F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 December 1940

PG30278

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	1.12.   Positions of our own boats at 0800. 1)  In the operations area W of the North Channel:   U 140 AM 18; U 94 AL 37   104 19; 43 55 (Weather boat) 103 41; 101 58   99 47; 95 65   52 68     Italian U-boats:   J 13 - AL 39   J 26 - AL 68   2)  West of Spain and Portugal:  U 37, 65, (Freetown).   3)  On return passage home:  U 29                 "            "          to Lorient:  U 47 (still in the                                                                        operations area)                  also J 2, 18 and J 14 (still in the operations area)   4)  In Lorient:  U 38, 96, 100, 123, 124.           " Kiel:  UA, U 46, 48, 96.           " Bordeaux:  J 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 25.   Ready for operations by December 15:  U 96, 100, 124 and several Italian U-boats.       In order to strengthen the disposition in the direction SW of the North Channel U 104 moved further south at midday and U 140 to a position directly off the North Channel (into the area which U 137 reported as a scene of considerable activity).  On the same day U 101 made contact at 1800 with an inward-bound convoy in square AL 5883.  The positions of all the boats are very favorable as regards this convoy.  U 101 was the boat furthest west, and made contact and all other boats are within range.  Some of them have the chance to reach it the same night, while all the others should be there at latest by the following night, provided, of course, that contact is maintained.   U 101 was ordered not to attack herself until the other boats had arrived.  She shadowed the convoy until the following morning, then reports "All torpedoes used" Diesel breakdown.  There must have already been other boats at the convoy.  U 101 was ordered to shadow until other boats had taken over.  All boats were ordered to report if they were in a position to attack so as to clarify the situation.     2.12.   U 52 and 47 reported: yes.  It was to be assumed however that U 95 was also in the vicinity, as she had requested beacon signals.  U 99 also came up.  She reported at 0940.  An auxiliary cruiser sunk.  According to radio Intelligence, this was "Caledonia".  Contact was nevertheless lost for the day.  Apparently there were strong A/S and escort forces with the enemy.  The great thing was to establish contact.  This couldn't be done:   a) by the boats themselves.  For this it was necessary to know approximately their present position.  Only U 47 and 43 however replied to the order to give their position.  U 94 was still some
	- 135 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	distance off.  U 47 and 43 S and NW respectively astern of the convoy.   b)  Or by a/c of which unfortunately only a very few were available:             One FW 200 from KG/40 Bordeaux             Two BV 138 from Brest, Group 406.     They did not make contact.     The situation therefore remained obscure during the day.  This operation shows up the gaps which inevitably result from warfare with so few U-boats.  It is necessary to concentrate these few available U-boats against the enemy formation, once it has been detected, if any major success is to be achieved.  There are not sufficient boats to make at all sure that the enemy will be held.  The U-boats slow speed and small visual range make things difficult anyhow.  But is is equally clear that these gaps can be very effectively filled, as far as making contact goes, by using a/c.  Even a few isolated reports would be of greatest value.  But there are only 2 BV 138 from GAF Coastal Group 406 available for this task and one FW 200 from KG 40, which is used for this purpose by arrangement with the Group.  Success is correspondingly small:  they did not make contact.     At 1644, U 94 sighted the convoy.  All boats were ordered to operate, even U 101, who has no torpedoes left.  It is vital to shadow until night fall.     U 43 sighted several Outward-bound ships while still 60 miles away from the convoy.  She pursued them and was drawn away to the west.  She sank 2 totaling 20,000 tons.     At 2348 U 94 reported:  convoy dispersed.     From all reports received by morning it was seen that the following were sunk on December 2:     By U 94 - 3 ships totaling 21,000 GRT   101 - 5 ships " 41,000 "   95 - 2 ships " 12,000 "   99 - 3 ships " 29,698 "   52 - 3 ships " ?   47 - 2 ships " 17,000 "       6 boats   18 ships   120,698     GRT           Including the auxiliary cruiser sunk by U 99, but excluding the tonnage of the 3 ships sunk by U 52.   Damaged:  U 101 - 2 ships totaling 10,000 tons.  One of these may have been sunk by U 99.   A Radio Intelligence report suggests that another steamer was torpedoed near the North Channel.  The name of the ship is not known.  She can only have been torpedoed by U 140.   U 103 was operating against the convoy, apparently without contact her behavior will have to be explained when she returns - also U 104, whose long silence despite orders to report, gives cause for concern.           U 100 sailed for the operations area.     13.2.   The attack on the convoy must be regarded as ended.  U 47, 95, 101 are returning (torpedoes used or lack of fuel).   U 43, 103, 104 must be expected to return soon.   U 99, 52 and 94 can remain in the operations area for some time.     I am assuming that the enemy will for the next few days avoid the area in which the last attack took place.
	- 136 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	My assumption was confirmed by an opportune Radio Intelligence (X) report, which stated that 2 inward-bound convoys are being re-routed, one of them hauling out far to the north, the other SC 13, evading to the south along a route about 70 - 120 miles S of the route taken by the scattered convoy.  Here we have an enemy report which is reliable, judging from all previous experience, but unfortunately does not give any details of time.  I decided nevertheless to operate the 5 boats still in the operations area, realizing that they may have to wait for several days.  The boats are disposed in deep formation along the convoy's route.  In the west are 2 boats on the same longitude so as to have a better chance of intercepting the convoy.  There are only 5 boats including the weather boat, 2 of them will probably have to return soon and only one other U 101 is on outward passage to the operations area.  So that the regular Radio message from the weather boat will not give away the disposition, the weather reports are temporarily to be taken over by an Italian boat.       Air reconnaissance detected a convoy inward-bound immediately off the North Channel.  There was no question of U-boats operating as it would be in the North Channel, long before they reached it.  When a/c returned the convoy's position was shown to be 50 miles out.  This is an example of the various difficulties which still arise in cooperation between a/c and U-boats.  They can probably only be overcome by maintaining close contact and by a training directed to achieve the common aim.     4.12.   U 96 left Kiel for the operations area.       U 103 reported 6 steamers totaling 31,470 GRT sunk (at sea since November 9).       No report from U 104, but there has been a U-boat warning for the area in which she may be.         As no weather reports have been received from the Italian boats, I find myself forced to detail one of our boats for this.  It will have to be one of the 5 in the attacking positions ready for the convoy, announced by Radio Intelligence.  This is very undesirable, but I have no alternative.  I do not think any danger need be feared from the probably very inaccurate bearings of the undivided short weather reports, but when there are many regular reports made from approximately the same area, the enemy is likely in the end to discover this boat's ops. area.  This, new very modest attempt to cooperate with the Italians has failed.  Two of them were ordered to make the weather reports.  Neither of them produced messages which were any use.     This is unfortunately not the only disappointment  I did not expect that the Italians would at once sink a lot of shipping.  They are still too unaccustomed to this theatre of operations.  They have never yet operated in similar waters under similar weather conditions.  They are not adequately equipped for it.  But I did at least hope that they would contribute to a better reconnaissance of the operations area.  In actual fact during the whole time I have not received one single enemy report from them on which I could take action.  All they have produced are several very delayed, mainly incomplete or inaccurate sighting reports.  They have never managed to maintain contact even for a very short time.   During the period in which the German boats sank 26,000 GRT in the same operations area, the Italian successes amounted to 12,800 tons at the best (8,000 of these doubtful) and one destroyer.
	- 137 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	I am not at all sure that their presence in the operations area of the German boats, the way they let themselves be sighted, their radio traffic, their clumsy attacks do not do us more harm than good. The main reasons for their failure are:   1. They do not know how to attack unnoticed or to remain unseen. 2. They do not understand how to haul ahead of a slower enemy. 3. They have no idea of night surface attack. 4. They understand nothing of shadowing and reporting.   The attitude of the Navy Department in Rome put paid to my intention to give them the opportunity to learn the basic principles of procedure in sight of the enemy, under guidance of German Officers.   My attempts to make use of them for warfare off the North Channel have proved in vain.  They do not serve any practical purpose.  From the point of view of the war, as a whole this can only be regretted.  I think that in the end the real reasons for their failure lies with the personnel.  They are not sufficiently hard and determined for this type of warfare.  Their way of thinking is too long-winded and lacking in initiative to allow them to adapt themselves readily and simply to the changing conditions of war.  Their personal conduct lacks discipline and they cannot keep calm in face of the enemy.   In view of all this, I am forced to detail and operate the German boats without regard for the Italians.  It is to be hoped that the Italians will benefit with time to an increasing extent from opportunities arising for them out of this.     5.12.   U 99 reported wind 10 and 11 from the operations area.     6.12.   Weather continues very bad in the operations area.  Use of armament cannot be expected.       U 47 and 95 entered port.   Both boats had bad weather for the whole time they were in the operations area and were able to achieve only little success, Lieut (s.g.) Schreiber C.O. of U 95 on the whole carried out his first patrol well.  He acted with decision and tenacity but unfortunately also made several mistakes.       U 100 has been allocated to ops. area within the disposition for the expected convoy.       There have been a great number of SOS reports from Merchant Ships in the area west of England, which gives some indication of the routes at present in use.  It is interesting to note that there is still traffic far to the north, about 59 to 600 N.     7.12.   Air reconnaissance W of Ireland was not flown as the a/c could not take off owing to weather conditions.         U 140 reported:  no use of armament because of weather.           8.12.   A Radio Intelligence (X) report shows beyond doubt that a radio message from a U-boat (U 99) from about 200 W was D/F'd.
	- 138 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	The bearing was 70 - 100 miles out.