COPY No.
     
 
This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer
 
     
     
     
 
C.B.  04051 (20)
 
   
     
 
 
 
"U 99"
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interrogation of Survivors
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
 
April, 1941
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

 
 

   
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
     
     
     
     
 
CONFIDENTIAL
 
     
          This book is the property of His Majesty's Government.  
     
          It is intended for the use of the recipients only, and for communication to such Officers under them (not below the rank of Commissioned Officer) who may require to be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties.  The Officers exercising this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due care and caution.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
 
CONFIDENTIAL
 
     
 
Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the
 
Official Secrets Acts
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
C.B.  04051 (20)
 
     
     
 
 
 
"U 99"
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interrogation of Survivors
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
     
 
April, 1941
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
     
     
     
     
  NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,  
  ADMIRALTY, S.W.1.  
     
  N.I.D.  
                                                                                                                                             A  
     
     

 

     
     
 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
          The following report is compiled from information derived from prisoners of war.  The statements made cannot always be verified; they should therefore not be accepted as facts unless they are definitely stated to be confirmed by information from other sources.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
 
3
 
     
     
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
_______
 
 
 
         
Page
I.
  Introductory Remarks  
5
II.
  Remarks on the Crew of "U 99"  
5
III.
 
Early History of "U 99"
 
7
IV.
 
Earlier Cruises of "U 99"
 
7
 
(i)
  First Cruise  
7
   
(ii)
  Second Cruise  
8
   
(iii)
  Third Cruise  
9
   
(iv)
  Fourth Cruise  
10
   
(v)
  Fifth Cruise  
10
   
(vi)
  Sixth Cruise  
11
V.
  Last Cruise of "U 99"  
11
VI.
  Sinking of "U-99"  
13
VII.
  Details of "U 99"  
15
 
(i)
  General Remarks  
15
   
(ii)
  Seaworthiness  
15
   
(iii)
  Horse Power of Diesel Engines  
15
   
(iv)
  Telegraph Orders, Powers and Speeds  
15
   
(v)
  Diving Depths  
15
   
(vi)
  Torpedoes  
15
   
(vii)
  "UZO" and "TUZA"  
16
   
(viii)
  Detector Gear  
16
   
(ix)
  Emergency Buoy  
16
   
(x)
  Device  
16
VIII.
  W/T  
16
 
(i)
  U-Boat Communications  
16
 
(ii)
  U-Boat-Aircraft Communications  
16
IX.
  Other U-Boats  
16
 
(i)
  "U A"  
16
 
(ii)
  "U 4"  
16
 
(iii)
  "U 5"  
17
 
(iv)
  "U 7"  
17
 
(v)
  "U 20"  
17
 
(vi)
  "U 24"  
17
 
(vii)
  "U 30"  
17
 
(viii)
  "U 37"  
17
 
(ix)
  "U 46"  
17
 
(x)
  "U 47"  
17
 
(xi)
  "U 48"  
18
   
(xii)
  "U 56" to "U 59"  
19
   
(xiii)
  "U 65"  
19
   
(xiv)
  "U 80"  
19
   
(xv)
  "U 93," "U 94," "U 95"  
20
   
(xvi)
  "U 97"  
20
   
(xvii)
  "U 101"  
20
   
(xviii)
  "U 110"  
20
   
(xix)
  "U 123"  
21
   
(xx)
  "U 124"  
21
   
(xxi)
  "U 139"  
21
   
(xxii)
  "U 545"  
21
   
(xxiii)
  "U 552"  
21
X.
  U-Boat Losses  
21
   
(i)
  "U 1"  
21
   
(ii)
  "U 22"  
21
   
(iii)
  "U 51"  
22
   
(iv)
  "U 102"  
22
 
                                                                                                                                        
  (C41259)                                                                                                                            B2  
     

 

     
 
4
 
     
     
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued
 
 
 
         
Page
XI.
  U-Boat Bases  
22
 
(i)
  Lorient  
22
   
(ii)
  St. Nazaire  
24
   
(iii)
  Brest  
24
   
(iv)
  Wilhelmshaven  
24
   
(v)
  Heligoland  
24
   
(vi)
  Kiel  
24
   
(vii)
  The Baltic  
24
XII.
  U-Boat Construction  
25
  A.  North Sea Ports  
25
   
(i)
  Hamburg  
25
   
(ii)
  Bremen  
25
   
(iii)
  Wilhelmshaven  
25
   
(iv)
  Vegesack  
25
  B.  Baltic Ports  
25
   
(v)
  Kiel  
25
   
(vi)
  Lübeck  
26
   
(vii)
  Danzig  
26
   
(viii)
  Stettin, Elbing, Königsberg  
26
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
APPENDICES
 
     
 
I. Extract from the Report Book of the Officer of the Patrol of the 2nd U-Boat Flotilla
27
II. Translation of an Article from "Kieler Neueste Nachrichten" of 17th December, 1940
28
III. Extract from German Periodical "Ran an den Feind"
29
IV. List of Crew of "U 99"
30
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

 
 
 
5
 
     
  INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS OF "U 99, " SUNK AT 0400 ON MONDAY,
           17th MARCH, 1941, IN POSITION 61° 16' N., 12° 56' W.  
            
 
_____________
 
     
 
I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
 
     
          At 0050 on Monday, 17th March, 1941, H.M.S. "Walker" carried out what may have been a fatal attack on an unidentified U-Boat; no survivors were seen.  
          At approximately 0318 H.M.S. "Vanoc" rammed and sank "U 100" and picked up survivors.  
          At 0400 H.M.S. "Walker" sank "U 99," and also rescued survivors.  
          The interrogation of the survivors of "U 100," "U 99" and "U 70," sunk on Friday, 7th March, 1941, was conducted at the same time.  For the sake of clarity it was decided to issue three separate reports on the three U-Boats, but to collate all general information from all three sources, and to append this to the last of these reports.  This report on "U 99," therefore, contains all general information obtained from these U-Boats.  Comparatively little information could be extracted from the survivors of "U 70" and "U 100," as these men had recently spent some time at Kiel, their base in Germany, where they had been made extremely security-conscious, probably as the result of the return to Germany of an escaped U-Boat prisoner of war who was able to apprise the naval authorities of full details of British interrogation.  
          It was apparent that U-Boat crews in Kiel had recently been warned against our methods of examining prisoners, but this did not apply to those from Lorient, on which port "U 99" had been based since August, 1940.  
          The loss of "U 99" and the capture of her Captain, who, according to German claims, had sunk a considerably higher tonnage of British shipping than any other U-Boat Commander, is a serious blow to German morale and propaganda, especially as "U 100" with Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Joachim Schepke, another of Germany's three leading U-Boat Captains, was lost on the same night.  The possible loss of a third U-Boat a few hours earlier contributed to an important victory for Great Britain over the U-Boats during the opening days of the much-heralded Battle of the Atlantic.  
          This report on the interrogation of the survivors of "U 99" contains a number of amendments to statements on this U-Boat made at earlier date by prisoners captured from "U-32," sunk on Wednesday, 30th October, 1940.  
     
 
II.  REMARKS ON THE CREW OF "U 99"
 
     
          The complement of "U 99" consisted of six officers, fourteen Petty Officers, and twenty-three ratings, totalling forty-three, of whom all were rescued except the Engineer Officer and two ratings.  
          The Captain and the Engineer Officer had been in the U-Boat on all her cruises, the First Lieutenant had seen only a short spell of active service early in the war, but the Chief Quartermaster, who was carrying out the duties of a junior Officer, was a most experienced man, and had been with the Captain for a long time.  The remaining three officers were a Lieutenant-Commander under instruction as a prospective U-Boat Captain, and two midshipmen, whose suitability for U-Boats was being tested.  
          The crew gave the impression of having attained a higher degree of cooperation and of having worked better together than in the case of U-Boat crews interrogated in recent months.  The senior Petty Officers were more experienced and had been with the U-Boat for a considerable time.  
          Among the ratings, also, there were fewer new hands.  
          The crew of "U 99" had an exaggerated idea of their importance and dignity; these inflated opinions were no doubt due to the extraordinary degree of public adulation to which they had become accustomed.  Special aeroplanes and bouquets at railway stations had long since become part of their daily lives when ashore.  
     
  (C41259)                                                                                                                        B*2  
     
     

 

     
     
 
6
 
     
          For the first time in this war, no criticism of their officers was noted; on the contrary, a marked degree of loyalty and admiration for their Captain was expressed by the men.  
          The Captain of "U 99," Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Otto Kretschmer, was one of Germany's leading U-Boat Captains, and a national hero; he was reputed to have sunk 252,100 tons of shipping before his last cruise, and claimed another 86,000 tons sunk on this last cruise, which would bring his grand total up to 338,100 tons.  He had thus sunk considerably more than any other U-Boat Captain, and was known as the "Tonnage King."  
          Korvettenkapitän Günther Prien and Kapitänleutnant Joachim Schepke were a long way behind him as regards tonnage sunk.  
          Otto Kretschmer was born on 1st May, 1912 in Heiden (Kreis-Liegnitz) as the son of a schoolmaster; his parents still live in Heiden.  
          He spent a year in England, about 1929, studying literature and English at Exeter University.  
          On 1st April, 1930, he joined the German Navy, and was promoted to Fähnrich zur See (Midshipman) on 1st January, 1932; he attended the naval school at Flensburg-Mürwik.  
          He transferred to U-Boats in 1936.  
          After being promoted to Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) in 1st June, 1936, he served in "U 35," a 500-ton boat of the older type.  
          In October, 1937, Kretschmer was appointed to the command of "U 23," a 250-ton older type U-Boat of the 1st U-Boat Flotilla "Weddigen."  
          He commanded this boat until he was transferred to "U 99" in March, 1940.  
          During the earlier part of the war Kretschmer carried out one or two cruises in "U 23," and claims to have sunk about 27,000 tons, including the destroyer H.M.S. "Daring." sunk on Sunday, 18th February, 1940.  
          He gave the impression of being a quiet, deliberate man, and looked more like a student than a U-Boat Captain.  He prided himself on being able to take advantage of whatever the passing moment offered and made no elaborate plans for attacking convoys.  He admitted that he had become weary of the war some time ago, and latterly had got no satisfaction from sinking ship after ship.  
        On 21st March, 1941, the German High Command announced that Kretschmer had been promoted to Korvettenkapitän (Commander) and that his total sinkings were 300,000 tons in addition to the destroyer "Daring."  
          His political views were less extremely Nazi than had been assumed.  On seeing the craters of a stick of bombs near Buckingham Palace he was genuinely shocked that an attempt had so obviously been made by his countrymen to bomb the Palace.  He spoke English quite well, though he lacked practice.  His whole demeanour was calm and quiet, and he seemed anxious to be friendly; he was also less suspicious of British Officers than was his First Lieutenant.  Kretschmer stated that he was unmarried.  
          The First Lieutenant of "U 99" was Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Hans-Jochen von Knebel-Döberitz, aged twenty-three years.  His family were of the Junker class, i.e., of the landed aristocracy, living in Eastern Pomerania; he was the first member of his family to enter the navy, which he joined in 1936.  In the autumn of 1938 he transferred to U-Boats, and during the earlier part of the war served in a 250-ton U-Boat, in which he made two cruises.  His former Captain has since been lost.  He also served in another U-Boat and in "U 23" under Kretschmer.  He was, for some months, Adjutant to Vice-Admiral Dönitz, the Admiral Commanding U-Boats.  
          Von Knebel-Döberitz only joined "U 99" before her last cruise and expected to have been appointed to the command of a U-Boat had he returned in "U 99."  On the surface he seemed a very thorough Nazi, but actually he was rather ashamed of many of the Nazi methods, and most of their leading personalities.  He maintained a facade of loyalty towards the regime, whereas in reality he was only loyal to his class and to his country.  He showed every promise, however, of becoming later more arrogant and even ruthless.  He spoke a little English, but suffered from an inadequate general education much influenced by half-understood propaganda.  He was a bachelor, and had few interests apart from the navy.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
7
 
     
          The Engineer Officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) (Engineer Lieutenant) Gottfried Schröder, did not survive the sinking of "U 99," and was drowned while trying to ensure and to hasten the sinking of the U-Boat; this was subsequently admitted to have been unnecessary.  
          The Lieutenant-Commander under instruction, Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Horst Hesselbarth, aged 28, was a Westphalian, and formerly served as Torpedo Officer in the cruiser "Leipzig."  After a brief technical U-Boat course he joined "U 99" shortly before she sailed, and was thus captured on his first cruise.  He gave the impression of being a rather dull and not very intelligent man without personality, but possessed some sense of humour and was interested in sport.  
          The two midshipmen had joined the navy in 1939, and were on their first cruise, to test their suitability for U-Boats.  They had not yet had any preliminary U-Boat instruction, and had only been through a short infantry course on joining, followed by some naval training.  They were both typical Nazis, unmovingly certain of a supreme German victory in 1941, and repeated the usual propaganda when discussing any subject.  
          The Chief Quartermaster (Stabobersteuermann) Heinrich Petersen, who was fulfilling the duties of junior Officer in "U 99," was an able and experienced man who had served in the navy for many years.  He had been under Kretschmer for a long time, and was the only man in the German Navy below commissioned rank to be awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross.  This dignity had gone to his head somewhat, so that at first he behaved rather arrogantly.  
     
 
III.  EARLY HISTORY OF "U 99"
 
     
          "U 99" was an improved 500-ton U-Boat laid down at the Germania Yard, Kiel, probably about June, 1939, as she was sufficiently advanced by January, 1940, for members of her future engine-room personnel to be drafted to stand by he during the final stages of construction.  
          The Engineer Officer, Oberleutnant (Ing.) Gottfried Schröder, was among the first to join the U-Boat.  
          Prisoners said that "U 101," "U 102" and three or four other U-Boats were being built at the Germania Yard at the same time as "U 99," and that one of these U-Boats was nearly completed about the middle of March, 1940.  
          During February and March, 1940, more and more men of her prospective crew joined "U 99," and she was stated to have been launched on Monday, 18th March, 1940, and to have been completed early in April, 1940.  
          Prisoners mentioned three or four trials carried out in the Baltic, after which "U 99" returned to Kiel during second week in May, 1940.  
          Shortly after the middle of May, 1940, "U 99," went on a three weeks' cruise in the Baltic, visiting Gotenhafen and Memel; "U 99" was said to have spent eight days at the latter port.  
          Prisoners denied that they saw other U-Boats building at these ports.  
          According to the crew the trials proved satisfactory and no alterations were made to "U 99" on her return to Kiel.  
          Otto Kretschmer was appointed to command "U 99," Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Bargsten being his first Lieutenant; Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Horst Elfe was the junior Officer, and, as mentioned above, Gottfried Schröder was the Engineer Officer.  
     
 
IV.  EARLIER CRUISES OF "U 99"
 
     
  (i)  First Cruise  
          "U 99" was said to have left Kiel early in June, 1940 for the Atlantic, but was attacked somewhere between Norway and Scotland, according to prisoners, and although she dived immediately, her periscope was damaged.  One man asserted that on this occasion "U 99" had more than 50 bombs aimed at her by aircraft, that she had also been hunted for some 22 hours by destroyers, and that the explosions of over one hundred depth charges were heard.  Not only the periscope, but also a fuel tank were damaged, which caused the boat to show oil trace.  
     
  (C41259)                                                                                                                        B*4  
     
     

 

     
     
 
8
 
     
          She therefore put into Bergen but the necessary repairs could not be carried out.  After landing the Chief Mechanician First Class, who was suffering from rheumatism, "U 99" proceeded first to Heligoland, where she remained only two hours, and then to Wilmhelmshaven, where she stayed about a week.  She had not sunk any ships on this cruise.  
          Prisoners stated that she had been away for two weeks or less, and that she did not return to Kiel, but remained in Wilhelmshaven until she set out on her second cruise.  
     
  (ii)  Second Cruise  
          "U 99" left on her second cruise towards the end of June or early in July, 1940, according to prisoners, and proceeded to the Atlantic.  
          The earlier part of this cruise was uneventful.  At 0400 on Sunday, 28th July, 1940, "U 99" fired a torpedo at S.S. "Auckland Star," in position 52° 17' N., 12° 34' W.' the ship was hit below the water line, and was abandoned by her crew, after vain attempts to get the engines restarted.  At 0455 the U-Boat fired a second torpedo which hit "Auckland Star" on the port side by the engine room, and caused further extensive damage.  At 0515 a third torpedo was fired from the port side and struck the ship somewhere by the bridge.  She started immediately to sink by the stern, and the U-Boat surfaced to the west of her.  At 0520 "Auckland Star" made her final plunge, and "U 99" made off in a north-easterly direction.  
          At 0015 on Monday, 29th July, 1940, "U 99" torpedoed S.S. "Clan Menzies" in position 54° 10' N., 12° 0' W. (about 90 miles south-west of Tory Island).  The steamer was proceeding at 17 knots and zigzagging; the sea was rough and the torpedo struck the ship on the starboard side as she was swinging to port; much damage was done and the engines stopped.  The crew took to the boats.  
          "U 99" closed one of these boats, and Kretschmer spoke to the steamer's Second Officer telling him not to flash lamps, or the U-Boat would blow the boat out of the sea.  On being told the ship's name, Kretschmer said:  "One of my Clan friends."  After asking the survivors about their cargo and destination and whether they knew their course and the coast, Kretschmer went astern with "U 99," turned her very quickly, and went alongside "Clan Menzies" to fix an explosive charge on to a ladder on the port side amidships.  Five minutes later the steamer blew up and sank in about twenty to twenty-five minutes.  
          "U 99's" next victim was S.S. "Jamaica Progress," torpedoed at 0040 on Wednesday, 31st July, 1940, in position 56 26' N., 08 30' W. (40 miles S.W. of Barra Head).  The stern of the ship had been practically blown off, the main deck on the port side was intact, but on the starboard side it was cracked; the shaft in the engine room was broken, both masts were split, and the main and auxiliary aerials were brought down.  The ship immediately settled down aft and the crew escaped in the boats.  
          "U 99" closed the Chief Officer's boat; a survivor of the ship, whom the boat was trying to rescue, was dragged under by the suction of the U-Boat and was drowned.  
          Kretschmer ordered the life-boat to come alongside "U 99," and the Chief Officer of "Jamaica Progress" noticed that there were four other men on the bridge of the U-Boat with the Captain.  
          The U-Boat then moved away and submerged.  A few minutes later she fired a second torpedo, which hit the steamer amidships; the "Jamaica Progress" then settled down very quickly.  
          "U 99" surfaced and again closed the Chief Officer's boat; Kretschmer, on hearing that the survivors had a compass and knew their position, wished them a pleasant trip.  
          The U-Boat was later seen twice again by the men in the life-boat.  
          "U 99" must then have proceeded in a south-westerly direction, as at 1225 on the same day, Wednesday, 31st July, 1940, she torpedoed S.S. "Jersey City," in position 55° 47' N., 09° 18' W.  This ship was No. 73 in convoy O.B.191, escorted by H.M.S. "Walker" and H.M.S. "Periwinkle."  The convoy was zig-zagging at 8-1/2 knots, the visibility was good, with a smooth sea, but there was a nasty swell.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
9
 
     
          "Jersey City" was hit on the starboard side at the after end of the engine room; she at once buckled at the point of the explosion, cracking badly amidships.  She foundered at 1408, about 1-1/2 hours after being torpedoed.  
          H.M.S. "Walker" and H.M.S. "Periwinkle" carried out attacks on "U 99," and dropped depth charges.  Air bubbles and oil were observed on the surface, but the U-Boat escaped.  
          "U 99" followed the convoy, and then presumably went ahead and lay in wait , as she was able to torpedo S.S. "Strinda," 10,000 tons, No. 13 in the convoy, at 2355 on the following night, Thursday, 1st August, 1940.  This ship was able to return to harbour.  
          Less than three hours later, at 0232 on Friday, 2nd August, 1940, "U 99" torpedoed S.S. "Lucerna," No. 33 in the same convoy, in position 55° 18' N., 16° 39' W.  The track of the torpedo was seen, and the steamer's wheel was put hard to starboard; "Lucerna" had started to swing when she was hit on the port side amidships, about 215 ft. from the bow; the torpedo passed right through the ship making a hole on the port side below the water-line about 35 ft. long by 18 ft. deep, and one on the starboard side about 2 ft. in diameter.  "Lucerna" was also able to return to harbour.  
          Six minutes after the above attack, at 0238, "U 99" torpedoed M.V. "Alexia," No. 52 in the convoy, on the port side right aft.  The ship took an immediate list to port, and the Chinese crew abandoned ship in boats.  By opening valves, the Captain got the vessel on to an even keel, but she had sunk about 4 ft.  
          According to German reports, the escorting destroyers sent frantic signals for help, and called other destroyers and Flying Boats to the scene; these made a number of attacks with bombs and depth charges on the supposed position of the U-Boat.  
          At 0431 "U 99" surfaced on "Alexia's" starboard bow, and started to shell the vessel, approaching her very slowly.  Although the crew of this ship could only just see a dim outline of a U-Boat in the darkness, they fired three rounds so effectively that the U-Boat was forced to dive at 0508.  "U 99" had fired eight shells, five of which hit the ship, but only dented the side.  "Alexia" also returned safely to port.  
          The Captains of the last three ships, "Strinda," Lucerna" and "Alexia," subsequently remarked on the small destructive power of the German torpedoes.  
          On Saturday, 3rd August, 1940, the German High Command announced that Kretschmer had sunk 53,118 tons of British shipping, comprising seven armed merchant ships, among them three tankers in convoy.  
          The actual tonnage sunk was-  
 
S.S. "Auckland Star"
13,212 tons.
S.S. "Clan Menzies"
7,336     "   
S.S. "Jamaica Progress"
5,475     "   
S.S. Jersey City"
6,322     "   
 
          These ships amounted to 32,345 tons, or 22,773 tons less than the claim of the German High Command.  
          "U 99" made for Lorient and is believed to have arrived there on or before Thursday, 8th August, 1940.  On that date Kretschmer received the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross, and his total sinkings were quoted as 117,367 tons, including H.M.S. "Daring."  
          The crew said that they did not know that they were to finish their cruise at Lorient, and thought that orders to proceed there were received while they were at sea.  
          "U 99" remained in Lorient only a short time before setting out on her third war cruise.  Half of the crew had eight days' leave during this period.  
     
  (iii)  Third Cruise  
          Prisoners stated that "U 99" left Lorient on Friday, 23rd August, 1940, on her third cruise.  
          By deduction the total tonnage attributed to Kretschmer on this cruise by German official sources was nearly 56,000 tons of shipping.  
     
  (C41259)                                                                                                                      B**2  
     
     

 

     
     
 
10
 
     
          The German High Command always announce totals of tonnage sunk, but frequently omit the mane of the U-Boat Captain responsible.  The only totals of sinkings claimed during the alleged duration of this cruise by German authorities on behalf of unspecified U-Boat Captains, which might refer to Kretschmer, were four merchant ships in convoy totalling 30,000 tons, claimed on Monday, 26th August, 1940, and an unspecified number of merchant ships, totalling 28,600 tons, claimed on Wednesday, 28th August, 1940.  Both these claims on behalf of unspecified Captains may refer to Kretschmer, as they amount to 58,600 tons.  
          According to the Germans, Kretschmer's personal total sinkings amounted to about 172,000 tons after this third cruise of "U 99."  
          Prisoners stated that "U 99" returned to Lorient, arriving there about Tuesday, 3rd September, 1940, after an unusually short cruise, her early return being due to the fact that she had fired all her torpedoes.  
          The U-Boat remained in Lorient for nearly six weeks before starting out on her fourth war cruise.  
     
  (iv)  Fourth Cruise  
          Prisoners said that "U 99" left Lorient again on Thursday, 10th October, 1940.  One Lieutenant-Commander under instruction as a prospective U-Boat Captain was carried, also a cinema-man named Lander.  
          It was admitted by the German communiqué of Saturday, 19th October, 1940, that Kretschmer during the preceding days had sunk seven ships alleged to amount to 45,000 tons.  This claim refers to the attacks on Convoy S.C.7, which occurred on the night of 17th to 18th and 18th to 19th October, 1940.  
          The German announcement stated that thirty-one ships were sunk, and that five U-Boats took part in these attacks, Kapitänleutnant Fritz Frauenheim, Kapitänleutnant Oskar Moehle, and two further unspecified Captains participating in addition to Kretschmer.  In point of fact twenty ships were sunk in this convoy.  
          Prisoners had no idea as to the names of the ships supposed to have been sunk by "U 99," but reiterated that their victims numbered seven.  
          "U 99" returned to Lorient on Thursday, 24th October, 1940, as Kretschmer wanted to take more torpedoes on board.  His total sinkings then amounted to over 162,000 tons according to the Germans.  
          The U-Boat was only a few days in port before setting out on her next cruise.  
     
  (v)  Fifth Cruise  
          "U 99" left Lorient about the end of October, 1940, and proceeded to her operation area West of Ireland.  She again had an additional officer on board, who was under instruction as a prospective U-Boat Captain.  
          At 2045 on Sunday, 3rd November, 1940, "U 99" torpedoed S.S. "Casanare," in position 53° 57' N., 14° 15' W.  The steamer was zigzagging at 14 knots, and was hit on the port side of the engine room; she was abandoned later in a sinking condition.  
          At 2225 on the same night "U 99" sank H.M.S. "Laurentic" in the same area.  The ship was struck by two torpedoes.  The U-Boat's cinema camera-man was said to have been called on the bridge by Kretschmer to photograph the sinking of this ship by the light of the star-shells fired by the British (See Appendix II for a German Press report on the sinking of H.M.S. "Laurentic.")  
          Later the same night, at 2322, "U 99" sank H.M.S. "Patroclus," also in almost the same position; this ship was hit by seven torpedoes.  
          On Monday, 4th November, 1940, the German High Command announced that Kretschmer had been awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross, and that he had now passed the sinkings figure of 200,000 tons.  Herr Hitler also sent a telegram of congratulations.  At the same time the Chief Quartermaster of "U 99" was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
11
 
     
          The Captain of "U 99" admitted that he had attacked and sunk S.S. "Scottish Maiden," at 0155 on Tuesday, 5th November, 1940, in position 54° 40' N., 14° 08' W.  This steamer was No. 82 in Convoy H.X.83.  Although Kretschmer had fired his last torpedo at "Scottish Maiden," he followed the convoy until the afternoon of that day, and on three occasions made signals, presumably passing the information to his base in the hope of other U-Boats being guided to attack the convoy.  
          At 1600 H.M.S. "Beagle" attacked the U-Boat, but "U 99" was able to return to Lorient, arriving about Friday, 8th November, 1940.  
          Kretschmer's claim of tonnage sunk rose to 217,198 tons.  
          "U 99" remained at Lorient for about two and a half weeks.  
     
  (vi)  Sixth Cruise  
          Prisoners stated that "U 99" left Lorient on Tuesday, 26th November, 1940, on her sixth cruise; she proceeded to an area W. of that in which she had operated on her previous cruise.  Very bad weather was encountered.  
          According to their statements, at 0330 on Monday, 2nd December, 1940, "U 99" torpedoed M.V. "Conch," in position about 55° N., 19° W.  The U-Boat was sighted steering in a S.S.E. direction about a mile to a mile and a half away on the port beam; it was very dark, and only the conning tower could be seen.  The Captain of "Conch" ordered the helm hard-a-starboard, but as the ship was swinging she was hit by a torpedo on the port side about 400 ft. from the bow.  "Conch" was proceeding alone at 9-1/2 knots at the time; she subsequently sank.  
          At 0350 on the same night in the same area, "U 99" torpedoed H.M.S. "Forfar," which, according to the Germans, sank within three minutes.  (Appendix II of this report contains a German Press account of the sinking of H.M.S. "Forfar.")  
          "U 99" arrived back at Lorient on Friday, 13th December, 1940 and remained there for over two months.  
     
 
V.  LAST CRUISE OF "U 99"
 
     
          "U 99" left Lorient on Saturday, 22nd February, 1941, on her last cruise.  On this occasion she had three additional officers, one Kapitänleutnant for instruction and two midshipmen.  She carried fourteen torpedoes.  
          According to prisoners, she travelled on the surface both day and night except when aircraft were reported; on these occasions she dived immediately without a moment's delay.  
          "U 99" did not have any opportunity of attacking shipping during the earlier part of this cruise, but on the night of 6th/7th March, 1941, she received orders by W/T from the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats to track and attack a convoy.  Accordingly "U 99" proceeded at full speed on the surface, and later on stopped, submerged and listened.  Prisoners knew that this convoy had in the first instance been located and reported by "U 47," Kapitänleutnant Prien.  
          "U 47" was described as having maintained contact by proceeding in a series of spurts, and then withdrawing again, to make sure of following the course of the convoy; it was explained that this method ensured the maintenance of contact.  
          "U 99" sighted"U 47" at about 1800 (B.S.T. on Thursday, 6th March, 1941, but at that moment two British destroyers emerged from the mist at a distance of about 1,000 metres, (1,093 yards), coming straight towards "U 99."  Prisoners heard the destroyers pass overhead "several times" and heard the explosions of a few depth charges.  They assumed that the destroyers must have been fitted with R.D/F, as otherwise the British would not have known of the presence of the U-Boats.  
     
  (C21259)                                                                                                                   B**3  
     
     

 

     
     
 
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          "U 47" surfaced later and reported by signal:  "Being attacked with depth charges"; but, according to prisoners, she again attacked the convoy.  
          "U 99" remained submerged three or four hours, and on surfacing was able to locate and follow the convoy by means of the Very lights which the ships were firing.  
          "U 99" then approached the convoy (O.B.293), and reached it at about 0700 on the morning of Friday, 7th March, 1941.  
          It is known from the interrogation of survivors of "U 70" (See C.B. 4051 (18), page 8) that "U 70" was also attacking this convoy.  
          The whale factory "Terje Viken," 20,638 tons, No. 63 in the convoy, was first hit at 0605 on the morning in question by two torpedoes.  It was established from the interrogation of survivors of "U 70" that she had fired three torpedoes at "Terje Viken" and that these all missed.  It is thus obvious that the first attack on "Terje Viken" was carried out by a third U-Boat, possibly by "U 47," under Prien.  At this first attack, "Terje Viken" was hit by the first torpedo on the starboard side about 100 ft. from the bow, the torpedo passing through the ship and holing her also on the port side.  Immediately afterwards the second torpedo struck the ship slightly forward of the first, exploded and completely wrecked the forehold.  
          According to the crew of "U 99" they had arrived on the scene rather later than "U 70," and sighted the "Terje Viken" after she had been damaged; prisoners admitted having realised that this ship had already been torpedoed, and stated that she was making only 9 knots, and that they thought she might still be salved.  In order to render her less more certain they torpedoed her.  "U 99" fired a torpedo and hit "Terje Viken" on the port side.  A second torpedo seems to have been fired at the same time at another ship, but missed.  The time, according to the Germans estimate, was then after 0700.  
          Leaving the damaged "Terje Viken," "U 99" went after another ship, described by prisoners as a 6,000-ton tanker, and fired in all three torpedoes at her before she sank.  
          In the meantime it was getting unpleasantly light, and the Germans saw two crippled ships floating about, but they went in the direction of "Terje Viken" to see whether she had actually sunk, when suddenly a Petty Officer reported a mast ahead on the starboard bow.  The First Lieutenant told him to keep a sharp watch on this mast, when unexpectedly an old type destroyer was seen making for the U-Boat.  "U 99" crash dived, and the crew counted fifty-one depth charges dropped on them, the various attacks occurring at intervals of twenty minutes to half an hour.  All these depth charges appear to have exploded above the U-Boat.  
          Later "U 99," undamaged, surfaced and sighted "U 47" for the fourth time during that operation.  She proceeded and approached the North Channel coming fairly close to the shore.  
          Prisoners stated that on a Sunday morning during this cruise "U 99" received orders to take up position to attack a convoy which had been reported by aircraft.  It was implied that this occurred about the end of February, 1941; the Sunday in question may, therefore have been 26th February or 2nd March, 1941.  
          The U-Boats ordered to take part in this attack were each given an area, and were stationed at equal distances about 7 miles from each other, in order to form as wide an "occupied strip" of ocean as possible.  Each U-Boat received from the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats orders to cover a certain square on the "occupied strip."  The U-Boat Captains then calculated the exact position allocated to them.  
          "U 99" proceeded to and remained in her allocated position the whole day, keeping in contact with other U-Boats.  She was forced to dive eight times by destroyers and Sunderland flying boats.  
          The latter part of the cruise was uneventful until the last night, 16th/17th March, 1941, when, according to survivors of "U 99," a number of U-Boats attacked an inward-bound convoy; prisoners stated that, apart from their own ship, U-Boats taking part were "U 100," Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Schepke, "U 110" under the command of Kapitänleutnant Lemp, possibly the U-Boat commanded by Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Rösing, and possibly also other U-Boats.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
13
 
     
          The First Lieutenant of "U 99" stated that the convoy had been reported by a U-Boat as a homeward bound convoy of about 50 ships, escorted by two Destroyers.  (N.I.D. Note.  The convoy actually consisted of 41 ships, escorted by five Destroyers and two Corvettes).  
          "U 99" received orders too late to attack the convoy during the night of 15th/16th March and therefore followed it the whole of Sunday, 16th March, 1941, until it was sufficiently dark to attack.  
          The First Lieutenant of "U 99" claimed that his U-Boat sank six ships, totalling 59,000 tons, from this convoy on the night in question.  He said that the first ship torpedoed was a full tanker of 15,000 tons, and was hit between the engine room and the tank space; he added that a sheet of flame shot out of the tanker turning the night into daylight.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The first ship reported to have been torpedoed on Sunday night, 16th March, 1941, from convoy HX 112 was the Norwegian tanker "Ferm," 6,593 tons, torpedoed in position 60° 59' N., 12° 36' W. at 2205).  
          The second ship claimed by the German officer mentioned above was described as a tanker of 12,000 tons, but the target was not hit as squarely as their first victim.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 2210 the British tanker "Venetia," 5,728 tons, was sunk, and is presumed to have been the ship in question).  
          A third torpedo, fired by "U 99" as she was turning, missed its mark.  
          The next ship stated by the Germans to have been sunk by them was a freighter of unspecified tonnage.  
          After that they professed to have sunk by torpedo another tanker of about 9,000 tons which was right in the middle of the convoy.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  The British tanker "Franche Compte," 9,314 tons, was torpedoed at 2324.  She did not sink, but managed to reach port.  She may be the ship believed by survivors of "U 99" to have been their fourth victim).  
          The First Lieutenant of the U-Boat stated that the fifth and sixth vessels sunk by "U 99" were merchant ships.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  One of the merchant ships may have been the British S.S. "J. B. White," 6,869 tons, torpedoed amidships on the starboard side at 0002 on 17th March, 1941.  She was torpedoed again later and sank).  
          By about 0300 on Monday, 17th March, 1941, "U 99's" total sinkings claimed for this one night had reached 59,000 tons, and the total for the cruise was stated to be the record figure of 86,000 tons.  
          "U 99" had now no torpedoes remaining, so Kretschmer decided to return to his base.  
     
 
VI.  SINKING OF "U 99"
 
     
          As "U 99" was leaving the scene the Chief Quartermaster sighted a destroyer and gave the alarm.  "U 99" crash dived.  
          At about 0330 H.M.S. "Walker," in approximate position 61° 16' N., 12° 56' W., was circling H.M.S. "Vanoc" to give her A/S protection while the latter picked up survivors from "U 100," which she had rammed at about 0318.  
          At 0337 "Walker" obtained contact quite close to where "Vanoc" was stopped' this was thought to be non-sub at first, but as the asdic operator insisted that contact was firm and the echo rapidly improved, the Captain decided to attack.  
          The crew of "U 99" heard the destroyer passing overhead, and then came the explosions of six depth charges, thought by the Germans to have exploded beneath the U-Boat which was then at depth of 120 metres (393.7 ft.).  
          "U 99" then went to about 140 metres (459 ft.), or deeper, and water entered the boat; according to the Captain she sank to about 185 metres (607 ft.) or more; but she suddenly started to rise quickly and surfaced; the conning tower hatch was thrown open and the Captain climbed out.  It was then about 0350.  The German Captain's intention was to try and get away on the surface but the Quartermaster reported that the steering gear was out of action; the electric  
     
  (C41259)                                                                                                                   B**4  
     
     

 

     
     
 
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  motors were also out of action.  The First Lieutenant connected the hand steering gear.  But everything, including the fuel tanks, had been smashed.  The crew had put on their lifebelts and hurried out of the U-Boat.  
          At 0352 "Walker" sighted "U 99" on the surface.  "Vanoc" and "Walker" opened fire on "U 00" at 0354, but ceased firing two minutes later.  At this juncture yet another U-Boat was reported astern by reliable witnesses in "Walker."  
          The Captain of "U 99" called out to his men that their U-Boat was sinking.  The First Lieutenant and the Engineering Officer, estimating that their ship would remain afloat for another ten or fifteen minutes, started to open valves to make certain of sinking "U 99."  As the First Lieutenant went forward, he suddenly heard splashing in the Control Room, and saw a stream of water coming in through the conning tower hatch.  He therefore climbed out at once, and found the whole crew gathered together on the bridge.  As the U-Boat did not seem to be sinking fast enough, and it was feared that the British might try to board her, the Engineer Officer again went below to open wide the galley hatch which had previously been only partly opened.  He never got out again, and the crew heard him shouting as the U-Boat sank.  
          The Captain said that a W/T message was sent in clear, just before "U 99" sank; but he did not know whether it was transmitted on full strength or not, or whether it had been received at his base.  The signal read:  "Depth charges - captured - Heil Hitler - Kretschmer."  
          Kretschmer expressed the opinion that "Walker" had not located their U-boat by any detector gear, but had sighted "U 99" on the surface and had dropped depth charges which were effective more by luck than anything else.  
          Five officers and 35 men were picked up by H.M.S. "Walker."  One officer and two ratings were drowned.  
          In the destroyer the men of "U 99" had meals in the same mess with a number of their victims, the survivors of the S.S. "J. B. White."  
     
  Summary of Claims of Shipping sunk, made by the First Lieutenant of "U 99"  
          According to the First Lieutenant, "U 99's" total sinkings on this cruise amounted to 86,000 tons, which beat all previous records of tonnage sunk on a single cruise, including "U 99's" own previous record of 85,000 tons.  
          Although this officer said that 14 torpedoes were fired, of which 12 hit their targets, only one missed, and one was a dud, this statement is thought to be inaccurate.  
          The crew considered this a unique achievement.  
          The successes claimed by "U 99" seem to be as follows:  
     
 
    German estimate of Tonnage. Actual Tonnage. Torpedoes.
7th March, 1941 Tanker "Terje Viken" 20,000 20,638 1 hit.
        1 missed.
  Tanker "Athelbeach"   6,000   6,570 3 hit.
16th March, 1941 Tanker "Ferm" 15,000   6,593 1 hit.
  Tanker "Venetia" 12,000   5,728 1 hit.
  Freighter "J. B. White"     ?   6,869 1 hit.
  Freighter         ?     ?     ? 1 hit.
  Tanker "Franche Compte"   9,000 9,314 1 hit.
  Merchant ship      ?     ?     ? 1 hit.
?
       ___    __    __ 1 dud.
?
       ___     ?     ? 1 unaccounted for
    86,000   14
 
     
          It appears that the German claims of tonnage sunk were even more exaggerated than usual.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
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VII.  DETAILS OF "U 99"
 
     
  (i)  General Remarks  
          Prisoners stated that "U 00" was built by the Germania Yard at Kiel.  She was described as having a displacement of 500 tons, but as being an improved type.  
     
  (ii)  Seaworthiness  
          "U 99" was, according to her crew, a very seaworthy U-Boat, and did not have to dive in bad weather, but could proceed on the surface even in heavy weather.  
     
  (iii)  Horse-Power of Diesel Engines  
          The Diesels were said to develop 1,400 horse-power each.  
     
  (iv)  Telegraph Orders, Powers and Speeds  
     
 
Revolutions.
Speed in knots.
Telegraph Orders.
Ahead.
Astern.
Ahead.
       
K.F. - Dead Slow
180
180
 7
L.F. - Slow
285
210
10
H.F. - Half Speed
350
250
12
2 x H.F. - 3/5 Speed
390
310
14
G.F. - 3/4 Speed
445
--
16
2 x G.F. - 4/5 Speed
460
--
   16.5
A.K. - Utmost Speed
475
410
17
3 x A.K. - Emergency Speed
485
--
   17.8
       
MOTORS
K.F. - Dead Slow
  57
  55
1.5
L.F. - Slow
114
115
  3
H.F. - Half Speed
167
163
4.5
2 x H.F. - 3/5 Speed
220
220
  6
G.F. - 3/4 Speed
257
--
  7
A.K. - Utmost Speed
295
295
  8
3 x A.K. - Emergency Speed
--
--
--
 
     
  (v)  Diving Depth  
          "U 99" did not usually dive deeper that 100 metres (328 ft.).  
     
  (vi)  Torpedoes  
          It appears that "U 99" had five torpedo tubes - four bow tubes and one stern tube.  She was said to carry 14 torpedoes of which two were stored on deck in special containers, one forward and one aft; of the remaining 12 torpedoes, four were in the forward tubes, one in the stern tube and one spare in the after compartment, four under and two above the floor plates of the forward compartment.  The two torpedoes above the floor plates were stowed in the middle of the forward compartment, on which the crew stated that they used to sit.  
          Prisoners said that on their last cruise and on only one earlier cruise were 14 torpedoes carried; on all other cruises only 12 torpedoes were taken, the containers on deck remaining empty.  
     
  (C41259)                                                                                                                   B***  
     
     

 

     
     
 
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  (vii)  Uzo and Tuza  
          Uzo (Unterseebootszieloptik), i.e.,  U-Boat aiming sight, was said to be the new name for Tuza (Torpedo-unterseebootszielapparat), i.e., U-Boat torpedo aiming apparatus, and is an instrument for aiming torpedoes when on the surface at night.  It consists of a pair of night binoculars mounted on a vertical tube on the bridge; this tube rotates on a graduated base and a pointer attached to the foot of the column indicates the relative angle of the target.  
     
  (viii)  Detector Gear  
          Prisoners denied that detector gear (S-Gerät) was carried.  
     
  (ix)  Emergency Buoy  
          Prisoners said that no emergency buoy was carried, and that in the event of an accident they would not be able to mark their position in any way.  
     
  (x)  Device  
          "U 99" had three horse shoes fixed to the conning tower; the story of how this device was acquired is told in Appendix III, in the translation of a German press report.  
     
 
VIII.  W/T
 
     
  (i)  U-Boat Communications  
          (a)  No dummy messages are made from sea.  
          (b)  S/T is not used for intercommunication between U-Boats, as it can be detected even with the most primitive listening gear.  
          (c)  According to one statement, a message in clear was made by a U-Boat during the engagement which led to her destruction.  It contained details of tonnage sunk.  There is no evidence to show whether this is an established practice in similar circumstances, but so far no such message has ever been heard.  
          (d)  Weather reports are, so it was stated, made by U-Boats every day between 2300 and 0300 G.M.T.  Normally they are sent at about 0100 G.M.T.  
          (e)  There appears to be some dissatisfaction with W/T discipline of inexperienced U-Boat commanders, who are said to make too many signals, thereby often compromising the whole action.  
     
  (ii)  U-Boat Aircraft Communications  
          (a)  It was already known that aircraft guide U-Boats on to their targets by means of D/F signals, and the procedure used was known in its main outlines.  Prisoners have supplied interesting details.  Aircraft reporting an outward bound convoy make a series of A's and D/F signals (A standing for ausfahrend), those reporting inward bound units make a series of R's (standing for rückkehrend).  U-Boats are informed by control when aircraft are making D/F signals.  The frequency for these signals is stated to be constant at 581 or 582 metres.  
          (b)  A similar procedure was known to be used by U-Boats among themselves.  A prisoner states that in such cases V's are used as D/F signals.  Control orders the U-Boat who has contact with the enemy to transmit and informs the other U-Boats.  The frequency is thought to be the same as that used by aircraft, though the statements of prisoners on this point are not clear.  
     
 
IX.  OTHER U-BOATS
 
     
  (i)  "U A"  
          "U/A" the U-Boat originally intended for Turkey, was stated to be the only 1,200-ton U-Boat now operating with the German Navy, and was said to be able to stay at sea for four months.  She is believed to be capable of 25 knots on the surface.  This U-Boat had never been seen in Lorient by prisoners.  
     
  (ii)  "U 4"  
          "U 4" is known to have been a training boat during the early part of 1940.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
17
 
     
  (iii)  "U 5"  
          One prisoner from "U 99" said that when he was at the Neustadt U-Boat School, during the summer of 1940, he trained in "U 5."  
     
  (iv)  "U 7"  
          "U 7" is stated to have been a training boat at Neustadt and during April, 1940, was commanded by Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Schrott.  Oberleutnant zur See Heidel was said to have commanded "U 7" during the last months of 1939.  "U 7" took part in the Norwegian operations, but, according to prisoners, did not sink any ships on that undertaking.  Schrott was stated to have been still in command of "U 7" in October, 1940.  
     
  (v)  "U 20"  
          A prisoner stated that during his period of training at the U-Boat School, Neustadt, from February to June, 1940, he served in "U 20" under the command of Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) von Klot-Heydenfeldt.  In June of that year, von Klot-Heydenfeldt left "U 20" to take command of a new U-Boat, probably "U 102," and did not return from his first war cruise.  
     
  (vi)  "U 24"  
          One Petty Officer from "U 70" said that during the Norwegian campaign he served in "U 24" under Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Udo Heilmann.  They left for a cruise towards the end of the campaign, but did not fire a torpedo, nor did they carry munitions.  "U 24" is said to have been out on patrol until recently, still under Heilmann, but it is thought that he is now waiting to take over the command of a new boat.  
     
  (vii)  "U 30"  
          "U 30" is said again to be a training boat.  
     
  (viii)  "U 37"  
          A Petty Officer who had formerly served in "U 37" said that this U-Boat had made a cruise to the Mediterranean before the war, but did not enter any Spanish port.  A survivor of "U 100" who had friends in "U 37" stated that the latter had carried out a cruise to the South Atlantic towards the end of August or early in September, 1940.  The crew were said to have been equipped at Lorient with tropical kit for this cruise.  "U 37" is known to have been in Lorient on the 21st February, 1941.  It is not known whether Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Oehrn is still in command.  
     
  (ix)  "U 46"  
          There is some confirmation that "U 46" is still commanded by Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Engelbert Endrass.  "U 46" was stated by several Senior Petty Officers of "U 99" and "U 100" to have been in Kiel for about three months undergoing repairs to damage caused to her bows by an aircraft attack, some time in September or October, 1940, in the North Sea.  One prisoner believed that one of "U 46's" tanks had been badly damaged and that several of her crew had been killed' the U-Boat was said to have stopped at Bergen on her way back to Germany.  She was still in Kiel in February, according to this prisoner, but was due to leave on a war cruise during that month with Endrass in command.  The German High Command communiqué of 4th April, 1941, claimed that the U-Boat commanded by Endrass had recently achieved notable success in the sinking of British shipping.  
     
  (x)  "U 47"  
          No very definite information regarding "U 47" or Prien since November, 1940, was available until recently.  
          It was said that "U 47" was attacked by aircraft somewhere between the Shetland Islands and south-west Norway in November and that a direct hit was obtained on the conning tower.  This gave rise to the report that, although "U 47" reached port, her commanding officer was either wounded or killed.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
18
 
     
          It has since been established that Prien was not killed by this aircraft attack, but should he have been wounded, it is possible that he was landed at Trondheim and the "U 47" was brought back to Kiel by the First Lieutenant.  
          A prisoner captured from "U 99" said that in December, when he was in Kiel, Prien arrived at that port by air, possibly from Norway.  
          The most likely explanation of Prien's inactivity from the end of October, 1940, until 19th February, 1941, is that "U 47" had been undergoing an extensive refit at the Germania Yard at Kiel.  
          A German Air Force officer recently captured claimed that his squadron K.G. 100, stationed at Vannes, near Lorient, had "adopted" Prien's U-Boat.  According to this prisoner, members of his squadron often escorted Prien in and out of Lorient harbour, and on returning from a cruise Prien usually sent a telephone message to the squadron.  
          An officer of "U 99" stated that "U 47," under Prien, left Lorient on 19th February, 1941.  This statement has been confirmed, and it can thus be accepted that whatever "U 47" and Prien may have been doing meanwhile, they were definitely at Lorient in February, 1941.  
          After leaving Lorient on 19th February, "U 47," with Prien in command, and carrying an additional officer under instruction as a prospective U-Boat captain, proceeded to her patrol area in the North-Western Approaches.  According to Kretschmer, "U 47," in collaboration with "U 99" and "U 70," took part in an attack on Convoy O.B.293 on the night 6th/7th March, 1941, during which "U 70" was sunk.  Prien was the first to report this convoy and was believed to have achieved some success.  One prisoner stated that Prien had sent a signal to the Vice-Admiral Commanding U-Boats to the effect that he had sunk 22,000 tons.  "U 47" was sighted four times by "U 99" during the above attack.  
          On 8th March the Vice-Admiral, U-Boats, ordered "U 47" and "U 70" to report their position.  "U 70" had been sunk and so could not reply and no response came from "U 47."  
          On 10th March, the Vice-Admiral, U-Boats again ordered "U 47" and "U 70" to report their positions, but again no reply was made.  
          On 11th March, at some period during the day, "U 99" picked up an unintelligible and very indistinct short signal, sent apparently from some other U-Boat, with a defect in her transmitting set, such as "U 47" was known to have had on a previous occasion.  Some members of "U 99's" crew believed that this indistinct signal could have been sent by Prien.  
          There is no news of "U 47" having returned to harbour.  
          H.M.S. "Wolverine" made an attack on a U-Boat at 0010 on 8th March, 1941, in approximately 60° 40' N. and 19° 25' W.  
          It seems reasonable to hope that this attack may have resulted in the sinking of "U 47."  
          The fact, moreover, that Prien was promoted to Korvettenkapitän (Commander) on 19th March, several days after he had failed to reply to the signals from the Vice-Admiral U-Boats, may indicate that the German naval authorities believed him to be a prisoner of war, as they did in the case of Kretschmer, who was promoted to Korvettenkapitän some days after "U 99" was sunk.  
     
  (xi)  "U 48"  
          According to German statements, "U 48" had sunk a greater tonnage than all other U-Boats, with a total of 308,000 tons.  "U 99's" latest total claim was not then available.  "U 48" was originally commanded by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Herbert ("Vati") Schultze, until June 1940, when, owing to illness, he was relieved by Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Rösing.  (See C.B. 4051 (15), page 21).  "U 48" was taken over by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Bleichrodt in the autumn of 1940, under whose command some 40,000 tons of shipping were claimed to have been sunk.  Ever since "U 48" was commissioned, the First Officer had been Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Reinhard ("Teddy") Suhren, who was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross on 5th November, 1940, when serving under Bleichrodt.  
          Later reports maintained that Schultze had again assumed command of "U 48."  
     
     

 

     
     
 
19
 
     
          The official German communiqué of the 2nd April, 1941, claimed that on his last cruise Schultze had sunk 35,300 tons of shipping in the North Atlantic, consisting of five merchant ships.  In a radio talk on the 1st April, Schultze claimed the sinking of a 10,000-ton freighter proceeding independently on the route from North Africa to England.  This freighter sank with such an explosion, according to Schultze, that he believed her to be carrying munitions.  
          Just before this Schultze claimed to have sunk off the West of Ireland a steamer of 4,1800 tons, proceeding independently from Calcutta to England with a mixed cargo.  The Captain and First Officer were taken prisoners on board the U-Boat and brought to Germany.  
     
  (xii)  "U 56" to "U 59"  
          "U 56" to "U 59" were stated to belong to the School Flotilla, which may be true in view of the fact that they are all only 250-tonners, and thus not very suitable for the type of operations at present being carried out in the Atlantic.  It was not known for certain who the Commanders of these boats were, but it seems likely that until November, 1940, Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Korth was commanding "U 57" at the U-Boat School, Neustadt, because one prisoner from "U 99" said that during his period of training there from May to November, 1940, he served under this officer.  From a report received during the summer of 1940, Korth was known to have commanded "U 57."  Korth was said, however, to have seen some active service during the spring of 1940 and to have achieved some successes.  The other officers in this U-Boat at the time were probably Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Reichenbach-Klinke and Oberleutnant (Ing.) (Engineer Lieutenant) Panknin.  Panknin is presumably no longer in "U 57," as he is known to have been in Lorient in February, 1941.  
     
  (xiii)  "U 65"  
          It was stated by prisoners captured at an earlier date that "U 65" was commanded by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Hans-Gerrit von Stockhausen (see C.B. 4051 (15) ).  According to a German High Command communiqué of 9th July, 1940 von Stockhausen was stated to have sunk 57,500 tons.  His name next appeared in the German communiqué of 29th December, 1940, according to which the total result of a long-distance cruise carried out by his U-Boat was the sinking of 46,000 tons.  On 11th January, 1941, the German war communiqué stated that the total sinkings reported on 29th December, 1940 were not the final figures for von Stockhausen's long distance cruise, but that the total tonnage amounted to 52,800 tons.  "U 65" was originally believed to have a displacement of 750 tons.  A prisoner recently captured from a surface ship which had been operating in the South Atlantic said that "U 65" which he described as a "900-ton U-Boat, had been operating off the coast of South Africa in December or January, 1941.  According to German press, von Stockhausen made a cruise in equatorial waters towards the end of 1940.  An officer of "U 76" stated that von Stockhausen had been operating off Gibraltar in "U 65" or in a still larger U-Boat, and that the cruise had lasted about three months; it was added that the U-Boat was reprovisioned and refuelled by tankers, who also replenished her supply of torpedoes.  On 20th January 1941, on the recommendation of Admiral Raeder, von Stockhausen was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross in recognition of his sinkings of 15 ships totalling 100,000 tons.  
          According to prisoners statements, "U 65" was in dock alongside "U 99" in Lorient in February, 1941.  
          On 17th March, 1941, the Bremen radio announced that von Stockhausen and his entire crew were spending a holiday on the estate of the Commander's father.  
          An officer prisoner stated that von Stockhausen was about to be made Commanding Officer of a U-Boat flotilla.  
     
  (xiv)  "U 80"  
          One of the officers from "U 70" said that "U 80" would shortly be ready for service.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
20
 
     
  (xv)  "U 93, "U 94," "U 95"  
          These U-Boats were said to have been at Lorient.  "U 94" is known to have been there on 20th February, 1941, and was stated to be a 500-ton U-Boat.  
     
  (xvi)  "U 97"  
          "U 97" was believed by prisoners to be in commission and to have already made some cruises.  
     
  (xvii)  "U 101"  
          "U 101" was stated to be a 500-ton U-Boat of the same series as "U 99.
  A prisoner from "U 99" stated that early in 1940, he was standing by "U 101" at the Germania Yard at Kiel, but that owing to a period in hospital, he returned too late for her first cruise, and was appointed to "U 99," which indicated that "U 101" made her first cruise before "U 99."  The Commander of "U 101" at this period was said to be Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Fritz Frauenheim, who, according to the official German war communiqué of 17th June, 1940, Frauenheim's U-Boat sank 41,500 tons of shipping, including the 11,400-ton "Wellington Star."  "U 101," like all German U-Boats at that time, was still operating from Germany, and on about 10th August she left Kiel in company with "U 51" and "U 100," the latter commanded by Kapitänleutnant Schepke.  It is probable that after this cruise "U 101," like "U 100," and "U 99," used Lorient for a base, whence she carried out some very successful patrols.  The German war communiqué of 3rd September, that is to say approximately three weeks after "U 101" left Kiel, stated that Frauenheim sank in his last cruise 58,010 tons of merchant shipping, consisting of eleven vessels, and seriously damaged a heavy cruiser and that, to achieve this, Frauenheim had to penetrate a strongly guarded coastal area, and furthermore, nearly all the ships sunk were in convoy.  For this achievement Frauenheim received the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross.  The next mention of Frauenheim's boat appears in the German war communiqué of 19th October, 1940, where he is alleged, together with the U-Boat Captains Kretschmer and Moehle, and two others unnamed, to have shared in the sinking, during the preceding days, of 31 vessels of a total of 173,650 tons, 26 of which were out of heavily guarded convoys.  Frauenheim, with 51,000 tons to his credit, had the lion's share of this attack.  "U 101" is believed to have arrived at Lorient on 20th February, 1941.
 
     
  (xviii)  "U 110"  
          "U 110" is said to be a U-boat of about 900 tons and her commander was said to be Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Dritz-Julius Lemp.  This officer is known formerly to have commanded "U 30" and to have claimed considerable success.  (See C.B. 04051 (13), page 16, and C.B. 4051 (15), page 17).  "U 110" was stated by prisoners to have been in Danzig in December, 1940, or January, 1941, and to have been carrying out trials which might have lasted into February.  
          Prisoners said that "U 110" left Kiel on 11th March, 1941, on her first cruise and arrived at Brünsbüttel while "U 100" was still there, but left again before "U 100."  Lemp while operating far out in the Atlantic, was said to have followed a convoy for five days, continually reporting its position, but then had engine trouble; two days later, however, he resumed his reports on the position of the convoy.  
          "U 110" was to have taken part in the attack on the convoy on the night of 16th/17th, March, 1941, during which "U 99" and "U 100" were sunk.  It was said that Lemp probably escaped destruction because he remained ahead of the convoy, while the escorts were hunting "U 99" and "U 100."  
          Prisoners said that these U-Boats of about 900 tons displacement, were known as "Sea-Cows" ("Seeküle"), but that their speeds were only slightly greater than those of the new 500-ton U-Boats.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
21
 
     
  (xix)  "U 123"  
          A prisoner from "U 100" said that "U 123" had a frog painted on her conning tower.  It was stated that she once returned to Lorient from a cruise with her periscope broken off; this was caused by a collision with a steamer which she had torpedoed and sunk, and which was still floating submerged.  
          An intercepted photograph of a U-Boat with a frog painted on the front of the conning tower also had an Edelweiss painted on the side of the conning tower.  It is known that only those U-Boats which were at Narvik, or whose captains were at Narvik, bear an Edelweiss.  This indicated that "U 123" was at Narvik, or is commanded by an officer who was there.  
          Prisoners stated that "U 123" was commanded by Korvettenkapitan (Commander) Victor Schultze.  According to German High Command claims, this officer had sunk 155,000 tons of shipping.  
     
  (xx)  "U 124"  
          "U 124" was said by a prisoner from "U 99" to be more than 500 tons, and a signalman Petty Office captured on 30th October, 1940, from "U 32," stated that he believed "U 124" to be of approximately 1,000 tons.  According to this same prisoner, the Commander is Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Wilhelm Schulz, who escaped from "U 64" which was sunk at Narvik.  This is supported by the fact that an engine-room rating of "U 99" stated that "U 124" has an Edelweiss painted on her conning tower.  
          On the 7th April, 1941, Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Schulz was awarded the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross for sinking over 100,000 tons.  
          Papers captured from German armed trawler"Krebs" off the Lofoten Islands on 4 March, 1941, include a report from the Captain of the Recovery Vessel "F.7," which failed to recover a practice torpedo fired by "U 124" at Memel on 16th July, 1940.  
     
  (xxi)  "U 139"  
          "U 139" is said to be of 300 tons by a reliable informant, who added that all the "130's" series have this displacement.  
     
  (xxii)  "U 545"  
          A signal rating from "U 70" said he believed "U 545" was already in service.  
     
  (xxiii)  "U 552"  
          "U 552" was said by a reliable informant from "U 100" to have been due to leave Kiel on 10th March, 1941, one day after "U 100" left on her last cruise.  
     
 
X.  U-BOAT LOSSES
 
     
  (i)  "U 1"  
          Two Petty Officers stated that "U 1" had been torpedoed by a Polish submarine.  As "U 1" was mentioned in orders for the Norwegian Operations and presumably took part, her alleged sinking may have occurred during that undertaking.  
     
  (ii)  "U 22"  
          Several prisoners state that "U 22" was lost under the command of Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Karl Heinrich Jenisch, the elder brother of the Captain of "U 32."  It is not certain where "U 22" was sunk, but prisoners believe that this took place during the Norwegian campaign.  She is known to have been at sea early in April, 1940, and, according to the log of the German armed trawler "Schiff 26," she was expected to return on 8th April, 1940.  No statements have been made concerning "U 22's" activities after this date.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
22
 
     
  (iii)  "U 51"  
          Prisoners stated that in April, 1940, "U 51" was commanded by Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Knorr, the First Lieutenant and the Engineer Officer being respectively Leutnant zur See (Sub-Lieutenant) Harms and Oberleutnant Ing. (Engineer-Lieutenant) Hertel, and a Chief Petty Officer carrying out the duties of the Junior Officer.  
          A prisoner who had served in "U 51" from April, 1940, until June, 1940, said that "U 51" went to Narvik at the beginning of the Norwegian campaign, but never fired a single torpedo during the whole cruise.  
          "U 51" was stated to have left Kiel about the 10th of August, 1940, together with "U 100" and "U 101."  
          Prisoners stated that on this cruise "U 51" was bombed by aircraft in some position between Rockall Island and Ireland and damaged to an extent which rendered it impossible for her to dive.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 1420 on 16th August, 1940, an aircraft attack was made on a U-Boat in position 56° 35' N. and 12° 58' W.)  
          She made for Lorient, but was torpedoed and sunk off that port by a British submarine, according to prisoners, who thought that Knorr was still in command at the time.  
          (N.I.D. Note.  At 0117 on 20 August, 1940, H.M. Submarine "Cachalot" attacked a U-Boat in position 47 06.5' N., and 4 51.5' W.  This attack was considered to have been successful.)  
     
  (iv)  "U 102"  
          "U 102" is said to have been completed early in 1940, shortly after "U 99," at the Germania Yards, Kiel; she was described as having a displacement of 750 tons.  "U 102" is known to have been doing trials in the Baltic in May, 1940, at the same time as "U 99."  "U 102," under command of Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) von Klot-Heydendeldt, was lost on her first cruise, probably at the end of June, or early in July, 1940.  The names of two other members of the crew who are known to have been lost are, the First Lieutenant Oberleutnant zur See Graf Hermann von Spee, and a Telegraphist named Höfer, a friend of one of the survivors of "U 99."  
     
 
XI.  U-BOAT BASES
 
     
  (i)  Lorient  
          Lorient is the base of the 2nd U-Boat Flotilla, under the command of Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Fischer.  
          At the present moment it seems also that most U-Boats operating from the French Atlantic seaboard are based at Lorient.  This port is being developed into an important harbour.  To achieve this object there was said to be a great number of workmen from the Todt building organisation and the N.S.K.K. (Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrerkorps: National Transport Corps).  They have apparently been in Lorient since last September, and are working day and night.  It was not ascertained what constructions were actually in progress.  Most prisoners denied knowledge of concrete tunnels being built to shelter U-Boats, though one informant, more willing and reliable than the others, said that the Germans were intending to build such concrete shelters as was being done in Heligoland and in other German harbours.  In the dock a partition is being built so that two U-Boats can use it simultaneously.  The French workshops and repair yards were said to have been considerably improved, and it was stated that work could now be carried out on U-Boats in Lorient which some while ago would have necessitated a journey to Kiel or Wilhelmshaven.  
          No reliable information could be obtained regarding the situation of the torpedo store in Lorient, but one informant said that torpedoes were loaded on to a platform between the old French building slips, just above the Pont de Caudron on the river bank opposite the town, as well as by means of barges.  
          The senior officers, with or without wives, live in villas in the neighbourhood; U-Boat lower-deck personnel live in barracks behind the Place Alsace Lorraine and in the Arsenal which is situated on the town bank of the Scorfe River.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
23
 
     
          Until some time in January, 1941, crews took their meals in the Hotel Beam Séjour, but following an air raid, when the windows were broken and some damage caused to the hotel, crews have had their meals and slept in the barracks or in the arsenal.  
          The town of Lorient has suffered considerably from air raids, and there is some record of damage having been inflicted on naval personnel.  In late September forty casualties were admitted, and on another occasion twenty U-Boat men were said to have been killed.  
          The Pont de Caudron was once partially damaged by a bomb, but was soon repaired.  
          A dock containing a U-Boat was said to have been hit by a bomb, but no damage was caused to the U-Boat.  
          During an air raid U-Boats lying in the harbour do not trim down, according to prisoners, but they are camouflaged with netting and only the watch stays on board, the remainder being supposed to go to air raid shelters.  Should any lights be shown in the town, the troops on guard immediately fire at the offending windows.  
          The civilian population of Lorient seems on the whole to be very subdued, and no instances of large-scale organised sabotage were mentioned.  The French women in particular seem to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Germans, who would like to mix much more freely with them were that not forbidden.  On the whole, it was said, the Germans were well behaved in their dealings with the French population, but there had been several instances which indicated that the French women, because she was considered racially inferior to her German counterpart, could be treated as a prostitute who existed only for the benefit of the German when he was away from home.  
          The Frenchmen in Lorient was said to keep himself aloof from the Germans; some of the French workmen were described as having taken every opportunity to sabotage German efforts.  An instance was recorded not long ago when a dismissed Indo-Chinese dockyard worker opened fire on the men on watch in the conning-tower of Prien's U-Boat.  Other instances were said to have occurred, but there were no statements of any large-scale organised sabotage.  
          Prisoners said that occasionally German guards were found at night with their throats cut and the bodies of two of these guards were discovered at low-tide.  The German method of retaliation to such outbreaks was said to be the shooting of forty Frenchmen indiscriminately.  
          Great efforts are known to have been made by the German naval authorities to keep the U-Boat crews physically and morally fit.  
          Food was said to be good in Lorient, though rations were not as generous as when the submarine was actually on patrol.  As in Norway and in other occupied territories, precautions are taken to keep the men free from venereal disease.  A law was mentioned which forbids intercourse with any French woman except those installed at the approved brothel, which closes at 10 p.m., and according to an officer of "U 99" it was strictly forbidden to visit the brothel for a week prior to sailing.  
          Prisoners alluded to entertainments in the town such as cinemas and theatres, but said that no dancing was permitted, and though drinks of all kinds could be obtained, the prices were nearly double what they were in September, 1940.  
          Prisoners made a number of statements regarding U-Boats at Lorient:  
          Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Lemp's U-Boat is believed to have been in Lorient in February, 1941.  
          Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Schuart and his U-Boat were seen in Lorient in October, 1940, and, according to the German press, he and Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Schütze were there at the beginning of December, 1940.  
          A U-Boat commanded by Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Schewe is said to be operating from Lorient.  
          According to a Chief Petty Officer of "U 99," who should be well-informed, Oberleutnant zur See (Lieutenant) Lüth was in Lorient in February, 1941, in command of a 750-ton U-Boat.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
24
 
     
  (ii)  St. Nazaire  
          Prisoners from "U 70" stated that this U-Boat was to have proceeded to St. Nazaire at the end of the cruise on which she was sunk.  Apart from this statement there was no evidence to show that U-Boats were using this harbour.  
     
  (iii)  Brest  
          Brest was stated by one prisoner to be U-Boat Base 7 (U Stelle 7).  The social centre for officers and men of the German Navy in Brest was said to be the "Hotel Café Astoria," close to the railway station.  
     
  (iv)  Wilhelmshaven  
          Wilhelmshaven appears to have suffered heavily from air raids.  Following a severe attack in January, the fire brigades from Hanover and Berlin were called to assist in fighting the blaze, and the medical and ambulance cops had to be augmented by units from Bremen and Hamburg.  A naval barracks was destroyed, but the number of casualties was not known.  
          It was stated that at the beginning of March, 1941, there were about 16 U-Boats under construction at Wilhelmshaven.  
          Some Norwegian U-Boats and destroyers were said to be in Wilhelmshaven for mine-laying duties.  
     
  (v)  Heligoland  
          Thousands of conscripted workers are known to have been sent to Heligoland.  They live in camps and are carrying out come vast building project.  As far as is known they are not uniformed members of the Todt organisation, but consist of people released from concentration camps and of labourers from Eastern Europe.  A suggestion was made that concrete shelters were being built in the harbour for the protection of U-Boats from air attack.  Great secrecy was maintained regarding construction in Heligoland, so that not even German sailors were allowed to wander round and satisfy their curiosity.  
          It is known that invasion landings were being practised on the shores of the island.  
          An intercepted letter from a lady in Heligoland dated January, 1941, indicated that she considered life dull there since U-Boat sailors no longer visited the island.  
     
  (vi)  Kiel  
          Up to a date early in March, 1941, Kiel was not considered to have suffered nearly as severely from air raids as other ports, and U-Boat survivors arriving in Liverpool expressed the opinion that the damage seen there was much worse than in Kiel or Hamburg.  
          The only instance recorded of damage to naval premises in Kiel was that caused by a bomb explosion in Howaldt's repair yard during the late autumn of 1940.  Various incendiary bombs were said to have fallen in the dockyard area, but none of them did any damage.  Much more damage, however, was caused in the town, but even this was not considered very serious.  
          It was stated that concrete U-Boat shelters were being constructed in Kiel harbour, but they were far from being completed.  
     
  (vii)  The Baltic  
          In Königsberg, Danzig and Memel there was little or no black-out according to prisoners.  
          Danzig was said to have three U-Boat building yards and Elbing also to posses U-Boat building yards.  
          At Pillau some of the men training at the U-Boat School were said to live in the former "Strength through Joy" liner "Robert Ley."  
          Stralsund.  The 7th S.St.A (7th Manning Division) was stated by many prisoners to be on the island of Danholm, the 9th S.St.A. to be in the Frankenkaserne, and the 11th S.St.A. in a part of Stralsund known as Schwedenschanze.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
25
 
     
          Swinemünde.  One of the depot ships in Swinemünde was said to be the former Hamburg-America liner "New York."  
          Flensburg.  One of the naval signaling schools is at Flensburg, situated in the Nürwik district encircled by the Kaiser Wilhelm Strasse, Torpedostrasse and Parkstrasse.  
     
 
XII.  U-BOAT CONSTRUCTION
 
     
          Neither officers nor men of U-Boats have any accurate knowledge of the rate of U-Boat construction.  Very much exaggerated reports are intentionally spread around in Germany for the purpose of keeping up the morale of the people and of U-Boat crews in particular.  Statements are made of U-Boat sections being built at the Florisdoerfer Locomotiv Works in Vienna, at a factory in Breslau, at Halle, and at a large number of other industrial towns in the interior.  These should be treated with considerable reserve and there is no evidence that anything more than engines, electrical and other accessories are built anywhere except at the shipbuilding yards.  
          The following ports are stated to be engaged in U-Boat construction:  
                  A.  North Sea Ports:  
                          (i)  Hamburg.  
                         (ii)  Bremen.  
                        (iii)  Wilhelmshaven.  
                        (iv)  Vegesack.  
                  B.  Baltic Ports:  
                          (v)  Kiel.  
                         (vi)  Lübeck.  
                        (vii)  Danzig.  
                       (viii)  Stettin, Elbing, Königsberg.  
     
  (i)  Hamburg  
          From the conflicting information available it appears that the Blohm and Voss Yard at Hamburg has a large building programme.  From 30 to 40 U-Boats are said to be under construction.  These are all thought to be 500-ton U-Boats.  
     
  (ii)  Bremen  
          The Deschimag Yard is the only yard at Bremen engaged in U-Boat construction.  The rate of production is stated to be only two boats every month.  
     
  (iii)  Wilhelmshaven  
          None of the prisoners or war recently captured had been in Wilhelmshaven and apart from the statement that U-Boats were under construction there, no information regarding the number or type of boat could be obtained.  
     
  (iv)  Vegesack  
          The Vulkan Yard at Vegesack is exclusively engaged in U-Boat construction.  Three U-Boats had been completed there up to the end of 1940, and in December, 1940, three others were under construction.  These are believed to be of 500 tons.  It is known that "U 76" was built at this yard and completed in the early autumn of 1940.    
     
  (v)  Kiel  
          (a)  Kriegsmarine Yard.  This is an amalgamation of Howaldt's Yard and the Deutsche Werke.  This yard is believed to have approximately 20 U-Boats under construction.  One prisoner of war, who had left Kiel in November, 1940, said that there were then 12 U-Boats on the slips and that when he returned on 28th December these had all been launched  
          (b)  Germania Yard.  The Germania Yard is believed to have approximately 14 U-Boats under construction.  
     
     

 

     
     
 
26
 
     
  (vi)  Lubeck  
          This port is said to be engaged in the construction of 300-ton U-Boats.  
     
  (vii)  Danzig  
          From statements of prisoners of war, it appears that three or four U-Boats are to be laid down during April, 1941.  
     
  (viii)  Stettin, Elbing, Königsberg  
          These ports have been mentioned in connection with U-Boat production, but no information has yet been obtained regarding the type or number of boats building.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
27
 
     
 
APPENDIX I
 
     
 
EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT BOOK OF THE OFFICER OF THE PATROL OF
 
 
THE 2nd U-BOAT FLOTILLA
 
 
Commander of the Patrol - OBERLEUTNANT (Ing.) PANKNIN.
 
     
  On the 20th February, 1941  
          (1)  Maschinenmaat Schmidt of "U.124" was met on shore without a leave card.  
          (2)  The following men were found on shore without identity papers (Truppenausweis):  
                  Fähnrich zur See Klingholz ,  
                  Obersteuermann Hanske of "U.94,"  
                  Steuermann Schmidt of "U.94,"  
                  Stabsbootsmann Tönes of "U,99" and  
                  Steuermann Hansen of "U.37."  
          On being asked why they had no identity papers the reply was made that they were from "U.101," which had just entered harbour and that their papers were still in Kiel.  Stabsbootsmann Tönes, who made himself the spokesman for the Feldwebels, conducted himself in an extremely unmilitary manner towards the Patrol.  In the presence of the remaining people in the restaurant he continued to argue the point and, among other things, he said that he did not require any papers here and that he considered it insulting to be asked to produce them.  Finally he produced them from his pocket in a most patronizing manner and old photograph which he held out to me with the words:  "Perhaps that will be sufficient for you."  
                                                                                       Lorient, 21st February, 1941.  
     
  Kommando, 2nd U-Boat Flotilla.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
28
 
     
 
APPENDIX II
 
 
 
     
TRANSLATION OF AN ARTICLE FROM "KIELER NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN" OF 17.12.40
     
 
HOW THE AUXLIARY CRUISER "FORFAR" SANK IN THREE MINUTES
 
 
By War Correspondent HANS KREIS
 
     
          17th December, 1940.  Kretschmer has returned to port; four pennants fly above the periscope.  The tonnage he has sunk is 35,000 g.r.t., and included in this is a large English Auxiliary Cruiser, the "Forfar." of more than 16,000 tons, as well as a big tanker and two merchant ships.  
          There is considerable joy out here at the U-Boat base on the Atlantic coast.  
          This was the sixth war cruise which Kapitänleutnant Kretschmer had carried out with such magnificent success.  He has only recently been decorated by the Führer with the "Oak Leaves" to the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross.  This makes him the first German U-Boat Commander to have sunk more than a quarter of a million tons of shipping.  
          Notwithstanding all the measures of defence adopted by the English, he has sent to the bottom 36 of their vessels or ships sailing for them, making up approximately 250,000 g.r.t.; three English auxiliary cruisers totalling 57,000 tons as well as a number of tankers figure in this.  
          During his cruise in the Atlantic before this last on he sank the two auxiliary cruisers, "Patroclus" (11,300 tons) and "Laurentic" (18,700 tons) in a heavy sea and in face of a strong counter-attack.  In this last patrol he encountered the "Forfar" in mid-Atlantic during the night in which our U-Boats operating there scattered a large convoy and sank a tonnage of nearly 130,000 g.r.t.  
          The "Forfar" swiftly met her fate; those on board could not determine from what bearing or range the attack was being made-whether the submarine was operating on the surface or submerged; the auxiliary cruiser's firing was indiscriminate, while red star shells and distress signals were discharged into the darkness; and still Kapitänleutnant Kretschmer closed to attack the vessel.  
          Suddenly a terrific detonation crashes through the night, bringing to the submarine the signal of success, while on board the cruiser everything is shaken and she starts to heel badly; the torpedo has struck her in the engine-room, destroying life, machinery, bulkheads and decks, the hull being damaged to the very keel.  The back of the "Forfar" is broken, her stern rises from the water and the huge ship of 16,000 tons disappears, making a wonderful impression even in the darkness.  
          The dull thuds of depth charges detonating below the surface are heard - depth charges which had been intended for German U-Boats.  They were in the fore part of the ship, and have been exploded by the pressure caused by the increasing depth as the ship sinks.  
          Scarcely three minutes after the discharge of the torpedo, nothing of the British Auxiliary cruiser but wreckage is visible.  
     
 
 
     
          The true facts of the sinking of the H.M.S. "Forfar" are as follows:  
          "Forfar," escorted by "St. Laurent," had been steering 250° at 14 knots.  At 2300 on 1st December, 1940, "St. Laurent" was detached and ordered to return to harbour.  It is probable that at midnight "Forfar" altered course to 235°, on receiving C.-in-C. W.A.'s signal ordering her to keep to the southward of a U-Boat reported in position 54° 23' N., 20° 11' W.  
          At about 0300 on 2nd December "Forfar" sighted a suspicious object on her starboard side, but tool no avoiding action and continued her zigzag.  At 0350 on 2nd December, in position 54° 44' N., 10° 30' W., "Forfar" was torpedoed on her starboard side amidships.  A few small fires were started, and the engine room flooded, but she seemed likely to remain afloat.  About half an hour later she sighted starshells which were being fired by the U-Boat who was engaging "Dunsley" some 16 miles to the north-west.  "Forfar," believing them to have been fired by "St. Laurent," herself fired starshell and red Very lights.  About 0440, "Forfar" was struck by a second torpedo, this time on her port side, and four minutes later by a third torpedo in the same position.  "Forfar" began to sink, and about 0450 she was struck by two more torpedoes on her port side.  The fore magazine blew up shortly afterwards, and the ship sank.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
29
 
     
 
APPENDIX III
 
 
 
     
 
EXTRACT FROM GERMAN PERIODICAL "RAN AN DEN FEIND"
 
 
HORSESHOE AS SIGN OF VICTORY.
 
 
SUCCESSFUL BREAK THROUGH BRITISH CONVOY.
 
     
          "We never have the feeding that anything could 'happen' to us, and we would go through fire for our "old man."  
          Thus our conversation began with the young P.O. Telegraphist, a Cologne boy, who has just returned from a war cruise against England in Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kretschmer's U-Boat.  A P.O. Telegraphist has numerous duties on board a U-Boat and so he is in a way a "universal P.O.; he is P.O. Telegraphist, Sick Bay P.O., Supply Assistant and also No. 1 at the gun.  
          "We were operating in the Atlantic," this man, on whose breast the ribbon of the Iron Cross is fastened, told us.  "We had only been three days at sea.  We had had aircraft alarm on various occasions, and then we dived, for aircraft are an infernally unpleasant affair for us.  Then, during the night, we sighted the first morsel.  We pursued her and were soon able to fire our first round.  She was a heavily armed English steamer, the 'Auckland Star,' 11,400 G.R.T.  She didn't take long to sink.  The next day the 7,336 G.R.T. English steamer 'Clan Menzies,' which was on the way from Australia to England with general cargo, came across our bows; she also was dispatched in a few minutes.  
          "Two days later.  We followed a steamer, and when we submerged to periscope depth, the C.O. found that we had a convoy ahead of us.  
          "There wasn't much beating about the bush, and already No. 3, the 5,475 G.R.T. banana ship "Jamaica Progress." was prevented from reaching her destination.  There was space for a million bananas in this vessel!  The English ladies and Misters will have to curb their appetite for bananas I expect!  
          "Then on the next day we were right in the middle of a strongly guarded convoy.  Destroyers and flying boats were acting as escort, and we were forced below the surface over and over again.  About 20 depth charges were dropped, some of them close to the boat.  But they did us no harm and we hung on to the convoy's heels.  During the night we surfaced again and found ourselves like the wolf among the sheep, right between the fattest morsels.  We attacked the largest one on the surface.  It was the 'Alexia,' 8,016 G.R.T.; the second followed, the 6556 G.R.T. 'Lucerna' and yet a third ship, a 9,400 G.R.T. freighter, whose name is not known to us, was sent to the bottom.  
          "During this time messages were being continuously despatched by the destroyers.  Again and again flying boats and destroyers passed over us and dropped bombs and depth charges on our estimated position.  We returned later to the scene and ascertained that the 'Alexia' had not yet been completely destroyed.  We were soon to have the satisfaction of sinking this obstinate opponent.  The 'Alexia' fired at us like mad, and we were forced to turn away in order not to be caught by the gunfire.  Moreover, our torpedo was not intended for the 'Alexia' at all, but for a tanker which was proceeding next to her.  But the latter had spotted the torpedo track in the strongly phosphorescent water and turned away.  The torpedo understood this and struck the 'Alexia'  We also managed to cut an 8,000 G.R.T. unknown freighter out of another convoy and she quickly sank.  
          In short, dry words, without any embellishment, this brave U-Boat man related the events of the cruise.  One noticed from his words that the dangers which this war cruise brought in its train were long forgotten and only the proud successes remained clearly in his mind.  
          Again and again he talked about his C.O., Kapitänleutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Kretschmer.  His coolness and confident control of the boat gave the whole crew a feeling of absolute security.  When Kapitänleutnant Kretschmer was decorated with the Knight Insignia of the Iron Cross by the C.-in-C. of the German Navy, the whole crew was overjoyed.  
          The boat lay for a long time in her home port, and the men were looking forward more and more to another trip against England.  At last the time came and this war cruise was so successful that Kapitänleutnant Kretschmer became celebrated far and wide.  The succeeding cruise was still more successful.  All U-Boat men want their boat to be the "record" boat of the Fleet.  
          Names such as that of Prien, Kretschmer, Schulze, Rollmann, Hartmann, Schuhart, are known to every German, and the English also know very well that they cannot easily escape the German U-Boats.  Their defence is becoming more and more intensive; but against the spirit, daring, dash and, above all, the capability of our U-Boat men there is no antidote.  
          Two horseshoes decorate the conning tower of Kapitänleutnant Kretschmer's U-Boat.  According to the log, both these horseshoes were found adhering to the anchor when it was being weighed in Kiel harbour.  It sounds almost incredible, but it is a fact.  The horseshoe has become the device of this U-Boat.  The white pennants which the boat flies on her return from war cruises all carry the horseshoe.  It is to be hoped that they may continue to bring the boat good luck.  
     
                                                                                            HERBERT KÜHN.  
     
     
     
     
     

 

     
     
 
30
 
     
 
APPENDIX IV
 
 
 
     
 
List of Crew of "U.99"
 
     
 
Name
Rank
English equivalent
Age.
Kretschmer, Otto Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant-Commander 28
Hesselbarth, Horst Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant-Commander 30
von Knebel-Doeberitz, Hans Jochen Oberleutnant zur See Lieutenant 23
Rubahn, Günther Fähnrich zur See Midshipman 20
König, Volkmar Fähnrich zur See Midshipman 20
Petersen, Heinrich Stabsobersteuermann Staff Chief Q.M., 1st Class 38
Ellrich, Rudolf Obersteuermann Chief Q.M., 1st Class 29
Weigelt, Armin Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class 27
Bergmann, Karl Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class 35
Thoenes, Gerhard Stabsbootsmann Staff Chief Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class 31
Popp, Artur Obermachinist Mechanician, 1st Class 27
Quellmalz, Heinrich Bootsmannsmaat Bo'sun's Mate, 2nd Class 25
Heinrich, Gerhard Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 25
Jakubovsky, Richard Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 24
Strauss, Wilhelm Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 24
Clasen, Johannes Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 26
Wendt, Franz Mechanikersmat P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class 24
Kassell, Josef Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class 26
Stohrer, Otto Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class 25
Uberscheer, Erich Maschinenhauptgefreiter Leading Stoker 23
Kohlruss, Ernst Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 19
Waltl, Johan Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 21
Teske, Paul Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 21
Binder, Franz Matrosenobergefreiter Able Seaman 21
Pils, Hans Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 21
Schiemang, Hans Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 21
Berg, Peter Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 20
Fleisch, Emil Maschinenobergefreiter Stoker, 1st Class 20
Helling, Wilhelm Mechanikersobergefreiter Artificer, 1st Class 21
Gottschalk, Werner Funkobergefreiter Telegraphist 20
Häger, Andreas Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 23
Mäling, Valentin Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 23
Zender, Hans Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 21
Mock, Heinz Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20
Stellmach, Ernst Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20
Krausch, Martin Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20
Karding, Emil Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20
Börner, Wilhelm Mechanikersgefreiter Artificer, 2nd Class 20
Lapierre, Hans Matrose Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class 20
Graf, Heinrich Matrose Ordinary Seaman, 2nd Class 19
 
     
 
Officers
5
Petty Officers
14
Men
21
              Total
40
 
     
 
        The following did not survive:
 
     
 
Schröder, Gottfried Oberleutnant (Ing.) Engineer-Lieutenant  
Schneider, Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class  
Löffler, Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class  
 
     
 
Officers
1
Men
2
              Total
3
 
     
 
Total Crew
 
     
 
Officers
6
Petty Officers
14
Men
23
              Total
43
 
     
  (C41259)    B25       5/41  
     
     

 


 

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