F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 31 August 1941

PG30295

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	16.8.   Positions at 0800: U 84 - AD 87   U 96 - AK 37 U 38 - AK 21   U 71 - AK 38 U 501 - AK 22   U 73 - AL 17 U 553 - AK 24   U 46 - AK 02 U 105 - AK 33   U 77 - AK 03 U 567 - AK 34   U 751 - AL 19 U 568 - AL 13   U 101 - AL 01 U 129 - AK 35   U 559 - AL 62 U 563 - AK 36   U 83 - AL 65 U 43 - AL 15   U 204 - AL 68 U 206 - AL 16   U 75 - CD 68         U 205 - CE 11 Outward bound: U 124 - CE 36 U 202 - AL 55   U 126 - CF 15 U 82 - AD 89   U 123 - CF 16 U 569 - AL 11         U 106 - BE 29         U 201 - BF 41         U 111 - BF 76         U 125 - CG 14                       Returning to base:       U 371 - CF 23         U 93 - CF 31         U 109 - BF 75         U 331 - BF 73         U 94 - BF 64         U 79 - BF 64.               Ready for operations by 31 August:   U 108, 141, 562, 66, 552, 95, 98, 69, 561, 558, 143, 752, 571.         The convoy from Gibraltar has not been contacted again.  The boats allocated were given freedom to maneuver in relation to the state of their fuel.  They were ordered to operate against the Lisbon traffic of whose movements we were well informed by the Communications Service.           U 331, 109 and 123 are returning to base.  U 124 and 126 remain in the area.           U 79 put in to Lorient, U 94 to St. Nazaire.           U 565 is outward bound for the operational area, from Brest.         17.8.   U 109 put into Lorient.
	- 141 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	U 143 put out from Kiel for a long distance cruise.       At 1100, the Air Reconnaissance assigned to the N.W. area for the immediate future, reported a convoy on course 2700, west of the Porcupine Bank.  After receiving several bearings on beacon signals from submarines, the convoy position at 1200 was calculated as AM 7143.   The aircraft observed yet another alteration of course to 2300 and then had to return to base.  The observation post suspects a Gibraltar convoy.  While the boats S.E. of Greenland (the Greenland Group) received orders to remain where they were, the remaining boats were ordered to operate against the convoy if within range.  They consisted of:  U 201, 204, 106, 564.  U 201 established contact in AL 9379 at 2131.     18.8.   U 201 maintained contact until 0203 in AL 9537, but at 0330 reported:  "contact lost".  Mean course is S.W.           At 1115, the Air Reconnaissance established contact, and reported the convoy in BE 3143.  At 1200, bearings were received from U 106, 201, 204, and 559, and according to a good cross bearing, the convoy was in AL 9893, proceeding at 8 knots, by dead reckoning.  The boats have ben operating against a supposed south-westerly course, whereas the convoy was actually proceeding south, 40 - 100 miles off.  The Reconnaissance, consisting of several Junkers 88, reported the convoy in BE 2265 at 1735 and sent beacon signals which could only be used as an indication because of the sharp angle if intersection.           U 552 put out from St. Nazaire on a long distance cruise.           At 1808, U 201 established contact.         19.8.   U 201 maintained contact until 0055, and then was driven off.  At 0055, U 204 reported the convoy in BE 2644, at 0608, U 559 reported it in BE 2914 and at 0728 in BE 2944.  The bearings from the boats are obviously different.           At 0925, U 201 again established contact, maintained it until 1658 in BE 5345 and was then driven off.  At 1740, the submarine reported the enemy in BE 5349.  The Air Reconnaissance flew over the area, and one of the G.A.F. aircraft, reconnoitering for the planned operation, transmitted beacon signals, the directions of which were reported by U 123.       U 204 reported that she was returning to base because of lack of fuel.       1 Afridi class destroyer and 2 steamers totaling 14,000 GRT were sunk from this convoy, and on 5.8., 2 direct hits were scored on a 14,000 GRT passenger ship.
	- 142 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	U 559 reported 4 direct hits on 3 steamers in the convoy.  At 2126, U 201 again established contact in BE 5631, course 1600, and at 2258 reported the convoy in BE 5657.  Then contact was broken off.  U 106 lost sight of the enemy at 2215.  If the independent searches made by the boats meet with no success, a diverging search patrol consisting of U 201, 564 and 559 is to be made in sector 160 as far as 2200.     Report made by the Captain of U 79:  Length of trip:  21.7 to 16.8.  Operated against the convoy proceeding to Gibraltar, as from 24.7, and torpedoed 5 steamers in this convoy, 3 of which were definitely sunk.  Then took part in the operation against the convoy outward bound from Gibraltar.  Was the first to report the convoy.  She was attacked with depth charges and developed oil traces which made it necessary for her to return to base.  An exceptionally well organized and successful cruise.       Reports made by the Captain of U 94:  Length of cruise:  12.7 - 16.8.  The boat was detailed first to the Southern area, where she observed nothing, and was then ordered to proceed off Gibraltar where she took part in an attack on an outgoing convoy.  No successes, as she was driven off almost immediately by destroyers.  Impossible to push on, owing to lack of fuel.         Report made by the Captain of U 109:  Allocated first to the Azores area, then after refueling at Gata, was sent to the Southern area.  She was recalled from there, as the enemy are obviously avoiding this area for the time being, and she was finally sent to the Gibraltar convoy route.   Ceased operating because she developed oil traces, and other damage.  No successes.         20.8.   The search for the south going convoy, in the sectors laid down, met with no result.  U 559 reported that she was returning to base from BE 9110 and abandoning further action against the convoy.           One aircraft of the Air Reconnaissance contacted the convoy again at 1359, and transmitted beacon signals.  All boats within range of the convoy are taking bearings and reporting.  All the same, the D/F bearings did not produce any useful position.  The aircraft itself reported the convoy in BE 8326 on course 2250, speed 8 knots.           As Operational Control was unable to form any clear picture from this information, the position reported by the aircraft was considered as doubtful.  The convoy might easily be to the south of this position.  As no contact has been made up till 1900, the boats received orders that if they met with no result from individual searches, to make a further search in this order:  U 201, 564, 106, starting from the given position in BE 5990 at 1500 and working out in sector 160 as far as 2000.  U 124 and U 126 were given freedom to maneuver within this sector.           At 1956, U 106 reported as follows:  The following boats are proceeding at 13 knots from the rendezvous to BE 8364.  U 126 - 1000, U 564 - 1200, U 106 - 1400, U 201 - 1600,
	- 143 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	from 1800 until 2100.     The boats have collected at this point from the south and north, so the convoy cannot be in this area.  According to this message, the boats are searching further to the S.E.  If this is unsuccessful as well, the convoy can only be to the north which means it must have been proceeding slower than was estimated.  The boats were ordered to make a further search after 2100, in the sector ordered by B.d.U.  We must now reckon with a convoy speed of less than 7 knots.       Radio Intelligence confirmed an air escort over a submarine in AK 2221, a sign that someone is proceeding in that area. Boats in the vicinity were ordered to operate on that area, but met with no success.       21.8.   Our boats did not contact the south going Gibraltar convoy.  The only clue to the existence of the convoy in the area is the message transmitted by U 564, of a Sunderland in BE 9718.           The Air Reconnaissance on its return flight contacted the convoy at 1730.  Operational Control only received the message at 1850, because of a W/T delay, so there was no point in getting a bearing from the submarine.  The aircraft reported the convoy in BE 9585, course 1500, at 11730.  The boats received orders to operate against the convoy at full speed ahead, report position, and if further operations became impossible, to report "No".  According to these messages, the following boats are operating against the convoy:     U 201, 552, 106, 564, U 108 recently joined.           U 126 and U 75 report "No".  U 124 started to return to base and has so far met with no success.  At 1750, the boats were disposed in order U 108, 201, 564, 106, 552 in BE 9585 on the mean course 1500 to 1900, going out from the convoy position.  At the first light, these boats should be on the arc which the enemy would reach if proceeding at 9 knots.  The boats should then advance towards the convoy.           Air Reconnaissance is to fly over the area from 1000 on 22.8.           No contact with the enemy has been made in the area occupied by the Greenland Group.  Presumably traffic must have ceased in this area, otherwise at least one contact would have been made, with such a large number of boats in the area.  It looks as if the enemy were by-passing us, by using a type of far reaching location gear.  This is not very likely, however, as with the extraordinarily good visibility there is at the moment, the boats would have at least observed mast-tops of the first ships and the destroyers.  I decided to transfer the entire group to the east, to have a disposition to the south and the southeast of Iceland in case no contact was made with the enemy.       The boats were ordered to proceed on course 700 with a day's run of 150 miles, as from 1800 on 21.8.  U 75 reported from BF 9747, that she had observed ship 36, but had been unable to maintain
	- 144 -

 

	Date Position, Wind, Weather   and Sea State, Illumination, Events Time Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
	contact, as her engines were damaged.  She reported that she would arrive in BF 85 on 22.8.  U 75 is operating against the south going convoy.     The Captains of U 371 and U 331 put in to make reports.       Lt.(s.g.) Driver, the Captain of U 371 has operated recently against the north going and the south going Gibraltar convoys, and has sunk 2 ships totaling 14,500 GRT.         Lt.(j.g.) von Thiesenhausen, the Captain of U 331, met with no success in this first trip made by the boat.  He made several mistakes while operating against the north going Gibraltar convoy reported by U 79.  The mistakes can be put down to his inexperience.  We hope he will meet with the necessary success when he has more experience.         22.8.   No contact was made with the enemy during the night.  At about 0130, U 75 and U 552, reported having seen star shells in CG 1110.  This was quite probably an attempt made by the enemy to mislead us, so only these two boats are to operate, as boats are only to operate, as ordered, on 10 degrees higher mean courses.           U 126 reported that she was returning to base.           The Air Reconnaissance again made contact with the convoy at 1050, and transmitted beacon signals.  U 564, 552, 75, 108, 557, 106 took bearings and reported, placing the convoy in CG 1380.  The convoy therefore m