EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
APRIL 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER II
  
 
 
 
THE DESTROYERS
  
     
 
        In March fourteen destroyers performed 68 days patrol and search duty in the Frontier. The average period of service was 4.5 days. During the past month twenty-three destroyers accumulated a total of 140 days active duty. The average period of service was six days. Increase in the number of ships began on the first day of the month. March 31st the HAMBLETON, HAMILTON, EMMONS, ELLIS and MANLEY were ordered to temporary duty in the Frontier. The ROPER, NOA and HERBERT were already on duty here so the month began with a grand total of eight destroyers.
  
     
          In the week that followed this number was gradually shaved down. On the ninth only two ships, the HERBERT and the NOA, were on duty. For the next five days there were, on average, two destroyers per day in the Frontier. During these days eight vessels, one-third the total for April, were sunk by enemy action. The ninth, when four ships went down, was the worst day of the month. Next day the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier strongly urged and recommended that an additional division be sent to reinforce the two destroyers then on duty. That same afternoon he was informed that no destroyers could be made available "now or in the near future with out taking them away from essential escort of convoys or naval ships."  
 
 
 
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        But five days later, April 16th, definite steps were taken to increase the destroyer strength of the Frontier when Cominch directed Cinclant to assign three ships to Commander Eastern Sea Frontier at once and "others to bring destroyer strength Eastern Sea Frontier to total of nine as soon as maybe." Cinclant immediately sent three destroyers and ordered three others to report upon the completion of their present tasks. Four of these six were assigned temporarily, since Cinclant planned to shift them later to keep divisions together as far as possible. But he gave assurances that before any destroyers were taken away he would bring the total strength up to nine. On the last day of the month there were nine ships operating in the waters of the Frontier. Throughout the last week there were, ordinarily, six destroyers on duty.
  
     
 
        It will be recalled that in the study of teh convoy system made in March it was stated that at least 31 destroyers would be required to place the system in effect. The destroyers in the Frontier during the past month, few in number and operating for indefinite periods of time, could not be used for this purpose. They were assigned instead to the patrol and search of localized, endangered areas. Such a method of antisubmarine warfare has been employed frequently in the past. In the early stages of this war the British had tried it in the Western Approaches at the beginning of the last war. It is a method, necessarily imposed by the exigency of limited strength, in violation of the two great principles of war; the conservation of energy, and the concentration of force. The nature of teh task assigned to vessels on patrol and search was graphically described by Woodrow Wilson when he said that
  
 
 
 
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he "despaired of hunting the hornets all over the farm."
  
     
 
        For eight days at the beginning of the month the HAMBLETON and EMMONS hunted hornets in the Frontier. On March 31st they were ordered to discontinue their training at Casco and report for temporary duty with Commander Eastern Sea Frontier. They were, on April 1st, given the following orders:
  
 

 

  
 
          1. Enemy submarine activity exists off the Atlantic Coast. GREER, ROPER, HAMILTON and MANLEY operating singly in vicinity Cape Henery to Cape Lookout. HERBERT and NOA operating Winter Quarter to Cape Charles.
              Several 125 foot Coast Guard Cutters and PY TOURMALINE operating same area.
              Some H.M.S. Trawlers in same area.
              Navy and Army planes patrol this area daily.
       
          2. This force will search fo and destroy enemy submarines.
   
          3. When ready for sea proceed to vicinity Wimble Shoal Buoy searching en route.
              Search area from Wimble Shoal Buoy to Cape Lookout as circumstances may indicate, in general following to seaward of the coastal shipping lanes.
              Destroy enemy submarines.
   
          4. - - - - - - - - -
   
          5. Guard 500 KC's, 4010 KC's and Fox schedule.
              HAMBLETON designation: Ton, Ton, Ton.
              EMMONS designation: Ema, Ema, Ema.
              Report position daily 0800, 1200 and 1600 bearing and distance from Diamond Shoal Buoy (Ice), giving bearing from and distance in six digit numerals followed by "In or Out", indicating course to or from New York.
              Navy and Army planes 3885 KC's by voice or key.
                    Report all enemy contacts in plain language.
 
     
          At 2000 Q April 1st the two ships left Tompkinsville in company. Through the night they proceded south a mile or two seaward of the shipping lanes. No incidents of interest occurred.  
 
 
 
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        Next afternoon when the destroyers were off the Virginia coast they received a radio report of a submarine from the S. S. DELSUD. The position of the U-boat as given by the merchant vessel was just a few miles ahead of the two ships. At full speed the destroyers set out for their quarry. Shortly they sighted a ship that opened fire upon them. The attack ceased when the ship recognized the two vessels as United States men-of-war and the destroyers identified the ship as the S. S. DELSUD. No contacts were made and the submarine message was cancelled by the DELSUD which had mistaken the destroyers for U-boats. For the rest of the day nothing of interest occured.
  
     
 
        However, shortly after dark on April 2nd, two suspicious craft were sighted. One, stopped and questioned by the HAMBLETON, proved to be a harmless fishing boat, whhile the other, investigated by the EMMONS, was found to be an American merchantman. As the two rejoined, a patrol plane flew overhead and dropped a float light near the EMMONS. Efforts to communicate with the plane failed, but it was believed that the float might indicate the position of a submarine. Both ships searched the area, one obtained a doubtful contact, and the two dropped a pattern of depth charges before it was decided that there was no good evidence of a submarine. The search was broken off when word was received from the S. S. ESSO AUGUSTA that a submarine was operating some forty miles from the present position of the two destroyers. The EMMONS proceeded to the given position while the HAMBLETON continued to patrol the area assigned.
  
 

 

  
 
        Next day, April 3rd, after the EMMONS returned from her fruitless
  
 
 
 
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search, the two ships patrolled the area seaward of the shipping lanes between Wimble Shoals and Lookout. At 2200 a submarine was reported between Lookout and Diamond Shoals. The destroyers set out for the indicated position where, upon arrival, they both got excellent, firm contacts. Star shells were fired which illuminated a large American tanker; no submarine was sighted. But for the next few hours the EMMONS received many reports of a submarine from merchant vessels that had seen the star shells in the sky.

  
     
 

        The 4th of April passed without incident until 0100. Then the S. S. CHESTER SUN reported a submarine contact in the area which hte ships had searched the previous night. They both returned to the location only to spend another few hours in futile search. The hunt was interrupted at 0500 by a message from the S. S. PHOENIX that had seen a submarine near Ocracoke. The destroyers proceeded to the area; spoke the PHOENIX who said the U-boat had followed her on the surface; and searched the nearby waters in vain.

  
 

 

  
 
        On the 5th it was decided to make an extended patrol of the area in which submarines had been reported by the PHONIX and the ESSO AGUSTA. At 0208 a loud explosion was heard a few miles to the west. Forty minutes later the ships came upon the torpedoed S. S. BIDWELL. The waters were searched until daylight withour results. Before breaking off the search the destroyers offered assistance to the crew of teh BIDWELL which shortly returned to Hampton Roads under her own power.
  
 
 
          Return was then made to the assigned area where the HAMBLETON  
     
 
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developed trouble with her port turbine. At this moment the EMMONS obtained an excellent sound contact and dropped a pattern of depth charges. The HAMBLETON soon joined her and likewise laid a pattern over a contact that was subsequently believed to have been caused by the disturbed water produced by the EMMONS first attack. No results from these operations were obtained.

  
     
 

        April 6th and 7th passed without incident.

  
 

 

  
 
        Likewise on the 8th and 9th the two ships steamed without result. Then they returned to Hampton Roads to refuel and repair their engines.
  
 
 
          The experiences of the EMMONS and the HAMBELTON demonstrate the difficulties that were shared, in greater or less degree, by every destroyer that performed temporary search and patrol duty. It was the opinion of the Commander of Destroyer Division 19, to which the two destroyers belonged, that "it will be extremely rare for patrolling destroyers to make actual contact with a submarine in which an alert submarine commander attempts to avoid contact. During the daylight hours the submarine can become aware of the presence of destroyers through its listening equipment considerably in advance of the time destroyers learn of the submarine's presence by means of their echo ranging sets. At night destroyers are easier to see than submarines." In this opinion the Commanding Officer of the NICHOLSON concurred. "Unless the position and track of the submarine," he reported, "are definitely known or the area searched is very restricted, the hunting of submarines by destroyers is not practicable."  
     
          Both these officers made additional comments on their patrol  
     
 
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and search duty can be summarized as follows:

  
     
 

        1. In certain endangered areas there were usually a great many independent units operating singly or in pairs. Rarely did these vessels have knowledge of teh operating plans of other units. The result was that some areas were too well covered while others were insufficiently patrolled. Also the danger from collision was increased during the hours of darkness.

  
 

 

  
 
        2. Though aircraft were frequently seen, communication between surface vessels and planes was very unsatisfactory. This was in part the result of a mechanical difficulty. Planes and ships assigned the same frequencies discovered that in practice it was sometimes impossible to exchange information on this frequency because of variations from the assigned meter band in individual radio sets.
  
 
 
          3. There was, as a rule, too frequent use of the radio between surface forces. Plain English messages were frequent. In the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the NICHOLSON such chatter destroyed his chances of hunting down the submarine that attacked the VICTORIA.  
     
          4. Operations of surface craft should be organized under a single command. During the patrol, search and rescue operations of the NICHOLSON and SWANSON reports were received from four different sources - Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, N.O.B. Bermuda, Com 5, and Cominch. Although it was known that six destroyers had joined in the search for survivors of the VICTORIA the position of the ships and the extent of the operations were not known. It was believed that teh volume of traffic between  
     
 
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these destroyers and their immediate superiors "caused deviation of the submarines from area of search."

  
     
 

        These reports suggest three possible conclusions about the antisubmarine warfare carried out on this coast in the past few months. In the first place many of the difficulties arising from the highly complicated task of hunting submarines can be solved only after a temporary period of trial and error. This has been a recurring phenomenon observed by the British and Americans in the last war and again in this one. It derives in large part from the necessity of adapting oneself swiftly and smoothly to the actions and surprises of an enemy who holds the initiative. In the second place the experience of the past few months has demonstrated the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of establishing a well organized, closely integrated, homogeneous striking force from a collection of disparate craft acting under different commands and operating together for brief and indefinite periods. In the third place it reveals the paradox that patrol and search, the inevitable resort of inferior numbers, can be really successful only when carried out by forces in such overwhelming number that complete coverage is possible. And when such forces are available the convoy and not patrol and search is the more economic and effective method of warfare. This was the conclusion of the Commander of Destroyer Division 19 who ended his report with teh words: "While patroling operations of this type--are of some value in combatting enemy submarine activities, the submarine menace on our Atlantic Coast can be defeated only through the operation of a coastal convoy system."

  
     
 
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