U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30247

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

15 August - 15 September 1939

PG30247

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.


					15.VIII.39. (Kiel)

1200					Telephone call from Supreme Command of the Navy (Lieut.(s.g.) Fraesdorf) saying that the officers' party for U-boat officers was to be on Saturday 19.8 and as many as possible were to be present. Were there no orders?

1300					Following steps taken:
					1) F.O. U/B informed by telephone.
					2) Deputy S.O. of 2nd U-Flotilla, Lieut. Franz, informed. U-28/29/33/34 can be ready by Saturday.
					3) C.O. of U-26 informed of emergency order for North Sea. Detailed orders received later through S.O. 6th U-Flotilla.
					4) 6th U-Flotilla ordered by radio to break off firing practice.
					5) U-57 recalled from Pillau, U-47 from Neustadt. U-48, with S.O. 7th U-Flotilla on board, recalled and S.O. 7th U-Flotilla informed of the North Sea emergency exercise. He is making preparations immediately. U-45/51 will arrive, tonight.

1700					T/P from Supreme Command of the Navy received:
					a) 10 U-boats to sail 19.8 (Orders are ready and will be issued).
					b) 4 U-boats of the 2nd U-Flotilla are to sail with the above (Arranged, see 1330).
					c) These 4 boats to be replaced by boats of the 5th U-Flotilla.
					d) Further boats are to be made ready quickly and it is to be reported when they are ready.
					Staff officer to Eckenfoerde to see about U-42.

2240					"Memel" arrived, having been recalled, with 1 G7a (T.N.: air-driven torpedo) and 15 G7e (T.N.: electric torpedo) belonging to 7th U-Flotilla on board to be handed over to boats of the 7th U-Flotilla.

2300					The question of giving U-58-59 another torpedo practice with a target ship and 4 torpedo recovery vessels was considered, but the project was later abandoned as impractical in view of the general situation.

					16.VIII.39.

0230					S.O. 6th U-Flotilla arrived and was informed of duties and situation in accordance with "emergency exercise North Sea." He then left on board U 37 for Wilhelmshaven, with orders for U 28/29/33/34, to prepare his boats.

1007					Decision by Supreme Command of the Navy: radio service to begin 0800/19/8 German summer time.

- 1 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

1140

Orders received from F.O. Scouting Forces for case WEISS.

1315

Telephone call from Group West, C-in-C Group West wishes to see F.O. U/B-designate personally.

1400

F.O. U/B returned from leave. Chief of Staff handed over to F.O. U/B.

1500

Arranged with Supreme Command of the Navy for U-boat radio service to begin at 0000/19/8, so that the boats can put to sea as soon as ever possible.

1530

F.O. U/B arranged to see C-in-C Group West at 1730/18/8.

17.VIII.39.

Instructions to 2nd, 6th and 7th U-Flotillas:

6th U-Flotilla to sail, with Flotilla S.O., at 0000/19/8.

7th U-Flotilla to sail at 0000/19/8.

4 boats of 2nd U-Flotilla to follow at first light on 19.8 or later.

Station Commands will supply the boats of the 3 flotillas with 2nd watch-keeping officers.

1900

During a telephone conversation with Wilhelmshaven it came out that there were not enough operational torpedoes ready. This was immediately reported by telephone to Berlin. See also F.O. U/B's special report on operational torpedoes, of which there are an insufficient number in spite of F.O. U/B's urging the matter for nearly 4 years.

18.VIII.39.

0900

S.O. 3rd U-Flotilla informed that F.O. U/B had decided to finish watchkeeping officers' torpedo-firing practice; and boats then to enter port on Friday night (18/19/8) to receive further orders.

1000

After consulting with Supreme Command of the Navy the following organization was approved by Naval War Staff(1st Division):

F.O. U/B
with staff on board ERWIN WASSNER

F.O. U/B West
Lieut. Comdr. Ibbeken, with Lieut. Loof (Staff office) and staff of 1st and 2nd U-Flotillas	Also F.O. U/B Baltic

	At the disposal of Commander Schomburg with staff of F.O. U/B Baltic.

If case WEISS should develop into a major action, F.O. U/B would go to Wilhelmshaven with ERWIN WASSNER.

1130

F.O. U/B took leave of the C.O.s of the 7th U-Flotilla, who are going into the Atlantic.

1430

F.O. U/B flew to Wilhelmshaven. Took leave of the C.Os of the 6th U-FLotilla and 4 C.O.s of the 2nd U-Flotilla who are

- 2 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

					going into the Atlantic. F.O. U/B gave personal instructions to the S.O. of the 6th U-Flotilla who is going into the Atlantic in U-37. F.O. U/B introduced S.O. of 2nd U-Flotilla, who is taking over the duties of F.O. U/B West, to the Group Command. F.O. U/B ordered U 31/32/35 to be in Kiel on the afternoon of 21/8 and the C.O.s to come on board ERWIN WASSNER to receive orders. "Saar" to be in Kiel at 0700/21/8 to re-adjust mines if necessary.

					19.VIII.39.

0000					The following sailed:
					U 45/46/47/48/52 from Kiel
					U 37/38/39/40/41 from Wilhelmshaven
					U 28/29/33/34 from Wilhelmshaven.

0800					S.O. 6th U-Flotilla, in U 37 was put in tactical command. F.O. U/B remains in operational command.)

0900					S.O.s of 3rd and 5th U-Flotilla arrived for conference. Orders were issued and the 3rd and 5th U-Flotillas instructed to be in the Rügen and Warnemünde sea areas respectively on the evening of 22/8. Depot ships to remain at sea until Y hour. Flotillas fitting out. F.O. U/B took leave of S.O.s. He did not take leave of the C.O.s of these flotillas as their duties are not so vital for the present.

1030					Chief of Staff phoned the Commander of the U-boat school. Firing practice to be continued until 26/8. Recovery vessels to stay. Aim to work 4 of the 7 C.O.s so that they are ready for operations by the evening of 26/8. 3 boats to continue practice 28/8-2/9. Supreme Command of the Navy's orders "TREIBRIEMEN" and PRISENSCHEIBE" arrived too late and can only be delivered to the boats which have sailed by courier a/c by night.

1130					Fleet Command had not yet been informed of the new organization of F.O. U/B and was so informed by telephone.

1300					F.O. U/B and staff transshipped from "HECHT" to "ERWIN WASSNER".

1500					F.O. U/B West instructed to convey all F.O. U/B's orders on secret grid charts to the Group Command and also to inform them that 4 U-boats will arrive on 30/8 at the disposal of Group West (U 36, 1, 3 and 4).

					20.VIII.39

0930					S.O. 1st U-Flotilla, returning from journey abroad, received instructions and began fitting out.

					Supreme Command of the Navy was requested to convey to F.O. U/B any observations of U-boats made by English a/c.

					21.VIII.39

					The following will be ready to fit out:

- 3 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

					U 50 evening of 21/8
					U 27 evening of 22/8
					U 26 evening of 32/8
					U 53 evening of 26/8

					F.O. U/B enquired whether all boats at readiness were to be sent out or if it would not be better to keep some as relief's or operational reserve. Supreme Command of the Navy decided that all U-boats were to be used. The decision was received in the afternoon, times of sailing were to be reported.

1000					Code word "ELEPHANT" received with additions "SCHWEDEN 1, 2, 3" for F.O. U/B. This last order is only a preparatory order, as cleared up by telephone. C.O.s of Hela boats were ordered to supply and will be instructed by F.O. U/B personally as to their duties. They will take over torpedoes at night, will sail at 0400/22/8 and are then to take over TM's (T.N.: torpedo-tube mines) and report.

					Situation as at 21.8

					I.) General
					1) Fitting out has gone according to plan, except for operational torpedoes (see page 3). The excessive number of orders and code-words have been a disadvantage. Preliminary plans were thought out in detail and to cover all eventualities, but code-words are liable to be forgotten when it comes to carrying out.This causes worry and confusion . Transmission of instructions has also been unreliable. For instance, F.O. U/B did not receive the highly important order "to be at readiness on the evening of 22/8" until 24 hours too late, and then only verbally. If peacetime organization differs from that on mobilization, the peacetime method of transmitting orders must be kept until new conditions are properly established.
					2) Everything possibly was done to keep the preparations secret (e.g. by informing the S.O.s personally, breaking off current exercises to give priority to F.O. U/B's exercises etc.). The mobilization of so many units can never be kept absolutely secret. But, although the enemy can discover that something is happening, he cannot form any clear idea.
					3) The very confident attitude of the crews deserves special mention. In my opinion it is a sign that the broad masses of the people have great faith in the government.
					II. Operational Situation
					1) The number of U-boats at present in the Baltic seems adequate. The development of the political situation with Russia will make it possible later to release boats of the 3rd and 5th U-Flotillas to reinforce the numbers in the North Sea.
					2) The North Sea patrols planned can start as soon as the 1st U-Flotilla has fitted out. I consider Group West's complaint that the Northern Sector of the North Sea is insufficiently defended is justified. I therefore, intend to hasten the training of 4 of the 7 school boats so that they can be at the disposal of Group West from 30.8.

- 4 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

					3) The Atlantic boats are on their way to their positions. I am of the opinion that the convoy system will not come into full effect in the first days of the war. Even if the government were to order it at once, there would still be many single ships on the sea routes until it had got started. The important thing is to catch these ships at once. A flotilla C.O. has been sent with the boats and it is intended later to send a second S.O. Thus the boats can always be divided into a N. and S. Group, each under a tactical commander and under the operational command of F.O. U/B.
					4) My plans have all been restricted by lack of boats. The situation is: by the evening of 21/8:
					7 U-boats of the 1st U-Flotilla ready with Group West
					4 " 2nd " on their way to the Atlantic
					3 " 2nd " " Baltic
					4 " 5th " " "
					5 " 6th " " " Atlantic
					5 " 7th " " "

					Total 35 U-boats.

					During the period up to 30.8 the following will be ready and some on their way:

					1 U-boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla (U30) sailing 0300/22/8 for the Atlantic
					1 U-boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla (U 27) sailing evening of 23/8 for the Atlantic.
					1 U-boat of the 2nd U-Flotilla (U26) ready by midday 26.8.
					1 U-boat of the 7th U-FLotilla (U53) sailing 1200/29/8 for the Atlantic.
					4 U-boats of the U-boat School (36/1/2/3/4) at disposal of Group West from 30.8.

					Total 8 boats.

					These are all the U-boats we can count on. (We cannot count on the following 9 boats: U 2, U 8, U 10 of the U-boat school, U 42, 51 long dockyard periods, U 49, 60, 61 with U-boats trials Group and U 11 with Communications Experimental Department).
					In order to occupy the positions, which are not many, without a break with the minimum of boats I would need a further 43 boats and an additional 43 boats which, as experience shows, would be in dock undergoing overhaul.
					Thus, for a war of some length, 130 U-boats should be necessary.
					Even then I would have no reserves, so that I could send out 3 or 4 boats from home against a worthwhile transport reported by the intelligence service. Also there are not enough boats for the Atlantic and none for remote sea areas.

- 5 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

					Therefore, the minimum requirement to be aimed at 300 U-boats.

					22.VIII.39.

0700					"ERWIN WASSNER" sailed from Kiel to Swinemünde with F.O. U/B. Non-agression pact (see also situation review).
					U 30 sailed at 0300 (Operations Order Atlantic No. 2), will operate with U 27 at the N. entrance to the Irish Sea. This was reported to Supreme Command of the Navy, also:
					U 27 - ready at 1200/23/8
					U 53 - ready at 1200/29/8
					U 26 - to be reported later. Boat is starting working up with her new C.O. (Lieut. (s.g.) Ewerth) on 23.8.

1500					Hela U-boats reported fitting-out completed.

1930					"ERWIN WASSNER" entered Swinemuende.

2230					Instruction by telephone from Group Command: "Operation FRITZ cancelled. Written confirmation follows."
					The following radio message was made immediately to the 3rd U-Flotilla: "Operation FRITZ cancelled. On receipt of code-word only operation IRMGARD is to be carried out by U 22. Remaining boats of 3rd U-Flotilla are to remain in the Rügen area until further orders." F.O. U/B
					A radio intelligence report of a cruiser and 8 steamers in the central North Sea points to convoys having been formed.
					Commander Schomburg, with F.O. U/B Baltic's staff, took over Headquarters WALFISCH.
					U 26 is expected to be ready to sail by 28.8.

- 6 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

Situation on 23.8

Operational Control

F.O. U/B will exercise operational control as F.O. U/B (Naval War Staff) and F.O. U/B Baltic. Commander Schomburg is at the disposal of F.O. U/B and will take over as F.O. U/B Baltic when F.O. U/B is in the North Sea.

Lieut. Commander Ibbeken has taken over the duties of F.O. U/B West.

Lieut.(s.g.) Sobe is in charge in Kiel of duties and fitting out of boats which are not yet operational.

Distribution of Boats

The following are on their way to the Atlantic:

2nd U-Flotilla: U 28/29/30/33/34

6th U-Flotilla: U 37/38/39/40/41

7th U-Flotilla: U 45/46/47/48/52

U 27/26/53 will sail shortly.

Thus all the boats available for the Atlantic have sailed and they cannot be relieved. If the situation continues as at present, or if war breaks out, the boats will begin to dribble back by about the middle of September. Naval War Staff planned to recall the boats before their time and thus get a second wave, but I do not agree with this, as too much time is lost on the long outward and inward-bound passages. These long passages are due to the order to proceed around the Faroes, on which Naval War Staff has insisted contrary to F.O. U/B's intentions.

The S.O. of the 6th U-Flotilla is in U-37. Later he can take over tactical command if necessary if the situation makes it necessary to change the operations order.


	North Sea:	1st U-Flotilla.

	Baltic:	3rd U-Flotilla, 5th U-Flotilla and U 31/32/35.
		3 boats of the U-boat school: U 5/6/7.
		Under training at U-boat school:
		1. Wave: U 1/5/4/36
		2. Wave: U 2/8/10
		Undergoing trials: U 60/61/49/42.
		Not at war readiness: U 25/51/11.

23.VIII.39.

A.M.

After the non-aggression pact with Russia, some boats ar