F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 October 1941

PG30298

     
 
 
 
Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
1. October
  The following boats are in the North Atlantic:

U 4431, U 562, U 564, U 575, U 83, U 71.

  En route there:
  U 206 in the Bay of Biscay.  U 374, U 208, U 502 coming from home.  
  U 204, U 129 and U 79 on escort duties in the Mid-Atlantic.   After carrying out these tasks, U 204 is to go to the north, U 129 into the Southern area, and U 79 to the Mediterranean.
  The following are on the way back:  U 372, U 94, U 565, U 556, U 205, U 373, U 572.
 
  In the South, the following boats are in the operational area west of Freetown:  U 107, U 108, U 66, U 68, U 125, U 103.  On the way out: U 126, and on the way back:  U 67 and U 111.
 
  The following are operating in the Mediterranean:  U 371, U 559, U 97, U 331, U 75.
 
   
 
  U 372 made contact again with a convoy steering S.W., but then it lost the convoy, had to break off pursuit towards evening on account of lack of fuel, and had to start the return journey.
 
   
 
  U 565 reported that it was returning, no traffic (between the Herbrides and the Faroes).
 
   
 
  U 124 entered Lorient.  U 69 entered St. Nazaire.
 
   
 
2. October
  U 94 reported that she had sunk the tanker "San Florentino" (12,000 GRT) in AK 8429.  Air reconnaissance found a convoy steering 2700 at 1240 in AL 6262.  The aircraft reported about 20 steamers from 10,000 to 20,000 GRT, 6 guard boats, 4 destroyers.  It appeared at first as if this convoy were going to America and not Gibraltar, on account of the size of the ships and the courses observed.  On its return flight a second aircraft picked up the convoy again at 1500 and reported it in AL 6283 with course 2000.  Both positions have been given to the boats, which received orders to operate on this convoy.  Air reconnaissance has been detailed for tomorrow in the area concerned.
   
  U 572, U 205 have entered Lorient.  U 373 has entered Brest.
   
3. October
  THe convoy was picked up again by air reconnaissance towards midday.  D/F bearings were reported from 7 boats, which gave a fairly exact position for the convoy in AL 8240 at 1200.  Mean course since yesterday is S.W.  U 83 is fairly close to the convoy position and can still keep contact today.
   
  According to an aircraft report the convoy consists of 25 merchant ships, 4 guard boats, 4 destroyers, 1 cruiser and 1 aircraft carrier.  Air reconnaissance is again detailed for the 4th October.
           
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  U 431 sank steamer 5,000 GRT in AJ 9683.
 
  U 67 reported that it had carried out the refueling of U 68.  It continues its return passage.
   
4. October
  During the night no contact was made with the convoy going to the south.  Air reconnaissance picked up the convoy again and reported its position in AL 8836 at 1500.
   
 
  5 boats are now operating on the convoy.  They were instructed to search in different sectors, on courses of 1700 to 2200 from the position of the convoy reported from the air.  Renewed air reconnaissance is fixed for the 5th October.
 
   
 
  U 129, which was an escort for the U-boat supply ship "Kota Pinang" and which was cruising in the Atlantic together with this ship, reported that the "Kota Pinang" was sunk from a distance by shell-fire from a cruiser of the Belfast Class in BE 7722.  It has saved the entire crew (119 men) and has started on return to base.  Its diving capacity is restricted by this additional load of men.  It has been arranged with the Naval War Staff to hand over this crew in Ferrol, as it is not justifiable for U 129 to pass through the Bay of Biscay under the circumstances.  U 129 received orders to do this.
 
   
 
  U 101 left St. Nazaire.  U 563 left Brest.
 
   
 
5. October
  U 431 made contact with an enemy convoy consisting of 2 ships escorted by 3 destroyers on a S.W. course, in BD 2647 at 0130.  U 372 is in the neighborhood and requests a beacon signal.
 
   
 
  U 431 continues to give further shadowing reports.
 
   
  The operation against the convoy going to Gibraltar is being continued.  U 204, which reported that it had carried out a special task (convoy Rio Grande) has been included in this operation, as it reported its position as being in the neighborhood in which the convoy is supposed to be.  The operation against the formation of transport ships which was reported by U 431, ended unsuccessfully, as U 431 as well as U 372 had to set out for base on account of fuel.  U 562's limited supply of fuel did not permit a commitment against the convoy.  It receives freedom of action in AM, with orders to carry out attacks near the northwest coast of Ireland, where, on account of certain observations, enemy traffic is suspected.
   
  U 552 entered St. Nazaire.  U 109 left Lorient.
   
6. October
  The operation against the convoy going south is continuing.  Air reconnaissance, however, has still produced no results.
             
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  The boats received orders in the afternoon to continue to operate against the convoy, whose speed of advance was from 4 to 6 knots.  The boats were to be evenly spread in N.S. lines between 180 and 230 West.
 
  U 129 reported that it had handed over the ship-wrecked men of the "Kota Pinang" to a Spanish tug.
   
  U 101 put into St. Nazaire because its W/T gear was out of order.
   
 
  U 553 left St. Nazaire.
 
   
 
7. October
  Search for the south-bound convoy continues.
 
   
 
  A former Norwegian whaler "Svend Fogn" was torpedoed in AL 2129.
 
   
 
  U 68 received orders to proceed to St. Helena via Ascension Island, and to operate there.
 
   
 
  U 565 entered Lorient.
 
   
8. October
  In order to pick up the convoy going south, the boats committed to the task are to be disposed at the first light on a front which corresponds to the position of the convoy, if it is assumed that its highest speed is 5.5 knots (about 430 N.).  The boats received orders to run counter to the convoy, in lines, on a zig-zag course.  Before this came into complete effect the convoy was picked up by air reconnaissance.  According to the cross bearing of the beacon signals, the result is a position a little north of the center of U-boat positions in BE 7689.  U 83 made contact at 1750 and reported the convoy in BE 7919 on a southerly course.  The contact was lost when darkness fell, on account of thick squalls and hail.  According to messages coming in, 3 more boats were in the immediate neighborhood.  One of them, U 71 glimpsed it about midnight.
   
  U 129 entered Lorient.
   
9. October
  The operation against the south-bound convoy is continuing.  The air reconnaissance committed to the task had no successes on account of the very unfavorable weather conditions.  As from 0900 hours on the 10th October, the boats received orders to be in the sector 1300 to 1800 from the last certain enemy position, which was in BE 7976 at 0100 hours on the 9th October.  They were to be on the arc that would be reached by the enemy traveling at speed of 5.5 knots, and they were to run counter to the convoy.
   
  U 126 made contact for a short time with one of the groups of 4 steamers protected by destroyers.  It lost them when darkness fell.  According to a still unconfirmed report, 44 men of a German U-boat crew have been landed in
         
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  Gibraltar.  They are said to belong to a large U-boat which was sunk by a trawler.  It is not out of the question that this is U 111.
 
  UA put in to Lorient on account of an oil trace.
   
  U 575 entered St. Nazaire.
   
 
  U 94 entered Bergen.
 
   
 
  U 568 left St. Nazaire.
 
   
 
10. October
  An aircraft made contact with a south-bound convoy at 1305 and sent beacon signals.  According to the pilot it must be assumed that the position of the convoy at 1330 was in the northern half of CF 3810.  That means the convoy has proceeded from the last reported position on a more easterly course, and at a greater speed than was supposed.
 
   
 
  The boats, which were in various sectors and had been assigned to attack the convoy, are west of it at a distance of 100 miles or more.  Latest bearings give a further position in CF 3819 at 1515.
 
   
 
  The boats have been advised to reckon that the mean course of the convoy is 1200 and the speed of advance is 5 to 6.5 knots.   According to this they are to be from 0900 on the 11th October, on a line (CG 4113 to CF 6392), which is as far as the convoy could have reached at a speed of 6.5 knots.  If the convoy has not been picked up by then, the boats are to continue the search on courses of 1100 to 1350 after the key-word has been passed.  Our own air reconnaissance will be in the area of the convoy from 1000.
 
   
  According to the requirements of the Naval War Staff, it is ordered that U 564 is to be refueled by "Gata" on or after the 13th October.
   
  U 83 reported in the evening that it had sunk a large floating crane.  In any case it was a very important vessel to the enemy.
   
  U 573, U 374, U 208 which were in the North Atlantic were ordered to operate in the attacking areas southeast of Greenland.
   
  U 502, U 109, U 553 and U 568 received orders to steer to AK 43, in order to be able to join up later with this disposition.
   
      U 126 sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT in the convoy which it reported.
       
      U 67 and U 111 were asked to report position.
       
      U 67 reported that it was in the same square as the south-bound convoy, it has therefore apparently operated on it.  U 111 did not report.  There must be some
     
     
                 
 
 
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Date
Position, Wind, Weather
 
and
Sea State, Illumination,
Events
Time
Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.
 
 
 
 
  connection between this and yesterday's radio intercept report about the destruction of a U-boat, and part of the crew being taken prisoner.  It must be considered lost.
 
  The traffic situation in the operational area west of Africa is extremely confused and unsatisfactory.  After the U-boat successes in the Freetown area in Spring, the English have apparently moved their traffic to another route to the west.  Having regard to our own ships and forces, the U-boats were not given permission to operate there at first.  Even after permission was granted to 4 boats, they only had very slight success - 2 steamers.  The Naval War Staff assumes that the only passage for all fast ships from the south is still through the West Atlantic.  But as the large area offered so many possibilities, which the English utilized fully for evasion and for changing their routes, it appears that it is hardly possible to pick up these single fast ships.  (It is forbidden to attack in the American Safety Zone).
   
  Sending the boats to the east has also brought no results.  The traffic situation must have completely changed.  A convoy is believed to be leaving Freetown between the 12th and 14th October.  If the attempt to pick it up also brings no results, then consideration will be given to the breaking off of operations in the south.  The boats which are being used there are badly needed in the north, all the more so because boats have also been taken away from there for other theaters of operation.  At the beginning of October the actual situation was as follows:
  There were:  
 
      4 boats in the area of operations in the North Atlantic
 
      9 boats in the area of operations in the South Atlantic
 
  As opposed to that there were:
 
      9 boats returning to base
 
      4 boats approaching the area
 
      3 boats on convoy tasks
 
      6 boats in the Mediterranean
 
      3 boats in the North Sea
 
  This splitting up of forces has made it obvious that it is scarcely possible to find targets with only a few boats in the North Atlantic.
 
  There are no possibilities of counter balancing this by operations in the Mediterranean and the North Sea. In both these areas the traffic is made up of the smallest types of craft, which are difficult to attack and to hit.  Success is accordingly slight.  It must be emphasized repeatedly that the enemy today can no longer be found and successfully attacked by small numbers of boats.  In September, on the contrary, there was a weakening instead of a strengthening of forces in the main operational area:  The effect of sending 5 new boats to the front was nullified by the fact that 3 were lost and 2 small boats were given over for training purposes. The transfer of boats to the Mediterranean and the North Sea therefore only took place at the expense of operations in the Atlantic.  U 371 reported that it had been hit in a gunnery action, and had sustained losses and damage.
                       
 
 
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