F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 March 1940

PG30259

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	1.3           Nothing to report.       2.3           U 50 entered port.  She sank:     1) Steamer without markings in Zone A about 3,500 tons 2) Steamer type "Christine Maersk", Zone A " 5,200 tons 3) Tanker " 8,300 tons 4) Darkened steamer west of the Herbrides " 5,000 tons 5)         "        "        "     west of Finisterre " 4,000 tons 6) Tanker from a convoy west of Finisterre " 1,000 tons     36,000 tons             Excellent work for this boat's first patrol.                   Countermeasures are being prepared against an expected English operation extending into the Bight.  U 52, who is to sail today for her operations area, will be kept back in a waiting position west of the declared area.  For details see F.O. U/B West's War Log.         3.3           In a radio message U 33 reported, among other things, 3 premature detonations.  This type of torpedo failure became less frequent for a while, but increased again after the torpedoes had been demagnetized.  It is notable that premature detonations are far more numerous with some boats than with others.  U 50 had only one during her whole patrol out of 12 torpedoes fired, while U 32 had 50% prematures, barely 8 days after leaving port, with a total of 6 torpedoes.                     U 52 has been ordered to continue on her passage.         4.3           Enemy news service reports an attack by a U-boat on a convoy southwest of Spain.  If this report is correct, this can only be U 54.  There has been no news of her since she left port.         5.3           B.d.U. attended a conference at Supreme Command of the Navy, in which further instructions were given for the coming operations.                   U 29 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation in the inner position.  Particularly good results are expected from this.         6.3           U 38 and U 52 will both be kept back in the areas they have now reached, so that they can, if necessary, be used in the impending operations.           7.3           The operations planned call for an extensive concentration of all available boats.  U 38 has therefore been withdrawn to the sea area north of Scotland.  Only U 28 and U 32 will remain in their old operations areas to carry out their minelaying.  U 29 is on return passage.
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	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	8.3           Nothing to report.       9.3           Nothing to report.         10.3           U 28 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation in the main position in accordance with Operations Order No. 22.         11.3           U 38 and U 52 have been allocated operations areas on the Norwegian coast.  (see Appendix 1 to War Log).                   U 31 did not return from her trial runs in the Schilling Roads.  Search showed that she had sunk near Black Buoy No. 12, after an attack by an English A/C.  (Details of this accident are set out in Appendix 2 to War Log).             It is particularly regrettable that a boat should have been lost by enemy action in the immediate vicinity of her own base, inside our own barrage defenses.  Losses of this kind should be avoidable.             This is the second time that an enemy A/C has flown very low over the Schilling Roads and attacked U-boats.             We must have sufficient AA defenses for the approach route on the Jade so that at least the enemy is prevented from flying low undisturbed.             B.d.U. has made demands accordingly.                   U 30, U 34, U 46, U 47, U 49, U 51 sailed for their operations areas (see App. 1).         12.3           U 32 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation.  (Operations Order No. 26).  This minefield closes the gap left beside the field laid by U 30 and is therefore likely to produce good results.           U 29 entered port.  She carried out her minelaying operation (Operations Order No. 22) very well, and in addition sank by torpedo:       1) Darkened steamer about 5,000 tons 2) S.S. "Pacific Reliance" 6,717 tons 3) S.S. "San Florentino" 12,842 tons     24,559 tons         13.3           U 43 and U 44 sailed in accordance with Operations Order North Sea/Atlantic No. 1  (see Appendix 1).         14.3           Preliminary regulations have been framed for the AA protection of all U-boats entering and leaving port and on trials.  A minesweeper or patrol vessel will accompany every U-boat in the area which is particularly dangerous (outside the protection of
	- 96 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	Wilhelmshaven as far as the 30 meter line).       15.3           U 41 and U 53 declared missing with effect from 15.3.                                                                 (signed):  Dönitz                                                      Rear Admiral and B.d.U.                 Appendix to B.d.U.'s War Log     Incident U 31        12/13 March 1940 Towards     1615           Telephone call from Group Department A4, stating that there were rumors in Jever that an English A/C had attacked a U-boat in the Schilling Roads.             It was confirmed with the flotillas that all U-boats which had put to sea for exercises had returned to port, except U 31.  This boat was to have been back by afternoon and had passed Schilling on her way in at 1150.               Telephoned the Adjutant of the fighter squadron in Jever:     1) Request to F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses for vessels.  He made 2 S/M chasers of the 12th S/M Chaser Flotilla. available. 2) Request to F.O.I.C. coast for vessels (He sent harbor defense boats). 3) "Saar", in Heligoland, was ordered to proceed to the scene of distress, to have her boats ready to search for survivors, to detect the place by means of echo-ranging gear and have her anchors, emergency air plant, compartment ventilation and divers ready. 4) U 30, lying in the lock ready to sail, was ordered to search at the scene of distress and to call with S/T. 5) Lieut. Commander Sorbe was ordered to come over immediately from Kiel and take charge of the salvage operations.  He could arrive by 0200.  2nd Flotilla to arrange for a Chief Engineer who is familiar with this type of boat and a medical officer to accompany him. 6) Dockyard was requested to get salvage material from Bugsier Shipping Company. 7) Group Command, F.O.I.C. North Sea Defense, F.O.I.C. Coast informed by telephone.             Meanwhile "Ruestringen" entered port.  The scene of distress was fixed off Black Buoy No. 12.  "Saar", U 30 and F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses informed.
	- 97 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	1800           8)  U 31 asked for her position.  No reply.  U 30 left.       1830           "Saar" left Heligoland.                   Meanwhile the personnel of the steamer had been interrogated (Appendix 1) and a report received from the sergeant from Wangerooge (See Appendix 1a) .  Neither gave a clear idea of what had happened.  A boat which was near by had only heard an explosion (U 21).       1945           Report from No. 12 S/M Chaser Flotilla which had found the scene of distress.  There was an echo and oil rising up.  (Appendix 2).  F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses was requested to give orders to the vessels, to watch the scene of distress especially for survivors.       2030           U 30 reported a patch of oil and knocking noises (Appendix 3).                   F.O.I.C. North Sea Defenses informed us that in the course of the night at least 4 minesweepers would arrive at the scene of distress to search and primarily to provide Flak defense.                   Dockyard informed us that Messrs. Friese and Sperrling were being sent to the scene of distress immediately at the request of B.d.U. U-boat Acceptance Command (Commander Bräutigam) was also requested to send a representative.       2150           Radio message made to Saar and U 30 (Appendix 4) informing them,     1) that salvage vessels "Kraft" and "Wille" would arrive towards 0300 or 0400, 2) that Lieut. Commander Sobe was arriving in charge of salvage operations, with Messrs. Friese and Sperrling, 3) that a minesweeping flotilla was arriving to guard the position and provide Flak defense. U 30 was then to continue on her passage and report.       2147           Radio message to Saar and U 30:  Until Lieut. Commander Sobe arrives C.O. of "Saar" is in charge of salvage.  (Appendix 4a).                   S.O. 12th S/M Chaser Flotilla reported that he had formed a close screen around the scene of distress, including U 30, and that knocking noises had been heard (see Appendix 5).  There were then at the scene of distress giving assistance:  "Saar", 12th S/M Chaser Flotilla with 9 boats, 11th S/M Chaser Flotilla with 2 boats, U 30.  A short report was made to Supreme Command of the Navy etc., on findings so far and steps taken (see Appendix 6).       2245           "Saar" and U 30 were ordered to inform the sunk boat that vessels were waiting to pick up any persons surfacing (see Appendix 7).  Further interrogation of the mate of the steamer Ruestringen elicited the fact that he had heard a dull explosion and that a column of water had crashed over the U-boat, which was at periscope depth.  The boat's bows then surfaced and she sank stern first. (See Appendix 1 and 8).       2350           Situation report from "Saar".  "Saar", S/M chasers 121, 127, 117, 113, A, B, C and U 30 were at anchor at the scene of distress.  Searching operations continued.
	- 98 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	12/13     0500           "Saar" reported that a boat had arrived with Friese and Sperrling, the Flotilla Engineer of the 2nd U-Flotilla, Lieut.(s.g.) School and a medical officer.  U 30 proceeded.  At 0230, "Saar" had given the signal to leave the U-boat and ordered ship's boats to stand by to pick up.  NOthing happened as a result of this.  Later it was stated that there had probably been a mistake about the knocking noises heard.     1000           At the request of Captain Bräutigam, Chief Diver Bastian was sent to the scene of distress with the salvage tug "Hermes" from the Navy Dockyard.       1125           A situation report was received from Lieut. Commander Sobe, Officer in Charge of salvage operations (Appendix 9).  The diver had found the boat but had been unable to establish any details during the short time that the water remained calm.  No answer was received to knocking signals.  At the same time he requested the services of Salvage Inspector Meier of the Bugsier Company.  Meier was informed through Navy Dockyard Hamburg and set out as soon as possible.                   On the orders of F.O.I.C. East Frisian Coast, the Captain, mate and helmsman of the steamer "Ruestringen", which is under his command, were again interrogated by a Naval lawyer.  These persons then made far more detailed statements than they had to the officer of the coastwise shipping control station.  (See Appendix 10).  Details were briefly as follows:             The A/C dived at the steamer "Ruestringen" from a 200 meter high cloud base with her engines shut off, and then, suddenly, at a height of about 30 meters, made a sharp turn towards the submerged U-boat.  The English A/C dropped bombs on the U-boat, which was proceeding at periscope depth.  After the hit, the boat's bows surfaced for a short time and she then sank immediately, stern heavy by 450.  From "Ruestringen" a second U-boat was soon sighted steering an approximate course for the scene of distress.  The ship's officers assumed that this boat had seen the whole incident and would do everything necessary, and they therefore took no further action and proceeded on their way.  For the same reason they did not report what happened to anyone in Wilhelmshaven, so that finally the first information was received through Jever. Towards     1830