL 74	U 413	-	BF 55	U 621	-	Op(BE 81)
	107	-	CD 65	238	-	AL 12	419	-	AF 47	641	-	BE 11
	123	-	Op(EE)	260	-	AK 92	422	-	AE 76	643	-	AF 73
	161	-	Op(FQ)	270	-	AL 85	426	-	AN 31	645	-	AK 95
	168	-	KH 15	275	-	AE 84	448	-	BF 81	666	-	AL 78
	170	-	BD 88	279	-	AE 50	460	-	BD 88	731	-	AK 92
	177	-	ES 19	281	-	AN 31	488	-	CF 89	758	-	BE 18
	181	-	FL 89	305	-	AK 96	518	-	DO 11	842	-	AN 31
	183	-	KF 38	309	-	AF 57	532	-	KH 29	844	-	AN 31
	188	-	KG 42	336	-	BF 45	533	-	KG 27	952	-	BE 15
	196	-	FM 88	338	-	AK 69	536	-	BC 89	963	-	AF 59
	198	-	DH 11	341	-	AL 47	539	-	AF 73	402	-	AL 75
	214	-	DS 21	377	-	BE 55	584	-	BD 33
	220	-	AE 79	378	-	BE 13	603	-	BE 58
	223	-	BF 85	386	-	AL 71	610	-	BE 69

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 309 - 413 - 963.
	Entered Port: U 963 - Drontheim; U 281 - 426 - 842 - 844 - Bergen.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	None.
	b)	"Konder" sighted at 1523 in BF 8477 enemy U-boat. Our own boats were warned.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings: One sighting in indefinite position probably W. of Portugal.
		2)	U-boat attacked or was attacked in DO 2429 (U 518).
	d)	None.

- 186 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	On orders of the Commander in Chief of the Navy 7 further boats will be withdrawn for the Mediterranean. They are the following: U 223 - 264 - 667 - 450 - 466 - 455 and 420. It was intended to break through the Straits of Gibraltar in two groups but this cannot be done owing to the fact that the boats will not all be ready at the same time. U 223 is still at sea.
			Boats have been ordered to utilize favorable opportunities for attack while underway, but not to attack any convoys. If they are not successful in breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar at the first attempt, the boats are to withdraw, allow anti-U-boat activity to subside and attempt the break-through once more after two days. They are only to return if their "Wanze" gear is faulty or if they have extensive engine trouble.
		2)	The following radio message has been sent by the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Monsun boats which will reach their operational area in about 10 - 14 days:
			"You will reach your operational area after a particularly long passage for which extensive preparations were necessary.
			This operation will only be worth all this if you utilize all your opportunities. I expect each one of you to make a great success of this undertaking."
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.






- 187 -

18.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 81	U 220	-	AE 77	U 341	-	AK 63	U 532	-	LW 97
	107	-	CE 41	223	-	BF 76	377	-	BE 19	533	-	KG 12
	123	-	Op(EE)	229	-	AL 71	378	-	AL 87	536	-	BC 86
	161	-	Op(FQ)	238	-	AL 13	386	-	AK 66	539	-	AF 48
	168	-	LW 79	260	-	AK 65	402	-	AL 72	584	-	AL 74
	170	-	CE 27	270	-	AL 47	413	-	BF 52	603	-	BE 54
	177	-	EJ 75	275	-	AE 79	419	-	AE 69	610	-	BE 65
	181	-	FL 58	279	-	AE 56	422	-	AE 78	621	-	Op(BE 81)
	183	-	LU 97	305	-	AK 69	448	-	BF 72	641	-	AL 75
	188	-	KG 11	309	-	AF 59	460	-	BD 80	643	-	AF 48
	196	-	FL 68	336	-	BE 66	488	-	CF 54	645	-	AK 68
	214	-	DS 11	338	-	AK 66	518	-	DN 31	666	-	AL 72
	198	-	CF 81	731	-	AK 68	758	-	BE 11	952	-	AL 78

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 309 - 413.
	Entered Port: U 413 - Brest; U 309 - Drontheim.
	Sailed: U 631 - Brest; U 667 - St. Nazaire; U 537 - 848 - Kiel; U 505 - Lorient; U 389 - Drontheim.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 488 sighted on 17 September 1943 in CF 5720 an enemy aircraft carrier. Boat is proceeding on outward passage.
	b)	None.
	c)	Enemy units were located in BE 6610, CG 5770, AL 6910.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Boats have received the following instructions regarding the anti-convoy engagement expected during the next few days.
		1)	The use of "Hagenuk wave indicator" should not affect the tactics of the boats near the convoy according to "Principles of attack on Convoys". This apparatus is only a means of ensuring against surprise attacks off the convoy, but must not induce the boat to submerge if the enemy is not in sight. Even at the beginning of the operation against the convoy, when the aim of the boat is to approach unnoticed, interception of location is merely a warning for the boat to enable it to submerge with increased readiness immediately on being sighted.

- 188 -

		2)	Special reference is made to the facility for maintaining contact with locating vessels and with the convoy by means of "Hagenuk".
		3)	Since very good results have been achieved with "Aphrodite" decoys just lately, these should definitely be used to facilitate night attacks.
	b)-	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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19.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 80	U 229	-	AL 44	U 419	-	AE 65	U 610	-	BE 56
	107	-	CE 24	238	-	AL 17	422	-	AL 12	621	-	BE 82
	123	-	Op(EE)	260	-	AK 03	437	-	BF 58	631	-	BF 54
	161	-	Op(FQ)	270	-	AL 41	448	-	BE 93	641	-	AL 47
	168	-	LW 49	275	-	AE 78	460	-	BD 80	643	-	AE 66
	170	-	CE 57	279	-	AE 58	488	-	CF 75	645	-	AK 66
	177	-	EJ 44	305	-	AK 63	505	-	BF 54	666	-	AL 44
	181	-	FL 24	336	-	BE 65	518	-	Op(DN 10)	667	-	BF 58
	183	-	LU 59	338	-	AK 03	532	-	LW 68	731	-	AK 63
	188	-	LU 93	341	-	AK 38	533	-	LV 74	758	-	AL 74
	196	-	FL 26	377	-	AL 87	536	-	CC 23	848	-	AO
	198	-	CF 56	378	-	AL 72	537	-	AO	952	-	AL 72
	214	-	DR 34	386	-	AK 03	539	-	AF 44
	220	-	AL 11	389	-	BF 59	584	-	AL 47
	223	-	BE 78	402	-	AL 44	603	-	BE 54

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 621.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 218 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	Convoy No. 43 see IVa.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British units were located in BF 7123, BE 9820, BF 1840, BF 1860, BF 2470.
		2)	--

- 189 -

		3)	Unknown American vessel gave SSS and SOS message from GR 6821 (None of our own boats in the vicinity).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 43:
		From the patrol line of Group "Leuthen" U 270 reported at 0406 a W.-bound convoy in AL 1944. This was probably ON 202. This was not certain because, as data was lacking, dead reckoning of the convoys was no longer accurate.
		U 270 was given freedom of attack and ordered to report on further contact. The whole of Group "Leuthen" was sent in to operate at maximum speed. Further boats are expected to make contact as weather conditions are considered favorable with good visibility and W. to N.W. wind strength 3 - 5. Up to 0800 no further reports had been received. Group "Leuthen" has been ordered to operate mainly in night attacks and only to utilize favorable opportunities for attack by day.
	b)	Objective for U 336 and 610 after passing through the Biscay area is AK 65.
	c)	1)	For the purpose of handing over the second "Hagenuk" from U 68 to U 621 new rendezvous is suggested by U 621 at 2000 on 19 September in BE 5942. Control is agreed and orders boats to continue outward passage or return if the rendezvous had not been effected by 1200 on 21 September.
		2)	As ordered U 170 reported on passing latitude of CE 78 that she had taken fuel and provisions from U 460 (on about 14 September) in BD 8855.
	d)	1)	A British aircraft sighted a W.-bound U-boat at 1057 in AL 1564 and reported later having attacked it at 1110 with depth charges and having probably scored 4 hits.
			In the course of the afternoon several short signals and radio messages were intercepted by Control station which could not be deciphered. The first assumption that these were from a convoy was not confirmed. It is possible that the boat, on being attacked by aircraft tried to send out with emergency transmitter and did not get through.
		2)	U 218 put out today for minelaying off Trinidad (see enclosure).

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- 190 -

20.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 59	U 223	-	CG 22	U 402	-	Op(AL 19)	U 610	-	BE 55
	107	-	CE 23	229	-	Op(AL 41)	419	-	AE 67	621	-	BE 59
	123	-	Op(EE)	238	-	Op(AK 38)	422	-	AL 13	631	-	BF 46
	161	-	Op(FQ)	260	-	Op(AK 36)	448	-	BE 95	641	-	Op(AL 41)
	168	-	LW 27	270	-	Op(AK 03)	460	-	BD 80	643	-	AE 68
	170	-	CE 76	275	-	AK 11	488	-	CE 99	645	-	Op(AK 03)
	177	-	EJ 11	279	-	AE 81	505	-	BF 49	666	-	Op(AL 41)
	181	-	FD 85	305	-	Op(AK 38)	518	-	Op(DN 10)	667	-	BF 82
	183	-	LU 28	336	-	BE 64	532	-	LW 39	731	-	Op(AK 38)
	188	-	LU 64	338	-	Op(AK 36)	533	-	LU 66	758	-	Op(AL 44)
	196	-	FD 94	341	-	Op(AK 34)	536	-	BB 99	848	-	AN 36
	198	-	CF 38	377	-	AL 72	537	-	AN 36	952	-	Op(AL 44)
	214	-	DR 27	378	-	Op(AL 44)	539	-	AE 68
	218	-	BF 65	386	-	Op(AK 36)	584	-	Op(AL 19)
	220	-	AK 35	389	-	AF 57	603	-	BE 16

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 621.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 221 - 455 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 43, see paragraph IVa.
		2)	U 161 sank steamer "St. Usk" 5,472 GRT, course 45⁰, in FR 52.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British unit was located in AL 1970.
		2)	U-boat sightings: MP 7333 and 7341 (probably Japanese boats). Further sighting in KZ 1788. (Not one of ours). A further sighting in the Bay area and 7 off Convoy No. 43.
		3)	Three attacks by aircraft on U-boats off Convoy no. 43, one attack being in AK 0349. U-boat attacked or was attacked in DO 5777 (U 518?).
		4)	Two SSS and torpedoing reports from unknown position (Convoy No. 43).
	d)	None.

- 191 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 43:
		The weather situation in the area of the convoy on the day of the 20th and night of 20-21st, was wind W. 3, sea 3 and visibility good - extremely good conditions for the convoy operation.
		Contact: After U 270 had found the convoy at 0406 in AL 1944, 3 further boats took up contact with the convoy on the morning of the 20th, those being U 238, U 338 and U 731. At 1130, however, contact was lost in AK 3931 and was not taken up again by day. Apart from one vessel with a destroyer, which was reported by U 305 at 1922 in AK 0259, no other boat was able to regain contact.
		It was not until the evening that U 260 sighted the convoy again in AK 0231. A further 4 boats, U 584, U 641, U 377 and U 270 then took up contact with the convoy again in the night, but to a certain extent only sighting starshells. According to the latest report the position of the convoy on the 21st at 0610 was AK 2949 with course 240⁰.
		The convoy was proceeding up to then on the Great Circle westward and in the night of 20-21st turned slowly aside on the Great Circle to the S.W. The speed estimated was 9 knots which corresponds to that of the ONS. This must, therefore, have been ONS 202.
		Escorts: Air. By day and night there were 2 machines over the convoy at the same time, which was ascertained definitely from intercept messages. 2 boats reported aircraft attacks. At 1713 U 338 gave the agreed short signal "Remaining surfaced for Flak defence", which was an indication for all the boats that air cover was too strong for them to approach without being observed. All the boats should have remained surfaced as ordered after receiving this signal, in order to take defensive action together against aircraft.
		Unfortunately the short signal came at a time when there were still too few boats in the vicinity of the convoy so that the intended effect, i.e. that of dispersing the escort, was not successful and the small number of boats up to the convoy alone bore the brunt of the attacks.
		It was also unfortunate that the boats could not be massed quickly near the convoy, because there were great variations in fixes from the reports received, which made it very difficult for the boats to find the convoy.
		Naval Escort: It was clear from the numerous destroyers sighted, some away from the convoy, that the convoy was proceeding with a larger number of escort vessels, primarily remote escorts than hitherto. Altogether, up to the morning of the 21st, 15 attacks were reported with Zaunkönig torpedoes on destroyers.

- 192 -

Sinkings:			Assumed:
U 238	in AK 3939	1/5,000 sunk	1/5,000 sunk
		1/5,000 probably sunk
U 645	in AK 0314	1/5,000 sunk	1/5,000 sunk
U 270		Zaunkönig firing on destroyer	1 destroyer probably sunk
U 260	in AK 0323	" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
U 952	in AK 2962	" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
U 377	in AK 2927	" " " "	1 destroyer probably sunk
U 305	in AK 0218	" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
		" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
U 641	in AK 2936	" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
U 229	in AK 2889	" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
U 584	in AK 2949	" " " "	1 destroyer probably sunk
U 270	in AK 2882	" " " "	1 destroyer sunk
Total result: 3 ships, together 15,000 sunk
	7 destroyers sunk, 3 probably sunk.

The operation against the convoy is being continued.

b) -

None.

Reports of Success:

U 161	1 ship	5,472 GRT
238	2 ships	10,000 GRT
645	1 ship	5,500 GRT
270	1 destroyer
260	1 destroyer
952	1 destroyer
377	1 destroyer
305	2 destroyers
641	1 destroyer
229	1 destroyer
584	1 destroyer
270	1 destroyer.

- 193 -

21.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 59	U 221	-	BF 91	U 389	-	AF 46	U 603	-	AL 70
	107	-	CE 33	223	-	CG 27	402	-	Op(AK 29)	610	-	BE 52
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	229	-	Op(AK 18)	419	-	AE 82	621	-	BE 59
	161	-	Op(FR 53)	238	-	Op(AK 27)	422	-	Op(AK 01)	631	-	BF 45
	168	-	LM 88	260	-	Op(AK 18)	448	-	BE 81	641	-	Op(AK 01)
	170	-	DG 18	270	-	Op(AK 18)	455	-	BF 91	643	-	AE 67
	177	-	DT 72	275	-	Op(AK 01)	460	-	BD 80	645	-	Op(AK 01)
	181	-	FD 51	279	-	AE 76	488	-	DG 26	666	-	Op(AK 01)
	183	-	LU 15	305	-	Op(AK 29)	505	-	BF 48	667	-	BF 85
	188	-	LU 25	336	-	BE 53	518	-	Op(DN 10)	731	-	Op(AK 27)
	196	-	FD 53	338	-	Op(AK 27)	532	-	LM 99	758	-	Op(AK 27)
	198	-	CG 11	341	-	Op(AK 01)	536	-	BB 94	848	-	AN 31
	214	-	DR 41	377	-	Op(AK 27)	537	-	AN 31	952	-	Op(AK 18)
	218	-	BF 49	378	-	Op(AK 01)	539	-	AE 67	533	-	LU 37
	220	-	AK 27	386	-	Op(AK 01)	584	-	Op(AK 01)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 621.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 91 - 155 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 43, see IVa.
		2)	U 539 was attacked in AE 8328 shortly before dark by a British aircraft.
			The Commanding Officer was reminded that, according to Standing Order No. 13, boats may only surface by night for charging batteries, and that by going against these orders other boats are only endangered. In the course of the day considerable enemy radio traffic was observed in the Iceland Passage. There has been no further report from the boat.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British units were located in BE 5296, BF 4461, BE 3860, AM 0170, AL 50 upper half.
		2)	U-boat sightings: 1 sighted in the Iceland Passage, a further one in MZ 8910 (possibly one of ours).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 43 see page 195.
	b)	U 279, 419, 539 and 643 coming from home waters will proceed to AK 50 after passing the Iceland Passage.

- 194 -

		They are to report their position when reaching latitude of AL 14.
		U 279 which was to have landed a spy in Iceland has been ordered, if still possible, not to carry out this task but to bring him back again. (According to a Reuter message the landing of spies in Iceland has been discovered by the enemy).
	c)	1)	U 603 - originally belonging to Group "Leuthen" - is in a position so far behind the convoy there are little prospects of success if she continues her passage. It is intended to dispose this boat and further ones coming from Western France, after refueling from U 460, in a patrol line in the area of the Newfoundland Bank.
			Order: As from 23 September the following will refuel from U 460 to full capacity in BD 6755: U 448, 610, 336 and 603. After this U 460 will remain in this area and the remaining boats will proceed to BD 39.
		2)	U 68 and 621 have not met up to now to continue their passage as ordered. Owing to faulty "Hagenuk" on U 460 U 68 has been ordered, with increased day's run, to BD 6755 and will hand over the "Hagenuk" provided for U 621 to U 460.
		3)	The intended re-provisioning of U 177 - 181 and 196 is not necessary as all three boats have now reported. U 488 will, therefore, remain in the present area - DG 52 and will there refuel U 68 to full capacity in a few days. Subsequently U 488 will be withdrawn to the N. to refuel convoy boats.
	d)	None.

IV.	a)	Convoy No. 43:
		On the morning of the 21st there was fog in the area of the convoy which persisted the whole day and during the night of 21st-22nd September. At 1000 U 377 reported from AK 0167 bearing 187⁰T, fixes by hydrophone and on convoy radio. According to dead reckoning this must have been a report on the convoy. The same boat obtained a hydrophone fix on the convoy once more at 1615 from AK 4361, bearing 130⁰T. U 584 then contacted the convoy at 2110 in AK 5173 and reported on it again an hour later. A further 6 boats sighted in the night destroyers which, according to dead reckoning were proceeding singly close to the convoy, or else gave their position so that it was to be assumed that in all at least 8 boats were quite close to the convoy in the night. The last report on contact according to hydrophone fix came at 0910 from U 260 which reported a broad band of noise, bearing 33⁰T, from AK 4949.
		On the 21st by day and in the night of 21st-22nd there was no air cover with the convoy, probably because of the fog. For this reason several boats came up close to the

- 195 -

		convoy. Also, reports regarding escort groups became less and there were only reports on single destroyers.
		After the great success achieved against the escort on the previous day, conditions were now good for a main attack on the ships. Unfortunately, however, this intention was frustrated by the weather situation - fog, visibility at times only 200 m.
		The operation against the convoy is being continued. It is to be hoped that visibility will become better on the 22nd and will allow a massed attack in the night of 22nd-23rd.
		U 386 reported that she was heavily depth-charged at 1730 on the 20th while attacking a destroyer group, and will have to return owing to damage. U 341, which reported once off the convoy, was probably lost already before reaching the patrol line at midday on the 19th. An intercept message regarding aircraft attack has been received.
		U 338 has not reported again since last short signal at 1713 on the 20th. Since the boat was remaining surfaced for anti-aircraft defence, her loss by aircraft attack is possible. 17 boats are still operating against the convoy, these being: U 377 - 758 - 378 - 952 - 641 - 66 - 229 - 584 - 402 - 645 - 270 - 305 - 238 - 731 - 260 - 422 - 275.

V.	Reports of Success: None.








- 196 -

22.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 81	U 220	-	AK 82	U 386	-	Op(AK 46)	U 539	-	AE 85
	91	-	BF 55	221	-	BF 83	389	-	AF 44	584	-	Op(AK 46)
	107	-	BE 78	223	-	CG 43	402	-	Op(AK 46)	603	-	AL 33
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	229	-	Op(AK 46)	419	-	AE 84	610	-	BE 46
	155	-	BF 55	238	-	Op(AK 46)	422	-	Op(AK 46)	621	-	BE 21
	161	-	Op(FQ 80)	260	-	Op(AK 46)	448	-	BE 72	631	-	BE 69
	168	-	LM 59	270	-	Op(AK 46)	455	-	BF 86	641	-	Op(AK 46)
	170	-	DG 48	275	-	Op(AK 46)	460	-	BD 83	643	-	AE 82
	177	-	DT 27	279	-	AE 78	488	-	DG 52	645	-	Op(AK 40)
	181	-	FD 21	305	-	Op(AK 46)	505	-	BF 44	666	-	Op(AK 46)
	183	-	Op(LJ 99)	336	-	BE 55	518	-	Op(DN 10)	667	-	BF 79
	188	-	LK 79	338	-	Op(AK 46)	532	-	LN 47	731	-	Op(AK 46)
	196	-	FD 82	341	-	Op(AK 46)	533	-	LU 22	758	-	Op(AK 46)
	198	-	CG 13	377	-	Op(AK 46)	536	-	BB 83	848	-	AN 31
	214	-	DQ 64	378	-	OP(AK 46)	537	-	AN 31	952	-	Op(AK 46)
	218	-	BF 48

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 621.
	Entered Port: U 537 - Bergen.
	Sailed: U 264 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	Convoy No. 43 see below.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British unit located in AL 62 and BE 55.
		2)	U-boat sightings: AK 4986, AK 7261, AJ 6983 (boats off Convoy No. 43). A further one sighted in DN 7364 (U 518).
		3)	According to interceptions of enemy radio traffic numerous British U-boats are expected to arrive in the southwest Indian Ocean.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 43, see below.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U 488 has been ordered to proceed to CE 70 and to wait there. Refueling of U 68 is intended.
		2)	U 386, damaged in operations against Convoy No. 43 will give reserve fuel over to outward-bound U 603 on 24 September in AK 9777.
	d)	None.

- 197 -

IV.

Convoy No 43:

Weather situation: The fog in the area of the convoy with visibility 200 - 300 m also persisted during the whole day of the 22nd. It was not until the evening 1 1/2 hours before dark, at 2100, that it suddenly became clear, but only until 0200 when visibility again deteriorated and it remained foggy for the rest of the night.

Contact with the convoy was maintained by day, through hydrophone. At 0910 U 260 reported it from AK 4949, bearing 33⁰T. Shortly before dark 4 further boats too up contact with the convoy. In the night of 22/23 the convoy was reported several times by U 238. Last report at 0345 from AJ 9365.

Defence: Air cover has been reported by the boats over the convoy since the afternoon of the 22nd, this cover consisting of flying boats and carrier-borne aircraft. 7 boats were attacked by the aircraft, one, U 270, was so badly damaged by close aircraft bombs that she had to withdraw for repairs. In warding off attacks the boats remained on the surface which resulted in aircraft not achieving their purpose, namely that of shaking off the boats, and moreover, contact with the convoy was maintained.

Remote escort was still very strong even after the sinking of several destroyers. It is to be assumed that the prospect of losing large numbers of ships has caused the enemy to strengthen his naval escort by further chaser groups. One boat also reported a motor torpedo boat. 3 boats were depth-charged in the course of the day of the 22nd and the night of 22/23, of these U 758 reported being pursued and heavily depth-charged.

Sinkings: The firings of the boats on the close destroyer escort of the convoy, are a proof that escorts are still too strong and that it is not yet possible to make any attack on the ships of the convoy. U 666 sank 2 leading destroyers; U 260 sank one wing destroyer; U 397 sank 1 ship, after firing on hydrophone fix. 10 destroyers in all have, therefore, been sunk up to now, 3 further ones probably sunk, also 4 ships.

Since the convoy is approaching nearer to the Newfoundland Bank and , therefore, to the fog zone, and as the boats have been in operation now for 3 days under the most extreme conditions it is intended that operations against the convoy should be broken off on the morning of the 23rd.

Reports of Success:

U 666	2 destroyers
U 260	1 destroyers
U 377	1 ship	5,000 GRT

- 198 -

23.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BE 71	U 221	-	BF 81	U 402	-	Op(AJ 96)	U 631	-	BE 68
	91	-	BF 57	223	-	CG 49	419	-	AK 36	641	-	Op(AK 47)
	107	-	CG 25	229	-	Op(AJ 96)	422	-	Op(AJ 96)	643	-	AE 84
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	238	-	Op(AJ 93)	448	-	BD 92	645	-	Op(AJ 95)
	155	-	BF 49	260	-	Op(AK 74)	455	-	BF 85	666	-	Op(AK 71)
	161	-	Op(FR 50)	264	-	BF 91	460	-	BD 67	667	-	CG 25
	168	-	LM 29	270	-	Op(AK 75)	488	-	DG 50	7431	-	Op(AK 74)
	170	-	DG 74	275	-	Op(AJ 96)	505	-	BE 65	758	-	Op(AJ 96)
	177	-	DG 96	279	-	AL 12	518	-	Op(DN 10)	848	-	AN 23
	181	-	ES 73	305	-	Op(AJ 93)	532	-	LN 42	952	-	Op(AJ 96)
	183	-	Op(LJ 90)	336	-	BE 54	533	-	LK 81
	188	-	LK 48	338	-	Op(AJ 90)	536	-	BB 58
	196	-	FD 51	341	-	Op(AJ 96)	539	-	AE 84
	198	-	BF 78	377	-	Op(AJ 96)	584	-	Op(AJ 96)
	214	-	DQ 81	378	-	Op(AK 74)	603	-	BD 31
	218	-	BF 71	386	-	AK 67	610	-	BE 47
	220	-	AK 79	389	-	AE 66	621	-	BE 96

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 621.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 103 - Brest; U 714 - 962 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 43, see IVa.
		2)	U 270 - withdrawing from Convoy No. 43 owing to damage by aircraft bombs - sighted several smoke clouds in AK 7964. According to dead reckoning this was convoy SC 142. Since there were no boats available for operations and further, U 270 was not really ready for action, the boat was ordered to continue her withdrawal.
			At 0100 U 220 encountered 2 destroyers in AK 8585 and suspected these to be the forward remote escort of the above mentioned convoy. The boat was depth-charged but continued her passage westward without any damage.
		3)	U 539 reported as follows on an aircraft attack on 21 September in AE 8546. "On surface run three very near aircraft bombs from "Lockheed-Hudson". No damage (See War Diary of 21 September).
		4)	U 260 reported as follows: "On 13.9. in BD 2379 single shot, missed, on C3 type with course 340⁰; 15.9. in AK 9774 vessel, with course 50⁰, chased for 8 hours without result; 16.9.

- 199 -

			in AK 9537 C2 type with course 70⁰ sighted; 18.9. in AK 9553 two-fan torpedo on large tanker, course 230⁰, impact no detonation; 20.9. in AK 0321 on C3 type, with course 90⁰, one single shot depth 7 m, one depth 1.1 m. Three impacts heard but no detonation. Boat suspected nets. (Commanding Officer should have fired at greater depth after he first suspected nets).
		5)	U 667 was attacked by an aircraft with a series of bombs in CG 5975. No further report.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British units located in AL 5890 and BF 4640/4670.
		2)	U-boat sightings: AJ 9825, AJ 9195, AJ 9199, AJ 9662; 1 sighted in position not deciphered. (All sightings off Convoy No. 43). Also one sighting each in DM 2936 (U 518) and CG 81 (U 667).
		3)	U-boat was attacked by aircraft in AJ 9524 (Convoy No. 43).
	d)	After a long time it was again possible to decipher in time the route ordered for a convoy. The basis for this, however, was only a sub-system. The main system is not likely to be broken down before the middle of October.
		Escort forces of ON 203, according to this, were ordered to proceed to AM 4339. In a subsequent radio message the following route was mentioned for the convoy: ?N - 3220 W; AK 4567; BC 1612; BC 6959, 44. . . N., ?W. It is intended to operate against this convoy.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 43, see IVa.
	b)	New objective for U 279 - 419 and 643 is BD 10.
	c)	1)	U 270 discovered, after investigating damage by aircraft bombs, breach in pressure hull. The boat is unable to dive and is returning. She has been ordered to proceed at high speed to the supply rendezvous of U 603 and 386 - AK 9777. Subsequently, return together of U 270 and U 386 - after the later has given over fuel to U 603. It is presumed that the damage to U 270 has been caused by breach of the pipe lead of the Kingston valve connecting rod. The boat has been instructed regarding procedure and necessary repairs.
		2)	U 377 - the Commanding Officer of which has been wounded in both arms - will also proceed to AK 9777, to take over the Medical Officer from U 386. The boat only has sick berth attendants on board. Subsequently return.

- 200 -

U 341 belonged to Group "Leuthen" and should have taken up position with this group in the ordered patrol line at 2000 on 20 September. The boat last reported her position from BE 57 on the 8th. At 1110 on the 19th a U-boat was attacked in AL 1564. Aircraft presumed 4 hits. All the "Leuthen" boats subsequently reported. It must be assumed that the attacked boat was U 341.

Several radio messages, which were probably connected with the attack, could not be deciphered by the Control Station.

U 103 has put out for minelaying off Takoradi.

IV.

Convoy No. 43:

The operation against the convoy had to be broken off on the morning of the 23rd for the following reasons:

Weather conditions - fog, visibility 300 m. - did not alter and an improvement is hardly to be expected.

On the evening of the 23rd the convoy must have already reached the fog belt of the Newfoundland Bank.

Through operations lasting for three days under the most difficult weather and defence conditions, the demands made on the boats' crews have reached their limits. A further operation in fog might lead to losses of boats, since their capacity for operations is exhausted.

The boats were given the order to break off operations and an additional order that boats in a favorable position before the convoy should utilize any opportunities for attacks.

At 1209 U 305 reported the convoy again as being in AJ 9524, course 210⁰. Two hours later the same boat reported contact in AJ 9515 with two vessels. These were the last reports received on the convoy.

On the afternoon of the 23rd aircraft were reported in the vicinity of the convoy. 2 boats reported attacks by aircraft.

Some of the crew of U 422 were wounded in this attack by guns. Further, the boat has slight damage to attend to and is withdrawing.

The following sinkings on the night of 23rd - 24th were reported later:

U 758 reported	1 destroyer sunk
	1 special service vessel probably torpedoed.
U 952 reported	1 destroyer sunk
	1 hit on 10,000 GRT ship
	1 hit on 6,000 GRT ship

- 201 -

U 238 reported	4 ships, 19,000 GRT probably sunk
	1 damaged vessel sunk, probably torpedoed.

Therefore the total sinkings were:

12 destroyers sunk, 3 further ones probably sunk

9 ships, 46,500 GRT, sunk 2/16,000 GRT torpedoed.

Reports of Success:

U 758	1 destroyer
	1 ship probably torpedoed
U 952	1 destroyer
	2 ships torpedoed
U 238	5 ships	27,000 GRT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

24.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BD 67	U 220	-	AK 87	U 389	-	AE 67	U 610	-	BD 67
	91	-	BF 48	221	-	BF 48	402	-	Op(AK 48)	621	-	BF 74
	103	-	BF 54	223	-	CG 84	419	-	AK 39	631	-	BE 67
	107	-	CG 13	229	-	Op(AK 70)	422	-	Op(AK 72)	641	-	Op(AK 49)
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	238	-	Op(AK 71)	448	-	BD 67	643	-	AE 79
	155	-	BF 72	260	-	Op(AK 75)	455	-	BF 79	645	-	Op(AJ 96)
	161	-	Op(FR 50)	264	-	BF 82	460	-	BD 67	666	-	Op(AK 72)
	168	-	LM 31	270	-	AK 89	488	-	DG 24	667	-	CG 83
	170	-	DS 19	275	-	Op(AK 72)	505	-	BE 64	714	-	AO
	177	-	DH 47	279	-	AL 15	518	-	Op(DM 60)	731	-	Op(AK 73)
	181	-	ES 43	305	-	Op(AJ 96)	532	-	LN 92	758	-	Op(AK 74)
	183	-	Op(LJ 90)	336	-	BE 45	533	-	LK 52	848	-	AF 76
	196	-	FD 21	338	-	Op(AK 70)	536	-	BB 5180	952	-	Op(AK 75)
	198	-	BF 80	377	-	AK 84	539	-	AL 33	962	-	AO
	214	-	DQ 74	378	-	Op(AK 74)	584	-	Op(AK 71)	188	-	LK 19
	218	-	BE 92	386	-	AK 97	603	-	AK 97

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 621.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

- 202 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 667 was attacked in CG 8293 at 0117 by aircraft with bombs and at 0217 with very heavy aircraft guns. The boat was ordered to attempt a break through from the S.W.
		2)	Report of U 422 see IV c) 1).
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British units were located in BE 6660, BE 3550, AE 5970.
		2)	U-boat sightings: CA 5848, AJ 9439, CG 8248, CG 8274 (U 667), DC 1262.
		3)	U-boat attacked or was attacked in DN 2953.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Final survey on Convoy No. 43 see page 204.
	b)	1)	Boats of former Group "Leuthen" which are still operational and the following new boats, proceeding from home waters and Western France U 279 - 643 - 641 - 731 - 539 - 666 - 758 - 402 - 584 - 419 - 378 - 952 - 645 - 260 - 603 - 275 - 336 - 610 and 448 will be combined into Group "Rossbach" and have been ordered to take up position in reconnaissance patrol from AK 2645 to 6817 course 90⁰, 4 knots, at 1600 on 26 September. As from 26 September a W -bound ON convoy is expected. Since hitherto, after operations against W.-bound convoy, there have nearly always been subsequent operations against E.-bound HX or SC convoys it can be assumed that the enemy now also presumed a U-boat disposition on the W. to E. convoy route about in the area of BC 20. It is therefore possible that the next ON or ONS convoys, have not yet been diverted, this has been confirmed according to a convoy route sent out by enemy radio on 23 September (Special Intercept message). The boats are warned particularly to remain unseen while approaching. Keep radio silence.
		2)	a) U 539 (IX c boat) is to be released from Group "Rossbach" after interception os the convoy. Objective is then CB 40.
			b) U 260 will have freedom of action, after interception of the convoy, owing to the Engineer Officer being ill.
		3)	U 305 will join Group "Rossbach" and will extend the reconnaissance patrol by one position to the S.

- 203 -

		4)	U 238 has been ordered to BD 40.
		5)	Owing to cancellation of refueling arranged from U 488, U 170 has been instructed to proceed to GA 60 (boat has already refueled from U 460).
	c)	1)	U 422 was attacked at 2005 on 23 September in AJ 9622 by a "Halifax" with bombs and machine guns. No location. Casualties: one man wounded slightly, one wounded in the arm, one in the leg, main artery in danger, medical aid is necessary. Further, exhaust pipe, air inlet and outlet on port outboard shot up, welding necessary on upper deck.
			For the purpose of medical aid, rendezvous has been ordered between U 422 and U 220 for dawn on 25 September in BD 1175. Owing to bad visibility U 220 is to send out a beacon signal at 1200, 1400 and 1600 and if rendezvous is still not effected it is intended that U 422 shall rendezvous with another boat carrying a Medical Officer further eastward.
		2)	U 68 has been ordered to refuel to full capacity from U 488 in CE 7555; U 68 is to report arrival upon passing latitude of CE 1546.
	d)	None.

IV.	a)	Final Survey on Convoy No. 43:
		For the first time for months a U-boat group was again sent in to operate against a convoy in the North Atlantic. The group consisted of 19 boats which were equipped with the newest weapons and devices. These were the new Zaunkönig torpedo, the Hagenuk wave indicator as new radar interception device, radar decoys "Aphrodite" and finally, the strongest Flak armament at present of 1 quadruple and 2 twin.
		The convoy was intercepted on the morning of the 20th as the boats were taking up their disposition. The position of the boats was, therefore, quite favorable. In fact the danger was overcome of the boats being discovered disposed in the patrol line.
		The escort with the convoy was so strong, according to reports by the boats, that it must be assumed that the enemy had provided extra defence for this first engagement.
		The operation lasted from the morning of the 10th to that of the 23rd. It was directed against ON 202, that is the fast convoy proceeding at 9-9.5 knots from England to America. The convoy was intercepted in AL 1944 and chased up to AJ 9524.

- 204 -

		At the beginning of the operation on the day of the 20th and in the night of the 20th-21st the weather was extremely favorable, with visibility clear and little wind, but subsequently on the morning of the 21st there was a thick fog, which persisted up to the evening of the 22nd. It cleared for 5 hours during the first half of the night 22nd-23rd, but became foggy again afterwards with poor visibility. This unfavorable weather and interruption of the operation after the first night for 2 days and a night were very decisive for the whole course of the operation.
		After intercepting the convoy on the morning of the 20th the boats were near it during the evening and the first night. It was at once clear that the convoy was surrounded by an unusually strong remote escort. Hardly one boat sighted the convoy itself. All came up against escort vessels before even reaching the actual convoy. The boats utilized these situations with surprising success and sank, in the first night, with certainty 7 destroyers of the escort probably two further ones.
		The preliminary operations for attack on the ships, were, therefore, finished and it was to be expected that the ships could be attacked during the next night without any great difficulties.
		The enemy must have realized the great danger for the convoy after the loss of so many escort vessels. He apparently then did all in his power with the great advantage of 2 days' fog to surround the convoy as quickly as possible with a new escort force.
		When on the evening of the 22nd the fog cleared for 5 hours the boats had again to deal primarily with escort force and did not find it any easier to make an attack against the ships. The sinking of 5 further destroyers proves this. It is significant however, that 3 destroyers of the close escort were sunk so that approach to the convoy became easier. 3 boats were able to attack the mass of ships and sank 5 torpedoing 2 further ones.
		It was now certain that the main blow could be directed against the convoy. 12-15 escort vessels in all had been eliminated which would have made it considerably easier for the boats. Unfortunately, however, the fog again set in and as there was no hope of the weather improving the operation had to be broken off on the morning of the 23rd.
		Defence:
		On the first and third day the enemy had normal air reconnaissance off the convoy. Apart from four-engined land-based aircraft, flying boats and carrier-borne aircraft were reported. The fact that the boats remained surfaced and warded off attacks with all guns led to success even though one boat was probably lost. Contact with the convoy was, however, maintained and the boats remained in the vicinity. It is essential that as many boats as possible of the group are always up to the convoy

- 205 -

		so that convoy escort - aircraft and escort vessels - are split up as much as possible and just a few boats off the convoy do not bear the brunt. If aircraft only engage a few boats many others can approach the convoy.
		The question of the strength of naval escort has already been discussed. The interruption of the operation by fog, must be considered as an important factor in this, the enemy gaining time thereby to bring up new escorts. The enemy would hardly have been able, if the course of the operation had been normal, to supplement his escorts so quickly.
		The aggressive action against the escort forces also resulted in the great advantage that hitherto numerous depth-charge attacks were not made. Only one boat had to break off operations owing to depth-charge damage. The losses amounted to 2 boats. U 338 and U 229. U 338 probably having been lost through aircraft 2 boats were badly damaged, U 270 by aircraft and U 386 by depth-charges. These losses and damaged bear no relation to the losses by the enemy.
		The total sinkings were 12 escort vessels and 3 further ones probable. Also 9 vessels sunk, 46,500 GRT and 2 torpedoed. This was therefore a very satisfactory result which might have been considerably better if the weather had been favorable.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

VI.	General:
	Operational use of G7ES:
	A)	General:
		The development of the G7ES was pursued with all speed in the second half of 1942 with the purpose of introducing for operations the anti-destroyer torpedo repeatedly requested by the Flag Officer Commanding UI-boats. The first step to this was the G7 ES - Falke, which could only be used against slow, deep draught targets, owing to its low Vt (speed) and lack of non-contact pistol.
	B)	G7ES (Falke):
		1)	Torpedo characteristics: Vt = 20 knots, impact pistol range according to heating 5,000 - 7,000 m, can be used against deep draught vessels with Vg (speed) 7 - 13 knots from position 0 to 180. Limited as regards seaway and depth (not more than seaway 5, not shallower than 3 m). Not to be used in the tropics.
		2)	The first operational trial with Falke was made in February/March 1943 on 6 boats with 2 torpedoes each in the North Atlantic. The training of officers and gunners took place in a two-day course at the Torpedo Experimental


- 206 -

		Establishment at Gothenburg. Use was limited to the stern tube owing to the fact that the pistols were not secure against sticking in the tubes. The same reason led, in the course of operational use, practically to the cessation of this. However, from the 12 torpedoes used 3 were fired, these being 2 firings from U 221 (Trojer), 1 firing from U 382 (Juli) with the following result: 1 hit with seaway 6 - 7 on a 5,000 ton freighter sunk. 1 hit on freighter without closer observation, 1 misfire owing to faulty setting. The operational possibilities were, therefore, fundamentally proved. Further, considerable experience was gained for further development. Requirements for further use of Falke were extension of the arming range (locking of the S-apparatus) from the present 720 m. to 1,000 m. as well as absolute security of the pistols in the tube.
	3)	For general operational use the Falke became available with the required improvements, as from 1.7.43, from the Western bases. Further use was intended in the Mediterranean (as from 1.9.43). The operational use of the improved G7ES anti-destroyer torpedo, originally intended only at a later date but accelerated considerably under pressure of conditions and proving preferable, led to only 5 boats being equipped with the Falke. Results from these are not to hand. Further use of the Falke had to be given up for the reasons mentioned.
C.	G7ES - Zaunkönig:
	1)	General: Operational readiness of the G7ES Zaunkönig (anti-destroyer torpedo) was not anticipated, in the normal course of trials, before the beginning of 1944. However, conditions necessitated, already in May 1943, the boats being given as quickly as possible a defensive weapon against enemy escorts in their increasingly difficult campaign against convoys in the North Atlantic. The Commander in Chief of the Navy therefore ordered operational readiness of the Zaunkönig for 1.10.43 and later (on 13.7.) for 1.8.43. This entailed, on the one hand, a great risk owing to lack of the normal course of tests, and , on the other hand, great sacrifices in other preparations of important war weapons not only of the Navy but also of the other branches of the service. This was only possible owing to the close personal cooperation of the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition. The fact that 80 torpedoes were actually ready on 1.8.43 in the Western bases for equipping 20 boats represented a great achievement by all departments concerned.
	2)	Torpedo Characteristics: Vt = 24.5 knots, non-contact and impact-pistol, range heated 3,700 m., unheated 5,000 m., can be used against all vessels of a speed between 10 and 18 knots from all positions.
		Use is limited to a certain extent in seaway over 6. The short arming range of 400 m. was necessary in order

- 207 -

			to keep the minimum firing distance as low as possible, but this makes it necessary for the boat firing the torpedo to crash dive after firing owing to the danger to itself, or when only firing from the stern to withdraw at a certain speed. In the first use of the torpedo as certain inappreciable percentage of self detonations was to be anticipated from the non-contact pistols, and about 10% of depth-keeping faults from the apparatus.
		3)	The Zaunkönig was made available for the first operational use in the period from 20 to 24 September 1943. In a convoy engagement in the North Atlantic there were 17 boats equipped with the Zaunkönig Each boat had 4 torpedoes (2 each in the bow and stern). Use was entirely successful. 13 hits were made with certainty and 3 probably (54%) with 24 firings. Out of 7 misfires 4 were due to overrunning. In addition one failed in the tube (tube-runner). 12 destroyers and 1 freighter were sunk by Zaunkönig, and 3 destroyers probably sunk.
			The firings were made for the most part from position 0 at distances around 30 hm. It is a disadvantage for the boats that they are forced to dive after firing. The short arming range would not have been necessary in the vast majority of firings owing to the fact that firing distance was long enough.
			The necessity for an arming range which can be adjusted as desired must, therefore, be met as soon as possible.
			Apart from the present range, there must be one which enables the boats to remain surfaced in every case without being endangered (about 800 m.).
		4)	Further use of the Zaunkönig, is intended by the continuous equipment of all boats based in the West, as from 21.9.1943 of all boats in the Mediterranean Sea as from 3.10.1943 of all operational boats proceeding from home waters.

- 208 -

25.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BD 67	U 218	-	BE 91	U 386	-	AK 97	U 603	-	AK 97
	91	-	BF 75	220	-	BD 11	389	-	AE 82	610	-	BD 67
	103	-	BF 49	221	-	BE 69	402	-	Op(AK 55)	621	-	BF 76
	107	-	BF 77	223	-	CG 86	419	-	Op(AK 02)	631	-	BE 58
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	229	-	Op(AK 70)	422	-	BD 11	641	-	Op(AK 51)
	155	-	BF 74	238	-	BD 11	448	-	BD 67	643	-	AL 12
	161	-	Op(FQ 90)	260	-	Op(AK 57)	455	-	CG 26	645	-	Op(AK 81)
	168	-	LB 92	264	-	BF 85	460	-	BD 67	666	-	Op(AK 54)
	170	-	DS 46	270	-	AK 97	488	-	DG 12	667	-	CG 86
	177	-	DH 18	275	-	Op(AK 58)	505	-	BE 55	714	-	AN 36
	181	-	ES 12	279	-	Op(AK 35)	518	-	Op(DM 50)	731	-	Op(AK 51)
	183	-	Op(LJ 90)	305	-	Op(AK 81)	532	-	LC 97	758	-	Op(AK 54)
	188	-	LK 21	336	-	BD 33	533	-	LK 23	848	-	AF 72
	196	-	ES 49	338	-	Op(AK 70)	536	-	BB 43	952	-	Op(AK 57)
	198	-	BF 93	377	-	AK 97	539	-	AL 16	962	-	AN 36
	214	-	DP 97	378	-	Op(AK 57)	584	-	Op(AK 57)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 198 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 621.
	Entered Port: U 198 - Bordeaux.
	Sailed: U 92 - Brest; U 309 - Drontheim.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into the outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 270 lost U 386 at the rendezvous and heard depth charge detonations. The boat is again able to submerge 40 m. (Further see IV c) 2)).
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British units were located in BF 1680, BD 1860, BD 1230.
		2)	U-boat sighting: 1 boat in unknown position.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	According to the findings of Radio Intelligence based on enemy radio traffic concerning the awaited ON convoy, the reconnaissance patrol of Group "Rossbach" will probably intercept the convoy during the night. Group "Rossbach" has, therefore, been ordered to take up patrol line from AK 2558 to AK 6781 at 0600 on 27 September, contrary to previous instructions.
			Advantages: Until the convoy is intercepted less danger from enemy reconnaissance; fuel situation more favorable in view of the day's run necessary being quite short; more time, therefore greater security against being detected while proceeding submerged for a long period of time.

- 209 -

			Disadvantages: Westerly disposition allows the enemy better opportunities to divert before being intercepted; loss of a day for operations.
		2)	New objectives: U 505 - 155 - 103 = CE 75 for contemplated refueling; U 91 - 221 = AK 80 for attack on convoy.
	c)	1)	U 238 has been instructed to make two radio messages on the weather from BD 40 on 26 September, in order to feign U-boat movements in that area (see War Diary of 24 September, IV b)).
		2)	U 270 has been ordered to withdraw from danger area to BD 90, U 386 has been ordered to report (see III a)).
		3)	Since the rendezvous of U 422 with U 220 failed in the fog, rendezvous of U 422 with U 460 has been ordered as from 1800 on 27 September in BD 5337.
		4)	After U 667 and 223 had been attacked several times by enemy aircraft, they were ordered, together with U 455, to carry out the operation, contrary to previous intention, from the south, that is along the N. African coast.
	d)	The following radio messages were sent to Monsun boats:
		1)	There is a Japanese U-boat in the Gulf of Aden and one on the Gulf of Oman. A further one is approaching operational area LK, LU and westward therefrom. The Japanese have small aircraft on board. Appearance: either single-decker (somewhat like Arado) with closed-in cockpit; or double-decker with open cockpit. Both are float-planes and single-engines. They will probably be used only in an open sea area.
		2)	Report at once on enemy sightings which indicate operations against Japan.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- 210 -

26.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BD 67	U 218	-	BE 83	U 378	-	AK 10/50	U 584	-	AK 10/50
	91	-	BE 92	220	-	BD 14	386	-	AK 97	603	-	AK 97
	92	-	BF 54	221	-	BE 68	389	-	AE 87	610	-	BD 67
	103	-	BF 48	223	-	DJ 12	402	-	AK 10/50	621	-	BF 85
	107	-	BF 79	229	-	AK 40	419	-	AK 20	631	-	BE 54
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	238	-	BD 41	422	-	BD 15	641	-	AK 10/50
	155	-	BE 98	260	-	AK 10/50	448	-	BD 67	643	-	AL 13
	161	-	Op(FQ 90)	264	-	CG 21	455	-	CG 54	645	-	AK 10/50
	168	-	LB 63	270	-	AK 97	460	-	BD 67	666	-	AK 10/50
	170	-	DS 84	275	-	AK 10/50	488	-	CE 70	667	-	DJ 13
	177	-	DH 13	279	-	AK 30	505	-	BE 57	714	-	AN 31
	181	-	EJ 72	305	-	AK 10/50	518	-	Op(DM 50)	731	-	AK 10/50
	183	-	Op(LJ 90)	309	-	AF 59	532	-	LC 68	758	-	AK 10/50
	188	-	MZ 82	336	-	AK 98	533	-	MZ 81	448	-	AF 47
	196	-	ES 19	338	-	AK 40	536	-	BB 42	952	-	AK 10/50
	214	-	EE 22	377	-	AK 97	539	-	AK 36	962	-	AN 31

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 621.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 437 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 161 sank in FJ 6711 an 8,000 ton vessel, course 40⁰.
		2)	After a further attack with aircraft bombs, U 667 reported: Up to now 5 attacks at short range, without any location being made. It is not impossible to proceed by night since there is no time left for out-maneuvering action.
			The Commanding Officer therefore, considers that the operation cannot now be carried out. The boat subsequently warded off two more aircraft attacks. Apart from Ju-compressor up to now no damage (further see IV b)).
		3)	U 386 was depth-charged by destroyers in AK 9777. Boat did not rendezvous with U 603 and U 377 for the purpose of refueling and medical aid.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	British units were located in: AL 03/67, CG 8530, AL 6590, AM 1390.
		2)	U-boat sightings: CG 8456, CG 8454, CG 8544, CG 8554, CG 8565 (U 667 and 223), CG 1326, CG 1926.
		3)	Aircraft attacked U-boat in CJ 9481 (?).
	d)	None.

- 211 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	A west-bound convoy is expected in the patrol line of Group "Rossbach" as from 27 September. Delays up to two days are, however, possible. A further west-bound convoy will be in the area approximately as from 29 September.
	b)	Boats U 667, 223, 455 and 264, withdrawn for the Mediterranean area, have been ordered, in view of the report by U 667, to give up their attempt to break through the Straits of Gibraltar and to withdraw to the west.
		It is suspected that the enemy is using radar devices there, the wave-band of which (cm. waves) cannot yet be intercepted by these boats. The appropriate receivers (Naxos) have, however, already been developed and will shortly be installed on all boats. The above boats are to refuel and then operate against convoys. U 264 will, therefore, proceed to AK 80, U 667 - 223 and 455 to BD 80. A new attempt to break through is planned for the next new moon period.
	c)	U 448 - 610 and 603 have refueled and taken on supplies to full capacity from U 460. These boats belong to Group "Rossbach".
	d)	U 338 and 229 must now be considered lost. Both were lost off Convoy No. 43 (Group "Leuthen"). The last report from U 338 dates from 20 September from AK 39 and was as follows: "Am remaining surfaced for anti-aircraft action".
		U 229 reported on the 21st from AK 2773 as follows: "Destroyer sunk, quadruple can only be fired from two barrels owing to breaking of equalizing spring." Several orders to report on their position were not answered by the boats.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 161 1 ship 8,000 GRT.

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- 212 -

27.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	BD 89	U 218	-	BE 80	U 389	-	AL 22	U 603	-	AK 97
	91	-	BE 67	220	-	BC 61	402	-	Op(AK 29)	610	-	AK 98
	92	-	BE 45	221	-	BE 67	419	-	Op(AK 02)	621	-	BF 86
	103	-	BF 71	223	-	DJ 13	422	-	BD 28	631	-	BE 43
	107	-	BF 84	238	-	BD 40	437	-	BF 58	641	-	Op(AK 27)
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	260	-	Op(AK 56)	448	-	AK 98	643	-	Op(AK 25)
	155	-	BE 97	264	-	CG 16	455	-	CG 48	645	-	Op(AK 53)
	161	-	Op(FJ 67)	270	-	BD 56	460	-	BD 64	666	-	Op(AK 27)
	168	-	LC 11	275	-	Op(AK 64)	488	-	CE 70	667	-	CG 73
	170	-	EH 24	279	-	Op(AK 25)	505	-	BE 70	714	-	AN 23
	177	-	CF 86	305	-	Op(AK 67)	518	-	Op(DM 50)	731	-	Op(AK 27)
	181	-	EJ 42	309	-	AF 57	532	-	Op(LC 30)	758	-	Op(AK 29)
	183	-	Op(LJ 90)	336	-	BD 48	533	-	MZ 53	848	-	AE 65
	188	-	MZ 61	377	-	BD 23	536	-	BB 41	952	-	Op(AK 53)
	196	-	EJ 97	378	-	Op(AK 53)	539	-	Op(AK 27)	962	-	AN 24
	214	-	EE 18	386	-	BD 37	584	-	Op(AK 02)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 621.
	Entered Port: U 962 - Bergen.
	Sailed: U 231 - Bordeaux.

II.	Air Reconnaissance:
	1)	Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.
	2)	Reconnaissance on England to Gibraltar convoy traffic.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	None.
	b)	Our own aircraft sighted at 1750 in CG 7649 a convoy consisting of 61 merchant vessels, 4 destroyers, 1 cruiser, speed 8 knots, course 90⁰, further at 1820 in CG 7949 a convoy consisting of 32 merchant vessels, 3 destroyers, 4 guardboats, 1 cruiser, speed 8 knots, course 90⁰ and at 1935 in CG 5772, 5 merchant vessels, 3 guardboats, course 160⁰.
	c)	1)	Enemy units located in BE 1180, AM 4560, BF 7620.
		2)	A U-boat sighted in unknown position.
	d)	The route for stragglers of ON 203, given in War Diary of 23 September was cancelled according to a new Special Intercept message and the following course ordered in its place: From 2626 over AL - 1439 - AK 2364 - AJ 6459 - BC 1612 - BB 6991 and 4. . . N. . .W.
		On 26 September these instructions also were cancelled and a more northerly route was ordered for stragglers.

- 213 -

		This radio message has been only partially deciphered and gives a route over 62 - 59⁰ . . . N., 35⁰ W. and over AJ 3133.
		Stragglers east of 23⁰ W. and between 23 - 35⁰ W. which are not able to reach the convoy rendezvous are to return to England or Iceland.
		On 26 September, the W/T guardship of ON 203 was D/f''d approximately in area 56⁰ 10' - 56⁰ 40' N., 16 - 17⁰ 30' W. and, on 27 September, an escort aircraft of the same convoy was also D/f''d in 58⁰ 30' - 58⁰ 50' N. 24⁰ 20' - 25⁰ 40' W. See also IVa.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	In view of the shifting of the ON stragglers' route to the north, mentioned under IIId, Group "Rossbach" has been ordered to proceed as from 1200 with course 300⁰ and speed 7 knots, and to remain as patrol line at midnight on 28 September in the position line reached (AK 1475 - AK 5599).
		The positions of the W/T guardship and of the escort aircraft seem to indicate that the convoy is not proceeding so far to the north as the positions given in the Special Intercept messages. If this assumption is correct the convoy may be expected, as from the afternoon of 28 September, approximately in the middle of the patrol line.
		Note:
		British aircraft have orders to report on the positions of ships being escorted only after withdrawing by about 100 miles from them. Therefore, the position of the convoy must have been about 100 miles further south or southwest than that of the aircraft.
	b)	1)	U 631 is proceeding at economical cruising speed to AK 58.
		2)	U 460 is to proceed to BD 97 after rendezvous with U 422. Refueling is planned there of U 223 - 667 and 455.
	c)	The rendezvous of U 377 and U 386 has taken place as ordered. U 377 does not require further medical aid. Both boats are returning separately.
		U 270 also reports that she is returning alone. The boat has been ordered to proceed along the Spanish coast.
	d)	None.


- 214 -

V.	Reports of Success: None.

VI.	General:
	A boat operating in the Mediterranean observed, during an aircraft attack, rocket projectiles which made a very loud noise and whistled. The attack was made by twin engined aircraft flying at low level.

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28.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	CE 48	U 220	-	BD 27	U 389	-	AL 21	U 584	-	Op(AK 18)
	91	-	BE 59	221	-	BE 56	402	-	Op(AK 18)	603	-	Op(AK 52)
	92	-	BF 44	223	-	CG 71	419	-	Op(AK 01)	610	-	Op(AK 55)
	103	-	BE 92	231	-	BF 91	422	-	BD 53	621	-	BF 52
	107	-	BF 85	238	-	BE 45	437	-	BF 57	631	-	BE 41
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	260	-	Op(AK 52)	448	-	Op(AK 55)	641	-	Op(AK 16)
	155	-	CF 32	264	-	CG 13	455	-	CG 49	643	-	Op(AK 16)
	161	-	Op(FJ 60)	270	-	BD 65	460	-	BD 53	645	-	Op(AK 29)
	168	-	MS 75	275	-	Op(AK 52)	488	-	CE 75	666	-	Op(AK 18)
	170	-	EH 54	279	-	AL 10	505	-	BE 80	667	-	CG 71
	177	-	CF 65	305	-	Op(AK 55)	518	-	Op(DM 50)	714	-	AF 84
	181	-	EJ 13	309	-	AF 58	532	-	Op(LC 30)	731	-	Op(AK 16)
	183	-	Op(LJ 90)	336	-	Op(AK 55)	533	-	MZ 34	758	-	Op(AK 18)
	188	-	MZ 35	377	-	BD 32	536	-	BB 40	848	-	AE 67
	196	-	EJ 48	378	-	Op(AK 01)	539	-	Op(AK 16)	952	-	Op(AK 01)
	214	-	ED 65	386	-	BD 63
	218	-	BE 80

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 422 - 621.
	Entered Port: U 621 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 470 - 762 - Bergen.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 488 sighted in CE 75 a carrier-borne aircraft and a single vessel (See IVc).
	b)
	c)	1)	Enemy units located in AL 9480 - 9580, AM 4590.
		2)	U-boat sightings: EP 4735 (U 123), FJ 9679 (U 161).
		3)	U-boat was attacked in FJ 9594 (U 161).
	d)	None.

- 215 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	The awaited convoy ON 203 has not yet been intercepted by Group "Rossbach". If no contact is made by the afternoon of 29 September at latest is must be assumed that convoy has bypassed or passed the patrol line. The latter is quite possible since the fixes by the boats, in the bad visibility of the last few days, were probably very inaccurate and therefore, it was not certain that the boats were actually 15 miles apart as ordered.
	b)	None.
	c)	Owing to enemy contact with U 488, the point of rendezvous with U 68 for taking on fuel and provisions, has been moved to CE 4515.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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29.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	CE 45	U 218	-	CF 25	U 386	-	BE 45	U 539	-	Op(AK 16)
	91	-	BE 58	220	-	BD 14	389	-	AL 10	584	-	Op(AK 18)
	92	-	BE 66	221	-	BE 55	402	-	Op(AK 18)	603	-	Op(AK 52)
	103	-	BE 94	223	-	CF 68	419	-	Op(AK 01)	610	-	Op(AK 55)
	107	-	BF 82	231	-	BF 83	422	-	BD 53	631	-	BD 32
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	238	-	BE 57	437	-	BF 48	641	-	Op(AK 16)
	155	-	CF 31	260	-	Op(AK 57)	448	-	Op(AK 55)	643	-	Op(AK 16)
	161	-	Op(FJ 80)	264	-	CG 11	455	-	CG 47	645	-	Op(AK 29)
	168	-	MS 44	270	-	BE 47	460	-	BD 53	666	-	Op(AK 18)
	170	-	EH 73	275	-	Op(AK 52)	470	-	AF 87	667	-	CF 92
	177	-	CG 17	279	-	AL 10	488	-	CE 45	714	-	AF 82
	181	-	DT 57	305	-	Op(AK 55)	505	-	BF 55	731	-	Op(AK 16)
	183	-	Op(LJ 80)	309	-	AF 47	518	-	Op(DM 50)	758	-	Op(AK 18)
	188	-	MO 77	336	-	Op(AM 55)	532	-	Op(LC 30)	762	-	AF 87
	196	-	EJ 15	377	-	BE 14	533	-	Op(MP 90)	848	-	AE 59
	214	-	ED 55	378	-	Op(AK 01)	536	-	BB 40	952	-	Op(AK 01)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 422 - 505.
	Entered Port: U 714 - Drontheim.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance:
	1)	Fighter sweeps into outer Biscay area.
	2)	Reconnaissance of England - Gibraltar convoy traffic.

- 216 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 667 reports as follows, summarizing attempt to break through the Straits of Gibraltar.
		"Since 24 September, 8 aircraft attacks with bombs, rocket bombs and machine guns warded off. Hits obtained. No radar location made. Return owing to extensive damage."
	b)	Our own aircraft sighted at 1700 in CF 6689, a convoy consisting of 31 merchant vessels, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 escorts, course N. speed 7 knots.
	c)	1)	Enemy units were located in BF 4120, BF 4450, CG 7330.
		2)	Report of torpedoing from LC 1224 (U 532?).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Group "Rossbach" has not intercepted the expected ON 203 convoy. It's arrival can no longer be expected. (See War Diary of 28 September).
	b)	Group "Rossbach" will proceed after dark with course 70⁰ and speed 6 knots. Operations against ONS 19 are intended. There is no direct information regarding route of this. Since, however, the ONS convoys always take in part of a convoy coming from Reykjavik a northern route can be assumed with some certainty.
		Investigation of the ONS routes detected since January 1943 shows, on longitude 25⁰ W., a spread between 56.5 and 61.5⁰ N., it must be taken into consideration that the most northerly avoiding movement is a reaction to U-boat attacks which have taken place.
		The last convoys, not engaged by U-boats, were proceeding approximately between latitudes 57 and 59⁰ N.
		If ONS 19 is not intercepted, arrival of ON 204 may be expected 1 day later approximately in the southern sector of the said patrol line.
		In view of the information given, new Group "Rossbach" has been ordered to take up patrol line from AD 8879 to AK 6366 at 1000 on 1 October, in the following sequence:

- 217 -

		U 389 - 643 - 641 - 731 - 539 - 666 - 336 - 758 - 584 - 610 - 419 - 378 - 952 - 645 - 260 - 603 - 275 - 448 - 305 - 631 - 402.
		Distances 15 miles. Radio silence is to be observed except for important messages. If possible avoid being seen. According to dead reckoning ONS 19 is expected as from midday on 1 October.
	c)	U 422 has received medical aid from U 460 and is returning.
	d)	U 223 has passed the Straits of Gibraltar and has therefore come under the Command of Captain U-boats Mediterranean.
		This boat put out as the first of the boats intended for use in the Mediterranean and was, therefore in the most forward position. Opportunities for surprise were utilized to good effect by the Commanding Officer.
		The second boat (U 667) was detected and attacked 8 times in all by aircraft, not located and had to return owing to damage. Since, in view of this report, it must be assumed that aircraft are operating with radar location, which cannot be detected by the wave indicator, that is on the c.m. wave, and since the whole defence system in the Gibraltar area was on the alert the operation was broken off for this period of the new moon. The boats withdrawn U 450 - 466 - 455 - 264 - 420 were released for Atlantic operations. It is intended again to send several boats, equipped with "Naxos" into the Mediterranean during the period of the next new moon.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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- 218 -

30.September 1943.

I.	U 68	-	CE 45	U 214	-	BD 48	U 378	-	Op(AK 02)	U 536	-	BB 40
	91	-	BE 57	218	-	CF 19	386	-	BE 54	539	-	Op(AK 25)
	92	-	BE 64	220	-	BD 17	389	-	AL 10	584	-	Op(AK 28)
	103	-	BE 86	221	-	BE 54	402	-	Op(AK 27)	603	-	Op(AK 61)
	107	-	BF 80	231	-	BF 82	419	-	Op(AK 28)	610	-	Op(AK 61)
	123	-	Op(EE 80)	238	-	BE 59	422	-	BD 66	631	-	AK 99
	155	-	CF 22	260	-	Op(AK 02)	437	-	BE 47	641	-	Op(AK 23)
	161	-	Op(FJ 80)	264	-	BE 88	448	-	Op(AK 63)	643	-	Op(AK 23)
	168	-	MS 14	270	-	BF 73	455	-	CF 65	645	-	Op(AK 02)
	170	-	ER 13	275	-	Op(AK 61)	460	-	BD 91	666	-	Op(AK 25)
	177	-	CG 13	279	-	AL 10	470	-	AF 76	667	-	CG 42
	181	-	DT 27	305	-	Op(AK 63)	488	-	CE 45	731	-	Op(AK 25)
	183	-	Op(LJ 80)	309	-	AE 66	505	-	BE 61	758	-	Op(AK 25)
	188	-	MQ 89	336	-	Op(AK 61)	518	-	Op(DM 10)	762	-	AF 76
	196	-	DT 72	377	-	BE 19	532	-	Op(LC 30)	848	-	AE 82
							533	-	Op(MP 60)	952	-	Op(AK 02)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 422 - 505 - 667.
	Entered Port: U 505 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 964 - 969 - Kiel; U 537 - Bergen.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: Fighter sweeps into the outer Biscay.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 279 was attacked by a "Hudson" at 0610 on 1 October without previous radar interception. The boat warded off the attack. The machine circled for an hour in the vicinity.
		2)	U 448 was detected at 1430 in AK 6169 by a "Mitchell" and warded off two attacks. (Re 1) and 2) see IVa).
	b)	Our own aircraft sighted in CF 6339 at 1310 a convoy consisting of 60 merchant vessels, 10 escort units, 1 reconnaissance aircraft, course 360⁰, speed 6 knots.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DN 4789 and 1 sighted with longitude only deciphered (sea area off India proper, U 532?).
		According to a Special Intercept message the route for stragglers of ONS 204 has been altered. It now goes over positions AL 2456 and AD 8924. (Further, see IVa).

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	The altercation of the stragglers' route, mentioned under III d, was ordered by the enemy at 1530. This alteration clearly means a by-passing of the ordered "Rossbach" patrol line.

- 219 -

		Rejecting the fact that the code might have been broken it can be assumed that the diversion was made in view of the sighting of U 448 at 1430 as well as of a further boat in a more northerly position.
		There is also the possibility that some boats to the N. which had faulty Wanze apparatus were located without having noticed this.
		Although the boats had been disposed so as to intercept ONS 19 and only as an alternative ON 204, the patrol line was moved by about 60 miles northward after the Special Intercept message had been received, since it could be assumed that ONS 19 was proceeding not much further S.
		Order: Group "Rossbach" to take up new patrol line from AD 8815 to AK 0339 at 1200 on 2 October. The most northerly position will be occupied by U 279 since U 389 has not yet sent in a passage report.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U 488 will refuel to full capacity U 155 and U 103 as from 4 October in CE 4347. Subsequently U 488 will proceed slowly northward.
			Operations in the S. are intended for U 155 and U 103.
		2)	Further, U 455 and U 264 will refuel to full capacity from U 460 as from 4 October in BD 9755. U 460 will subsequently wait in the same area as U 455 and U 264 will proceed to AK 80.

V.	Reports of Success: None.


			for Flag Officer Commanding U-boats.
			Chief of Operations.


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- 220 -

Naval High Command
2 Naval War Staff / B.d.U. Op.	6 July 1943.
Ref. No. Group Command Secret 291 A2.

Most Secret

Operational Order "Trinidad" for "U 218"

(Alternative Operation for "Gibraltar")

Operation: Minelaying of the North entrance to the Gulf of Paris is to be carried out.

II.

Enemy Situation: There is regular heavy convoy traffic to and from Trinidad (main harbor Port of Spain). There are overseas, coastal and Caribbean convoys. In the case of Caribbean shipping, fast single vessels may also be expected. Convoys proceeding to the Atlantic consist exclusively of tankers. Shipping enters and leaves Port of Spain usually in the morning.

III.

Defence: Air patrols must be expected by day and night. In the coastal area naval patrols. Probably detection at once by strong air cover. There are 2 enemy minefields east and west of the gap (See sketch). In the middle of May 1943, according to an intercept message, the designation was mentioned for the first time for small airships in the Trinidad area. These may be expected.

IV.

Mines: 12 SMA with 600 m. mooring rope, time setting = 55 days disarming device = 3 hours, clockwork arming switch = 36 hours, depth-setting minus 20 m., period delay mechanism one. Mines may be laid only at depths of 50 m. - 500 m. Distance apart of mines 400 m.

Geographical limits: None. The mines are to be laid as near as possible on the outgoing route. (It is very important to make observations beforehand).

VI.

Carrying out the Operations:

Boats are to put out in accordance with Order. Mines to be laid if possible at the period of the new moon.

When laying take into consideration the ebb current running strongly to the north, or the less strong flow current running south.

The mines are to be laid in front of the mine gap shown. The enclosed sketch is to be taken as a guide for carrying out the operation.

The Commanding Officer may make changes according to the enemy situation observed or notified. The time of minelaying is left to the Commanding Officer after investigating the area.

Regarding extinguishing of lights and prohibited areas see Standing Order No. 491, Section D.

VII.

A report is to be made as soon as possible after carrying out the minelaying but from at least 150 miles away, by a short signal.

A.F.K.P. = Have carried out minelaying off Trinidad.



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VIII.	No limitations regarding use of torpedoes.

IX.	If the enemy situation does not permit the operation to be carried out, withdraw and report by radio in order that a new area for minelaying may be assigned.

X.	After minelaying has been carried out a further operational order will be sent by radio.


		for Flag Officer Commanding U-boats.
		Chief of Operations.









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Naval High Command
2 Naval War Staff / B.d.U. Op.	29 June 1943.
Ref. No. Group Command Secret 266 A2.
Most Secret

Operational Order "Takoradi" for "U 103 "

Operation: Mines are to be laid in the entrance to Takoradi.

II.

Enemy Situation: Regular numbers of single vessels have been observed going to and from Takoradi, 40 ships monthly being estimated. The traffic to Freetown runs partly in convoys, with weekly about one incoming and outgoing convoy, consisting of 8 - 10 ships. From the smaller harbors on the Guinea Coast there is supply traffic to Takoradi to join the convoys. Surveillance of shipping is effected, as far as is known, by a tug cruising around 5 miles off the harbor entrance.

III.

Defence: There is no information regarding air and sea patrol. Slight activity by aircraft during the day must be expected, stronger air cover will detect at once. Land-based radar off the harbor is possible.

IV.

Mines: 8 T.M.C. time setting = 80 days, clockworking arming switch = 2 mines 1 day, 3 mines 4 days and 3 mines 6 days. Response 20 m/oe, detonation on first run-over 2 mines, on third 2 mines, on sixth 4 mines (4 blue, 2 red, 2 green). Maximum depth at which mines may be laid 25 m., minimum 10 m., distance apart 300 m.

Geographical limits: None. The mines are to be laid as near as possible off the harbor entrance.

VI.

Carrying out the Operation: On the way into the operational area tubes are to be loaded with torpedoes. 1 day before reaching the area to be mined they are to be unloaded. 1 bow and stern tube are to be left with torpedo ready to fire. Enemy traffic to be observed before minelaying. The Commanding Officer must make every effort to lay the mines as near as possible to the entrance.

The time of minelaying is left to the Commanding Officer, after investigation of the area; the period of new moon should be utilized.

VII.

Report is to be made as soon as possible after minelaying but from at least 150 miles away, by means of a short signal. A.F.K.P. = Have carried out minelaying off Takoradi.

VIII.

After minelaying a radio message will be sent assigning operational area.

IX.

If the enemy situation does not permit the operation to be carried out, withdraw and report by radio so that a new area for minelaying may be assigned.

for Flag Officer Commanding U-boats.

Chief of Operations.



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