F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 January 1945

PG30362

     
     
 
1.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 14
U 485
 - Op(BF 35)
U 863
- Op(MQ 40)
U 1053
- AL 26
 
248
 - Op(BD 37)
486
 - Op(BF 35)
869
 - AK 38
1055
 - AM 89
 
278
 - Op(AN 16)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
870
 - Op(CG 85
1058
 - AO 44
 
285
 - AM 42
650
 - Op(BF 26)
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1172
 - AM 32
 
297
 - Op(AN 36)
680
 - BF 15
905
 - BF 12
1200
 - AN 29
 
312
 - Op(AN 15)
764
 - AM 32
907
 - AN 32
1202
 - AN 24
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - BF 25
979
 - AE 73
1208
 - AO 44
 
315
 - AF 77
773
 - AN 73
1009
 - AK 61
1230
 - AK 85
 
322
 - BF 16
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1014
 - AO 44
1231
 - Op(BB 75)
 
325
 - BF 11
825
 - AN 28
1017
 - AN 28
1232
 - Op(BB 76)
 
400
 - BF 16
843
 - KS 87
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
1233
 - AE 67
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1051
 - AN 28
1235
 - AN 32
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1200 - 1230.
  Entered Port :  U 1202 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 864 - Farsund;  U 1199 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
                15th Group: 0943 suspicious object, position unidentified.
  1010 suspicious patch of oil, position unidentified.
  1105 suspicious object, position unidentified.
  1219 suspicious object, position unidentified.
  0039 suspected submarine location, preparing to attack, position unidentified.
  0207 suspected submarine location, preparing to attack, position unidentified.
    All sightings were made by patrol aircraft of unit 899.
             Basra reported the 0719 message from the American steamer (KE 20 U):  Torpedo fired on the starboard side, missed in LC 2110 (U 863?).  See also War Log 31.12. paragraph III c).
     Enemy units were located in:  AL 6130 - 6860 - AM 4870 - BE 2970.
  d) According to a radio intercept, a convoy passed the loop barrage (Firth of Forth) at 1520 ( 1020 informed).
       
- 811 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) As situation reports from all operational areas are urgently required, all boats returning to base were requested to make same.
  c)  None.
  d)  According to a report from U 1227 there would be very good opportunities for surprise attacks by submarines in the sea area off Gibraltar, against the heavy convoy and single ship traffic.  U 1227 fired a four fan torpedo shot at a battleship accompanied by a small cruiser, but missed as the ship zig-zagged heavily.  Submarine reported that enemy air patrols were rendered ineffective by the use of Schnorchel.  Density-layering (only in Straits and off the coast) was another safeguard.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 15
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 31
U 1053
- AL 36
 
248
 - Op(BD 61)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
869
 - AK 39
1055
 - AM 94
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(EF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 85)
1058
 - AO 47
 
285
 - AM 45
680
 - BE 33
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1199
 - AF 87
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - AM 33
905
 - BF 16
1172
 - AL 33
 
312
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - BF 16
907
 - AN 29
1200
 - AN 31
 
315
 - AN 12
773
 - AN 23
979
 - AN 81
1208
 - AO 41
 
322
 - BF 15
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1009
 - Op(AK 67)
1230
 - AK 85
 
325
 - BF 15
825
 - AN 25
1014
 - AO 41
1231
 - Op(BE 75)
 
400
 - BE 15
843
 - JC 12
1017
 - AN 12
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
1233
 - AE 83
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - LC 25
1051
 - AN 22
1235
 - AN 43
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1200 - 1230.
  Entered Port:  U 1208, 1058, 1014 Horten (907 Bergen);  U 1235 Stavanger.
  Sailed:  U 1004 Bergen.  (U 991, U 1227, U 1228 Kristiansand to Flensburg).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 812 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) Submarine sightings:
     Colombo repeated the submarine sighting from the American steamer (WE 2 KJ):  "At 1230 submarine attacked to starboard in LD 1841 bottom right, and at 1240 the submarine surfaced.  Send aircraft immediately".  (Possibly Japanese, as yesterday's submarine sighting report was 360 miles to the west).
  d) 1) The channel Isles reported several loud detonations at 1053, some way off to the north, at 1245, ENE and at 1415 WNW.   Active enemy sea patrols in the Alderney-Guernsey area.
    2) The large numbers of escort aircraft from Group "Pistol" which have appeared recently are nothing to do with the anti-submarine group of the same name, but are escorting convoys in conjunction with "Eastcheap".  (Command station or anti-submarine craft).  According to wireless telegraphy traffic, anti-submarine craft are operating in the area from North Scotland, along the English east coast, to Yarmouth.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 181 reported that she was putting in to Djakarta on 5.1., and had completed the refuelling operation with U 843.  On 27.8. she had come across active carrier-borne aircraft in LZ 96.  The boat was again warned of the danger of submarines on the incoming route.
    2) U 1235 put in to Stavanger as her port Diesel was out of order.
  c)  None.
  d) Experiences of U 1202 in the Irish Sea:
             A good area for operations, full of possibilities.  Heavy convoy traffic, continuous single-ship traffic around points of concentration of convoy routes in AM 9470 - 9570 - 9250.  Consequently these are the most favorable submarine stations.
     Defence:  Mediocre sea defences, aircraft over day and night; all the same, we managed to proceed off-shore, by Schnorchelling, and were never contacted.  Good conditions for navigation.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 813 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
3.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 10
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 31
U 1051
- AF 79
 
248
 - Op(BD 64)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
869
 - AK 39
1053
 - AM 15
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
870
 - Op(CG 86)
1055
 - Op(AM 98)
 
285
 - AM 48
680
 - AM 79
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AO 47
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - AM 26
905
 - BF 24
1172
 - AM 26
 
312
 - OP(AN 15)
772
 - BF 15
907
 - AN 29
1199
 - AF 79
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
773
 - AN 23
979
 - AE 82
1208
 - AO 41
 
315
 - Op(AN 16)
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1004
 - AF 87
1230
 - AK 59
 
322
 - BF 15
825
 - AF 79
1009
 - Op(AK 37)
1231
 - Op(BB 75)
 
325
 - BF 16
843
 - JB 26
1014
 - AO 41
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
400
 - BF 11
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AN 31
1233
 - AE 86
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
863
 - Op(LC 20)
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
1235
 - AN 31
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
   
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1230.
  Entered Port:  U 312 - Trondheim, U 1235 Stavanger.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Submarine sightings:  At 2346, an American steamer (KW 2 RA) was pursued in LC 3671 by a submarine.  At 0130, the steamer opened fire on the submarine (possibly Japanese or even U 863).
     Enemy units were located in:  AL 3883 - AM 3250 - 7510 - CG 9514.
  d)  During the morning of 3.1., 3 escort aircraft from unit 899 were located in the St. George Channel by means of radio intercepts.
             At 1056, a convoy passed the Loop Barrage in the Firth of Forth.
             In reply to a query from B.d.U. as to what they considered the detonations had been, Sea Defense Commandant of the Channel Isles reported that during the night of 20/21.12.  several depth-charge patterns had been heard.  Detonations on the 26.12. were so heavy that houses on Alderney were shaken.  Reports on more distant detonations were not clearly explained.Each detonation report was checked by an experienced officer.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 814 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  U 1230 transmitted this position report:  Spies landed according to plan.  Operations only in BA 95/96.  Very little single ship traffic, much fishing activity.  Ship sunk:  On 3.12. in BA 95/96, one 5,500 GRT single ship proceeding on course 500 at 10 knots.  Apparently very little patrol activity.  Most of the escort off the Gulf, lights showing according to peacetime regulations.  The submarine is thoroughly clear for submerging again (battery mounting hatch was welded inside to the twin dual mounting, with armor plating).  The submarine still has 8 T IIIa, 5 T V, provisions for 5 weeks and 100 cubic meters.  She requested further instructions.
    2) U 1172 was ordered to alter course to AM 87 (along the coast).  U 764 was allocated to the operations area in the Channel.
    3) U 312 put into Trondheim without previously reporting.  Broke off the operation.
  c)  According to enemy press reports, both the spies landed at Boston on 30.11. by U 1230, were arrested soon afterwards.  (American report on 24.12).  As we have also had no news from the spy landed by U 1229, it appears that the use of submarines for this type of task is not justified, and will not be continued.
  d) 1) U 1200 must be presumed lost.  She put out from Bergen on 19.10. with the Channel as her operational area.  On 3.11. she reported "clear for Channel operation in AM 70".  Since then we have received no more signals from the boat.  According to our calculations she should have entered port by now.  A spy report on 5.11. stated that a patch of oil had been observed in mid Channel, which presumably came from a sunk submarine.  U 1200 should have been just off Cherbourg at this time.We presume that she was sunk by anti-submarine craft in the Channel while entering the operational area.
    2) With submarine losses as low as they are, it is striking how many seem to be type IXC submarines while still outward bound in the Iceland Passage (U 1226, 877.  There is considerable anxiety about U 869).  Losses were most probably caused by Schnorchel breakdowns.  As however it is likely that patrols will be increased, U 1233 was warned and ordered not to take any risks during her passage.
    3) As U 1202 had met with such success in the Irish Sea, U 1055 was given a detailed situation report and U 285 was allowed freedom to maneuver in the Irish Sea/St. Georges Channel.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 1230  1 ship 5,500 GRT.
 
 
- 815 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
4.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 12
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 31
U 1051
- AF 78
 
248
 - Op(BD 64)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
869
 - AK 39
1053
 - AM 14
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 94)
1055
 - Op(AM 98)
 
285
 - AN 73
680
 - AM 76
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AO 16
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - AM 29
905
 - Op(BF 25)
1172
 - AM 26
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - BF 14
907
 - AN 24
1199
 - AF 78
 
315
 - Op(AN 16)
773
 - AN 23
979
 - AE 83
1208
 - AO 16
 
322
 - BF 11
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1004
 - AF 79
1230
 - AK 62
 
325
 - BF 24
825
 - AF 78
1009
 - Op(AK 56)
1231
 - Op(BB 75)
 
400
 - AM 79
843
 - JB 37
1014
 - AO 16
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AF 78
1233
 - AE 85
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - Op(LC 38)
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1230.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 1203 Kiel (U 907 Bergen).
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
0845 Submarine location with preparations for attack, position unidentified.
1005 Periscope sighted by Gibraltar based aircraft (U 870).
0145 American steamer reported:  "Am being pursued by submarine, in DH 2226" (None of our boats in the vicinity).
0357 Escort aircraft (184 W 14) reported submarine location with preparations for attack, position unidentified, to Liverpool.
0600 Aircraft (OJPM) reported to Colombo:  "Am over enemy submarine"  (possibly connected with the message from the American steamer.  See KTB. 3.11., paragraph III c).
     Enemy units located in:  AF 7780 - AL 9198 - 3480 - AM 2540 - 9710 - BE 3690 - 4642.
  d) Sea Defence Commandant of the Channel Isles reported that a lifeboat from the steamer "Dumfries Newcastle" (5,149 GRT) had been brought in by the harbor defence vessel Peter Port.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 816 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) As U 1230 still has sufficient supplies to continue transmitting weather reports in AK 6156 for at least 14 days, she is to occupy this grid square to a depth of 200 miles, as a base for making weather reports.  Reports are to be made 3 times a day.  The former meteorological submarine, U 1009, was transferred to the North Channel, as an attacking area, with instructions to proceed into the Irish Sea whenever possible.  Also to attack off Anglesey whenever possible, as the Liverpool-St. George and Bristol Channel traffic was calculated to pass through this area.  Submarine to remain at least 14 days within the operational area.
    2) U 312 put into Trondheim.  While trying to press into Hoxa Sound (Scapa), she was forced on to the rocks by the current, and her main rudder put out of action.  The boat returned to base, steering with her engines.  No traffic was located.  2 patrol lines in Pentland Firth.
      U 315 returned to base at Trondheim because of damaged engines.  She should have been off Scapa Flow to make attacks on carriers, but according to dead reckoning, did not even reach the operational area.
      Submarines have been off Scapa now since 7.12. for the purpose of attacking carriers.  As the enemy must have noticed the existence of submarines during this time, and have taken every precaution not to lay themselves open to attack, we do not intend to detail any more boats to this area.  The 3 boats which are already in the area are to remain in the operational area until provisions are exhausted.  Air reconnaissance is required, to find out what traffic is in the Bay, and the type and lay-out of the barrages.
    3) U 680 reported movements in the Channel, from AM 19.  We have located N.W. convoy traffic in EF 3529 and S.W. convoy traffic in BF 3539.  Most of the traffic is on the Cherbourg route.  Patrol vessels and search groups active all the time, schnorchelling possible.  Wireless telegraphy message was not received complete, but apparently the submarine made no successful attacks.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 817 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
5.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 181
- KB 21
U 486
- Op(BF 35)
U 864
- AN 24
U 1051
- AM 11
 
248
 - Op(BD 86)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
869
 - AK 39
1053
 - AM 23
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1055
 - Op(AM 95)
 
285
 - AM 76
680
 - AM 19
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AO 16
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - AM 51
905
 - Op(BF 26)
1172
 - AM 28
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - BF 11
907
 - AF 87
1199
 - AF 77
 
315
 - AF 58
773
 - AN 23
979
 - AE 83
1203
 - AO 72
 
322
 - AM 79
806
 - Op(BD 75)
1004
 - AF 78
1208
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 25)
825
 - AN 11
1009
 - AK 59
1230
 - Op(AL 42)
 
400
 - AM 75
843
 - JB 54
1014
 - AO 16
1231
 - Op(BB 75)
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AN 11
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - Op(LD 41)
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
1233
 - AE 87
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 315 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053.
  Entered Port:  U 864 Bergen;  U 181 Djakarta (U 682 Kiel).
  Sailed:  U 868 Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:  At 1252, an English unit transmitted this message to Commander-in-Chief Gibraltar:  "Am attacking a submarine".  Unidentified position.  At 1442, Gibraltar broadcast important wireless telegraphy messages to 4 other units.  (possibly U 870).
     Enemy units were located:  AL 3643 - 0280 - AM 9480 - 4070 - BE 3670 - 3472 - 1460 - BF 1340 - 5420.
  d) 1) According to a priority radio intercept on 4.1., a ship from the T.B.C. convoy (26) (Thames-Bristol Channel) capsized and sunk on 3.1. off Cape Cornwall (in the vicinity of Land's End).  Steps were taken to rescue the crew.
    2) A priority radio intercept:  Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches (Admiral Liverpool) at 2331 on 4.1. announced that the convoy rendezvous was at 1300 on 5.1 in AE 8896, course 3060.  Possibly this refers to a convoy proceeding to Reykjavik.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
       
- 818 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) U 1231 is returning to base from the operational area St. Lawrence River/Halifax.  Position BC 8242.  No nearer positions have been reported as yet.
    2) The priority radio intercept message about the convoy rendezvous in AE 8896 (see paragraph III d) was passed on to the boats in the vicinity (U 1233 en route for the Atlantic, U 979 returning to base from Reykjavik).  Boats were instructed to make full use of all opportunities.
  c) U 868 (supply boat for St. Nazaire) put out from Kiel (subsequently to Horten for training in Schnorchelling).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 92)
U 537
- Op(JH 10)
U 869
- AK 39
U 1053
- AM 23
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1055
 - Op(AM 95)
 
285
 - BF 11
680
 - AM 17
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AO 16
 
297
 - Op(AM 36)
764
 - AM 54
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1172
 - AM 51
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - AM 75
907
 - AF 79
1199
 - AN 11
 
315
 - AF 82
775
 - AN 23
979
 - AE 83
1203
 - AO 72
 
322
 - AM 72
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1004
 - AF 77
1208
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 26)
825
 - AM 32
1009
 - AK 68
1230
 - Op(AK 68)
 
400
 - AM 48
843
 - JB 40
1014
 - AC 16
1231
 - BC 82
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AM 32
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
1233
 - AE 79
 
486
 - Op(BF 35)
868
 - AO 74
1051
 - AM 32
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 315 - 322 - 400 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 315 Trondheim.
  Sailed:  U 480 Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
19th Group: At 1100 investigated a suspicious object, a patch of oil, in an unidentified position.
  At 1254, submarine location made, with preparations for attack, position unidentified.  Cancelled at 1306.
       
- 819 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Enemy units were located in:  AM 0281 - AM 1660 - 4150 - BF 1940 - 2580.
  d) All Allied merchant ships in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean were ordered to cease zig-zagging as from 5.10., except within a 500 miles from the African coast, and within a 500 mile radius of Freetown.  Limits in the Atlantic were 210  N - 400 W., in the Indian Ocean 100 S. - 800 E.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 869 reported from AK 63, in answer to a request for position.  There was some concern about the submarine as she should have been considerably further south-west, if she had proceeded along the normal route through the Iceland Passage.  According to our calculations (taking an average day's run of 55 miles) the boat must have gone through the Straits of Denmark.  The boat is to report her fuel reserves tonight, so that a decision can be taken as to allocation of operational area.
    2) U 486 is returning to base from the Channel operational area, as she has expended all her torpedoes.  Position AM 46.  Ships sunk:  1 motor vessel, 6,000 GRT, in BF 2516; 3 escort destroyers; 1 corvette probably in BF 3516/28/29 torpedoed on 24.12.  A passenger vessel of 11,000 GRT in BF 3553, not actually observed to sink, but presumed definitely sunk, as lifeboats and floats from the troop transport "Leopoldville" (11,509 GRT) washed up on the Channel Isles.  The submarine Schnorchelled day and night to the north of Barfleur.  Traffic off Cherbourg at night, fast convoys during the day.  Concentrations of ship traffic; N.W.-S.E. traffic in BF 3259, and S.W.-S. traffic in 3553/61.  Traffic during the day off Lizard Head.  Remained 9 days in the operational area.
    3) U 1231 reported her position, on request, as the Gulf of St. Lawrence/Nova Scotian coast.  In BB 59, little traffic, only at night.  In BB 14 - BA 38, also very little traffic (boat has been there since 8.12).  BB 81 - 75 (until 25.12.), little traffic, convoys sighted on 26. and 27.12. respectively on the Cape Sable - Cape Canso route, and vice versa, not on the Halifax route.  Traffic around the latter in the evenings.  Day's run to the north to cover BB 7613 - 7534.  Southgoing traffic during the day from BB 7527.  Very little patrol activity or air defence.  Lights burning according to peacetime regulations.
 
 
- 820 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      As a result of these experiences off Halifax, the boats in that area (U 806 - 1232) received instructions, if present operations unsuccessful, to approach as near as possible to New York - fuel and provisions permitting.
    4) U 1172, in AM 51 according to dead reckoning, was given freedom to maneuver in the Irish Sea, on basis of situation report from U 1202, to proceed to this area through the North Channel.
  c)  None.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 486  3 ships 17,509 GRT
                 3 escort destroyers
                 1 corvette probably sunk.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
7.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 83)
U 537
- Op(JH 10)
U 869
- AK 63
U 1053
- AM 31
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1055
 - Op(AM 92)
 
285
 - BF 88
680
 - AM 17
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AO 16
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - AM 57
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1172
 - AM 52
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - AM 71
907
 - AF 78
1199
 - AM 32
 
322
 - AM 47
773
 - AN 23
979
 - AE 91
1203
 - AO 44
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1004
 - AN 11
1208
 - AO 16
 
400
 - AM 44
825
 - AM 33
1009
 - AK 66
1230
 - Op(AK 91
 
480
 - AF 87
843
 - JA 93
1014
 - AO 16
1231
 - BC 64
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AM 33
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1020
 - Op(AN 17)
1233
 - AE 84
 
486
 - AM 46
868
 - AO 72
1051
 - AM 33
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1203 Horten;  U 244 Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Submarine sightings:
     
0243 Submarine sighting, preparing to attack, reported by Iceland-based aircraft to Sangerdi (Iceland), unidentified position (possibly U 1223).
       
- 821 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   
1310 Submarine sighted, preparing to attack, reported by Gibraltar-based aircraft to Lyauthey.  Position unidentified (U 870).
    Enemy units located in:  AM 7310 - AN 1620 - BE 5860 - BF 2247(?) - 2770 - CF 2276.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) When U 486 had given her situation report, U 764 received orders to proceed along the English south coast to the operational area off Cherbourg, as there are good opportunities for attack in this area.
    2) U 1230 reported, on request, that she intended to return to base on the 26.1.
  c)  None.
  d) From a short report from U 315, we gathered that she had been forced to break off the operation and return to base on the 6th as her starboard engine was out of order.  It was impossible to repair the damage on board.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 83)
U 537
- Op(JH 10)
U 869
- AK 66
U 1053
 - AM 32
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1055
 - Op(AM 92)
 
285
 - Op(AM 89)
680
 - AM 16
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AO 16
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - AM 81
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1172
 - Op(AM 53)
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - AK 47
907
 - AF 77
1199
 - AN 33
 
322
 - AM 47
773
 - AN 23
979
 - AE 92
1203
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
806
 - Op(BB 75)
1004
 - AM 32
1208
 - AO 16
 
400
 - AM 19
825
 - AM 33
1009
 - AL 45
1230
 - Op(AK 28)
 
480
 - AF 79
843
 - JA 86
1014
 - AO 16
1231
 - BC 62
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AM 24
1232
 - Op(BB 75)
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1020
 - Op(AN 18)
1233
 - AE 76
 
486
 - AM 51
868
 - AO 44
1051
 - AM 24
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 1014 - 1058 Horten.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 822 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
15th Group:
1350
 probable submarine conning tower on (570  57' N., longitude West unidentified, course 2000, speed 4 knots.
18th Group:
At 1444
 hours attack on 1 landing craft, 1 convoy vessel, and 1 stationary ship in 580  05' N., longitude Ease unidentified (shuttle boat).
 
At 1630
an Iceland-based aircraft made a location on a suspected submarine, prepared to attack, in an unidentified position (U 1233?).
 
At 1632
a Gibraltar-based aircraft located a submarine, prepared to attack.  The submarine submerged and the attack did not materialize.
    From 2024 - 2139, very urgent wireless telegraphy messages were transmitted by a unit in the same area, (probably U 870 contacted from the air and attacked by naval forces).
    Enemy units located in:  AL 3560 - 9190 - AM 5770.
  d)  According to a priority radio intercept at 1300 on 8.1., the Norwegian steamer "Bestik" (2,684 GRT) was damaged in the Scapa Flow area.  The steamer "Ashbury" (3,901 GRT) was lost.
     The damaged "Bestik" anchored, and was under escort by units "St. Theresa", "Bandit", and "Narvik".  (Possibly a successful attack by a submarine).
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) As, according to our calculations, U 297 must shortly return to base, the limits to the operational area were removed, and the boat given freedom to maneuver along the Scottish coast as far as Aberdeen.  U 1020 was allowed freedom of operation further to the south.
 
 
- 823 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      The operational area consists of the entire English coast to about Flamborough Head.
    2) Further information concerning the situation in the operational area was urgently needed.  As several boats (U 322 - 400 - 772) were returning to base from the operational area and the Bristol Channel, they were reminded to transmit position reports while returning in AM.
    3) No report was received from U 869 as to the state of her fuel, in spite of continuous inquiries.  The boat was allocated an operational area off Gibraltar.  Sea area to the west of CG 9592, but not within the Straits of Gibraltar.  To proceed schnorchelling when entering CG.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
9.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 248
- Op(BD 83)
U 650
- Op(BF 35)
U 871
- Op(MQ 40)
U 1058
- AN 33
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
680
 - AM 23
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1172
 - Op(AM 64)
 
285
 - Op(AM 94)
764
 - AM 87
907
 - AM 32
1199
 - AM 27
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
772
 - AM 19
979
 - AF 71
1203
 - AO 16
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
773
 - AN 23
1004
 - AM 33
1208
 - AO 16
 
322
 - AM 17
806
 - Op(BB 77)
1009
 - AL 54
1230
 - Op(AK)
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
825
 - AM 26
1014
 - AN 33
1231
 - BD 14
 
400
 - AM 16
843
 - JL 22
1017
 - AM 26
1232
 - Op(BB 77)
 
480
 - AF 78
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1020
 - Op(AN 18)
1233
 - AE 79
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
863
 - Op(LD 82)
1051
 - AM 25
   
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
868
 - AO 16
1053
 - AF 77
   
 
486
 - AM 26
869
 - AK 69
1055
 - Op(AM 92)
   
 
537
 - Op(JH 10)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1014, 1058 Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  U 244 Bergen;  U 1014, 1058 Kristiansand.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
2043 submarine located by aircraft "348 W 8", in AM 3948 prepared to attack.
       
- 824 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
2359 submarine located by aircraft "348 W 8", in AM 0284 prepared to attack.
     Enemy units were located in AM 1890 - BE 7860 - 2110.
  d) 1) According to a priority radio intercept at 1647 of urgent wireless telegraphy traffic from the tanker "Sitala" (6,218 GRT) with the Casablanca/Gibraltar convoy, she was either damaged by the sea or in contact with the enemy.  (U 870 is in this area).  Possibly an attack by a submarine.
    2) War Log of 8.1., paragraph IIId):  The tug "Bandit" reported to Scapa at 1558 on 8.1:  "Consider it inadvisable to take the Norwegian steamer "Bestik" in tow this evening, am waiting until daybreak".
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 739 (North Sea Schnorchel boat) is ready to put out from Trondheim today.  She was originally intended to operate against carriers off Scapa, but as this did not prove fruitful, the boat was put under F.d.U. the Northern Waters.  No decision was reached about detailing U 313 and U 315 which would both shortly be ready for action.
    2) As no message was received from U 248, U 1231, en route for home, received instructions to transmit short weather reports during the next three days.
    3) As we are expecting situation reports from the Channel and the Bristol Channel during the next few days, U 1017, 1051, 1004, 825 and U 1199 have been instructed to scatter to positions off the S.W. coast of Ireland.
  c)  None.
  d) Wireless telegraphy message No. 211 was transmitted to all boats.     (See Appendix).
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
- 825 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix to War Diary 9.1.45.
Information gathered:  W/T message No. 211
       
           The enemy's interest in new devices, the "M" cypher and cypher material is such that he tries in every way to get alongside submarines unable to submerge or unmaneuverable and even submarines which are sinking.
       
           Returned prisoners of war report that as soon as the submarine has surfaced, the enemy ;lowers a boat and tries to come alongside, usually under cover of light arms fire.  In several cases the enemy was known to have come alongside a slowly sinking submarine which had already been abandoned by the crew.
       
           Therefore:  If a submarine which is not battle-worthy and is unmaneuverable is forced to surface in the vicinity of enemy sea forces, in order to disembark the crew, measures are to be taken to ensure that she is then sunk at once under all circumstances.  The Captain and the Engineering Officer and the most experienced members of the crew are to remain on board until the very last moment before sinking.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 826 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
10.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 87
U 486
- AM 25
U 868
- AO 16
U 1051
- AM 27
 
248
 - Op(BD 83)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
869
 - AK 96
1053
 - AF 78
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1055
 - Op(AM 92)
 
285
 - Op(AM 95)
680
 - AM 32
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1058
 - AN 34
 
297
 - Op(AN 38)
764
 - AM 88
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1172
 - Op(AM 65)
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - AM 73
907
 - AM 31
1199
 - AN 28
 
322
 - AM 43
773
 - AN 24
979
 - AF 72
1203
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
806
 - Op(CB 15)
1004
 - AM 26
1208
 - AO 16
 
400
 - AM 45
825
 - AM 02
1009
 - AL 64
1230
 - Op(AK 24)
 
480
 - AF 77
843
 - JL 16
1014
 - AN 34
1231
 - BD 12
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AM 27
1232
 - Op(CB 15)
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1020
 - Op(AN 18)
1233
 - AL 22
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 486 - 684 - 772 - 773 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1058 Stavanger;  U 773 Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
18th Group:
1050
 submarine located, aircraft preparing to attack, unidentified position.
 
1110
 hours - surfaced submarine, course south, speed 2 knots, position unidentified.
 
1235
 hours - submarine located, aircraft preparing to attack, position unidentified (thought to be in Shetland-Faroes area).
19th Group:
1500
 hours - submarine located, aircraft preparing to attack, unidentified position.
    Enemy units located in:  AF 8480 - AL 3490 - 3370 - AM 8720 - 3650 - BF 4298 - 4843.
  d) according to a radio intercept, Rosyth gave 2 units orders to operate against a submarine in 40  N 38' W., latitude unidentified (AN 1318?) (possibly connected with the submarine location made by 18 group).
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 1004 reported that she was putting in to Bergen.  On 2.1 she had put out from Bergen,
       
- 827 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      and according to our calculations was forced to break off operations just before entering the Shetland Straits, as her Schnorchel was out of order.
    2) During the last 2 days, U 248 has not transmitted any weather reports, as she was contacted on the 7. and 8.1 by Search Groups.  She fired a hook shot at a corvette and detonation was heard after 12 minutes 14 seconds, but nothing was observed.  The submarine was given permission to make a detour 200 miles to the north if the present anti-submarine measures in the operational area continue.
    3) U 244 formerly had instructions to proceed to position off Reykjavik.  As we have still not received any situation reports from U 979 which is proceeding back to base, and as this area is not sufficiently fruitful owing to the continual darkness, U 244 was detailed to proceed to the sea area west of Ireland (AM 72).  Route between the Shetlands and the Faroes.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    1 corvette torpedoed by U 248.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 79
U 486
- AM 24
U 869
- AK 99
U 1051
- AM 43
 
248
 - Op(BD 53)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1053
 - AF 79
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1055
 - Op(AM 92)
 
285
 - Op(AM 95)
680
 - AM 31
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1172
 - Op(AM 68)
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
764
 - BF 16
907
 - AM 33
1199
 - AM 02
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
772
 - AM 46
979
 - AF 75
1203
 - AO 16
 
322
 - AM 29
806
 - Op(CB 17)
1004
 - AF 87
1208
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
825
 - AM 51
1009
 - AL 65
1230
 - Op(AK 67)
 
400
 - AM 46
843
 - JL 17
1014
 - AN 31
1231
 - AK 84
 
480
 - AN 11
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1017
 - AM 51
1232
 - Op(CB 17)
 
482
 - Op(AM 64)
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1020
 - Op(AN 18)
1233
 - AL 23
 
485
 - Op(BF 35)
868
 - AO 16
   
   
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1004 Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 880 - 927 Kiel;  U 510 Djakarta.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 828 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) Submarine sightings:
   
18th Group:
1045
 suspicious object, probably a Schnorchel, in AN 4455.
 
0024
 submarine located, preparations to attack, in unidentified position.
 
0040
 suspicious object, wake or eddy, in unidentified position.
19th Group:
1345
 suspicious object, probably Schnorchel 57 0 44' N., 080 09' W., sighted by aircraft "348 W 34" (patrol).
 
2056
 submarine located, preparations to attack, in AN 0323.
 
2119
 submarine, course 1200, speed 5 knots, thought to be in M 0323.  At 2100 a bearing contact buoy, in position.  (this can only be U 764 who has entered the Channel, therefore the position given is unlikely).
    At 1927, American steamer (WZ 2 BJ) reported:  Am being attacked in MQ 4190 (possibly U 871).  Active anti-submarine activity by enemy patrols in the North Channel area.
    Enemy units were located in:  AM 8950 - AN 7321 - 0130 - 4480 - 4720.  The unit located in AN 4410 has apparently made contact.
  b) 1) A steamer was torpedoed in the Irish Sea in AM 9252, probably at 1520, and subsequently sunk.  The following messages were received:  At 1530 and 1620, British steamer CY 5 UR:  Sinking ship in distress, AM 9252.  From these messages, we gathered there were 2 steamers.
    2) A drifting wreck was reported on 10.1. in the Milford area.
    3) Canadian passenger ship took two Allied ships in tow in BB 7990, on 21.12.
    4) On 21.12:  English steamer reported "no survivors".  According to a subsequent wireless telegraphy message, this probably referred to the loss of a French ship.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 427 (acting as shuttle-escort to the convoys off the S.W. coast of Norway), fired a 3 fan
 
 
- 829 -
     
     

 

     
     
 
      torpedo on a destroyer formation which was attacking the convoy, at 2338, in AM 3277.
      At 0012 and 0045 she fired hook shots on hydrophone bearings.  Detonations and sinking sounds occurred both times.  The submarine was thought to have sunk 2 destroyers, a short report is awaited.
    2) U 907 was ordered to proceed to AK 97.  She is to relieve U 248 as meteorological submarine, as the later intends to return to base on 19.1.
    3) Until further notice, no boat is to pass through the North Channel to the Irish Sea.  The 4 boats in the North Channel en route for that area, are to proceed South instead.  U 1009 has insufficient provisions to make the detour through the St. George Channel, and is therefore permitted to continue through the North Channel and operate there.
  c)  None.
  d) U 773 reported, after putting in, that she had cruised up and down AM 88 until her supplies were exhausted.  This boat also confirmed convoy traffic off the south coast of Ireland (AM 8881), proceeding towards the gap in the minefield in the Irish Sea.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
 - AF 78
U 486
 - AM 31
U 868
- AO 16
U 1020
- Op(AN 01)
 
248
 - Op(BD 61)
510
 - LR 78
869
 - BD 36
1051
 - AM 46
 
278
 - Op(AM 15)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1053
 - AN 23
 
285
 - Op(AM 95)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1055
 - Op(AM 92)
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
680
 - AM 32
880
 - AO 74
1172
 - Op(AM 92)
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
764
 - BF 16
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1199
 - AM 54
 
322
 - AM 27
772
 - AM 46
907
 - AM 26
1203
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
806
 - Op(CA 63)
927
 - AO 74
1208
 - AO 16
 
400
 - AM 43
825
 - AM 54
979
 - AF 76
1230
 - Op(AK 64)
 
480
 - AM 32
843
 - JK 62
1009
 - AM 44
1231
 - AK 03
 
482
 - OP(AM 61)
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1014
 - AN 28
1232
 - Op(CA 63)
 
485
 - Op(BF 26)
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1017
 - AM 46
1233
 - AL 16
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 482 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 68 Horten.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 830 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine Sightings:
     
15th Group:
0920
 submarine located, preparations for attack.
 
0932
 "am continuing patrol", position unidentified (probably Herbrides area).
 
1730
 Schnorchel sighted, course 1750, unidentified position in the North Channel.
 
1816
 submarine located, preparations to attack, in AM 9284.
 
1830
 enemy submarine sighted in AM 9257, submarine submerged when sighted.
 
2254
 submarine located, preparations to attack, in AM 5377, finally cancelled.
 
0330
 submarine located, preparations to attack, in unidentified position (Irish Sea?).
     American steamer sighted periscope in MR 9980 at 1435.
    Unidentified American craft received orders from Annapolis at 1230, to proceed to BA 8994 at full speed ahead, as an enemy submarine had been reported in that area.  Estimated time of arrival, course and speed to be reported.
     At 2120, Scapa broadcast:  "Patrol "E" reported a suspicious object 100 yards from "Baffle" (probably craft).  Patrol "E" to go in as support.
     Enemy units were located:  AL 8262 - AM 0270 - 7540 - 4120 - BE 6686 - BF 2150.
  d)  As a result of the submarine successes (see War Log of 11.1. paragraph III d) the enemy moved her route on 11.1. to the middle of the Irish Sea (presumably only for single ships).
    South Route:
     AM 68128, AM 68774 (rendezvous for ships southgoing from Liverpool), AM 94336, AM 95961.
    North Route:
     Parallel to the former, but 8 miles to the east.  Rendezvous for northgoing convoys, 8 miles east,
       
- 831 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Rendezvous for northgoing convoys, 8 miles east of the south-traffic rendezvous.
    All single ships are to use these routes.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 1233 was ordered to proceed towards Cape Hatteras, on the surface as much as possible.
    2) According to a position report from U 1202 - U 825 - U 1051 are proceeding into the Irish Sea.  The new traffic route in the Irish Sea was transmitted on wireless telegraphy to the three boats in the area at the time (U 1172 - 285 - 1055).  The boats received instructions to operate on the routes mentioned, if the traffic situation seems unfavorable from the positions they are occupying at the moment.  The best positions seem to be the rendezvous and both the southernmost extremities.
    3) U 1199 and U 1017 were given freedom to maneuver in the Channel, according to operational orders and situation reports.  They were instructed again, that the main target for attack is the Cherbourg traffic, and if defence measures are too strong there, they can attack the convoy off the English coast. (or further to the west).
    4) U 1231 reported, on request, that she had fired shots at one destroyer in BB 1486 on 30.11. and at another in BA 3832 on 3.12.  Each time, detonations were heard, and "echoes" like sounds of sinking.  A decision can only be reached when the boat has returned to base.
    5) U 1014 is putting in to Bergen, as her periscope is damaged.
  c) None.
  d) 1) Escort-submarines off southern Norway:  A short report from U 427 showed that of the 2 destroyers presumed to have been sunk yesterday, 1 destroyer was sunk for certain as a direct hit was observed and sinking noises heard, and another destroyer had anyway been torpedoed.  The ship which was sunk might possibly have been a cruiser.  A statement to this effect will be made in the OKW-report (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces).
    2) Air attack on Bergen at 1300 on 12.1., by about 40 4-engined aircraft, submarine pens attacked, presumably 5 ton bombs.
 
 
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      2 hits were scored on the 3.5 m. roof, which was pierced twice.  One of these bombs did not damage the 1.5 m. roof, 4 m. below the other.  The second bomb pierced the upper roof.  The thin walls dividing the workshops were torn out but machines and apparatus were scarcely damaged.  Very little damage was inflicted on the dockyard, and the submarines were not hit.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 427  1 destroyer
          1 warship (destroyer or cruiser) torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.January 1945.
 
 
 
I.
U 244
- AF 77
U 486
- AM 32
U 868
- AO 16
U 1020
- Op(AN 01)
 
248
 - Op(BD 65)
510
 - KA 33
869
 - BE 45
1051
 - AE 49
 
278
 - Op(AN 15)
537
 - Op(JH 10)
870
 - Op(CG 95)
1053
 - AN 29
 
285
 - Op(AM 95)
650
 - Op(BF 35)
871
 - Op(MQ 40)
1055
 - Op(AM 95)
 
297
 - Op(AM 38)
680
 - AF 77
880
 - AO 48
1172
 - Op(AM 95)
 
313
 - Op(AN 15)
764
 - Op(BF 24)
905
 - Op(BF 35)
1199
 - AM 57
 
322
 - AM 26
772
 - AM 43
907
 - AM 27
1203
 - AO 16
 
325
 - Op(BF 35)
806
 - Op(CA 61)
927
 - AO 48
1208
 - AO 16
 
400
 - AM 29
825
 - AM 81
979
 - AF 79
1230
 - Op(AK 66)
 
480
 - AE 99
843
 - JK 28
1009
 - AM 45
1231
 - AK 69
 
482
 - AM 53
862
 - Op(JH 50)
1014
 - AM 22
1232
 - Op(CA 61)
 
485
 - BF 26
863
 - Op(LD 40)
1017
 - AM 49
1233
 - AL 17
 
  On Return Passage:  U 322 - 400 - 482 - 485 - 486 - 680 - 772 - 843 - 979 - 1053 - 1231.
  Entered Port:  U 1014 Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 1208 Horten;  U 275 Bergen;  U 532 Djakarta.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) Submarine sightings:
     
15th Group:
0906
 location thought to be submarine preparations to attack.
 
0920
 "suspicious object sighted thought to be a Schnorchel".
 
0922
 submarine located, preparations for attack.
     All positions unidentified.
     
18th Group:
1620
 possible Schnorchel sighted
       
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in AN 1554, and attacked with depth-charges.
 
1630
 probable submarine located in AN 1554, preparations for attack.
 
2010
 probable submarine located in AN 1631, preparations to attack.
    Patrol aircraft "W 18" reported probable submarine location, preparations to attack, in unidentified position, on 14.11.
     Enemy units located in:  AK 6555, AN 1313.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) - c) None.
  d)  U 245 (in Kiel at the moment) is to operate against the Thames-Scheldt convoy route.  She was issued with the following operational order "Brutus":  See Appendix.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
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Appendix to War Log 13.1.45.
   2 Naval War Staff/B.d.U. Op.
   Ref. No. 625.
       
Operational Orders "Brutus"
Operation against Thames-Scheldt convoy traffic by U 245
       
I. Task:
  1)  Attack supply traffic proceeding from the Thames to Antwerp.
             Supplies on this route are of the greatest importance to the battle on the Western Front.  Every ship sunk has an effect on this battle.  The lives of many German soldiers will be saved by the destruction of such important war material.  The captain should think of this while operating, and should carry out his task ruthlessly.
  2)  The submarine is to follow Operational Orders "Brutus", the verbal instructions from B.d.U., and otherwise to act according to the situation. The success of the operation depends on the captain's ingenuity, his "sense of swell" and his daring.  When opportunities for attack are unfavorable because of sand banks and minefields in the area, the captain himself is left to decide whether the chances of success, by advancing to the west or the east on to the convoy route, through the mined area, justify the risks incurred.
       
II. Reports on the Enemy.        State on 13.1.1945.
  3) a) Sea forces:
             See appendix 1 paragraph 3).  Enemy forces are not likely to appear in the area in which the boat is advancing.  Contact with the enemy forces is only likely to occur in the English declared mined areas (from AB 8170).  With regard to the defence measures of these naval forces, they have not had to reckon with submarines in this area since 1939 and they appear to be inexperienced and unobservant.  A submarine fitted with Schnorchel and TV is far superior.
    b) Air forces:
             As soon as submarines put out from Kiel, they are in danger of air attacks.  The most dangerous time is when the submarine has put out from the Elbe and before she has begun Schnorchelling.  In the opinion of the Naval Chief Command North, there is less danger from air attacks within the Heligoland Bight out to point "Xant", than, for instance, in the Bay of Biscay and off the Norwegian coast.  Otherwise the submarine is to act, on the surface in accordance with the current orders of B.d.U.
 
 
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    c) Supply Traffic to be attacked:
            On the Thames-Scheldt convoy route, see Appendix 1 and appendices to charts, a-e.  Appendix 1a will be of some assistance.  For the convoy route along the English east coast, from AN 8170 to AN 7960, see Appendix 2.
    d) Mine situation:
            See Appendix 3 and tracing 3a.
       
III. News of our own Sea Forces:
  4) a) Outward bound:
            Our own patrol forces as far as Heligoland, our own escort vessels as far as point "Sophie", but from there on none of our own craft to be expected.
    b) In the Operational Area:
            S-boats and midget craft may be encountered, but the submarine will be warned whenever possible (see cover-name list).  It is unlikely that our own air forces will operate, and they would anyway not affect the boat.
       
IV. Execution:
  5) a) To put out from Kiel when ready for action.  All preparations and tactical repairs should be made very carefully, as, if the submarine were forced to return to base owing to damage, the intended operation might be discovered.  The crew are not to be informed before putting out, but only when the boat has reached the open North Sea, and it is obvious that she will not be forced to return to base because of technical damage.
  6) All secret documents which are, in the commander's estimation, absolutely necessary, to be thrown overboard.  Measures to be taken for destruction of secret cypher material (especially operational orders with appendices) in case of need.
  7) The boat is to pt out on receipt of verbal instructions from Senior Officer Flotilla, after orders issued by Naval Chief of Command North.  Give out the following to camouflage the real reason for the intended departure through the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal:  The installation of important apparatus in Bremen.  Ice-protection will be required, instructions concerning use and distribution will be issued by the Flotilla Senior Officer.
  8) Approach:
    a) Minefield escorts will be carried out by Sperrbrecher from Brunsbüttel to Cuxhaven minefield.  From there onwards, minefield escort by two M-boats 35 (minesweepers) and by one boat as an escort as far as point "Sofie".  While under escort,
 
 
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