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I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

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II.  COMPLEMENT OF "U 353"

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        In early summer, 1941, "U 56" was sent to Kiel for refit for a short while, after which Römer, Kapitänleutnant Günther Kuhnke and Kapitänleutnant Hans Werner Kraus were ordered with their boats to the vicinity of the Shetlands.  At the last moment, however, the operation was cancelled and the three boats were ordered instead to Helsingör.  Römer said this was due to the outbreak of the Russian war.  He remained the whole summer of 1941 in Helsingör and Copenhagen, with little to do and enjoying himself greatly.  (N.I.D. Note:  Kapitänleutnant Kuhnke commanded "U 125" until April, 1941, when he was given a new boat.  Kapitänleutnant Werner Kraus is now in command of "U 83.")

        Römer recalled how Kapitänleutnant Otto Harms, whose supply U-Boat, "U 464," was sunk on 20th October, 1942, had been the previous captain of "U 56," and how Kapitänleutnant Werner Pfeifer, whose boat, "U 581" was sunk on 2nd February, 1942, had also trained in her.  He knew both these officers well, and was particularly amused at coming to join his friends from the same boat as prisoners.

        He had leave until the end of 1941, when he was appointed to "U 353" and went immediately to stand by her building at Flensburg.

        Despite his four and a half years of U-Boat experience, Römer was not regarded by his shipmates as a popular or an efficient officer.  There were two reasons for this:  he was extremely difficult to please and was greatly lacking in initiative.  He never gave praise where it was due, and everyone on board had the feeling that he trusted neither himself nor his ship's company.  As, however, they knew him to have so much more experience, they did not like to criticise him openly, often reminding them that they had no right to go on leave, though frequently indulging in long leave periods himself.  "U 353's" ship's company referred to him as "Der Kleine" ("The Little Man").  To meet, Römer was far from being unfriendly and often expressed his admiration for the British as a people and in particular as seamen.

(iii)  First Lieutenant

        The First Lieutenant, Leutnant zur See Hanns Werner, was aged 21.  He entered the German Navy as an ordinary seaman in 1937 and did his preliminary training at Stralsund, afterwards proceeding as officer cadet to the training ship "Schlesien," in which he remained until mid-1940.  He then went to the Naval College at Flensburg as a midshipman until September, 1940, afterwhich he joined the U-Boat service, serving in school U-Boats until early 1941, when he went to the U-Boat school at Pillau for further training as senior midshipman.  After serving a few weeks in Torpedo-boat T.135 he was appointed to stand by "U 353" at the end of 1941, and was promoted Leutnant zur See in April, 1942.  "U 353" was his first operational U-Boat.

(iv)  Second Lieutenant

        The Second Lieutenant, Leutnant zur See Hellmut Kruse, was also aged 21.  His father was a rich man, being closely associated with the Deutsche Bank, and Kruse was well educated and extensively travelled.  After serving a short period in the German Army in 1939, he transferred to the Navy and did his preliminary training at Stralsund.  He then served some time in the training sailing ship "Albert Leo Schlageter" and then in "Schleswig Holstein" before being appointed to patrol boats in the Channel and North Sea, where he remained for a year.  This was followed by a period at the Naval College at Flensburg-Mürwik, a period of service in an ex-Norwegian torpedo-boat and a course of U-Boat instruction in "U 37" before being ordered to stand by "U 353," his first operational U-Boat.  He was commissioned Leutnant zur See in early summer, 1942.

(v)  Engineer Officer

        The Engineer Officer, Leutnant (Ing.) Rolf Holz, aged 22, entered the German Navy at Stralsund in 1938, after which he went to the Naval College at Flensburg-Mürwik.  Before the war he served as an officer cadet for a short while in "Schlesien" and then did another course at Flensburg.  His next appointment was to "Gneisenau," in which he served throughout the Norwegian campaign and until he joined the U-Boat service at the beginning of 1941.  He then went to the Naval College at Kiel until mid-1941, when he went to the U-Boat School at Pillau, serving as Engineer Officer in a school-boat, and then stood by his first operational U-Boat, "U 353."  Holz had rather a good opinion of himself and felt that he could have commanded "U 353" better than his captain, with whom he was on poor terms.  He was unpopular with the men, who thought him conceited and callous.  Survivors said he sometimes punished them with "Flagge Luzzi" (shifting from whites to blues continuously throughout one day), although he knew it to be forbidden.

(vi)  Midshipmen

        Fähnrich zur See Margis, aged 19, was the only one of the two midshipmen to survive.  He entered the German Navy in May, 1941, at Stralsund, after which he served for about a year in "Scharnhorst" participating in the Channel dash of early 1942.  He then did a course at Flensburg-Mürwik and was appointed to "U 353" during her building.  He had never before had anything to do with U-Boats.  Under interrogation, he was the only officer to adopt an unpleasing and unduly security-conscious attitude.  He nevertheless appeared to have been popular with the ship's company.

        The other midshipman was named Fähnrich Petri.

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(vii)  Experience and Morale

        Römer himself complained frequently of the excessive youth of his officers and their almost complete lack of experience.  He said that the Engineer Officer was the only one of them with any previous U-Boat experience, and that only from a school-boat.  He also said that the men were 80 percent of them without previous U-Boat experience and asked how he could possibly be expected to make a success of things with such a raw body of men.  As interrogation progressed, an atmosphere of mutual recrimination developed between the captain, his officers and the men which gave the impression that "U 353's" ship's company had been put together in a hurry and with few experienced men from which to choose.  None of the officers, except Fähnrich zur See Margis, gave the impression of being particularly Nazi in his outlook.  Two of them deliberately said they were not Nazis.

        Interrogation of the ratings established that none of the three Chief Petty Officers, seven of the twelve Petty Officers and only three of the 24 other ratings had any previous U-Boat experience.  One of the Chief Petty Officers had formerly commanded an E-Boat.

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III.  EARLY HISTORY OF "U 353"

(i)  Building Yard

        "U 353," a 500-ton Type VII C U-Boat of the series "U 351" to "U 380," was laid down at the years of the Flensburger Schiffsbaugesellschaft in Flensburg in summer, 1941.

(ii)  Building

        She was launched in November, 1941, and her ship's company was drafted to her from time to time from then onwards.  They were all accommodated at the infantry barracks in the Waldstrasse.  For some of the time in Flensburg "U 353" lay at the old shipyards towards the west of the estuary.

(iii)  Commissioning

        "U 353" was ready for commissioning in early February, but ice conditions delayed this until 31st March, 1942.  This was marked by a party on board a depot ship, attended by Römer's father, a Korvettenkapitän der Reserve from the Admiralty in Berlin, and a number of other officers.  "U 353" bore a recognition sign consisting of a white square, followed by three vertical white bars to one side of it, and was attached to the 5th U-Boat Flotilla at Kiel until going on patrol.

(iv)  U.A.K.

        She remained in the vicinity of Flensburg for the next three weeks doing exercises, since there were too many U-Boats at the U-Boats Acceptance Command (U.A.K.) at Kiel for her to proceed there immediately.

        On arrival at Kiel, about 21st April, she lay in the Wik Harbour, whence she did the normal U-Boats Acceptance Command trials in the Kieler Foerde.  She also entered the pressure dock at the Deutsche Werke and was tested to the equivalent of a depth of 100 metres (328 ft.).

        The U-Boats Acceptance Command trials lasted until about 20th May.

(v)  Silent Running Tests

        She then proceeded to Rönne for silent running tests, but these were interrupted by the threat of Russian submarines.  She consequently sailed to Danzig, where she arrived about 23rd May, proceeding immediately to Königsberg, where she put into the Schichau yards for a few days for small repairs to her compressor.

(vi)  Torpedo Firing Exercises

        On leaving Königsberg, she proceeded to Gdynia, where she spent some five days carrying out torpedo firing exercises, and thence to Hela for the Agru-Front trials.

(vii)  "Agru-Front"

        "U 353" spent about four weeks at Hela, which survivors admitted to be an unusually long time.  Most of them were not aware of the reason for this, but Römer explained that it was because of his being called on to train a batch of German Engineer Officers.  During the Agru-Front exercises, some very steep dives were done, including one at 56, which caused her batteries to spill.  Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Gerd Suhren, in charge of the Agru-Front, came on board several times.  During some of the time that she was based on Hela, many of her ship's company were accommodated on board the depot ship "Iberia" at Danzig.

(viii)  Further Silent Running Tests

        On leaving Hela about 3rd July, "U 353" proceeded once more to Rönne for her silent running tests, which had been previously interrupted.

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(ix)  Final Adjustments

        She returned to Flensburg for final adjustments on 11th July.  She had been prevented from doing her usual tactical exercises off Gdynia and Pillau, owing to the large number of U-Boats present causing congestion.  One man said that the real reason for this was that the presence of Russian submarines in the Baltic had considerably interfered with existing arrangements.

        During final adjustments, the K.D.B. was removed, the Search Receiver and S.B.T. (see Sections VII and VII) were fitted, and certain minor repairs to the engines were carried out.  The ship's company went on leave in watches.

(x)  Tactical Exercises

        In mid-August "U 353" sailed from Flensburg to Gdynia for her tactical exercises, which lasted until early in September.  Diving tanks 1 and 2 were out of order, but were repaired locally.

       "U 353" once sighted a Russian submarine which fired at her.  It was not stated whether she sustained any damage.

(xi)  Fitting-Out at Kiel

        On 11th September "U 353" arrived in Kiel for fitting-out before proceeding on patrol.  She entered Deutsche Werke for small adjustments and embarkation of her four upper deck air torpedoes, and then proceeded to the Wik Harbour, where she remained a few days fuelling, embarking provisions and electric torpedoes.

        On the evening of 20th September a "Bierabend" was held in the Wik barracks for the ship's company.  Next day the officers met privately and drank a toast in champagne to the success of their first patrol.

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IV.  SOLE PATROL OF "U 353"

(i)  Sailing Date

        "U 353" sailed from Kiel at 0700 on 22nd September, 1942.  She was accompanied by two other 500-ton U-Boats commanded by Kapitänleutnant Von Zitzewitz and Korvettenkapitän Hermann, and for a short distance by two "Sperrbrecher."

        She had provisions for ten weeks on board and carried 130 tons of fuel oil.  It was expected that she would remain at sea just over eight weeks, after which she was to make Brest, where she was to join the 1st Flotilla.  In view of the length of her patrol, she had orders to economise strictly in the use of fuel and consequently proceeded most of the time on Diesel-Electric.  One man said that she was due to refuel from a Supply U-Boat in the week following her sinking.  Römer, however, said that she did not intend to refuel until after eight weeks, when she would stay at sea for another four.

(ii)  Passage to Kristiansand S.

        She proceeded at five knots on the surface to Kristiansand S., where she arrived about 0700 on 24th September.  There she topped up with fuel and minor adjustments were made to her compass, which had been adversely affected by damp.  The Engineer Officer had to remain on duty in Kristiansand S., but the others went for motor trips in the neighbourhood.

        "U 353" lay opposite the grain silos at Solyst while at Kristiansand S., with the two other U-Boats between her and the pier.  Refuelling took place from two Norwegian oil lighters which came alongside.

(iii)  Departure from Kristiansand S.

        At about 0700 on 25th September she left Kristiansand S. accompanied by the U-Boat commanded by Korvettenkapitän Hermann, which had a defective gyro compass and is also believed to have developed an oil track soon after leaving port, having to put into Bergen.

        "U 353" hugged the Norwegian coast northwards at four knots after leaving Kristiansand S.  She was escorted by minesweeping and patrol boats ("Vorpostenboote"), but had no air protection.  On making Skudesnes (off Stavanger), the escorts parted company, and she set course 270° on the evening of 26th September and proceeded until she reached the 100-fathom line, when she altered course for a position due east of Iceland.  Römer said that after leaving Skudesnes until reaching their position in the Atlantic, all U-Boat commanders are allowed to use their discretion regarding diving.  He himself kept east as far as possible for fear of aircraft.

        While proceeding due north, Römer several times detected R.D.F. transmissions on his search receiver, each time diving immediately.  He continued due north until he had reached his intermediate grid square before altering course to pass through the so-called "Rosengarten" between Iceland and the Faeroes.

(iv)  Passage of "Rosengarten"

        The passage of the "Rosengarten" began on the evening of 30th September and continued during part of the following day.  Throughout "U 353" proceeded at about six knots on Diesel-Electric on the surface.

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        On 30th September, just as she was entering the "Rosengarten" area, she again detected an aircraft with her search receiver and dived for a short while.  While proceeding through the "Rosengarten" Römer was woken every hour with reports of drifting mines, and in the morning sighted three only 50/100 metres distant.  He never fired at any of them for fear of betraying his position.  Heavy weather was encountered from now onwards, the wind force varying between 7 and 9.

        Römer and his officers said they could not believe there were any moored minefields in the "Rosengarten," since the depth of the water was much too great for them.  They admitted, however, that aircraft were a great danger, and it was for this reason that they proceeded through the centre of the "Rosengarten" and not to either side.  They also admitted the danger of the many drifting mines, which they thought the British had laid there in contravention of international law.  There is no doubt that Römer and his officers were not informed before sailing of the presence of any British mine-fields in this area.

(v)  Orders from Admiral U-Boats

 

        After passing through the "Rosengarten," "U 353" reported her position to the Admiral U-Boats and received orders to proceed, according to Römer, to a position roughly 400 miles west of Rockall.

(vi)  Makowski's Convoy

        About 3rd October, "U 353" had just surfaced when she received s signal from the Admiral U-Boats reporting the presence of a convoy about 190 miles north-north-west of his then position.  A U-Boat (number unknown) commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Makowski, had signalled the presence of this convoy to the Admiral U-Boats.  "U 353" was then steering 200° and to attack this convoy would have meant altering course to 340° into a head-on sea.  Römer said that, with a sea force 8 or 9 as it then was, this would have been impossible, so he decided to continue on his existing course.  That night he submerged again because of the heavy sea.

        He explained that the heavy seas prevented any U-Boats attacking the convoy just reported to him and many from reaching it at all.

        About 5th October, the Admiral U-Boats ordered "U 353" and other boats to abandon the attack on Makowski's convoy.  The whole of the next day Römer spent submerged.  On the night of 5th/6th October, Römer received a signal ordering him and Hesse and other U-Boat commanders to report their position and the weather.

(vii)  Receipt of New Orders

        Later he received instructions from the Admiral U-Boats to proceed to another position which sis not, however, involve any great alteration of course.

(viii)  Arrival in New Position

        On arrival in her new position about 6th October, "U 353" was one of nineteen U-Boats forming an approximate 360-mile line on 240°, boats 20 miles apart.  Among the boats present were "U 413" and the boats commanded by Sturm, Hesse, Schulz and Makowski.  (N.I.D. Note:  Korvettenkapitän Sturm commands "U 410," Kapitänleutnant Hermann Hesse commands "U 133,"  Oberleutnant zur see Makowski in known, and Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Schulz is believed to command a U-Boat.)  Other boats mentioned as having perhaps formed a part of this patrol sweep were those commanded by von Zitzewitz, Mengersen, Kapitzky, Neumann, Thilo, Hermann and Czygan.  (N.I.D. Note:  Kapitan von Zitzewitz, of the 1934 term, and Kapitänleutnant Kapitzky of the 1935 term, are both known to command U-Boats.  Kapitänleutnant Mengersen, of the 1937 term, formerly commanding "U 101," is known to have commanded another U-Boat since summer 1942.  Korvettenkapitän Hans Werner Neumann, of the 1925 term, is believed to command a U-Boat.  Korvettenkapitän Thilo, of the 1922 term, commands "U 174."  Korvettenkapitän Wolfgang Hermann of the 1928 term, and Korvettenkapitän Czygan of the 1925 term, are known to command U-Boats.)

        Hesse's boat took up the leading position in this newly formed patrol line.  "U 353" was the seventh or eighth boat in the line and the sweep was due to begin the next morning at 0800 but was slightly delayed by the late arrival of some of the boats which had been following up Makowski's convoy.

(ix)  Commencement of Patrol in Line

        As soon as Römer reached his position in the patrol line, he signalled his arrival to the Admiral U-Boats and commenced to carry out the standing orders for a U-Boat waiting in position.  These were, he explained, to proceed on the surface at right angles to the line for half an hour, and then for an hour in each direction.  He accordingly proceeded for half an hour at slow speed on course 240°-250° and then for an hour on 070°, before altering course to 250° for the next hour.  Other boats did just the same.  The nineteen U-Boats forming this line were named "Gruppe Panther."

        "U 353" and the other boats remained in position for one week.  In theory, Römer explained, no enemy ship could have passed through this patrol line of about 400 miles without being seen, it being assumed that visibility was about 10 miles.  In practice, however, he had to admit that day visibility was not usually more than six miles, while at night it was considerably less.

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(x)  First Sighting

        While patrolling Römer sighted a fast independently-sailing ship at a range of about 4,000 yards.  It was early in the morning and visibility was very bad, with heavy waves pounding the bridge.  Römer could nevertheless distinctly make out her silhouette.  In order to get into position to attack, he altered course in a wide arc, only to find when he had got into position that the ship was out of sight.

        After a somewhat uneventful week had been spent in very bad weather, during which most of "U 353's" crew were heartily sea-sick, one boat signalled that she had pursued an independently-sailing ship for about four hours without success.  Römer said that it was quite usual for individual U-Boats to pursue independently-sailing enemy ships while forming part of a sweep, it being left to the discretion of their commanding officers to decide whether the ship pursued was worth breaking line for.  If a convoy were sighted, the sighting U-Boat would be obliged to report it to the Admiral U-Boats, for interception by all boats in her group.

(xi)  Second sighting

        Early on 10th October, Römer sighted a ship, which survivors estimated to be of about 15,000 tons, sailing independently.  Some said she was a floating whale factory.  This ship was on a closing course and Römer decided to wait until she came closer, before submerging to attack at periscope depth.  A few minutes later, however, he realised that her course gave an angle of 30° to 40° with his line of sight, and, since he had learned never to submerge and await his target's approach unless the angle were 15° or less, he was forced to abandon his original intention.

        He decided instead to pursue her, but the weather rapidly worsened and the vessel disappeared behind a rain squall.  Undeterred, Römer pursued his quarry in the direction in which he believed her to have sailed for another two hours at the highest speed he could muster.  He said he was not at all sure what her basic course was, since she was zig-zagging much of the time.  He had the strong impression that she had sighted him and consequently zig-zagged more than ever.  He decided, however, to pursue her in conformity with the Admiral U-Boats standing orders, which state that, when a ship disappeared in a rain squall, the U-Boat captain should not abandon the chase or wait to catch sight of her again, but should pursue in the direction in which he believes her to have gone.  Römer thought that he was sailing south.  About midday he abandoned the chase and returned to his former station.  He did not report this incident to the Admiral U-Boats.  Survivors believed, however, that she had been sunk later by another U-Boat.

        The First Lieutenant and the Engineer Officer were highly critical of Römer's decision in regard to this ship,which they felt might well have been sunk had their captain shown more initiative.  They were not slow to voice their opinions and Römer, remarking that their attitude was not far short of mutiny, severely reprimanded them both.

        In later interrogations, Römer stated that he was twice obliged to submerge while pursuing this ship, owing to aircraft.

(xii)  Hesse's Convoy.  (Creation of "Gruppe Leopard")

        Next day, 11th October, "U 133" (Kapitänleutnant Hesse) reported the sighting of a convoy of three fast ships and three destroyers, proceeding westwards at about 10 knots, adding that she was in contact with it.  This was followed by a signal from the Admiral U-Boats ordering the boats in Hesse's vicinity to attack this convoy if weather conditions permitted.  The position from which Hesse had announced his sighting was 120 miles distant from "U 353," but, as the weather was favorable, Römer decided to close to attack.  Estimating his highest speed at 14 knots, he required about 30 hours to catch up with it.  Two hours later a further signal from the Admiral U-Boats ordered all boats from Kapitänleutnant Schultz's to Oberleutnant zur See Baberg's, which included Römer's, to attack Hesse's convoy.  Römer was already on his way.

        Six boats were closing this convoy, thus diverting 120 miles of the original 380 miles of the "Gruppe Panther's" front.  The weather was extremely bad, and "U 353" was forced to slacken speed.  Römer was particularly angry at not receiving sufficient signals from Hesse, who was meanwhile keeping contact with the convoy.  Whereas it was to be expected that Hesse would constantly report the position and speed of the convoy, he only sent one signal describing its composition.  This caused Römer to remark:  "There seems little point in going on.  The weather's shocking."  Wind was south-westerly and the bridge frequently under water, necessitating the lashing of the watch to the bridge.

        At this stage what Römer described as "a typical signal from Admiral U-Boats" was received ordering boats in "Gruppe Panther" from L to T to proceed on a course of 340° at 10 knots, so as to replace those he had ordered to attack Hesse's convoy in the line of patrol they had just abandoned.  He followed this with a signal "Boats operating against Hesse's convoy will be known as 'Gruppe Leopard.'"  The boats comprising "Gruppe Leopard" consisted of those commanded by Baberg, Bleichrodt, Hesse, Römer, Schulz and Makowski.  Soon afterwards, the Admiral signalled:  "'Gruppe Leopard,' despite severe weather, to continue the attack."  "That's all very well," said Römer  "He's sitting ashore, while we have to do the dirty work."  But he comforted himself with the reflection that Dönitz had himself served in U-Boats for a long period.  He nevertheless signalled the Admiral that he considered further search for Hesse's convoy useless in view of the severe weather.  In reply to this signal, he was ordered to "Continue to operate against Hesse's convoy."  

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(xiii)  "Gruppe Wolf's" Convoy (S.C.104)

        An unexpected signal was then received, via the Admiral U-Boats, from a group of U-Boats known as "Gruppe Wolf," stationed about 400 miles to the west of "Gruppe Leopard" and consisting of 10 boats, reporting that an eastbound convoy had been sighted.  This signal emanated originally from the contact-keeper of "Gruppe Wolf" and was passed by the Admiral U-Boats not only to "Gruppe Leopard," but also to the remainder of "Gruppe Panther."  The Admiral U-Boats then ordered "Gruppe Leopard" to attack to attack the convoy sighted by "Gruppe Wolf."  This new convoy was proceeding eastwards at eight knots and Römer calculated that he would contact it by setting course exactly 270°.  (N.I.D. Note:  This was Convoy S.C.104.)  He explained that the "Gruppe Leopard" was ordered to attack this convoy, because the Admiral wanted the boats of "Gruppe Wolf" to abandon it and return to their original patrol line to westward.

        At this point, "U 353" switched from the Irish W/T frequency, on which she had been operating hitherto, to the American frequency.

        Römer complained that throughout the following period he was unable to take sights once, owing to the sun and the stars never appearing, and so was obliged to navigate by dead reckoning.  He estimated, however, that it would take him about one-and-a-half days to contact the new convoy.

        Several of "Gruppe Wolf's" 10 boats managed to establish contact with this convoy.  Among them that commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Trojer, who was on his first patrol as a U-Boat Commander.  But they were all beaten off by the escort vessels.  Various boats made signals during the day at 1100, 1500 and 1700, that they had established contact, some reporting a convoy course of 80°, others of 90°, and others of 45°.  Römer attributed this difference in reports to the fact that none of the U-Boats ever got near enough to see more than the mastheads of the ships.

        At 1800 on 11th October, "U 353" was steering due west, expecting to establish contact at 2200.  A rain squall, however, blew up and visibility was reduced to two miles.  By 2300, Römer had still failed to establish contact.  He then received a signal from a part of "Gruppe Wolf" which stood further south, reporting contact, whereupon he altered course to about 165°.  At 0100 he submerged and listened for H.E.

        He heard nothing, however, and thereupon decided to surface and steer about 70° in case the convoy had eluded him in the night.  At 0200 he went below to get some sleep.

(xiv)  Third Sighting

        At 0500 on 12th October, the look-out reported "Shadow to port!", whereupon Römer was woken and went on the bridge, where he saw an independently-sailing merchantman of 4,000 to 5,000 tons.  "U 353" went to action stations and Römer prepared to attack.  Weather was still very poor, with spray interfering with visibility.  The vessel was only 800 yards distant and Römer turned away as it was getting light, ordering "Port 15, full ahead both!"  He estimated the speed of the vessel at six knots.

        Seas were breaking over "U 353's" bridge, making it difficult to aim accurately, but Römer fired two torpedoes from Tubes 1 and 3, with depth setting 10 ft. and speed 30 knots, at a range of 2,000 yards.  After firing, he submerged to periscope depth, turning away from his target to observe the effect of his shots.  He was anxious not to be sighted, as he could not use his 88 mm. gun owing to the seas, and appreciated that he would be at a disadvantage if it came to a gunnery duel.

        The ship altered course immediately after he fired the first two torpedoes.  In order to ensure his kill he followed with a third, this time from his stern tube, at a depth setting of 6 ft.  The ship altered course 180° and was still under way and looked as though she was going to ram him.  Römer was therefore forced to alter course.  It was growing appreciably lighter.

        The Engineer Officer asked Römer whether the ship was sunk, since all below decks had heard two loud explosions, the sound of which carried clearly through the water.  Römer had to admit, however, that the ship had not sunk.

        He observed her through his periscope and a short while later saw a cloud of steam rise from her amidships.  She then broke in two and sank.

        "U 353" promptly surfaced, being then some 10 miles distant from the scene of the sinking and closed her at full speed.

        As he approached, Römer saw that another U-Boat was already present among the lifeboats and wreckage.  He called her by flags to discover her identity and found that she was the boat commanded by Korvettenkapitän Hesse ("U 133").  He then hailed her, "This morning I made two hits on the ship you have just sunk."  There was an argument between the two captains, and it was finally agreed that Römer's two hits had caused the steamer to alter course so that she came exactly into Hesse's line of fire and Hesse then fired the torpedo which sank her.  Neither captain knew her name, By arrangement with Römer, Hesse signalled the Admiral U-Boats that he had sunk a heavily damaged 4,000-ton ship, and he and Römer agreed to credit themselves with 2,00 tons each.

        Survivors from the sunken steamer were in lifeboats and, according to Römer, the two U-Boats proceeded among them to apologise for not being able to rescue survivors.  Römer explained that he did not inquire as to the ship's name, as to do so would have meant talking to the survivors then swimming in the water, which seemed highly distasteful to him.  Members of his crew, however, said that he proceeded at full speed through the wreckage, showing the greatest callousness towards survivors.  Some prisoners said that the signal to Admiral U-Boats had mentioned that survivors were swimming in the water, to which the Admiral curtly replied that in future references to survivors were to be omitted.  The Engineer Officer, according to one man, expressed the view that in any case the rescue of survivors was of no importance.

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        The Engineer Officer, himself no friend of Römer's, frankly criticised his captain's action in expending so many torpedoes on such a small ship.  Several ratings were also critical of Römer's handling of this attack.

        After his conversation with Hesse, Römer compared his estimated position with him and set course eastwards on the surface, still in search of the same convoy.  He had established that Hesse was also unable to contact it.

(xv)  Meeting with Baberg ("U 618")

        Ten minutes later another U-Boat was sighted and exchanged recognition signals with "U 353" by Aldis.

        Anxious to know which U-Boat this was, Römer ordered his W/T personnel to check up on her call sign and ascertained that this was "U 618," commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Kurt Baberg, of his own term.  He asked what luck he had had, to which the reply was:  "Two ships sunk, one of them with torpedoes,"  Baberg, according to Römer, had been at sea much longer than "U 353," but it was his first U-Boat command.

        "Good luck to you," signalled Römer, "I fired some myself this morning, but Hesse took her from me."  "Any signs of the convoy?" asked Baberg.  "No," Römer answered, "but I estimate it to be on such and such a course."  The two captains then compared their estimated positions, prior to parting company.

        Baberg then set course 50° and Römer 90°.  Hesse had previously set course 140°.

(xvi)  Aircraft Attack on U-Boat in Company

        About mid-day, on 12th October, "U 353" was proceeding on the surface in daylight in company with two other U-Boats, one of which was commanded by Bleichrodt.  (N.I.D. Note:  Kapitänleutnant Bleichrodt is believed to command "U 109.")  Visibility was good and the recent stormy weather was not quite so marked.  "U 353" was to port of the other two, being five or six miles distant from the nearest.  A rating was engaged in repairing her W/T aerial.

        Suddenly an aircraft which Römer described as a Sunderland appeared out of low cloud and attacked one of the other two boats, columns of water arising around her.  Survivors were horrified to see what occurred, as they felt that the target had very little chance of escape.  Römer immediately gave the order to submerge to 70/80 m.  (229-262 ft.), and continued on the same course.  He said that aircraft depth-charges were generally set to 40 m.  (131 ft.)  Survivors then heard the explosions of depth-charges some distance away, which they realised were not intended for them but for the boat attacked.  An hour later, hearing no H.E., "U 353" surfaced and saw one of the other two boats over to port.  The third boat was nowhere visible, but a smoke float was burning on the surface, which survivors presumed must have been dropped by the attacking aircraft.  Though he admitted he realised the danger of such a course, Römer at once proceeded straight for the smoke float to see if there were any survivors from the sunken U-Boat, but none could be seen.  He also said that he saw no wreckage or oil patch.  He did not at first know the fate of Bleichrodt's boat, but heard afterwards that she had signalled the attack as having damaged her although not rendering her ineffective.  (N.I.D. Note:  At 1323 G.M.T. on 12th October, 1942, a Liberator "C" of Squadron 120 attacked one of two U-Boats in position 53° 53' N., 33° 43' W.)

        As soon as he surfaced, Römer mounted his search receiver in case he should be detected by aircraft from behind the low clouds.  The third boat also surfaced, but the two exchanged no signals for fear of detection.

(xvii)  "Gruppe Wolf" Reports Contact

        A signal was then received from "Gruppe Wolf" that contact had at last been established with the convoy.  Simultaneously came one from Oberleutnant zur See Trojer, also of Römer's term, reporting the sinking of 47,000 tons in two nights.  Römer explained that Trojer had been with the "Gruppe Wolf" in the west and that he also commanded a 500-tonner.  He thought that Trojer had sunk a ship with every torpedo fired.  A telegraphist said that Trojer had sunk eight ships with nine torpedoes.

(xviii)  Meeting with Schulz's U-Boat

        Römer continued his search for the convoy, but again contact was lost.  On 15th October he met another U-Boat, commanded by Schulz, who was also not in contact.  (N.I.D. Note:  The spelling of this name is not certain, and it is not known which U-Boat he commands.)  Schulz and Römer parted company, Schulz later reporting a destroyer elsewhere.  Römer continued on his previous course.  By this time he admitted to being thoroughly tired.

(xix)  Pursuit of S.C.104

        Survivors said that all the shadowing boats had been attacked at some period.  They were very impressed by the strength of the escort, which they described as consisting of four corvettes and two destroyers, compared with the total of two or three escort vessels which they believed to be normal. 

        Between the time of abandoning the first convoy and sighting the second, "U 353" received W/T signals from the other boats reporting their experiences.  One reported that she had been D/Cd. for six hours on end, and many of her instruments were out of order, another that she had

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been D/Cd. for four hours and other that they had been forced to abandon their attack.  One boat signalled that she was no longer navigable and two other boats were ordered to her assistance, only to find that she had meanwhile been got under control.

        (N.I.D. Note:  Details of the attacks made by the escorts of this convoy can be found in C.B. 04050 (11)/42.)

Survivors thought that at least one of the U-Boats shadowing this convoy had been lost.  They said that the Admiral U-Boats had twice signalled one boat to make her position and only received a reply three days later, whereas another boat had altogether failed to give her position.  They therefore presumed her to be lost.

        (N.I.D. Note:  At 2331 on 15th October, H.M.S. "Viscount" in station 3,000 yards 30° on the port bow of the convoy, obtained an R.D.F. contact, range 6,200 yards, and altered to close at 15 knots.  At 2342, when the range had been reduced to 2,000 yards, revolutions for 16 knots were ordered and she closed to ram.  At 2344 the U-Boat was sighted fine on the port bow, fully surfaced.  She increased speed and "Snaked the line," commencing to port.  "Viscount" followed her swing to port, but failed to catch her as she swung back to starboard.  In "Viscount's" opinion, the U-Boat then committed suicide by swinging back to port right across "Viscount's" bows, who was then turning under full starboard rudder.  "Viscount" struck the U-Boat on her port side about 20 ft. abaft the conning-tower.  The stern hit her fairly, then lifted and crashed down on top of her, pinning her for about 15 seconds before she dragged clear to port with her back broken.  The U-Boat drifted away to a distance of about 30 yards and passed slowly down the port side as "Viscount" forged ahead.  She received quick broadside from every gun as she passed, receiving many hits from the close-range weapons.  A heavy D/C set to 140 ft., was placed close alongside her by one of the quarter throwers as she sank stern first at 2347.  The number "U 48" is reported to have been seen on her conning tower.

        This attack has been assessed as "known sunk" and the U-Boat involved was no doubt the one referred to above as having failed to reply to Admiral U-Boats' request for its position.)

(xx)  Escort Attacks "U 353"

        At about 0500 on 16th October, "U 353" was proceeding at full speed on the surface.  Nothing was in sight and Römer was asleep.  It was pitch dark.  The look-out suddenly noticed a shadow and called his captain on to the bridge.  There Rome saw a series of shadows all around him, the nearest of which he judged to be about five miles distant.  He could not make out its outline, but estimated it to be about 60° to port.

        Römer accordingly went hard a-starboard.  Meanwhile, he noticed that the outline of the vessel sighted was narrowing, and he assumed that she was either turning towards him or away from him.  He estimated her to be 2,500-3,000 yards distant.  At the same time, he observed that her form seemed larger, and therefore decided she was making for him.  He believed that she must have contacted him with some gear, or that his wake had betrayed him.  In any case, two minutes later she opened fire on him, running right past him in the dark.  This gave Römer the impression that she had not actually sighted him.  She also fired several rounds of starshell.  The fire, according to survivors, went over them.

        Römer then submerged to 150 metres (492 ft.).  He explained that is was a first principle in U-Boats never to allow the enemy time to establish accurate gunnery range.

        He heard 20 depth-charges exploding at a distance of about 400 yards, a range which he described as not fatal but unpleasantly close.  This caused a few instruments to break, especially the gauges, but the electric lighting, to everyone's relief, remained in order.  The attack lasted about one hour, Römer taking evasive action throughout.

        One prisoner said that Römer twice used his Submarine Bubble Target during this attack.

        (N.I.D. Note:  At 0253 G.M.T. on 16th October, H.M.S. "Eglantine," escorting Convoy S.C.104, made an R.D.F. contact 240°, 2000 yards.  She turned to the bearing at full speed and opened fire with Oerlikons to illuminate target, but she did not sight it.  At 0255 at 1,800 yards R.D.F. contact was lost and Asdic reported H.E. and echo from wake and bubbles.  Asdic contact was obtained at 1,000 yards, echo slightly high.  At 0258 "Eglantine" attacked with a full pattern of depth-charges set to 100-150 ft., the U-Boat turning to port.  Firing was too late by at least 10 seconds.  Echo remained astern with doppler low.  At 0305 "Eglantine" went in for another attack, but owing to a breakdown of communications this failed.  Contact was lost at 0306, but was regained at 0308, with doppler slightly high, 220° at 700 yards.  At 0312 "Eglantine" attacked with four depth-charges set to 150-385 ft.  Contact was lost at 400 yards and regained astern, only to be immediately lost again, only to be immediately lost again.  Contact was regained at 800 yards bearing 010, doppler slightly low.  At 0320 "Eglantine" delivered another attack with full pattern 150-300 ft.  afterwards regaining echo astern, but this faded.  At 0330 she made for the convoy and was in station at 0402.)

        An hour after the depth-charge attack was over, Römer could hear no H.E. and therefore surfaced.  It was then 0500 G.S.T. and still dark.

        The Admiral U-Boats had previously signalled the speed of this convoy as eight knots, and Römer had received estimated position and course made good from the other shadowing U-Boats.  He accordingly set course so that, by proceeding at full speed, he would arrive at a given position ahead of the convoy at a stated time.  He assumed, in making his calculations, that the convoy would not in the meanwhile alter course.

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        Visibility was very poor and, as dawn was breaking, he altered course slightly away from the estimated course of the convoy so as not to be surprised by its escorts in the half-light.  He reckoned that he would then be six to seven miles on its beam, a distance which, in view of the poor visibility, he felt to be safe.  He proceeded on the surface the whole forenoon in this manner.

 

(xxi)  "U 353" Submerges to Await Convoy

        At 1305 he estimated himself to be about eight miles ahead of the convoy and at 1315, visibility being then only about 500 yards, he submerged and, proceeding at his slowest underwater speed, started to listen on his hydrophones.  He heard nothing, however, and then rose to 20 metres (65 ft.) or just below periscope depth.  Many of his ship's company thought this was a very foolish move, saying that he should either have remained at periscope depth or gone to a depth where he would have been relatively safe from depth-charge attacks.

        A short while before submerging, he had received a signal from the Admiral U-Boats, reporting the presence of a second westbound convoy in the vicinity.  Römer had calculated that the two convoys would cross at about 1800 that evening.  He therefore felt that, even if he failed to attack the eastbound convoy which he had contacted that morning, he would have a good chance of attacking the westbound.

__________________________

V.  SINKING OF "U 353"  (All times G.M.T.)

        At about 1110 on 16th October, 1942, "U 353 was proceeding dead slow at a depth of 20 metres (65 ft.).  Römer thought that he was still about eight miles to eastward of the eastbound convoy and, as he had so far picked up no H.E., went to his cabin, according to his own version , to study his charts.  Ratings said that he went to sleep.  The First Lieutenant admitted to having lain down in his bunk.

        The P.O. Telegraphist operated the multiple hydrophones, and at about 1115, soon after Römer went to his cabin, heard faint propeller noises bearing 045° relative.  "U 353" was then steering in the general direction of the convoy.  The operator said he could hear the H.E. of what he imagined to be the leading ship in the convoy, giving 54 to 56 r.p.m.

        He reported this to Römer, who immediately altered course so as to bring the H.E. on the beam.  "U 353" then proceeded for about half an hour at about 120 r. p.m.  The P.O. Telegraphist said he found listening somewhat difficult at this speed; he preferred listening at 60 to 90 r.p.m., which he described as "U 353's" silent slow submerged speed.  Meanwhile the seaman torpedoman was shifting ammunition cases from forward to aft, which further added to the difficulties of accurate listening.  Survivors even blamed this noise for having betrayed their position to the hunting craft's hydrophones.

        Suddenly the hydrophone operator heard faint propeller noises bearing 252° relative.  He was in some doubt as to whether to report this; he said to Römer however, "I think I can make out some propeller noises coming towards us, sir, but I'm not sure whether they're our own."  He was also disturbed by the noise of his own propellers.  At the same time he asked Römer to alter course 20° so as to bring the H.E. on the beam.  In this position, he felt he would have a much better chance of determining whether they were his own or another ship's H.E.

        Römer altered slowly to 336°, continuing at 20 metres depth and at 120 r.p.m.  After another quarter of an hour, the operator again reported to Römer that he could distinguish the oncoming propeller noises from his own.  The Second Lieutenant  began to show signs of nervousness.  The H.E. became more pronounced.  Römer slowly rose from his bunk.  The torpedo tubes were manned.  THe Engineer Officer suggested rising to periscope depth.  (N.I.D. Note:  At 1407, while H.M.S. "Fame" was about two miles ahead of column 4 of S.C. 104, a firm Asdic contact was obtained at 2,000 yards and at once classified as submarine.  Speed was increased to 15 knots.)

        Suddenly among the other noises could be distinguished the propellers of a destroyer.  By now Römer had left his cabin and reached the control room, where he had ordered the Engineer Officer to go to periscope depth and the boat was gradually rising.  The hydrophone operator again reported "Noises clearer and louder.  Now bearing 225°."  By then it was no longer necessary to use earphones to hear the propeller noises, which sounded only 50 yards distant.

        Then came a number of ear-splitting explosions, which prisoners said were immediately below their boat.  (N.I.D. Note:  At 1413 H.M.S. "Fame" dropped a pattern of 10 depth-charges set to 50 and 140 ft.  The visibility had now closed to about one mile.)

        The lights in "U 353" went out and there was a water entry aft and forward through the K.D.B. shaft.  The pressure hull, however, was undamaged.  The electric motors ceased to function, all but one of the depth gauges broke and the after hydroplanes were put out of action.  Römer nevertheless ordered "Submerge deeper!"  The depth gauge in the bow compartment was still operating and showed a depth of 20 metres.

        "U 353" then submerged much deeper, though owing to the general confusion, survivors did not know the exact depth.  They said, however, that the sides of the boat started to crack and the paint peeled off them.  The Engineer Officer then said to Römer that he could not be responsible for the boat's movements, as his instruments were broken, and Römer accordingly ordered the boat to be brought to the surface.  She still had a pressure of 2,700 lb. per square in. in her air bottles.

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        The boat was almost out of control, but the Engineer Officer, realising the weight of water aft, which was being worsened by a water entry through her after torpedo tube causing her to lose trim, blew number 5 tank aft and she began to surface.  He then blew No. 1 tank forward and her bows broke surface.  Römer ordered all hands to assemble in the control room and prepare to abandon ship.  The water tight doors on either side of the control room were then shut, though the search receiver cables were in the way and had to be removed.

        Some difficulty was experienced in opening the lower conning-tower hatch owing to excess pressure having developed inside the conning tower.  As soon as the pressure was equalised inside the boat, however, this became possible and Römer clambered into the conning-tower.  In the excitement he got stuck half way and was pushed through with great difficulty.  Meanwhile the galley hatch had been opened.  His officers described Römer as trembling with fear and deathly white.  (N.I.D. Note:  "Flame" had just turned to the position of the attack and was preparing for a hedgehog attack when a large bubble was seen, followed by the bow of the U-Boat breaking surface at a very steep angle.  Speed was increased to 18 knots and fire opened with every weapon which would bear.

        "Flame" then rammed her forward.  By the time that "Fame" had reached the U-Boat's position the latter was on an even keel and stopped.  "Fame's" bow hit the U-Boat a glancing blow and the U-Boat scraped down her starboard side.  A pattern of five depth-charges set at 50 ft. was dropped when the U-Boat was abreast the stern and as her men were coming on to the upper deck "Fame" then made another circle to come up to attempt boarding.)

        According to ratings, the Engineer Officer failed lamentably in his duty.  Not only was he panic stricken, but, instead of waiting to the last to open the vents to sink the boat, he clambered on to the upper deck as fast as he could, afterwards shouting below"  "Flood her! Flood her!"  Realising there was no one left below to carry out his orders, he sent one of the control room stokers to do it for him.  He said that, as the men panicked, he was forced to kick them back into the boat to make sure of his own escape.  He said to Römer, "If you'll give me a pistol, sir, I'll see to it that no one leaves the boat."

        According to his own version of the incident, he first discovered there was no one left below and then himself went back again and opened the vents.

        The whole of "U 353's" ship's company then jumped overboard and swam towards the escort vessels.  A midshipman who was too weak to catch hold of a rope thrown to him by "Flame" was killed by her propellers and one man was said to have been killed by gunfire from the merchantmen.  Römer complained bitterly about the latter incident, though he admitted that none of the warships fired at his men.  According to the Engineer Officer, who was much disgusted.  Römer was swimming in the water while others were still on board.  He shouted out several times "Chief, sink the boat."  (N.I.D. Note:  By this time the convoy was steaming past on either side of the sinking U-Boat, most of them firing everything they had got.  H.Nor.M.S. "Acanthus" joined "Fame."  Just as "Fame" was about to lower a boat an echo was reported at about 600 yards.  This was, however, discovered to be non-sub and the whaler was lowered and an officer boarded the U-Boat, only leaving her one minute before she sank at 1502 in approximate position 53° 54' N., 29° 16' W.  "Acanthus" rescued 20 ratings while the captain, four officers and 14 ratings were picked up by "Fame," who had sustained a long narrow rip on the starboard side of her engine room on the waterline.)

        In captivity, Römer admitted that he should have waited at 100 or 150 metres (328 or 492 ft.) for the convoy and not at 20 (65 ft.)  He said he did not wait at periscope depth owing to poor visibility.  He attributed the loss of his boat mainly to defective multi unit hydrophones (G.H.G. gear) which he said had been damaged in the encounter with the escort vessel early in the morning of 16th October.  His officers, however, said that this was a feeble excuse and that everyone on board knew that the hydrophones were functioning perfectly.

        The Engineer Officer said that he thought much of the trouble was due to Römer having allowed one of the two midshipmen on board to navigate, although he knew perfectly well that a strongly escorted convoy was in the vicinity.  Some prisoners said that the reason for Römer's apparent lack of concern was that he never in any case placed much faith on his hydrophones and was consequently too easily disposed to ignore the warning they gave.

        Römer said he was unable to send a signal to the Admiral U-Boats, reporting his sinking, as his set was put out of action by depth-charges.

__________________________

VI.  DETAILS OF "U 353"

(i)  General

        "U 353" was similar in most respects to other 500-ton Type VII C boats, described fully in previous C.B.s in this series.

(ii)  Diving Depth

        According to some survivors "U 353's" depth gauges were marked up to 250 metres (820 ft.) but others said that they were not marked higher than 200 metres (656 ft.).  She had never submerged deeper than 150 metres (492 ft.).  The gauges had no danger mark.  She was only guaranteed to 100 metres (328 ft.).

(C47475)

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(iii)  Propulsion

        (a)  Diesels.  Two new type, 4-stroke, 6 cylinder nominal 950 H.P., manufactured by Germaniawerft under licence from M.W.M. (Maschinenwerke, Mannheim).  Each developed a maximum of 1,500-1,600 H.P. with supercharger.  (A prisoner compared this type with the older type of nominally 850 H.P. developing 1,200 H.P.)

        Maximum revolutions, 480 r.p.m. ("Graph" 480 r.p.m.).

        Maximum speed, not ascertained ("Graph" 17.8 knots).

        Bore 400 mm. (15.7 in) and stroke 470 mm. (18.5 in.)  ("Graph" bore 15.75 in., stroke 18.11 in.).

        A special metal, bright silver coloured, termed "V 2 A," was said to have been used in construction of these engines.

        (b)  Motors.  A.E.G. developed 350 H.P. at 280 r.p.m.  No reduction gear to tail shafts fitted.

(iv)  Batteries

        (a)  Type.  "36 M.A.K."

        (b)  Cells.  Sixty-two, each with 36 negative and 38 positive plates.

        (c)  Voltage.  Maximum when charged, 149.

        (d)  Capacity.  Each guaranteed for 9,200 ampere hours.

        (e)  Spilling.  When filled to normal will not spill when diving angle does not exceed 45°.  When filled higher, 30° to 35° is danger angle.

        (f)  Non-spilling Device.  One man said that each cell was fitted with a non-spilling device resembling an inverted funnel.

(v)  Fuel

        (a)  Total carried.  128 tons.

        (b)  Consumption.  Slow speed ("Kleine Fahrt")  on Diesel-Electric:  2 cu.m. (1.7 tons) per day.  Slow Speed ("Kleine Fahrt") on both Diesels:  3.5 to 4 cu.m. (2.8-3.2 tons) per day.

(vi)  Armament

        (a)  Guns.  One 88mm. forward.  One 20 mm. on bridge.  Four M.G.s could be mounted on bridge.

        (b)  Torpedoes.  Number.  12 electric below decks.  Two air in upper deck containers.

        Propellers.  Electric torpedoes have two blades.  Air torpedoes have four or six blades.

        Pistols.  New type whisker pistols.

(vii)  Communications

        (a)  W/T Transmitters.  40 watt.  150 watt.  200 watt.

        (b)  V.H.F.  Fitted in control room.  It was known as the "Tornister Gerat"  (Knapsack Gear) from the container in which i