F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 August 1941

PG30294

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
  
 
 
 
1.8.
   Positions:
1) In the operations area west of the North Channel:
  U 74 - AM 4111,   U 46 - AM 4511,
  U 97 - AM 4748,   U 559 - AL 6876,
  U 205 - AL 5568,   U 204 - AL 5777,
  U 565 - AL 8255,   U 372 - AL 8722,
  U 431 - AL 9726   U 401 - BE 1341,
  U 558 - BE 3185,   U 75   BE 6621.
2) In the operations area west of Gibraltar:
  U 331 - CG 91,   U 79 - CG 7816,
  U 126 - CG 7876,   U 109 - DG 87,
  U 94 - DG 85,   U 93 - DG 84,
  U 124 - DG 95.        
3)       West of Freetown:
  U 123 - EH 67.        
             
Outward bound:  U 83 - AE 85;  UU 563 - AF 87.
  Returning to base:  U 73 - BF 44;  U 561 - off Brest;  U 68 and U 141 - off Lorient;  U 66 - CG 78.
   
  In Lorient:  U 105, 43, 38, 101, 106, 557, 125, 111, 108, 562, 107, 103, UA.
  In St. Nazaire:  U 751, 77, 96, 71, 553, 552, 98, 69, 95, 203.
 
  In Brest:  U 202, 201, 564.
 
  In Kiel:  U 143.
 
  In Trondheim:  U 568, 567, 206.
 
  In Horten:  U 129.
 
   
 
  On 30th July, the 4 submarines, "U 109, 94, 93 and 124", which were originally allocated to the Southern area, turned round, and proceeded northwards.  As they should end up off Gibraltar, I arranged for them to proceed there by Aruba/Gibraltar route.  On 3.8., the submarines received orders to form a reconnaissance line from DG 6835 to DG 3835, and at 0800, to proceed on course 750 at a day's run of 180 miles.  The Naval War Staff cancelled the restrictions on attacking en route Bruno, until the 6.8, as none of our ships will be in the area during this period.
 
   
 
  U 371 in CF 7355, U 126 in CF 8565 and U 79 in CF 9855 were allocated new areas for attack until the arrival of the four southern boats.  Width 150 miles.
  
                           
 
 
- 126 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
  
 
 
 
  According to a radio intercept, a convoy approaching on course 10 at 6 knots, was in BE 4875 at 2200 on 31.7.  I decided to operate against it.
 
  "U 558, 559, 204, 431, 372, 401" immediately received orders to operate against this convoy, at full speed ahead.  In a second W/T message, they were disposed in 5 degree sectors from 3500 to 200, for the approach to the convoy route, and to make a search in these sectors, assuming that the convoy was proceeding between 4.5 and 7.5 knots.
   
  Air reconnaissance was proposed for the 2.8, and U 75 received orders to act as radio beacon for the aircraft, and from 0900 on 2.8, to transmit beacon signals on the Bordeaux route - the suspected convoy route.
   
 
  U 46, 74 and 205 were moved nearer the convoy.  
 
   
 
  U 205 reported a surfaced enemy submarine in both AL 6722 and AL 5835.  
 
   
 
  U 561 put in at Brest.  U 141 put in at Lorient.  U 68 put in at Lorient.
 
   
 
  The Captains of U 203 and U 95 put in for reports.  Lt.(s.g.) Muetzelburg, the Captain of U 203, operated against the Gibraltar convoy, and sank 5 ships totaling 31,000 GRT, against overwhelming odds.
 
   
 
  Lt.(s.g.) Schreiber, the Captain of U 95, operated in the Northern area and was finally in the patrol line waiting for the north-going SL convoy.  He saw nothing apart from a very fast ship, and achieved nothing.
 
   
2.8.
   U 331 refueled in Cadiz, and was allotted CG 57 as attacking area, width 160 miles, with orders to operate against traffic putting into and out from Lisbon.
   
  At 1645 U 204 contacted the convoy in BE 1813, on course 3500.  She immediately received orders to transmit beacon signals and not to attack.  The remaining boats were to report "Yes" on establishing contact.
   
  U 204 made shadower reports, but added that this depended entirely on hydrophone watches as the visibility in the operational area was 1/2 mile, owing to fog.  At 2020, U 559 reported the convoy in BE 1529, course N.E.
  U 372 requested beacon signals, and must therefore be in the vicinity.
   
  It is not quite clear why the boats established no visual contact in spite of continuous hydrophone observations.  Moreover, according to information received from radio intercepts and dead reckoning based on the first shadower report, the convoy speed increased considerably.  Thus, the suspicion arose that the boats might have been mistaken with their hydrophone observation, and that in reality, have contacted a faster A/s band or something similar.  U 204 received orders to make every effort to obtain visual contact.  The most
       
 
 
- 127 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
  
 
 
 
  recent position of the convoy reported by U 204 is BE 1531, course N.E.  U 123 reported no traffic in the Southern area, and moved her operational area to DG.
 
  U 71, 77, 96, 751 put out from St. Nazaire.
   
  U 43 put out from Lorient.
   
 
  The Captains of U 561 and 141 put in to make reports.
 
   
 
  Lt Bartels, the Captain of U 561, sank 2 ships, including one large tanker, in the Gibraltar convoy, 16,000 GRT in all.  This was the first time U 561 had gone into action against the enemy.
 
   
 
  Lt. Schueler operated very skillfully in the action off the Scilly Isles and in the North Channel.  After sinking 3 ships totaling 21,000 GRT, he escaped a severe depth charge attack by his correct and skillful conduct.
 
   
 
3.8.
   At 0130 hours, U 204 reported the convoy in BE 1298 and transmitted continuous shadower reports until 0625.  U 431, 205 and 558 reported "Yes", i.e. they have established contact.  U 75 requested beacon signals.  U 205 reported 4 A/s ships in BE 1383 at 0955.
 
   
 
  The latest shadower reports were made during the early hours.  Thus contact has apparently ceased, as the boats are making no reports in spite of ordered to report immediately on establishing visual or hydrophone contact with the enemy.
 
   
  At 1142, U 558 again reported the convoy in BE 2412, course N.E.  If this report is correct, the convoy must be further south than was calculated from the last hydrophone observations.  From this it looks as though U 204 had been taken in by an A/s group.
   
  After 1400, U 372, U 401, U 565 and U 559 reported "Yes", and have consequently established contact with the convoy.
   
  Air reconnaissance contacted the convoy at 1510, and transmitted beacon signals.  The fix variations are again very considerable (Air position, AL 8884).
   
  U 558 made two more shadower reports, according to which, the enemy was in BE 2188 at 1450.
       
  At 1550, U 565 reported the convoy in BE 2184, course 800.  U 97 had to stop following the convoy and return to base owing to lack of fuel.  The boat arrived without incident and without sighting any traffic. This shows that English single ship traffic has decreased again during recent weeks and has been amalgamated into convoys.  Stress must again be laid on the ultimate aim of
       
 
 
- 128 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
  
 
 
 
  submarine warfare, namely, to locate and attack convoys.
 
  Further shadower reports came in from U 204 and U 558.  Later, U 204 was driven off, U 372 requested beacon signals, U 46 reported "Yes".
   
  The following W/T message was transmitted to these boats at midnight.  "This night is decisive, go in and attack!  You are more numerous and stronger than the enemy.  Always report contact".
   
 
  U 105 put out from Lorient.
 
   
 
  U 568 and U 129 put out from Trondheim.
 
   
 
4.8.
   At 0312, U 204 reported patrol forces in AL 9875.  No further shadower reports have been received, and contact appears to have ceased.  The boats were ordered to transmit position reports.
 
  The following reported:
 
  U 558, 431, 559, 75, 83.  U 204 and U 74 added a weather report. Rain over the area, visibility 100 meters.  U 565 requested permission to return to base owing to loud noises and because she was only partly clear for submerging.
 
  At 0700, U 204 again contacted the convoy in AL 9818, course 600.  Contact was maintained during the entire day, and shadower reports were transmitted by various boats.  The Air Reconnaissance contacted the convoy at 1258.  At 1851, U 431 reported the convoy in AL 9668, and almost at once U 372 transmitted a shadower report in AL 9623.  It is impossible to judge whether this means a mistake has been made with the bearing or whether the convoy has split up.  At the same time, U 565 while returning to base, as she was not clear for submerging, reported another convoy in BE 2269, course N.N.W.  U 71, 77, 96, 751 and 43, which had put out on 2.8, were in a very favorable position to attack this convoy.  U 565 received orders to make every effort to remain and report contacts.  The Air Reconnaissance was allocated to this convoy on 5.8.  At 1818 U 565 reported that she had been forced to submerge by patrol vessels, one Diesel had been out of action for 14 hours, and she was returning to base.
 
   
 
  No further messages were received concerning either the former or the latter convoy.
   
  U 126 reported no traffic.
   
  As, according to a radio intercept, we must reckon with a convoy putting out from Gibraltar within the next few days, boats to the west of Gibraltar received orders to proceed eastwards at cruising speed.  U 124 to U 109 should increase their day's run to 240 miles in order to arrive off Gibraltar at the given time.
               
 
 
- 129 -
 
     

 

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
  
 
 
 
5.8.
   U 431 reported that both her Diesels were out of order, and that she had succeeded in repairing one but not the other.  No contact.  She was ordered to return to base.
 
  At 0500, U 83 made contact with the convoy in AM 7185.  The sea area through which the convoy is now proceeding is becoming more and more unfavorable for the submarines owing to the proximity of the coast.  Constant air patrols by shore-based aircraft must be expected during clear moonlit nights and sometimes even during normal nights.
   
  G.A.F. Listening Service showed that several formations were flown.  Boats in unfavorable positions and which have no contact should proceed towards the west.  The boats were requested to give positions, results, state of fuel and torpedoes, in order to give a rough impression of the existing position.
   
 
  The following information was gained from reports received:
 
 
U 372 - 1 steamer, 5,000 GRT, sunk.
    1 steamer, 7,500 GRT, burnt out.
    1 steamer, unconfirmed.
U 204 - 1 steamer, 14,000 GRT, direct hit.
U 74 - 1 steamer, 8,000 GRT, torpedoed.
    3 steamers each 8,000 - 10,000 GRT, hit.
U 75 - 2 steamers, 12,000 GRT, sunk.
 
  These sinking reports are not entirely reliable.  Further observations were apparently impossible, as the enemy defences came into action.  We can calculate that:  4 steamers, 24,500 GRT were sunk, 6 steamers were torpedoed.
 
  The actual results can only be obtained when the boats return to base.
 
   
 
  The other boats, U 558, 83, 46, 559, 431, 205 were beaten off and forced to submerge, by the strong patrol and destroyer escort and by the air escort attached to the convoy at night.  They reported no results.  U 401 has not reported since 1429 on 3.8.
 
  The operation against this convoy can be considered as ended.  It shows that although most of the boats were quite inexperienced they achieved successes, in spite of very heavy escort by surface forces and aircraft, and in spite of the unfavorable sea area (close off shore) and poor weather.  The probable loss of one boat (401) is inevitable in an operation such as this.
 
   
 
  According to a priority radio intercept message, the north-going convoy was in BE 7925 at 2000 on 4.8.
 
  I decided to operate against it, and for this purpose, concentrated all the available boats in the northerly area into the northern half of grid square BE.  Air reconnaissance for the next day is to be allocated to the suspected convoy position.  Further, operational orders can only be issued when position and course data has been confirmed by the Air Forces.