U-boat Archive - Admiralty CB 4051 - History of U-boat Policy

COPY No.

This book is invariably to be kept locked up when not in use and is not to be taken outside the ship or establishment for which it it issued without the express permission of the Commanding Officer

C.B. 4501

HISTORY

U-BOAT POLICY

1939-1945

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FEBRUARY

1946

iii

CONTENTS

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		Page.
	Introduction	1

SECTION I. 1939-1940


Date.	Title of Paragraph.	No. of Para.
25.08.39	Minelaying by U-Boats	1
29.08.39	Total Number of U-Boats	2
7.09.39	Operations against Merchant Shipping	3
15.09.39	U-Boat Operations in the North Sea	4
20.09.39	Use of Small U-Boats	5
20.09.39	U-Boats in the Atlantic	6
22.09.39	Methods of Attack by U-Boats	7
23.09.39	Lifting of Restrictions on U-Boat Targets	8
25.09.39	U-Boat Losses	9
10.10.39	U-Boat Building Programme	10
10.10.39	Blockade of England	11
13.10.39	Conduct of the U-Boat War	12
16.10.39	Attacks on Merchant and Passenger Shipping	13
17.10.39	North Sea and Baltic	14
29.10.39	Enemy Tankers	15
1.11.19	Conduct of the U-Boat War	16
10.11.39	Conduct of the U-Boat War	17
11.39	U-Boat Operations	18
6.01.40	Long Range U-Boats	19
26.01.40	Merchant Shipping	20
2.02.40	DOENITZ's Views on U-Boat Policy	21
9.02.40	U-Boats in Mediterranean--Italy's Reaction	22
23.02.40	Restrictions of Operations	23
26.03.40	Mediterranean Operations	24
26.04.40	Training Policy	25
4.06.40	The U-Boat Programme	26
12.06.40	Report by DOENITZ on U-Boat Losses	27
18.06.40	Atlantic Bases	28
13.08.40	RAEDER and HITLER in Conference	29
7.09.40	Summary of U-Boat Operations	30
20.09.40	U-Boat Supply Ships	31
28.09.40	U-Boat Building	32
14.11.40	Operational Objectives	33
3.12.40	Air Support for U-Boats	34
27.12.40	Long Term Building Policy	35
8.40	One Year of U-Boat Warfare	36

SECTION II. 1941

7.02.41	Co-operation with G.A.F.	37
27.02.41	U-Boat Successes	38
4.03.41	Control of Naval Air Operations	39
18.03.41	U-Boats for Rumania	40
12.04.41	Italian U-Boats	41
20.04.41	Change of Operational Area	42
20.04.41	U-Boat Numbers	43
20.04.41	U-Boats in the Mediterranean	44
28.04.41	DOENITZ's Views on Situation in U-Boat War	45
2.05.41	Difficulty in Locating Enemy Convoys	46
7.05.41	Offensive by Italian U-Boats	47
8.05.41	Difficulties in Locating Convoys	48
6.06.41	U-Boat Figures	49
16.06.41	DOENITZ's Views on U-Boat Operations in the Mediterranean	50
12.06.41	Use of Dakar as a U-Boat Base	51
18.06.41	Use of Dakar as a U-Boat Base	52
21.06.41	Withdrawal of Italian U-Boats from the Atlantic	53
26.06.41	U-Boat Figures	54
10.07.41	Effect of American Occupation of Iceland	55
21.07.41	Use of Torpedoes as Mines	56
22.07.41	DOENITZ's Views on Policy	57
25.07.41	Output of U-Boats Inadequate	58
31.07.41	Russia	59
7.41	U-Boat Construction	60
1.08.41	South Atlantic U-Boats	61
6.08.41	Italian U-Boats in Mediterranean	62
22.08.41	Need for Concentration of U-Boat Forces	63
22.08.41	Sending German U-Boats to Mediterranean	64
8.41	Successes and Prospects of the U-Boat War	65
2.09.41	Co-operation between U-Boats and G.A.F.	66
17.09.41	More U-Boats Necessary	67
19.09.41	Arctic U-Boats	68
30.09.41	U-Boat Successes	69

(C57405) *2

SECTION II. 1941 - continued.

Date.	Title of Paragraph.	No. of Para.
13.10/41	U-Boats in the Arctic	70
22.10.41	South Atlantic U-boat Policy	71
1.11.41	U-Boat Figures	72
1.11.41	Arctic U-Boats	73
1.11.41	U-Boats as Convoy Escorts	74
3.11.41	Subsidiary Operations for U-Boats	75
5.11.41	Supply Base in Western Mediterranean	76
10.11.41	U-Boat Distribution	77
10.11.41	Experimental U-Boat Types	78
15.11.41	Arctic U-Boat Operations	79
26.11.41	More Effective U-Boats	80
29.11.41	U-Boats in the Mediterranean	81
5.12.41	Review of U-Boat Situation	82
5.12.41	U-Boats for the Black Sea	83
8.12.41	Northern Waters and Norway	84
10.12.41	Large U-Boats	85
11.12.41	Views on the Mediterranean Situation	86
12.12.41	Numbers of U-Boats for Mediterranean	87
12.12.41	Transport of U-Boats to Black Sea	88
19.12.41	U-Boats in the Atlantic	89
20.12.41	U-Boats in the Mediterranean	90
24.12.41	America	91
24.12.41	Withdrawal of U-Boats from the Atlantic	92
27.12.41	Report on U-Boats	93
29.12.41	U-Boat Operational Areas	94
30.12.41	Mediterranean U-Boats	95

SECTION III. 1942

2.01.42	Withdrawal of U-Boats from Gibraltar	96
3.01.42	German U-Boats in Mediterranean	97
22.01.42	Lack of Man Power	98
10.02.42	Operations in Northern Atlantic	99
11.02.42	Communication with Japan	100
11.02.42	Disposition of U-Boats	101
11.02.42	Intentions	102
11.02.42	U-Boats in American Area	102 (a) and (b)
9.03.42	U-Boats in Iceland Area	103
13.03.42	U-Boats in Northern Waters	103 (a)
15.03.42	U-boat War in American Area	104
17.03.42	Repair of U-Boats	105
26.03.42	Caribbean Sea	106
4.04.42	Intelligence from U-boats	107
16.03.42	U-Boat Position in American Area	107 (a) and (b)
13.04.42	U-Boats in Norwegian Area	108
13.04.42	U-Boat Position	109
23.04.42	U-Boat Attacks on PQ Convoys	110
3.05.42	Importance of U-Boats in the Atlantic	110 (a)
9.05.42	Central and South America	111
10.05.42	U-Boats in Northern Waters	112
5.06.42	U-Boat Operations against Brazil	113
7.06.42	U-Boat Operations against Brazil	114
9.06.42	U-Boat Operations against Brazil	115
12.06.42	U-Boat Situation	116
17.06.42	U-Boats in American Area	117
15.06.42	U-Boat Attacks on Brazilian Shipping	118
19.06.42	U-Boat Operations in Northern Waters	119
4.07.42	Enemy Air Supremacy	120
15.07.42	Increase of U-Boat Operational Capacity	121
7.08.42	U-Boats in South Atlantic	122
10.08.42	U-Boats in South Atlantic	123
11.08.42	U-Boats in South Atlantic	124
17.08.42	U-Boats in the Mediterranean	125
26.08.42	U-Boats in the Black Sea	126
28.08.42	U-Boat Losses to Date	127
4.09.42	Weapon Development in U-Boats	128
9.09.42	Lack of Air Co-operation with U-Boats	129
9.09.42	Allied Shipping Losses	130
22.09.42	German/Japanese Spheres of U-Boat Action	131
24.09.42	U-Boat Intentions	132
28.09.42	Conference on U-Boats	133
6.10.42	Increase in Operational U-Boats	134
13.10.42	U-Boat Operation in Indian Ocean	135
10.42	Analysis of Causes of Enemy Shipping Losses	136
18.11.42	Losses in the Mediterranean	137
19.11.42	Disposition and Intentions of U-Boats	138
27.11.42	Activity on African Supply Route	139
1.12.42	U-Boat Operation off South Africa	140
2.12.42	U-Boat Operation off South Africa	141
9.12.42	U-Boats for Northern Waters	142
23.12.41	Watch on Allied African Supplies	143
24.12.42	Disposition and Numbers	144
24.12.42	Walter U-boats	145
28.12.42	U-Boat Base in Far East	146

SECTION IV. 1943

Date.	Title of Paragraph.	No. of Para.
27.01.43	Planning and Construction of U-Boats	147
8.02.43	U-Boat Dispositions	148
8.02.43	Need for Reconnaissance	149
26.02.43	Difficulty in Locating Convoys	150
26.02.43	German U-Boats for Japan	151
4.04.43	U-Boat Support from Japan	152
11.04.43	New Construction	153
11.04.43	Serious U-Boat Losses	154
21.05.43	Review of First Quarter, 1943	155
31.05.43	Crisis in U-Boat War	156
15.07.43	Shortage of Workers for U-Boat Constructions	157
19.07.43	U-Boat Losses in Bay of Biscay	158
16.09.43	North Atlantic	159
10.12.43	Air Reconnaissance for U-Boats	160

SECTION V. 1944

1.01.44	Radar	161
10.01.44	North Atlantic	162
18.01.44	Disposition of U-Boats	163
2.44	Shortage of Aircraft for Atlantic Air Reconnaissance	164
26.02.44	Delay in New Types of U-Boats	165
20.03.44	Decrease in U-Boat Operations	166
12.04.44	Allied Aircraft Carriers in Northern Waters	167
4.05.44	Protection of Section Construction and Assembly of New U-Boats	168
24.04.44	Invasion Counter-Measures	169
5.07.44	Employment of U-Boats against Invasion	170
9.07.44	Employment of German Naval Personnel	171
12/07.44	U-Boat Force in Atlantic	172
21.07.44	Anti-Invasion Operations	173
29.07.44	Disposition of U-Boats after the Invasion	174
10.08.44	Deployment of U-Boats in Invasion Area	174 (a)
3.08.44	Withdrawal of U-Boats from the West	174 (b)
13.10.44	Dates for New Types of U-Boats	175
31.10.44	Norwegian Waters	176
3.12.44	U-Boats against Enemy Carriers	177
3.12.44	Hope of Successes with Schnorchel	178
1.10.44	U-Boat War, Situation and Prospects	179
11.11.44	Falling Strength of German Naval Forces	179 (a)

SECTION VI. 1945

1.45	Development of U-Boat War	180
3.01.45	Schnorchel U-Boats	181
17.01.45	Insufficient Air Reconnaissance for U-Boats	182
18.01.45	Operations with Schnorchel	183
21.01.45	Operations off Gibraltar -- Schnorchel Again	184
21.01.45	Fuel Shortage. Immobilisation of Big Ships	185
22.01.45	Proposal to Allocate U-Boat Personnel to Land Warfare	186
23.01.45	Danzig Bay--Anxiety	187
26.01.45	Worries about Loss of Silesia--U-Boat Production	188
28.01.45	U-Boat Operations	189
28.01.45	Fuel Oil Position	190
11.02.45	U-Boats off the English Coast	191
16.02.45	Prospects of the U-Boat War	192
17.02.45	Advantages of Schnorchel	193
17.02.45	DOENITZ still Optimistic	194
20.02.45	Baltic. Russian Advance threatens U-Boat Training	195
23.02.45	Defense of U-Boat Building Yard at Bremen--Anxiety	196
23.02.45	State of U-Boat Building and Repairs	197
24.02.45	Effect of Schnorchel on the U-Boat War	198
26.02.45	Serious Loss of U-Boats at Bremen	199
1.03.45	U-Boat Policy	200
2.03.45	Expectation of Results with New U-Boats	201
16.03.45	Disposition of U-Boats	202
28.03.45	DOENITZ's Views on Pre-War Building	203
8.04.45	Redisposition of U-Boats	204
10.04.45	Grave Losses of U-Boats through Air Raids	205

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(C57405) *3

APPENDIX A

	Date.
Table 1	22.11.39	Plans for U-Boat Building.
Table 2	1.11.40	Review of U-Boats in Commission since September, 1939.
Table 3	26.01.41	State of U-Boats.
Table 4	10.11.41	Disposition of Operational U-Boats.
Table 5	1941	Distribution of Operational U-Boats in 1941.
Table 6	11.02.42	U-Boat Numbers and Dispositions.
Table 7	40-42	U-Boat Building Programme, 1940-42.
Table 8	12.03.42	U-Boat New Construction Plan for 1942 and 1943.
Table 9	12.06.42	State of U-Boats.
Table 10	24.08.42	Survey of U-Boat Losses per Month from September, 1939-August, 1942.
Table 11	24.12.42	State of U-Boats.
Table 12-19 inclusive	1.04.42	Numbers of U-Boats of Different Types and Distribution of Operational U-Boats.
Table 20	1939-43	U-Boat Losses in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Atlantic. September, 1939-October, 1943.
Table 21	1939-1944	Estimated Monthly Sinkings of Allied Shipping by U-Boats, 1939-44.

APPENDIX B

List and particulars of Personalities mentioned in this Report.

APPENDIX C

List of Sources from which this Report has been Compiled.

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	I









	INTRODUCTION
	_______

	The following pages consist of extracts from the files of the U-Boat Division of the German Admiralty between 1939 and 1945. These extracts cover all available material on policy; in some cases the information is summarized or condensed.
	This book is therefore not a history, except to the extent that it indicates what was in the minds of those responsible for the conduct of U-Boat warfare; it forms a background for students of the U-Boat campaign, and for those engaged in historical research.

	_________________________


	February, 1946.

















	(C57405)

SECTION I

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SEPTEMBER, 1939--DECEMBER, 1940

25.08.39.	1. Minelaying by U-Boats
	Raeder stated that he was exploring the possibilities of minelaying around the ports used by shipping between England and France and the main ports on the west coast of England. He stressed the strength of the British anti-U-boat defences.

29.08.39.	2. Doenitz stated that of a total of 57 U-Boats, 49 were ready for operational duties.

7.09.39.	3. Operations against Merchant Shipping
	A discussion took place between Chief of Naval War Staff and Operations Division, on the future policy of U-Boat warfare in the Atlantic. It was stated that U-Boats available for Atlantic operations numbered 18. It was hoped that by October there would be 26.
	Shortly before the outbreak of war, the intention was that all large U-Boats should proceed to the Atlantic for operations against English merchant shipping as soon as war was declared. The "Prize Law" was to be observed. This would force the British to restrict their merchant shipping and would make then resort to the convoy system. It was decided to continue this type of warfare until the convoy system was fully introduced, when U-Boats would work in packs.
	U-Boats would be able to operate against British naval forces in port, only if those forces were driven out of their bases by air attack by the G.A.F.

15.09.39.	4. U-Boat Operations in the North Sea
	The main tasks allocated to U-Boats in the North Sea were:
	(a) Attacks on targets around British bases and sweeps made in conjunction with other forces in areas south-west and west of Norway.
	(b) Minelaying off the south, south-east and east coasts of England.
	(c) Attacks on merchant shipping in the Skagerrak.
	(d) Protection of German ore imports from Narvik.
	(e) Reconnaissance and attack on troop transports in the Channel.

20.09.39.	5. Use of Small U-Boats
	U-Boat Division of Naval Staff decided that, since large U-Boats were reserved solely for operations in the Atlantic, small U-Boats should be used against bases in the north-east of England, and in the area east of the Pentland Firth and the Herbrides.

20.09.39.	6. U-Boats in the Atlantic
	The Chief of Naval Staff stated that 21 U-Boats were already in the Atlantic when war with England broke out. For the time being, only four to five boats would be operating at one time. At the beginning of October, a large number, about 10 to 12, would again be operating. There would then be convoys proceeding from the Mediterranean to England and from Cape Town to England, which would offer promising targets.

22.09.39.	7. Methods of Attack by U-Boats
	U-Boats had been instructed to attack French naval and merchant ships only in self defence, French and English convoys only when encountered north of Brest, and to spare all passenger steamers. Complaints were made that U-Boats were having great difficulties in identifying these targets, especially at night.
	Permission to attack without warning had not been given in writing, but this practice was approved by the Naval War Staff. If a U-Boat commander sank a merchant ship without warning, it was entered in his log as though he had confused it with a naval vessel or auxiliary cruiser.
	An order, approved by Raeder, dated 21.09.39, had been issued to U-Boats in the Channel to attack all darkened ships without warning. Efforts were being made by Flag Officer, U-Boats to extend this order to other areas.
	F.O. U-Boats demanded, as a protection for his own U-Boats and to facilitate attacks on merchant shipping, that all merchant ships using W/T for S.O.S. and position signals should, after the preliminary warning to stop, be sunk without warning.

23.09.39.	8. Lifting of Restrictions on Targets for U-Boats
	At a meeting with Raeder, Hitler ordered that French ships were no longer to be spared, and he agreed to the demand of F.O. U-Boats that merchant ships using W/T for S.O.S. could be sunk without warning. All darkened ships in certain areas and all merchant ships recognized as belonging to the enemy could be attacked without warning.

25.09.39.	9. U-Boat Losses
	Naval Staff estimated that five U-Boats had been lost to date. These losses were considered to be high.

10.10.39.	10. U-Boat building Programme
	In a report signed v. Fischel, prepared by the German Naval Office for Hitler, it was stated that considerably more raw materials, man-power, and works capacity would be needed to carry out the increased U-Boat building programme.
	Its execution should take precedence over all other tasks and services. Requirements of raw materials were given. These must be kept up for the duration of the war.
	The following figures represented extra indispensable man-power:
	Ship and ships' engines construction 29,000 men.
	Torpedo and mining 60,000 men.
	Fine mechanical and optical instruments 5,000 men.
	Other jobs 35,000 men.
	Total for the most important work 120,000 men.

10.10.39.	11. Blockade of England
	Raeder told the Führer that U-Boats had been ordered to abstain no longer from sinking Scandinavian merchant ships along the Scandinavian coast.
	For political reasons, the Fuehrer declined the proposal to have U-Boats built in, or bought from Russia.
	Raeder's view was that the occupation of the Belgian coast would not help the U-Boat war. He pointed out the importance to the Navy for the U-Boat wa of bases on the Norwegian coast (Trondheim).
	Hitler would consider this point.

15.10.39.	12. Conduct of the U-Boat War
	In a memorandum, Raeder stated that at present the war on merchant ships was waged according to the following rules:
	(a) Unarmed enemy merchant ships sailing independently: stop, search, bring in; if this is impossible, sink.
	(b) Neutral merchant ships sailing independently with contraband for enemy powers: stop, search, bring in; if this is impossible, sink.
	(c) Enemy merchant ships in convoy, likewise neutral merchant ships in enemy convoy: sink without warning.
	(d) Troop transports: sink without warning.
	(e) All merchant ships which offer resistance to capture, or threaten German ships: sink without warning.

	12 (a). U-Boats were now entitled to sink without warning:
	(i) All identified armed enemy merchant ships.
	(ii) All darkened enemy and neutral craft in enemy coastal waters, which were acting suspiciously.
	(iii) All ships which were making use of their W/T when the U-Boat surfaced, or when captured.
	The following were also top be stopped and searched:
	(iv) All unarmed enemy merchant ships sailing independently.
	(v) All neutral merchant ships sailing independently, or in neutral convoy.

	12 (b). For the present, the following were excepted from a capture and sinking:
	(i) The merchant ships of friendly neutral states; Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia.
	(ii) Passenger steamers, and steamers which might carry a considerable number of passengers, even when sailing in enemy convoy.
	(iii) Neutral ships sailing independently without contraband. On account of the British Admiralty's instructions to merchant ships to ram all U-Boats, U-Boats should sink without warning all enemy merchant ships, wherever encountered. The British Admiralty had also announced their intention to arm all merchant ships.

16.10.39.	13. Attacks on Merchant and Passenger Shipping
	At a meeting between Raeder and Hitler, the Fuehrer approved:
	(a) The torpedoing without warning of all merchant ships identified with certainty as enemy vessels (British or French).
	(b) Passenger steamers in convoy could be torpedoed shortly after being warned. Raeder remarked that passenger steamers were already being torpedoed, if they were darkened.
	(c) The Italian, Russian, Spanish and Japanese Governments should be requested to declare that they would carry no contraband, otherwise they would be treated as other neutral nations. (This was being done).

	13 (a). Russians Offer a Base
	Raeder announced that the Russians had placed a base west of Murmansk, in which a repair ship would be stationed, at the disposal of Germany.

17.10.39.	14. North Sea and Baltic
	Operations Division, Naval Staff, ordered U-Boats in the North Sea and Baltic to cease attacks on merchant shipping, as generally the danger incurred while observing the "Prize Law" was considerable. Operations against convoys, troop transports, etc., however, were to continue, if these ships endangered the U-Boats. Armed merchant ships could be attacked without warning.
	On 17.10.39, an order was issued to U-Boats to attack all enemy merchant ships by whatever means. This order was justified by the danger of ramming, or other active resistance by enemy ships. Enemy ships were not first to be boarded, but to be sunk by torpedo. Action by gunfire was to be avoided.

29.10.39.	15. Enemy Tankers
	Enemy tankers particularly were to be singled out for U-Boat attack.

1.11.39.	16. Conduct of the U-Boat War
	A memorandum by Raeder stated that even passenger steamers, sailing darkened and in convoy, might be attacked without warning. He stated that the blockade of England should be declared, by which neutral ships, after previous notification to neutral States, might be torpedoed without warning. At a conference with C.-in-C., G.A.F., it was decided that merchant ships in convoy might also be attacked from the air without warning.

	16 (a). Blockade of England
	Raeder stated that the moment of declaring the blockade must depend upon the development of the political situation, and the time and nature of the Army's advance. If the Army contravened the neutrality of the neutral States, the Navy would chose that moment for further action.

	16 (b). U-Boat Construction Programme
	In Raeder's opinion, the U-Boat construction programme had not been pressed strongly by Hitler, because equipment and munitions for the Army had priority. With the present allocation of steel, metals and workers, the big programme could not be executed. Another investigation into this problem was promised for December, but pressure would be needed to carry this through. (See Appendix A, Table I - Plan for U-Boat Building.)

10.11.39.	17. Conduct of the U-Boat War
	At a meeting with Hitler, Raeder proposed the next step should be the sinking without warning of enemy passenger steamers which were heavily armed and were used as troop transports, and for carrying contraband. It was known that these steamers were armed. Hitler agreed, on condition that the names of the large steamers concerned were first to be made known, and if it could be announced that they had been converted to auxiliary cruisers and troop transports.
	Raeder proposed as a later step, the sinking without warning of neutral steamers known to be laden with contraband and whose port and time of departure and route had been established (e.g., Greek steamers). The proposal was to be considered in conjunction with change of policy by neutrals. Ships of friendly nations (Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain) should not be attacked.

	17 (a). Bases for U-Boats
	Intelligence and control centres were to be established in neutral ports.
	Hitler asked Raeder whether the Navy had any special wishes about bases on the Dutch and Belgian coasts. Raeder said that these bases lay too near English coastal waters and were therefore useless for U-Boats. If Den Helder were occupied, it could possibly be of use as a base

	for light forces. The occupation of the Belgian and northern French ports was only important in so far as the British troop transports would be forced further south and would thereby be exposed to attack by U-Boats and mines.

Nov. '39.	18. U-Boat Operations
	A report on the direction of U-boat warfare up till the end of November, 1939, issued after a discussion between F.O. U-Boats and the Naval War Staff, stated that during October and November, large U-Boats, over and above those on Atlantic service, carried out minelaying operations against the British coast, Scapa Flow, and the Norwegian coast. The small North Sea U-boats also carried out minelaying.
	Minelaying had been satisfactory, but the number of torpedo failures was considerable and because of this, much enemy merchant shipping had escaped destruction.
	N.I.D. Note. See Admiral Doenitz's Essay, page 9, para 22. N.I.D. 1.G.P. 10.
	Seven U-boats had been lost through enemy action (no dates given).
	The number of U-Boats was still too small for the U-Boat forces to be split up in order to attack the enemy in different parts of the world, with or without the co-operation of auxiliary cruisers. For the moment, U-Boats were to work as a compact unit.
	Further mining operations by large and small U-Boats around the coast of England were being planned.

	18 (a). Bases
	Attempts were being made to acquire U-Boat supply bases in neutral countries, and small tankers for U-Boats were being built to supply U-Boats at sea and thus increase their radius of action.

	18 (b). Operations
	Naval Staff stated that nothing would suit the English better than the comparatively small number of U-Boats at Germany's disposal should continue to be used in the same manner as they had been up to date. The enemy's defence, turn-round in ports, and assembly at distant "rendezvous" was working smoothly, and the losses thus incurred could be accepted by him. Conservative methods of waging war were to the advantage of the enemy. The use of U-Boats in English coastal waters had been expected by the enemy, and had therefore been ineffective. The element of surprise was needed to make operations successful, and therefore new tactics must be devised. Since the number of U-Boats was still too small they must operate only where they were likely to achieve success. The results of the last-war policy of attacking merchant shipping in convoy with single U-Boats showed that this did not afford much success and the policy of sending out several U-Boats to make concerted attack on a convoy had not achieved the success expected, because of the enemy's use of direction-finding by bearings, and owing to the fact that only a maximum of nine Atlantic U-Boats could be sent out on concerted attacks.
	Naval Staff concluded that for the moment, enemy merchant shipping could only be
	The plans for towing U-Boats by surface vessels (auxiliary cruisers, which could also act as supply ships) to far distant areas of operation, such as the east coast of Canada, Freetown, Cape Town, Aden, Persian Gulf, Colombo, were in the opinion of F.O. U-Boats, quite possible, and had been successfully tested. Naval Staff considered that if this method proved successful, the English would have to reform their anti-U-Boat measures completely.

1940

6.01.40.	19. Long Range U-Boats
	It was decided by Naval Staff to use long-range U-Boats. Co-operation with auxiliary cruisers was being planned by Operations Division, and operations in the tropics now came under consideration.

	Assmann's Views on U-Boat Policy
	The following is an extract from an undated comment by Operations Division Naval Staff, on the possibility of co-operation between auxiliary cruisers and U-Boats, and on "the attitude of the F.O. U-Boats in this respect." (The memorandum is signed by Fregatten Kapitän Assmann.)
	"The opinion was expressed that the war against England merchant shipping could be more effectively waged, if there were some change in the U-Boat policy. It was condemned as being too conservative, and it provoked too many successful counter-measures on the part of the English.

26.01.40.	20. Merchant Shipping
	At a meeting between Hitler and Raeder, Hitler agreed to the sinking of neutral ships without warning (friendly neutrals excepted), in certain areas round England, in which the sinking might be attributed to mines.

	20 (a). New Types of U-Boats
	The Aurol U-Boat, an experimental boat of 80 tons with an estimated submerged speed of 27 knots, would be ready for trials in the spring. Plans for a boat of 320 tons, with a submerged speed of 25 knots, were in hand.

	20 (b). Anti-detection
	It was hoped to protect U-Boats from location by an "Opanin" covering. Opanin was a bye-product from Buna. Practical experiments would be made in a few weeks with "U.11."

2.02.40.	21. Doenitz's Views on U-Boat Policy
	On 2.2.40, Doenitz criticised Assmann's views (see above under 6.1.40) as follows:
	He denied that the success of U-Boat attacks on convoys had been vitiated by the enemy's use of direction-finding, and denied that huge packs of U-Boats were needed for concerted attacks on convoys. He referred to the recent success of a concerted attack on a convoy by only three U-Boats, and insisted that the best use was being made of the U-Boats available. With the existing shortage of boats, the long-distance operations proposed for U-Boats would weaken the chances of effective "kills" in nearer waters. In January, apart from vessels sunk by mines laid by U-Boats, 37 enemy steamers had been sunk by torpedo.

9.02.40.	22. U-Boats in Mediterranean - Italy's Reaction
	The report of an interview between the German Naval Attaché, Rome, and the Chief of Italian Staff, Somigi, mentioned a refusal by Italy to allow German U-Boat supply ships, disguised as Italians, to operate in the Mediterranean. Even the presence of German U-Boat supply ships in the Mediterranean would involve Italy in political difficulties with England, which was considered undesirable.
	An undated document entitled "Considerations on U-Boat Operations in the Mediterranean" issued by the U-Boat Division of Naval Staff, disclosed that the policy pursued up till then had been to supply U-Boats on the west coast of Spain and in the Canary Islands, and to send them to operate in the western area of the Mediterranean. The intention was to surprise the enemy in the eastern Mediterranean, and for this purpose, to establish supply ships in the Adriatic, since help was not forthcoming from the Italians.

23.02.40.	23. Restrictions on Operations
	Hitler did not agree with Raeder's proposal that two U-Boats (armed with torpedoes and mines) should operate off Halifax, because of the psychological effect on the U.S.A.
	Raeder asked for a decision whether the operation of U-Boats in the Mediterranean would be politically practicable. Hitler wanted first to obtain the agreement of the Duce.
	Hitler asked whether such an operation would have a decisive effect on the conduct of the war. Raeder stated that the total effect of all these operations would be decisive, and that all surprise operations against unescorted and unprotected ships were specially important, for their effect could be very great. Raeder thought that a decision not to use U-Boats in the Mediterranean or off Halifax would limit the effect of the U-Boat war appreciably.

26.03.40.	24. Mediterranean Operations
	Raeder asked hitler whether this question had been discussed with the Duce. Hitler replied that no details of the conduct of the war had been discussed, but he thought that U-Boats should operate in the Mediterranean, against British and French ships only.

26.04.40.	25. Training Policy
	Raeder and Hitler decided that small U-Boats (except single transport boats in Norwegian waters) must be withdrawn for training; large boats must be used as soon as possible against merchant shipping, which offered good prospects, as enemy destroyers were operating in the north, and convoys had been denuded of escorts. Even when operating in large numbers, successes would seldom be scored by U-Boats against fast, strongly escorted warships off the Norwegian coast.

4.06.40.	26. The U-Boat Programme
	Raeder drew Hitler's attention to the delay in the U-Boat programme, caused by lack of workers and materials. Hitler said that after the overthrow of France, the Army would be reduced and older men and technicians released, so that Air Force and Navy could be built up.

12.06.40.	27. A Report by Doenitz on U-Boat Losses
	In the first nine months of war, a total of 74 U-Boats had been or were already commissioned. Of these, 66 had operated against the enemy. Twenty-four U-Boats had been lost = 36.4 per cent. It was difficult to compare losses of the various types of U-Boats, because of the varying operations undertaken by them, but the small U-Boats of 250 tons certainly incurred less danger. Doenitz promised that these losses would fall as soon as a counter-measure was found to asdic.

18.06.40.	28. Atlantic Bases
	Fricke, of the Operations Division, Naval Staff, pointed out the advantage to the U-Boat arm, if the Army having reached the western coast of France. There would be new bases on French coasts for U-Boats, and airfields in France would provide reconnaissance in the eastern Atlantic to scout for U-Boats.

13.08.40.	29. Raeder, Chief of Naval Staff, and Hitler in Conference
	Raeder asked the U-Boat torpedo and torpedo tube manufacture should have absolute priority, otherwise the U-Boat war would be jeopardised after October. Hitler appreciated this demand, and ordered Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to settle the matter.
	N.I.D. Note. This is an example among many, of the failure to dencentralise. Serious bottlenecks, such as the one mentioned above, had to be referred to the Fuehrer, who then told the Chief of Staff (an Army General) to remedy matters.

7.09.40.	30. Summary of U-Boat Operations
	Raeder and Hitler discussed the following points:
	U-Boats operating from Trondheim, Lorient, Bordeaux, were getting results in western North Channel, and west of Scotland.
	As soon as all targets could be attacked without warning, a further gradual increase in successes was expected. Enemy defence at the moment consisted of strong air cover, rather than escort vessels, of which there were too few.

20.09.40.	31. U-Boat Supply Ships
	A report by Fricke, on the supplying of U-Boats by auxiliary cruisers and supply ships, indicated that the first attempt at such a policy had not been successful, mainly owing to engine defects in the U-Boat. The experience gained would, however, be valuable, and more progress would be made.

28.09.40.	32. U-Boat Building
	Reasons were given for the delay in the U-Boat building programme. Despite the priority it had been given from the beginning of the war, there was shortage of labour, demands for raw materials had not been met, there had been difficulties with spare parts and fittings (e.g., torpedo tubes), other undertakings had been given greater priority (e.g., operation "Seelöwe" - the invasion of England).

14.11.40.	33. Operational Objectives
	At a meeting between Hitler and Raeder, Raeder stated that Britain was getting alarmed at U-Boat successes. Therefore, all forces of the Navy and G.A.F. must be concentrated on disrupting British supply lines. British escort forces had hitherto been weak, but U.S.A. was building new destroyers and A/S vessels, and an increase in escort vessels was already perceptible. Therefore it was urgent to:
	(a) Carry out the U-Boat programme, which was still handicapped by too many other commitments also regarded as urgent. The effect was that by the end of 1941, fewer boats would be completed than had been planned.
	(b) Sink British destroyers, escort vessels, and A/S vessels by constant attacks of the G.A.F. The sinking of enemy destroyer and escort vessels was of prime importance to the U-Boat war.

3.12.40.	34. Air Support for U-Boats
	Extensive air reconnaissance, working closely with the U-Boats in the operational area, was urgently required. Raeder brought this point to the notice of Hitler at a meeting on 3.12.40. He demanded that the aircraft used for this reconnaissance should be under the direction of the Navy, and their crews should be drawn from trained seagoing officers. The Do.217 aircraft was suitable for the task and could carry aerial torpedoes.

27.12.40.	35. Long Term Building Policy
	Raeder reported to Hitler that the monthly output of U-Boats was still inadequate. It should be raised to 20 to 30 boats, instead of 12 to 18 per month.
	The Seelöwe" project (invasion of England) would hold up the U-Boat war, as it required construction of barges, and much material and man-power, which would otherwise be used for U-Boats.
	Raeder wondered whether:
	(a) All training boats should be thrown into the war, in the hope of a speedy decision;
	or
	(b) Should there be a long term policy in the building of U-Boats and training of U-Boat personnel? He wanted the latter, and Hitler agreed.

Aug. '40.	36. Summary of Memorandum entitled "One Year of U-Boat Warfare," by Operations Division, Naval Staff:
	(a) Position at the Outbreak of War. At the beginning of the war, the German U-Boat fleet consisted of nine large, 17 medium, and 30 small boats. Of these the Atlantic boats took up their positions in the second half of August, 1939, and immediately before the outbreak of war the remainder proceeded to the North Sea and Baltic. The large and medium U-Boats were to attack merchant shipping west of Ireland and in the Bay of Biscay, the small boats were reserved for minelaying operations on the English and French coasts, and for operations in the Baltic, off the Bay of Danzig and in the northern exit of the Kattegat.
	(b) Atlantic. The aim was to have continuous patrols in the Atlantic, but quite early some of the larger U-Boats had to be withdrawn, and in the following months activity of big Atlantic U-Boats was spasmodic.
	(c) North Sea. As soon as the small U-Boats had completed their duties in the Baltic, and after initial minelaying operations in the North Sea had been carried out, they were despatched to attack, first, merchant shipping in the eastern North Sea, and then the English naval forces east and west of the Orkneys.
	(d) The War Against Merchant Shipping. Political considerations, and the "Prize Law," by which passenger ships were exempt from attack, at first restricted the U-Boat war against merchant shipping in the North Sea.
	The U-Boat offensive was reasonably successful, as the enemy took time to build up a convoy system. In the Atlantic, packs of four to six U-Boats achieved good results, and the restrictions on U-Boat warfare were gradually lifted.
	(e) U-Boat Operations. The Naval Staff considered that during the first winter of the war German U-Boat losses were reasonable, whereas U-Boat successes, including the sinking of the "Courageous" and "Royal Oak," and mining operations against English harbours and bases, were outstanding. Thirty-three mining operations were carried out, and a total of 330 mines were laid by U-Boats in the first year of the war.
	Towards the end of the year, the small U-Boats were sent to the North Sea, and particularly to the Scottish east coast, where enemy traffic had greatly increased. At the beginning of January, 1940, U-Boats in this area were ordered to carry out unrestricted attacks on all ships immediately, with the reservations (a) that U-Boats should attempt to remain unobserved, and (b) that Danish ships flying the Maltese Cross were to be left unmolested because of economic agreements.
	(f) The Channel. In January, 1940, unrestricted U-Boat operations were ordered in the Bristol Channel, and by May, 1940, "all out" tactics had been adopted in the whole of the Channel, off the French west coasts, and the Scottish east coast. As a result of these "all out" tactics in the North Sea and St. George's Channel, there were queries and protests from neutrals, who had lost ships, but these did not lead to political difficulties.
	(g) The Atlantic. From the beginning of the war, the Germans had attempted to carry U-Boat warfare out into the Atlantic, so as to compel the enemy to resort more and more to convoys, thereby using up shipping tonnage. Supply bases had been established in western Spain and the Canary Islands; and for operations against northern Norway, in "Basis Nord" (Zapanda Lista Bay on the Murmansk coast).
	(h) The Number of U-Boats Available. In December, 1939, and January, 1940, only a very small number of U-Boats were ready for sea. It had been necessary to change engine installations in the old 500-ton boats, and to effect extensive repairs in all U-Boats; on the other hand, it had been necessary to withdraw many of the small boats for U-Boat training. The losses of two to three boats per month in the first few months of the war had not been replaced by new constructions. The icing-up of the Baltic, and the consequent stoppage of training, brought about an improvement in February, 1940, as the small U-Boats could be withdrawn from there for operations on the North Sea.
	(i) The Invasion of Norway. Naval Staff stated that from the middle of March, 1940, the Atlantic U-Boats had kept watch on the western and northern Norwegian harbours, as far as Narvik, and on the English bases in the north. This watch interrupted Atlantic operations for two months, and restricted operations in the North Sea to a few boats. During the invasion of Norway, all U-Boats were withdrawn to carry supplies, and for escort duties and attacks on English bases.
	Owing to renewed torpedo failures, these operations were less successful than Naval Staff had anticipated, and the vital supply question forced the U-Boats to act as transports to the endangered position in Trondheim.

	(j) Further Operations. After the middle of May, 1940, it was at last possible to return boats gradually to the Atlantic, where they operated with great success.
	The few small boats which could be spared from training duties had plenty of targets against which to operate off the Minch and North Channel. Their operations in these distant areas were made possible by the new supply bases in Norway.
	(k) New Bases in France. When the French Atlantic coast was occupied by the Germans in July, Lorient was established as a U-Boat base, bringing the immense advantage of a much shorter route to the operational area in the Atlantic.
	(l) Blockade against England. In August, 1940, a blockade was declared against England, which gave U-Boats complete and unrestricted liberty of action against all targets, with the exception of Irish ships.
	(m) New Constructions. It had been found that the building time per U-Boat was nine months and as the change-over of dockyards for work on U-Boat construction had only been gradual, large numbers of U-Boats were not available during the first year of war. It was expected that not until the end of 1940 could as many as 8 to 10 U-Boats be commissioned monthly, and not until 1941 would the figure reach 25 per month. During the first year, new construction had not covered the losses sustained. A large number of U-Boats (at times 20) had been needed for training purposes, so that only about 18 boats had been available for operations in the Atlantic, and about 8 to 12 small U-Boats for operations elsewhere. (See Appendix A, Table 2 - Review of U-Boats in Commission since September, 1939.)
	(n) Summary. These operational U-Boats had since August, 1939, been sent out very frequently and harbour time was used for vitally necessary repairs only. U-Boats had carried out 288 operations against the enemy, and the proportion of sea time was an average of 45.5 per cent., which meant that each U-Boat had about six months sea-time in one year. Of the 61 operational U-Boats, 28 were lost; i.e., 46 percent. 79 officers, 273 petty officers and 412 men were killed, and 33 officers, 114 petty officers and 280 men were taken prisoner.
	It was estimated that U-Boat operations were responsible for the sinking of one battleship, one aircraft carrier, six destroyers, three submarines, four auxiliary cruisers, for damage done to several warships, and for the destruction of about 2,000,000 G.R.T. of merchant shipping. They also caused tonnage restrictions imposed on the enemy by the necessity of building up convoy systems, and strained the small numbers of enemy escort vessels, which in turn limited the movements of enemy naval forces. The operations indirectly caused a falling-off in neutral shipping through fear, and the forcing-up of freight and insurance rates.
	Nevertheless, Naval Staff considered that neither the direct nor the indirect results of these successes constituted a turning point in the war against England. After the loss of much Scandinavian, Dutch, Belgian and French shipping, the enemy still did not lack shipping space. But it was hoped that severe economic and supply difficulties could be imposed on the enemy by the further destruction of his imports.
	In the opinion of Naval Staff, the difficulty at present facing the U-Boat offensive was not so much the enemy's escort forces, which, though numerically small, were fitted with good locating devices, but rather enemy air cover, which had been surprisingly in evidence, and which might become dangerous. It was hoped that with the longer, darker nights, the situation would be eased, and that a more rapid increase in the number of U-Boats could be expected.
	(o) Future Plans. Naval Staff stated that the next U-Boat offensive was to take place in the North Atlantic. For this there would be a welcome reinforcement of some 40 Italian U-Boats, subordinated to German command. In the opinion of Naval Staff, if the individual achievements of the Italian boats, and the operational possibilities in the area planned for the offensive (somewhere in the Azores, on the English supply routes, from the south Atlantic and from Central America) should not quite come up to expectations, there would still be, in the next few months, an increased number of German U-Boats available (an increase of some six boats per month), which, in co-operation with the Italians, should result in some decisive successes in the battle against English supplies.

___________________

(End of Review by German Naval Staff on the first year of U-Boat warfare.)

SECTION II

_____

JANUARY, 1941--DECEMBER, 1941

7.02.41.	37. Co-operation with G.A.F.
	A discussion took place between F.O. U-Boats and Goering about K.G. 40, which had been operating in conjunction with U-Boats. Goering's opinion was that U-Boats needed the co-operation of air reconnaissance only as long as U-Boat numbers were small, and he stated that Admiral Raeder would never have the Naval Air Force he so much desired.

27.02.41.	38. U-Boat Successes
	It was stated in a report signed by Doenitz, that in December, 1940, 14 U-Boats operating in the Atlantic sank 50 ships (345,125 G.R.T.). In December, 1940, the full number of 16 U-Boats operated together. An average of 1,135 G.R.T. of enemy shipping was sunk by each U-Boat for every day at sea. One hundred and twenty-six torpedoes were fired in action during the month, 17 were failures, 75 were hits, and there were 33 misses. No mining operations were undertaken by U-Boats in December, 1940.

4.03.41	39. Letter from Raeder to Hitler on the Control of Naval Air Operations
	To: The Fueher and Supreme C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces:
	With the issue of B.Nr.OKW/WFST/Abt.L. Nr.00354/41 G.Kdos of 28.2.41, the new ruling re air reconnaissance over coastal area and sea was decided upon and made an order. As a plain soldier, I have no comment to make and am firmly convinced that in the closest co-operation with the Air Force, this new ruling will be attended with the greatest possible success.
	But as the responsible Head of the Naval War Staff, I feel obliged to express again my definite opinion against this ruling. In the war at sea against England, I do not agree with a combined policy from two sections of the Armed Forces, but rather a single undivided operational offensive by all naval forces, in which I include air forces, in so far as they can and do operate over the sea and in conjunction with naval forces, as an important and indispensable section of our sea power. Naval forces, and naval air forces operating at sea or in conjunction with naval forces must, I am convinced, be concentrated under the one direction and command, if the most ideal form of co-operation and mutual support is to be attained and if our offensive power is to be used as effectively as possible against the enemy.
	I am definitely of the opinion that the war against England can be won only at sea. The Navy has to wage war not only against a considerably stronger enemy, but against an enemy who has full use of the necessary naval air forces. We must therefore attempt to provide for our own Navy the best conditions imaginable, which will preclude any inter-departmental friction.
	Being of this conviction, I must point out the danger I foresee in this new ruling. It gives no authority in respect of reconnaissance and operations to the Naval Commands who have operational responsibility for certain areas. These commands therefore have no opportunity of exercising the last-minute rapid decisions, which in such cases are recognised as a necessary measure and as a corrective of errors which may have been made. If the most loyal co-operation is wished, such measures will always be necessary.
	In particular, I consider that in the division of responsibility for reconnaissance, between two authorities in the Northern Waters, there lies a great danger, which could immeasurably vitiate the operation of Naval forces both in the Atlantic and elsewhere. Such operations were risky in themselves, and could, if there was faulty reconnaissance, cause serious reactions and losses of ships, which would weaken the Navy, and heavily damage German prestige.
	Any serious friction which might arise from the division of responsibility for the reconnaissance which is to contribute to such operations cannot be tolerated as far as the Atlantic area is concerned.
	I request that, if after a period of about three months the practical application of this present ruling should, in my opinion, have shown serious yet reconcilable weaknesses, I may issue a report on it. If, however, weaknesses which would have serious consequences for the whole direction of the war at sea should appear in the organisation, I shall have to give a report before then.
	RAEDER

18.03.41.	40. Discussion between Raeder and Hitler. U-Boats for Rumania
	Transport of small German U-Boats (Type II, i.e. , "U.1" - "U.6" and "U.7" - "U.24") overland to Rumania would take 4-1/2 to 5 months. Naval War Staff proposed, therefore,not to send then, especially as they could ill be spared from Germany.

	40 (a). Lack of Workers delays U-Boat Building
	Raeder stated the average monthly output of U-Boats, which in the second quarter of 1941 would be 18, would after this decrease to 15, whereas, if the demands for workers were fulfilled, it would rise to 20 by the end of 1941 and to 24 in 1942. Raeder stressed the general unreliability of the Italians, and suggested as an alternative that they should operate north of the Equator in the Gulf of Guinea.

12.04.41.	41. Italian U-Boats
	F.O. U-Boats and Naval War Staff came to the conclusion that the further use of Italian U-Boats in the Atlantic would serve no useful purpose, since up to date they had accomplished nothing. It was recommended that most Italian U-Boats should operate in the Mediterranean, as the Allies were building up their forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.
	The return of Italian U-Boats to the Mediterranean would leave more German U-Boats free for long-distance operations, and would free the port of Bordeaux, up to now used by Italian U-Boats, as a base for German U-Boats.

20.04.41.	42. Change of Operational Area
	Northern U-Boat operations had been transferred from outside the North Channel further West (South-West Iceland) on account of enemy defences and short light nights.

20.04.41.	43. U-Boat Numbers
	The increase in U-Boat numbers was slow, at present only 30 operational boats. (Counting losses, probable number of operational boats on 1st May, 37; 1st June, 39; 1st July, 45; 1st August, 52).

20.04.41.	44. Sending German U-Boats to the Mediterranean
	The present situation in the Mediterranean appeared specially promising for German U-Boat to operate against British transport traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Besides sinking of tonnage, military repercussions on Army operations). An intensive examination of the question whether to send the boats led to the conclusion that the disadvantages would outweigh the possible successes. Reasons:
	(a) Main task of U-Boat was was attack on supplies to England. Only 30 boats were now available for operations, and of these only about 10 in the operational area.
	(b) Only small and experienced boats were suitable for the Mediterranean. The first would be there on 7th May at the earliest.
	(c) The effect of boats operating singly would be too small. Overhauls and repairs could be done only in Italy and boats would have to put in to Italian harbours after watch 10 to 14 days' operation. Very long passage. At least 10 boats needed for success.
	(d) An Italian, Jugoslavian or Greek base would take at least four weeks to prepare. This, too, would weaken home bases.
	(e) Conditions in Mediterranean unfavorable on account of clear water and long periods submerged.
	It was supposed to withdraw Italian boats from Atlantic and use them in force in the Eastern Mediterranean.
	Hitler agreed not to send German boats to the Mediterranean and to the withdrawal of Italian boats from the Atlantic.

	44 (a). Pan-American Safety Zone
	Hitler decided in the presence of the Foreign Minister that the zone should be honoured as far as 20° north, but south of this only a 300-mile zone.

28.04.41.	45. Doenitz's Views on Situation in U-Boat War
	British shipping had dispersed itself widely in the Atlantic and their anti-U-Boat measures had increased, with the result that U-Boats were having difficulties, particularly in locating convoys. G.A.F. co-operation had been of little use to the U-Boat offensive. Aircraft numbers had been insufficient, position reports given by them uncertain, and range too short.
	U-Boats should be sent to areas where there was the greatest concentration of enemy shipping, e.g., ports of departure and destination. Anti-U-Boat defence off British ports was too strong to allow many U-Boat successes. It would be possible for them to operate off Canadian ports or around Newfoundland, but this was not at the moment politically desirable, and there were disadvantages in the long route involved and the supply difficulties.

(C57405)

	For the present U-Boats would have to attempt to intercept convoys around the limits of the blockade area, where they would find concentration of shipping. The small U-Boats would take up the offensive in the Faroes-Herbrides passage, and in the North Channel. The greatest problem was that of reconnaissance and location of enemy convoys. This could not be solved unless there were greater numbers of U-Boats or a more intensive air reconnaissance.

2.05.41.	46. Difficulty in Locating Enemy Convoys
	The anxiety previously expressed on account of the lack of Success in locating enemy convoys for attack by U-Boats, particularly in the "rendezvous" area north-west of Ireland, led in May, 1941, to an enquiry as to whether the British Navy had changed its convoy tactics, and to a report issued by the Intelligence Section of the Naval War Staff on the British convoy system. It was established that there had been no drop in the enemy convoy traffic.

7.05.41.	47. Offensive by Italian U-Boats
	German F.O. U-Boats gave his agreement to an offensive by Italian U-Boats (suggested by the Italian F.O. U-Boats) off Cape Town, as German U-Boats could not be spared to operate in this area. He did not, however, expect much success from the Italian U-Boats. The German Naval War Staff later (9.5.41) raised objections.

8.05.41.	48. Difficulties in Locating Enemy Convoys
	Pending more successful methods of locating enemy convoys by greater numbers of U-Boats or by more extensive air reconnaissance, the following suggestions were put forward by Fricke (Chief of Naval Staff).
	(a) Complete wireless silence should be observed by all boats, while in the operational area.
	(b) Researches should be made into the question whether W/T could be used to bring confusion to convoys in the U-Boat patrolled areas.
	A report on U-Boat radio devices, dated 14.5.41, showed that there was great anxiety about the proved superiority of the British locating devices.

6.06.41.	49. U-Boat Figures
	German U-Boat statistics, passed by Raeder to Admiral Arturo, Under-Secretary of State of the Royal Italian Navy, included: U-Boat losses up to 30.2.41, 35 boats.
	On 1.5.41, there were 121 U-Boats, of which 40 were used for training, 44 being under trials and repair, leaving 37 available for operational duties.

16.06.41.	50. Doenitz's Views on U-Boat Operations in the Mediterranean
	(In reply to first of three orders of Naval War Staff to send U-Boats to the Mediterranean.)
	F.O. U-Boats considered that the main task of U-Boats was to attack British supply lines. As the supply ships sailed in convoy, the U-Boat attacking force could be compact, which was particularly desirable as G.A.F. reconnaissance did not extend into the U-Boat operational areas.
	At that time 30 operational U-Boats were undergoing repairs. The remaining operational U-Boats were sufficient only to cover the main operational areas west of England and west of Africa. For operations in the Mediterranean, only U-Boats with experienced crews could be considered. At least 10 U-Boats would be needed for successful action in the Mediterranean; this would considerably lessen the weight of attack in the Atlantic.

12.06.41.	51. Use of Dakar as U-Boat Base
	Plans were rapidly being made to use Dakar as a U-Boat base, and particularly as a supply base for U-Boats and U-Boat supply ships, France's agreement having been obtained.

18.06.41.	52. Use of Dakar as U-Boat Base
	A report by Fricke on long-distance U-Boat operations stressed the importance of the Freetown area from an operational point of view. All traffic leaving South American ports and all traffic entering the Atlantic by way of the Cape en route for Britain, passed through this area, and this concentration of shipping provided U-Boats with great chances of success.
	U-Boats in that area had been supplied previously by tankers and supply ships, which could operate some 1,000 miles from the coast (the distance between Dakar and Freetown is some 500 miles). Three supply ships on this task had been sunk by the enemy, with the result that by July it would no longer be possible to send U-Boats to operate in this area. This could only be remedied by the use of Dakar as a U-Boat base.

21.06.41.	53. Withdrawal of Italian U-Boats from the Atlantic
	F.O. U-Boats' conclusion that Italian U-Boats should be withdrawn from the Atlantic was made known to Fricke, Chief of Operations Division, Naval War Staff, but the whole question was regarded as one of some psychological importance, and was handled by Hitler himself, in conference with Mussolini, at the Brenner Pass.

	53 (a) Differences between Doenitz and Naval Staff
	On 16.4.41. the Naval War Staff demanded that Doenitz should send German U-Boats to the Mediterranean, which he was loath to do, as such an action would only be at the expense of the main task, attack on British shipping. The order was repeated, and Doenitz, on the third order, expressed disapproval that he had not been informed of the intended attack on Greece and Crete, which knowledge would have enabled U-Boats to be sent to the Mediterranean before it was too late. All Italian U-Boats, except 11 large ones unsuitable for Mediterranean operations, were to be withdrawn from the Atlantic.

26.06.41.	54. U-Boat Figures
	Figures given by the U-Boat division of the Naval War Staff on 26.6.41 showed a total of 370 U-Boats, 48 being on operations, 48 being used for training purposes, 231 being built and the remaining 52 were engaged on acceptance trials. (See Appendix "A" Table 3, State of U-Boats, 26.1.41.)

10.07.41.	55. Effect of American Occupation of Iceland
	Roosevelt's declaration of the occupation of Iceland led to a meeting between C.-in-C. of the Navy and Hitler, when Hitler stressed that for the duration of the Russian campaign, "incidents" with America, which might bring her into the war, were to be avoided. American merchant-ships, when recognized as such, were not to be attacked in the blockade area. This did not mean that U-Boat commanders were to take extra special care in identifying the nationality of merchantmen. No reproach would be made to U-Boat commanders sinking American ships in the blockade area, because of "confusion" with another nationality or because of "non-identification".

21.07.41	56. Use of Torpedoes as Mines, with "Fab" firing unit
	Shortly after the beginning of the war, unsuccessful trials had been made in the use of torpedoes as mines with "Fab" firing unit in an attempt to blockade those enemy ports where mines could not be laid by planes and where U-Boats could not penetrate for lack of water. Operations Division of the Naval War Staff enquired as to the possibilities of resumption of these trials.

22.07.41.	57. Doenitz's Views on Policy
	The main problem of U-Boat warfare was still location of enemy shipping concentrated in convoys on the high seas. The attempt to find enemy traffic farther to the west had not met with any success. A statement, dated 21.7.41, suggested that the hunt should take place nearer the coasts of Britain, where air reconnaissance would be useful.
	The problem of reconnaissance could only be solved when there were more U-Boats. To divide the numbers by using U-Boats for special operations meant weakening the war against shipping.

25.07.41.	58. Output of U-Boats Inadequate
	Raeder showed by graphs that the monthly output of U-Boats ought not to fall below 25; for with 300 operational boats, which on the basis of a monthly increase of only 21, and 5 per cent, losses monthly could not be attained before 1.7.43, 5 percent, losses monthly would be 15 boats. Therefore the monthly increase would be only 6 boats, and 10 percent, losses would equal 30 boats, that is to say a minus quantity of 9 boats. With 42 boats the losses had worked out at about 6 per cent. But from the end of 1941, the monthly output would be only about 14. The need for more workers was therefore very great (about 25,000 needed at present). Hitler promised that after the end of the war in the east, the navy would get the necessary number of workers.

	58 (a). State of Battle of Atlantic:
	(i) At present conditions were unfavorable, and were becoming more so on account of the American occupation of Iceland and the increasing effect of their aid to Britain.
	(ii) All possible forces must be concentrated against the enemy convoy and supply traffic.
	(iii) State of U-Boat war was unsatisfactory. Successes had fallen sharply. Reason: strong British escort, American air cover.
	(iv) Air war on supplies promising, but here also results had fallen off.

31.7.41.	59. Russia
	F.O. U-Boats reported a lowering in the standard of training, due to the fact that many younger officers and men would require longer intensive training. Training U-Boats, then on operational duties in the Baltic, and operational U-Boats in North Norway were to be withdrawn to act as training U-Boats. F.O. U-Boats took exception to any lowering in the number of operational U-Boats.

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July, '41.	60. U-Boat Construction
	A report by the U-Boat Division of the Naval War Staff on U-Boat construction revealed that mainly on account of lack of workers, the number of U-Boats to be constructed per month had dropped from 29, the number planned at the beginning of the war, to 25, and then 22. With the drain on personnel caused by the Russian campaign, it was estimated the U-Boat weapon would fail in its task of destroying British shipping. It was estimated that 2,400 workers were needed to produce one U-Boat per month; therefore to produce the 25 boats per month (which was the number Hitler had demanded) would require 60,000 workers. The total number of men needed to produce 15 new boats per month and to keep 190 U-Boats repaired was estimated to be 76,150 workers. Each U-Boat under repair required 85 workers.

1.08.41.	61. South Atlantic U-Boats
	F.O. U-Boats' proposal to enlarge the operational area of the southern area U-Boats (South Atlantic) towards the west was turned down by the Naval War Staff.

6.08.41.	62. Italian U-Boats in the Mediterranean
	F.O. U-Boats expressed anxiety lest the Italian U-Boats returning from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean would lie idle in ports and not be sufficiently on the offensive to meet coming events in the Mediterranean. He suggested that the Italian Admiral Falangola be relieved as F.O. Italian U-Boats, by Admiral Parona, who would introduce more vitality into the service.
	The demands that German U-Boats should be sent to the Mediterranean would receive further consideration.

22.08.41.	63. Need for Concentration of U-Boat Forces
	F.O. U-Boats remarked on recent U-Boat attacks on convoys off Gibraltar:
	Strong enemy anti-U-Boat measures called for heavier concentration of U-Boats. It was found that a successful attack now required a much larger pack of U-Boats then formerly. The advantage of the increase in the number of operational U-Boats had thus been somewhat reduced. He again emphasized that no operational U-Boats should be withdrawn for special operations and that, with the present more meager opportunities for success, a greater concentration of the available U-Boats was necessary.

22.08.41.	64. Sending German U-Boats to the Mediterranean
	Hitler broached the subject of sending U-Boats to the Mediterranean. Raeder thought that all available operational boats should be concentrated in the Atlantic, especially as convoys were getting so difficult to locate. He had ordered the four boats from Finland and four from the exits of the Belt and Sound to reinforce the Atlantic boats. At least 40 boats would be needed in the Mediterranean and conditions were very different there.
	Hitler thought North Africa was very important to the British, and the Afrika Corps might be relieved by a few boats, say 3 x 2 = 6.
	Raeder proposed a discussion with the Duce and the provision of an Italian base, Hitler agreed. Raeder thought the Duce would not concur.

Aug, '41.	65. Successes and Prospects of the U-Boat War (F.O. U-Boats' Views)
	(a) The main problem was now, as always, in finding the enemy convoys in a wide area.
	(b) The attempt to concentrate attacks on a knot of convoy routes further to the west had not been successful; fog and bad weather were largely responsible. From the 21st July U-Boats would try to set upon traffic nearer the English coast. They would be aided by the longer hours of darkness, in which they would escape if pursued, and could operate with aircraft reconnaissance.
	(c) But the problem of reconnaissance could be solved only by using considerable numbers of U-Boats; therefore diversion of boats for special tasks lessened prospects of success in the merchant shipping war.
	(d) It became more and more noticeable that the majority of boats on operations were new, with inexperienced crews. Yet successes in June and the first quarter of July were reassuring.
	(e) In the Southern area a new situation had arisen owing to the loss of supply facilities, which was made more serious by the re-routing of enemy traffic to areas barred to U-Boats.
	(f) The present lack of results in the U-Boat war must be regarded as a temporary phenomenon.

2.09.41	66. Co-operation between U-Boats and the G.A.F.
	Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe expressed his opinion that to gain better results from air/U-Boat co-operation, operational U-Boat areas should be moved nearer air bases so that full German air superiority in those areas should be maintained. Naval War Staff and F.O. U-Boats were not in agreement, stating that U-Boat operations met with most success against convoys on the high seas, far removed from areas where German air superiority could be claimed. They maintained that for U-Boats the greatest advantage to be drawn from air co-operation was that of reconnaissance especially in areas beyond the enemy's coastal waters. They needed co-operating aircraft, which could shadow targets and could produce bearings so that with the U-Boats own bearings accurate cross-bearings could be made available.

17.09.41.	67. More U-Boats now necessary for Same Success
	F.O. U-Boats said that to obtain successes similar to last year's against the strongly escorted convoys, three to four times the number of U-Boats were now necessary. The main problem was reconnaissance for finding convoys.

	67 (a). U-Boats for Mediterranean
	Two boats were on the way, two more sailing at the end of the week, the remainder would be ready for sailing 22nd and 27th September.

19.09.41.	68. Arctic U-Boats
	Reference was made to a directive issued by Hitler that there should be increased U-Boat activity off the Arctic coast.

30.09.41.	69. U-Boat Successes
	Report by Doenitz on U-Boat successes in June, 1941:
	In June, 1941, 48 U-Boats were operational, with a total of 961 days of sea time.
	Total enemy tonnage sunk in June - 390,812 G.R.T. (64 ships).
	On an average each operational U-Boat in June sank 8,142 G.R.T. of enemy shipping. Each U-Boat had an average of 20 days sea time, i.e. for each day at sea each U-Boat sank 407 G.R.T.

15.10.41.	70. U-Boats in the Arctic
	On a Hitler directive U-Boats were to be sent to the Arctic to operate against British and Russian supply convoys to Murmansk. Should the British strengthen their forces in the Arctic, U-Boats would have to be withdrawn from the Atlantic for the offensive against them.

22.10.41.	71. South Atlantic U-Boat Policy
	Operations Division of the Naval War Staff referred to their former intention of sending only a few U-Boats of the largest type to operate in the Southern Area (South Atlantic) because of the shortage of supply bases, and announced their intention of sending many more U-Boats as soon as the supply problem was resolved. They considered that the U-Boat had a great chance of success in the area around the Cape and, after the canceling of the neutrality zone, off the American coast.

1.11.41.	72. U-Boat Figures
	The estimated number of U-Boats on 1.11.41 was 216, of which 81 were operational. Operational U-Boats are those boats ready for operations and do not include boats undergoing repair.

1.11.41.	73. Arctic U-Boats
	Naval War Staff did not consider that U-Boat operations in the Arctic would have much chance of success, on account of the length of the nights, bad weather and navigational conditions, and the strength of the enemy defences there. Also the traffic between Britain and Archangel was not regarded as great enough to warrant any large scale U-Boat offensive.

1.11.41.	74. U-Boats as Convoy Escorts
	Operations Division of the Naval War Staff outlined the principles underlying the use of U-Boats as convoy escorts. Little advantage was to be gained from a close escort of convoys by U-Boats. The U-Boat escort's task was one of reconnaissance well ahead of the convoy, though within visual range, and in this respect it was very valuable. F.O. U-Boats was not in agreement and suggested that close escort by U-Boats should continue. F.O. U-Boats was supported in his opinion by Group West.

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3.11.41	75. Subsidiary Operations for U-Boats
	F.O. U-Boats complained of the number of special operations, e.g., escort and reconnaissance duties, assigned to U-Boats for the month of November, fearing again a splitting-up in the U-Boat forces, which, he was determined, should be concentrated against the British in the Atlantic.
	In reply, the Naval War Staff referred to the high importance to the war effort of the blockade runners, which, it was intended, should be protected and escorted by U-Boats.

5.11.41.	76. Supply Base in the Western Mediterranean
	Preparations were being made for U-Boats to be based in the Western Mediterranean. Fricke, of the Naval War Staff, announced the preparation of La Spezia as the main supply base. The repair facilities there too would be taken over, but it was not intended to establish a specially German repair centre with special personnel, etc., as this could be done only at the expense of repair facilities for the Atlantic U-Boats on the western coast of France, and would entail still another weakening in the Atlantic operations.

10.11.41.	77. U-Boat Distribution at this Date
	Total. 220 in service of which 84 operational.
	55 school-boats.
	79 doing trials.
	(For full table, see Appendix A, Table 4.)

10.11.41.	78. Experimental U-Boat Types
	The firm of Walter working in conjunction with Admiralty, had experimented since 1940 with V.80, a streamlined U-Boat with single mode of propulsion surfaced and submerged, and a very high underwater speed, estimated so far at 23 knots at least.
	In January, 1940, Admiralty had sanctioned the construction of V.300. This was much like former U-Boats but had special propulsion for high submerged speed (19 knots), consisting of two turbines with a total of 4,000 h.p. without bubble track.

13.11.41.	79. Arctic U-Boat Operations
	Conditions were unfavorable - polar night, bad weather, no air reconnaissance, currents, etc. The prospect of operations here should not be over-estimated.
	There were at present two boats operating, one outbound and one returning, three boats at a time were being kept in the operational area.

	79 (a). Reallocation of Boats to Arctic and Mediterranean
	Atlantic operations would be drastically reduced in favor of operations in the Arctic and Mediterranean. Escort duty for incoming prize ships and blockade-runners required other forces, and repairs were delayed by lack of workers. Therefore, a reduction of sinkings was inevitable.
	Eastern Mediterranean boats were in Salamis; Spezia was to be the base for Western Mediterranean boats.
	Four boats had either passed or were passing Gibraltar.
	Mediterranean boats were to be placed under the command of the German Admiral in Rome.

26.11.41.	80. Methods of Making the U-Boat Arm more Effecive
	The following is a report by Dönitz, to C.-in-C. of the Navy, justifying his demands for an increase in the numbers of U-Boats:
	(a) Situation in the North Atlantic. Of the two methods of attacking enemy convoys, viz.
	(i) to attack convoys in areas off the ports of destination or ports of departure, and
	(ii) to attack convoys on the high seas;
	Dönitz argued in favor of the second. Attacks in areas off ports met with too strong counter-measures, and losses were apt to be high. Dönitz aimed at the destruction of enemy convoys on the high seas by U-Boats, but the great problem here was that of reconnaissance and detection of convoys, for which much greater numbers of U-Boats were required.
	(b) Withdrawal of U-Boats from Atlantic. Dönitz admitted that U-Boats were required to operate in subsidiary theatres of war, but depreciated the withdrawal of boats from the Atlantic and their task of attacking enemy supplies there,

	(c) Repairs and Construction. Dönitz proposed that the increase in the number of operational U-Boats might be accelerated by an improvement in repair facilities for U-Boats. He complained of the withdrawal of workers from U-Boat repairs to work on surface ships. He denied the usefulness to German sea-power of battleships and cruisers and urged that they should be paid off thereby leaving the dock and shipyards clear for the main sea-weapon - the U-Boat.
	He demanded also an increase in the number of torpedo recovery vessels. The shortage of then had caused delays in the operational readiness of U-Boats and in the training of crews in torpedo-firing.

29.11.41.	81. U-Boats in the Mediterranean
	U-Boat division, Naval war Staff, ordered that a maximum of 25 U-Boats for operations in the Mediterranean should be maintained, as long as the enemy was obliged to send his supplies for the Libyan campaign through the Mediterranean.

5.12.41.	82. Review of U-Boat Situation
	Dönitz's views on the U-Boat situation as at 1.12.41. addressed to Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, are as follows:
	(a) Mediterranean. In view of the fact that most enemy supplies to Africa were going by the Cape route. Dönitz considered that ten U-Boats positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean were sufficient, and suggested that six or eight of the 15 U-Boats in the Gibraltar area should operate to the east of Gibraltar and in the Western Mediterranean. On 1.12.41. 36 U-Boats altogether were embarked for the Mediterranean, of which 20 were already there and 16 en route. (36 other U-Boats were in the Atlantic, in the Arctic, or under repair.)
	(b) North Atlantic. Dönitz again stressed the inadvisability of withdrawing U-Boats from the North Atlantic, and suggested that all large U-Boats unsuited for the Mediterranean, all medium U-Boats not needed in the Eastern Mediterranean or in the Gibraltar area, and some of the U-Boats stationed in Northern Waters should be released for Atlantic operations.
	(c) Supplying of U-Boats. Attempts to supply U-Boats at sea by surface vessels could not be given up. It was intended to try out the first U-Boat tanker in January, 1942, when the group of U-Boats it would supply would operate in the Halifax and Bermuda areas.

5.12.41.	83. U-Boats for the Black Sea.
	U-Boat Division of Naval War Staff was examining the possibilities of sending U-Boats to the Black Sea:
	(a) By land and down the Danube.
	U-Boat Types IIA and IIB, weighing some 140 tons (without superstructure and conning tower), were the only ones to be considered. The time involved would be some 10 months. This method of transport was possible with these two types, but the attempt had been abandoned.
	(b) By the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.
	The U-Boats would sail on their own as far as Greece, and from there they would be towed. Type IID was the boat under consideration. Trials had been undergone with Types IIB and IIC, which had proved under-water towing possible. But it was not advised, because towing operations were difficult, and navigational conditions likely to be unfavorable.

8.12.41.	84. Northern Waters and Norway U-Boats
	Admiral, Northern Waters, and Admiral, Norway, complained to the Naval War Staff of the shortage of U-Boats and lack of experienced U-Boat commanders in their areas. Admiral, Northern Waters, was of the opinion, that for the moment there were more prospects of success for U-Boats in the Northern Waters than in the Atlantic.

10.12.41.	85. Large U-Boats
	F.O. U-Boats, asked the U-Boat Division, Naval War Staff, to release 12 large U-Boats to strike a heavy blow against shipping off the American coast. The U-Boat Division released six, but would not withdraw large U-Boats from the area west of Gibraltar. F.O. U-Boats was of the opinion that large U-Boats in the Mediterranean were at a disadvantage, because their size made them more easily located and they were more vulnerable to depth-charge attacks.

11.12.41.	86. F.O. U-Boats: Views on the Mediterranean Situation, addressed to C.-in-C. of the Navy:
	Strengthening the U-Boat forces off Tobruk and Alexandria was most important. Ten U-Boats were on their way to this area.
	The concentration of enemy ships in Gibraltar was regarded by F.O. U-Boats as an embryo-convoy, awaiting its opportunity to leave port. U-Boats west of Gibraltar would concentrate on it, while those east of Gibraltar would attack ships sailing independently to Gibraltar, and an occasional warship or transport sailing eastwards from Gibraltar.

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12.12.41.	87. Numbers of U-Boats for Mediterranean
	Thirty-six U-Boats were in or on their way to the Mediterranean. It was intended to have 50 there, 20 for Eastern Mediterranean and 30 for Western Mediterranean and Gibraltar area.
	In January, the U-Boat numbers would rise considerably. There were delays through lack of workers, Eastern campaign, etc.

12.12.41.	88. Transport of U-Boats to Black Sea
	The question of transporting U-Boats of Types IIa and IIb overland to the Black Sea was discussed. It would take 10 months before this could be done. Hitler did not approve the scheme.

19.12.41.	89. New Possibilities for U-Boats in the Atlantic
	Operations Division were considering new possibilities for a U-Boat offensive in the Atlantic.
	The U.S.A. had now fully entered the war, and all former restrictions on areas for U-Boat operations had been lifted. All ships, with a few exceptions, could be regarded as enemy. The future policy must be to attack enemy shipping in areas where it had been previously undisturbed, i.e., in the former pan-American zone. There was promise of success, for enemy defence measures would still be small and the U.S. Navy had up till then little practical experience.

	89 (a). The following Operational Areas could be considered:
	(i) The areas off the eastern American ports, particularly New York and Chesapeake Bay.
	(ii) The junctions of shipping lanes in the north and central Atlantic; east coast of Florida, Trinidad, between Fernando Noronha and the South American coast, the Bermudas and east and south of Halifax and Sidney.
	The North Atlantic route and the routes followed by the north to south convoys were however still important.
	This large extension of operational areas would mean very long outward and homeward voyages for U-Boats. The withdrawal of U-Boats to other theatres of war had restricted the numbers available for Atlantic operations. Air reconnaissance could be little used for these long-distance operations and the range of the "Y" service on the American coast was as yet an unknown factor. Successful attacks on ships sailing independently were expected in these areas.
	Pending conditions in these areas being established the U-Boats were to have freedom of action in the areas assigned to them, as in the case of the Southern Atlantic U-Boats.
	It was considered advisable to discover as soon as possible what counter-measures were to be used by the enemy in these areas. It was very important that sufficient U-Boat tankers should be provided to supply the U-Boats in these distant areas. With the help of U-Boat tankers it was hoped that some time in the future U-Boat operations could be expected to the South Atlantic, the promising areas around the Cape and estuary of the River Plate.

20.12.41.	90. U-Boats in the Mediterranean
	A signal from F.O. U-Boats to the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, dealing with the disposition of U-Boats, disclosed that by February, 1942, it was expected that the greatest U-Boat striking power would be in the Mediterranean.

24.12.41.	91. America
	A report by Operations Division, as above, but with the following additional items of interest was addressed to F.O. U-Boats:
	The U-Boat offensive on the American coast could take the form of mining or torpedo attacks. The waters off the American ports (except New York) were suitable for ground mines. It was intended to use ground mines TMB/C in these areas, on the assumption that American ships would not be fitted with degaussing (MES). It was also thought probable that this renewed attack on ships sailing independently would soon die down, and the planned offensive on convoys would be taken up again when the U-Boats were once more pressed back on to the high seas from the American coast.

24.12.41.	92. Result of Withdrawal of U-Boats from the Atlantic
	F.O. U-Boats expressed disapproval of the renewed orders by the Naval War Staff to maintain a force of U-Boats operating in the area west of Gibraltar. The enemy convoy, which U-Boats had been awaiting, had escaped, suffering slight damage, but inflicting heavy losses. The enemy had known of the withdrawal of U-Boats from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean. The lack of U-Boats in the Atlantic had allowed the enemy to concentrate his anti-U-Boat measures around Gibraltar.

27.12.41.	93. Report on U-Boats by U-Boat Division of the Naval War Staff
	At that date 38 U-Boats were at sea, of which 20 were in the Mediterranean; 60 Boats were in port, 34 of which would be ready for sea again by 1.2.42.
	N.I.D. Note. It would therefore seem that the 16 U-Boats, which Doenitz had started in para 82 above, were on their way to the Mediterranean, were not all sent, and that, despite plans given in para 87 above, the number there was maintained at about 20 (see also para 95).

29.12.41.	94. U-Boat Operational Areas Report by Operations Division of Naval Staff
	The eastern Mediterranean was considered the most important area for U-Boat operations.
	The Naval War Staff still intended to maintain forces of U-Boats west and east of Gibraltar. These U-Boats would attack supplies for Malta, etc.

30.12.41.	95. Mediterranean U-Boats
	The following is a report by F.O. U-Boats, addressed to Chief of Naval War Staff:
	Twenty-three U-Boats were then in the Mediterranean, and more were to be sent in order to make up the losses and increase the strength.
	Doenitz had doubts as to whether the U-Boat offensive in the Mediterranean was paying its way, for U-Boat losses were very high and were counter-balancing any successes.
	Enemy anti-U-Boat defences were weaker in the Eastern Mediterranean than in the Western Mediterranean, and there was therefore a greater chance of success in the eastern area. He considered the number of U-Boats stationed in the Western Mediterranean too high, and recommended that a few U-Boats should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean in order to renew attacks in the Atlantic. U-boats should not be concentrated in the Mediterranean when such a concentration was uneconomical.

SECTION III

_____

JANUARY, 1942--DECEMBER, 1942

2.01.42.	96. Withdrawal of U-Boats from Gibraltar Area
	Operations Division of Naval War Staff approved the recommendations of F.O. U-Boats, to reduce the number of U-Boats in the Gibraltar area, where it was found that losses were not being counter-balanced by successes. From then on, the force of U-Boats to be maintained there could be reduced to the number sufficient to keep watch on enemy routes in the Western Mediterranean. In the area west of Gibraltar, only some three U-Boats would operate in place of the former considerable number.

3.01.42.	97. German U-Boats in Mediterranean
	C.-in-C. German Naval Command, Italy, requested Naval War Staff to consider whether the Atlantic or Mediterranean U-Boat operations were the more important. A complete and lasting success in the Mediterranean was not to be expected with the number of U-Boats at his disposal. Half measures would be ineffective and would only delay the full resumption of the Atlantic war. He was of the opinion that limiting of Mediterranean U-Boats to present strength would jeopardize the carrying out of Hitler's orders.

6.01.42.	97 (a). Operations division replied that the Mediterranean situation was unfavorable, but not so critical as at the end of November. The numbers of boats allocated to the Mediterranean were as planned: in Mediterranean, 23 boats; lost in Mediterranean, one boat; on passage to Mediterranean, four boats; damaged and returned, four boats; awaiting dispatch, two to three boats; total 34 to 35 boats. For the present, however, replacements for damaged and lost boats, or for boats operating off Gibraltar, would not be forthcoming. (Three boats instead of the planned seven to eight west of Gibraltar.)

22.01.42.	98. Lack of Man-Power and raw Materials
	Report by Admiral Lange on critical situation in U-Boat war arising from lack of man-power and raw materials for new construction and repairs.
	These difficulties must be overcome, because the U-Boat Arm was the decisive factor on sea warfare.

10.02.42.	99. Operations in Northern Atlantic
	U-Boat Division to F.O. U-Boats: U-Boats were to operate between enemy bases in northern Scotland, Northern Ireland and Iceland, also between these bases and northern Norway, in order to reconnoiter and hinder enemy landing plans and transport movements, and keep an eye generally on the situation in this area.

11.02.42.	100. Possibility of Communication with Japan by U-Boat
	U-Boat Division warned F.O. U-Boats that for political reasons direct communication with Japan by U-Boat might be required.

11.02.42.	101. Disposition of U-Boats
	For a conference between Raeder and the Naval Staff, figures showing the U-Boat dispositions on 11.02.42 were prepared. These figures are shown in the appendix (Table 6). The following intentions were announced:
	To increase number of boats in Norwegian area by end of February to 12
	To bring up number of boats in area Scotland-Iceland by end February to 8
	20

11.02.42.	103. Intentions
	Sailing of those large and medium boats in western France, and large boats in Germany, which were ready for patrol off the American coast. Medium boats would go to the northern area (south of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland), the larger ones to the coast of the U.S.A. between Florida Straits and New York, or important traffic points in the West Indies. On 16th February, three boats would be off Curacao and Aruba for the first time.

7.02.42.	102 (a). U-Boats in American Area
	Five U-Boats were to be sent to the American area during February.

11.02.42.	The number of U-Boats off the American coast was given as 35, of which nine were operational there, 14 were returning to port and 12 were en route (including six bound for the West Indies).

	The larger U-Boats were employed off the American coast between Florida and New York or the important junctions for shipping in the West Indies.
	The appearance of U-Boats off the American coast was expected to cause British shipping to use the eastern Atlantic routes, so a few U-Boats might with advantage be stationed west of the West coast of Africa.

8.01.42.	102 (b). All U-Boats of Type IXc becoming operational by the middle of January were to make a surprise attack in the Aruba-Curacao-Trinidad area.

11.01.42.	Many independent routed ships could be expected off the coast of Canada, making their way to the convoy collecting points off Halifax and Sydney. Type IXb U-Boats could operate as far as Florida Straits and Type IXc as far as Trinidad-Aruba. Operations further afield could not be made until a U-Boat tanker was provided.

24.01.42.	Reports of U-Boat successes in the American Area showed that the situation there should be exploited fully before enemy counter-measures were increased.

8.02.42.	The first U-Boat commander to return from operations off the American coast reported that the expectations of encountering independently routed ships and of weak defences had been fulfilled in the main.

24.02.42.	A U-Boat in the Caribbean Sea reported that American ships routed to Curacao and Aruba had received orders to make the last 50 miles of their journey by daylight because of U-Boat attacks, and those sailing to and from Trinidad were to keep near to the coast and to the east of the islands for the same reason.

28.02.42	Two U-Boats of Type VIIc, at present off New York, reported that they still had large supplies of oil on board, thus proving that U-Boats of this type could be used for operations close to the American coast. Such operations, Stated Doenitz, would be excellent experience for new crews before sending them to take part in convoy attacks, since counter-measures and air defences were still weak off the American coast.
	During February, 12 U-Boats entered the American area, including the three in the Caribbean and two off Florida Straits, but at no time were there more than nine U-Boats in the area at once.

7.03.42.	Operations in the American area were hampered by bad weather, especially off Newfoundland, where icing conditions and thick fog were prevalent. Shipping, which at first continued to run as usual despite sinkings, had almost ceased by now, and Type VIIc U-Boats had therefore not been as successful as had been hoped.

9.03.42.	103. U-Boat Situation in Area Iceland-Herbrides and in Arctic
	A review by Plans Division:
	(a) Enemy traffic to Murmansk-Archangel, very important to Allied war strategy, was as yet undisturbed.
	(b) At most three to four U-Boats had operated in Arctic area. English convoys had to pass by a route narrowed by Polar ice barrier to at most 180 to 200 miles. It might be assumed that they would not approach nearer than 100 miles off the Norwegian coast, which left a channel about 100 miles wide to patrol. Two to three boats were not enough for this, bit six would stand a good chance of success. It must be possible, with the aid of aerial reconnaissance, to inflict material damage on, if not to stop, enemy sea communications. Ocean depths were favorable to U-Boats, and the area, visibility and daylight would facilitate attacks on convoys. Protection was limited to escort vessels, not strong numerically. Compared with chances of attacking convoys in other areas, the prospects were very favorable.
	(c) Boats in area W.N.W. of Herbrides were no good for intercepting Russian convoys and had very little success.
	(d) It was recommended that three to four boats be stationed east of Iceland.
	(e) Until May, the danger of an action against Norway must be reckoned with, therefore the Iceland and North Sea boats should not be diverted for a promising operation off the U.S. coast, but the convoys to Russia must be regarded as a priority target. More boats should be stationed in Arctic area (Bear Island-North Cape) rather than in the Iceland-Herbrides area.

	103 (a). Proposed:
	(i) Reinforcement of Admiral, Arctic's North Sea boats to at least 10 to 12 (including Narvik boats).
	(ii) Strengthening U-Boat position east of Iceland to three to four boats.
	(iii) Return of U-Boat disposition N.W. of Herbrides.

13.03.42.	103 (b) Disposition of U-Boats in Northern Waters
	Naval Staff stated that eight U-Boats were in the Scotland-Iceland area to attack shipping in Northern Waters, and that four of these U-Boats were to protect the movement of the "Tirpitz" and to detect and attack PQ convoys.

17.03.42.	Naval Staff ordered that 10 U-Boats from the total of 20 in Group North's Command should be transferred to Admiral, Northern Waters, and that they should operate from Kirkenes against PQ and QP convoys. Two boats from Group North's Command should also be used for this purpose, the remaining eight to be used mainly for defence in the Norwegian area, but could be disposed to attack PQ convoys if necessary.

25.03.42.	Four U-Boats were sent out by Admiral, Northern Waters, to detect and attack PQ 13.
	Doenitz was of the opinion that U-Boats should be stationed at points on the Murmansk convoy route, where shipping was forced to pass. The choice of the area of U-Boat operations depended on the number of U-Boats available at the time. When the number was small, U-Boats should be stationed near ports and when large near the convoy focal points in the open sea. The latter positions would give the U-Boat more chance of success because:
	(a) There would be more time in which to attack the convoy, and all U-Boats would be given a chance to attack.
	(b) There would be less chance of air and surface craft defence.
	(c) Navigational difficulties would not be great and there would be deeper water in which to make attacks.

6.04.42.	Group North reported that two U-Boats were off Jan Mayen and another group of four boats at another position on the convoy route awaiting PQ 14. This convoy was expected to reach Jan Mayen on the 7th and to enter the area of the second group of U-Boats on the 8th or 9th. Group North proposed that Admiral, Northern Waters, should dispose all available U-Boats off Bear Island and the North Cape, and that destroyers, under cover of darkness, should be sent to the Kola Peninsula in order to attack the convoy there if occasion offered. U-Boats which became operational in the meantime should proceed towards Murmansk in the hope of contacting the convoy in that area.

15.03.42.	104. U-Boat War in American Area
	Extract from F.O. U-Boat's war diary:
	After 2-1/2 months' U-Boat operations in American area, the following picture emerged:
	(a) Sea defence in area off Halifax and Cape Race is small, badly organized and untrained.
	(b) Air defence in certain places (Aruba, Hatteras, Halifax) was indeed adequate in numbers, but it was inexperienced and bad compared with the English.
	(c) Some stoppage of traffic had been observed (Aruba, Port of Spain, Hatteras-Florida Straits), but this might merely be a momentary panic and not a considered policy.
	(d) Independent ships, sailing on direct route America-England, pointed to the Allies' difficulty in organizing a comprehensive convoy system.
	(e) A surprising number of tankers were engaged on purely American import trade, showing how short of oil America was, and her difficulties in giving up tanker space to England.
	(f) Taking it all round, operations in American waters had become more difficult, but the task might be lightened by a U-Tanker, which would enable:
	(i) Simultaneous attack on many important traffic points;
	(ii) Quicker deployment of boats to a temporary favorable traffic junction;
	(iii) Extension of attack to the most distant areas off Central and Southern America, not only by large, but also by medium boats - also carrying out of shallow water and special missions.
	Sooner or later, the formation of convoys as defence must be expected, but long distances and lack of suitable vessels would impede this for some time.
	Torpedo nets were being used by Allied ships (streamed at 10 knots - astounding!). Perhaps a torpedo warhead with net cutter might be constructed - but they needed the panacea - a non-contact pistol that really worked.

17.03.42.	105. Repair of U-Boats in Foreign and German Dockyards
	The position in regard to new U-Boat construction had degenerated, so that within measurable time one could not reckon a monthly output of 24-25 boats; from the middle of 1942, not more than 15 should be expected.
	Reasons were as follows:
	(a) The shortage of raw materials, especially copper and aluminum, had become much more serious in the past weeks.
	(b) Essential workers on U-Boat repairs could only be obtained at expense of new construction.
	(c) Technicians were drafted to Russian Front.
	These limitations meant that repair capacity in German dockyards in excess of 90 berths could not be used for U-Boats. It was recommended that they should be used for other purposes.

	*The 90 berths would be for:*
	Work on thorough refitting of operational
	U-Boats, at present 30
	On school and experimental U-Boats
	dockyard periods 12
	Engine refitting 6
	-- 48
	Final overhaul on new construction 30
	Small current repairs on U-Boats under
	going trials and training 12
	90

	There were 171 places available:
	Thus: For U-Boats 90
	Reserve 10
	Available for other use 71
	171

26.03.42.	106. Caribbean Sea
	U-Boat Division informed F.O. U-Boats that Raeder had again ordered a patrolling of the Caribbean Sea area.

28.03.42.	106 (a). F.O. U-Boats replied that such a measure would entail holding back U-Boats ready to sail, or premature recall of U-Boats before they had expended fuel and torpedoes; he proposed that the operation should wait until a U-Tanker was available.

2.04.42.	106 (b). U-Boat Division replied that Raeder wished his order to be carried out with all means at disposal.

4.04.42.	107. Intelligence from U-Boats
	Chief of Naval War Staff instructed F.O. U-Boats to obtain from U-Boats returned to base, all possible intelligence on enemy shipping, aircraft, floating mines, weather conditions etc. and that U-Boats should bring home one or two knowledgeable survivors from sunk ships.

16.03.42.	107 (a). U-Boat Position in the American Area
	Only four U-Boats were at present in the American area. Five more were expected to arrive in the next few days. The decrease was a result of withdrawing seven U-Boats to the Herbrides-Iceland area.

12.04.42.	107 (b). Increased American Air Patrols
	A report signed by Doenitz stated that counter-measures here had been increased but U-Boat successes had remained at the same high level. The American crews had proved inexperienced and unwatchful, and even depth charge attacks in shallow water had not caused any losses. Air attacks had, however, been increased and U-Boats had had to remain submerged for days. In the full moon period the aircraft, because of their large number were especially dangerous and had forced the U-Boats to make their attacks further out to sea. When U-Boat tanker arrived the U-Boats would have greater scope, and should exploit this to the full in attacking along the whole length of the American coast before defences became fully organized.

15.04.42.	107 (c) Good results off American Coast
	In reporting on the first 3 months of U-Boat attacks off the East coast of America since the focal point of attacks was shifted to this area, Doenitz claimed that 229 ships of 1,521,882 G.R.T. had been sunk and 23 ships of 82,566 G.R.T. damaged, apart from the sinking of several destroyers and corvettes. These figures showed that not only the monthly tonnage sunk had increased but that the tonnage sunk by each U-Boat for each day at sea had also increased. This proved that it was better to use the U-Boats off the American coast than in the Central Atlantic, despite the long journey which this entailed. Besides, not a single U-Boat had yet been lost off the American coast.
	The focal point of U-Boat attack should remain off the American East coast, so long as the weak defences and good chances of success remained.

30.04.42.	107 (d) Position of U-Boat War in American Area during April
	Doenitz reported as follows:
	The decreased number of sinkings since the 21st April, was at first thought to mean that the enemy had altered his shipping routes, but was later found to be because of the full moon period, as had been the case the previous month. During the full moon period U-Boats find

	it difficult to make attacks as they are forced to remain submerged and cannot evade the enemy's A/S defences. Verbal reports from returned U-Boat commanders still painted the same picture, i.e.:
	(a) American area still very favorable for attacks.
	(b) A/S attacks had increased, but the men making them were "Not professional sailors, but people being paid for being in an area endangered by U-Boats," and therefore attacks were not pressed home.
	The German commanders were all of the opinion that the American area would be favorable for U-Boat attacks for several months to come and that losses would be small in relation to successes.
	Sinking per boat per day at sea had been:
	January, 1942, 209 G.R.T. February, 378 G.R.T. March, 409 G.R.T. and April, 412 G.R.T., thus showing that sinkings were on the increase.
	The number of powerful boats economical in the use of fuel (6 Type IXc and 11 Type VIIc) at present en route for this area would make it possible to patrol the entire coastal area from Cape Sable to Cape West, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. The enemy would find it impossible to evade these U-Boats by altering his shipping routes. These U-Boats should reach their area of operations on the 8th May, a week before the new moon period.
	The U-Boat Tanker now in the American area successfully delivered supplies to 12 boats in ten days.

13.04.42.	108. U-Boats in Norwegian Area
	Twenty boats were detailed for the defence of Norway, with the task of
	(a) Binding down enemy supplies in Arctic area and off the ports of destination.
	(b) Early perception and frustration of enemy landing intentions in Norwegian area.

13.04.42.	109. U-Boat Position on 1.4.42
	Total 288, of which operational boats 122.
	Twenty of these were in the Mediterranean, of which seven at sea.

	109 (a). Allied Transport Sinkings Important
	Hitler agreed with Raeder that it was of decisive importance to sink as much Allied transport space as possible in order to hamper their offensive operations. Hitler considered attacks on Murmansk convoys especially important at the moment.

23.04.42.	110. U-Boat Attacks on PQ Convoys
	Naval Staff stated that the last operations against PQ convoys had shown that the enemy regarded the Bear Island/North Cape as being greatly threatened, and had increased his defences there. It was therefore thought that the focal point of U-Boat attacks might be moved further west, where convoy protection might be weaker. Naval Staff considered that attacks should be made there by large numbers of U-Boats under the command of Admiral, Northern Waters, despite the possibility that the convoy might be more scattered.

25.04.42.	110 (a) Group North issued the following orders to U-Boats attacking Russian supply convoys:
	(i) U-Boats were to attack these PQ and QP convoys at every opportunity, in conjunction with the G.A.F., especially the PQ convoys running between Iceland and Murmansk.
	(ii) It was estimated that the PQ convoys ran from Reykjavik through the Denmark Strait south of Jan Mayen near the ice barrier to Bear Island and from thence to Murmansk every 14 to 21 days. The convoys generally consisted of 10 to 15 steamers escorted by one cruiser and four to eight destroyers, corvettes and aircraft-carrying craft of varying sizes. Heavy units were disposed at a distance from the convoy. Russian submarines were active near the coast, but enemy submarines must be expected at all times.

3.05.42.	110 (b). U-Boats of Greater Value in Atlantic than in Northern Waters
	F.O. U-Boats stated to the U-Boat division his view that U-Boats should be employed in the war on merchant shipping in the Atlantic rather than on operations in Northern Waters, for the following reasons:
	(i) U-Boats operating in Northern Waters were very much hampered by the long daylight hours in summer, while attacks would still be possible in the Atlantic by night.
	(ii) Bad weather decreased chances of attack in Northern Waters, and enemy attacks with land and carrier-based aircraft often prevented the U-Boat from scoring successes even in good weather.
	(iii) Keeping contact with other U-Boats was difficult during the long daylight periods.

	(iv) An average of 16 to 20 ships in two months had been sunk in Northern Waters (14,000 G.R.T. in March and 26,000 G.R.T. in April). By using the same numbers of U-Boats in the Atlantic, on the basis of sinkings there, 96,000 G.R.T. could have been sunk in March and 120,000 G.R.T. in April.
	(v) The U-Boat would be best employed in sinking ships likely to be used in an invasion attempt.

9.05.42.	111. Central and South Atlantic
	For Hitler's information, Naval War Staff sent Vice-Admiral Krancke a chart showing enemy shipping movements in Central and South Atlantic in the months March/April, indicating especially concentrations of traffic in area Fernando Noronha and south-west of Freetown. This pointed to the necessity of sending U-Boat groups to these areas. Consultations were proceeding with F.O. U-Boats.

10.05.42.	112. Difficulties of U-Boats in Northern Waters
	Admiral Arctic sent to Operations Division Naval War Staff, and Naval Group Command North, a study of the possibilities of U-Boat warfare in Northern Waters during the long daylight period.
	On U-Boat warfare in this area he expressed himself as follows:
	The long daylight lessened chances of success against strongly guarded convoys. However, successes might be increased by:
	(a) Longer operational zones, i.e. from Jan Mayen area to Russian ports, except coastal waters.
	(b) The U-Boat groups, acting on information from air and U-Boat reconnaissance, would avoid contact with distant escorts, with the object of causing the convoy to come in contact with a number of U-Boats disposed in depth. These U-Boats would then have a better chance of attack, even if part of their number remained out of range of the convoy.
	(c) Extension of air reconnaissance, so essential to successful operations.
	(d) Eight U-Boats were needed for each operation and the convoys ran every 14 days. But because of the difficulty of keeping U-Boats operational, there were only 18 available for these attacks, so that it was not possible to attack every convoy.
	(e) C.O.s and crews should have experience of operations in these waters.
	(f) Development of combined attacks by aircraft and naval forces was necessary.
	(g) Much risk attended attacks on convoys in coastal waters, as they were strongly guarded by aircraft and ships, and attacks in daylight were hardly possible.
	(h) Mining operations by U-Boats were possible in the whole of the Kola Bay. Near the White Sea they would have to be restricted to north of a line running between Kanin Noss and Cape Gorodezki, because of existing minefields and the unfavorable, and for the most part unknown, depth of water, and currents.

5.06.42.	113. U-Boat Operations against Brazil
	U-Boat Division to F.O. U-Boats:
	In view of possible immediate war with Brazil, 10 to 15 U-Boats might be required to attack Para, Natal, Recife, Bahia, Rio, Santos with mine and torpedo. Reduction in operations in Atlantic area should be accepted.

7.06.42.	114. F.O. U-Boats recommended Operations Division, Naval Staff, to postpone the Brazilian operation, as no U-Boat tanker was yet available, and postponement was advisable, on account of the adverse effect on Atlantic operations.

9.06.42.	115. Head of Operations Division to Vice Admiral Krancke:
	An operation was planned for 10 U-Boats and a U-Tanker against main Brazilian harbours 3rd to 8th August, some boats to carry 2 to 4 mines. Krancke was requested by Raeder to obtain Hitler's decision on this.

12.06.42.	116. U-Boat Situation on 12.6.42.
	Chart showing U-Boat situation on this date will be found in Appendix A, Table 9. This chart is fully detailed and shows, by number, the disposition of each U-Boat, including losses, and types.

17.06.42.	117. U-Boats in American Area
	Since 20th April U-Boats stationed off the principal ports from Cape Fear to New York have not reported sighting any shipping. The largest number of sinkings were made in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico and the Florida Straits.

19.06.42.	Three U-Boats of Type VII left for mining operations off New York, Delaware Bay and Chesapeake Bay. Investigations had been made after the entry of the United States into the war, and the coastal area between Fire Island (east of New York) to Cape Canaveral was found suitable for mining. Up to the present U-Boats had been successfully used in torpedo operations in this area, but since the single U-Boats stationed north of Hatteras had little success while to the south the situation had been exactly the opposite, it was thought that mining operations to the north would be advisable. It was pointed out that this would tend to split the enemy's defence forces.

30.06.42.	Doenitz stated that the U-Boats' success in June had been unexpectedly high, due to:
	(a) U-Boats on passage to North America and the Caribbean had met a number of independently routed ships in the open sea.
	(b) U-Boats in the Caribbean Sea had sunk a large number of ships.
	(c) Traffic in the Hatteras area had been resumed.
	The situation in the Caribbean was more favorable than in the North American area and should be exploited.

10.07.42.	Traffic in the American area was again reported to have ceased since about 3rd July, probably as a result of heavy losses at the end of June. Such a stoppage means that the Americans are suffering great difficulties but to the U-Boat it means a drop in sinkings.

19.07.42.	Doenitz stated that the focal point of U-Boat attacks should be made where the largest number of independently routed ships would be found, i.e. north of the Gulf of Mexico and off Trinidad.

15.06.42.	118. U-boat Attacks on Brazilian Shipping and Harbours
	The proposal by Naval War Staff to operate a group of two Type IXC and eight Type VIIC boats with a U-Tanker off the principal Brazilian harbours about 3rd to 8th August was approved, but subject to the political situation.

19.6.42.	119. U-Boat Operations in Northern Waters
	Chief of Naval War Staff to F.O. U-Boats:
	(a) Attack on England-Murmansk convoys was the most important task of naval forces in Norwegian area. Every ton of war material sunk lightened the burden on the Eastern Front. Indeed the Navy should apply all means at its disposal to this task, even at the cost of tasks in other areas.
	(b) Difficulties of operating in this area were fully realized. It was not proposed to increase numbers of U-Boats, as it was not thought that successes would correspondingly rise or justify the consequent diminution of effort in the Atlantic area.
	(c) U-Boats, even in bad conditions, had the chance of attacking convoys, stragglers, and damaged ships, and contact-keeping aircraft were of considerable importance.
	Six to eight U-Boats were considered necessary by Naval War Staff against each PQ convoy.

4.07.42.	120. Enemy Air Superiority in Bay of Biscay. German Air Attacks on Shipping Targets
	F.O. U-Boats reported to Naval War Staff on:
	(a) Conversation with Jeschonnek (Chief of Staff, German Air Force), on 2.7.42, in which was discussed:
	(i) Enemy air supremacy in Bay of Biscay. U-Boats were bombed in their bases and could not put out by day, or by night on the surface as they were detected. More boats were damaged in the Bay than lost by enemy action in operational areas. Aid was urgently required, also for future operations of blockade-runners.
	(ii) Jeschonnek and Doenitz agrees that it would be more profitable to attack shipping than land targets. Jeschonnek proposed to send more Ju88s. Fw200s were no longer up to war strength, and He177s should be used as replacement, but the 1st Staffel had gone to the Eastern Front and the next would not reach the Flieger Führer Atlantic until August/September.
	(b) Unsatisfactory conversation with Goering, who demured at aircraft attacking shipping rather than land targets, no decision was made. Doenitz attributed the slow U-Boat building programme to lack of copper, and of man-power, and Goering promised to look into the man-power question.

15.07.42.	121. Plans to increase Operational Capacity of U-Boats
	Admiral Lange sent a decision of Raeder's to various departments of Admiralty, for the necessary action. In this statement, Raeder's target for operational U-Boats was given as follows:
	On 1.8.42 144 boats
	On 1.10.42 194 boats
	On 1.1.43 289 boats
	On 1.4.43 314 boats
	Raeder's report is summarized:
	(a) In the coming months, the increase in operational U-Boats would prove of decisive importance to the conduct of the war.
	(b) Operational U-Boats would not be repaired in home dockyards, because of the long distance and consequent danger to boats. (For exceptions to this condition, see para. (e) below.)
	(c) An effort must be made to increase the sea-time of U-Boats based on France and Norway. Formerly, this had been 1 : 1 (U-Boat at sea : U-Boat in harbour) It should be in future 3 : 2.
	(d) In France U-Boat repair berths were to be developed to full capacity. Fifteen unprotected extra berths were shortly to be built in Bordeaux, and the possibility of building such in other French ports was to be examined.
	(e) Small* and large overhauls were to be carried out at operational base yards; and thorough overhauls* only if the boat's condition did not permit of her transfer to Germany. Boats were to go to home dockyards for complete refitting. Final overhauls (Restarbeiten) were to be reduced to 21 days per boat.
	(f) The order of C.-in-C. Navy, regarding employment of foreign workers on board U-Boats under repair, made the dockyard management solely responsible for the scope of such employment. (Provision of German technicians for repairs had priority.)
	(g) Total requirements of technical workers according to new plan, and hastening of final overhauls, were to be looked into at once.
	(h) With a view to obtaining the necessary man-power, the following possibilities were to be examined among others:
	(i) Temporary seconding of technically trained personnel from U-Boat training establishments in Neustadt and Plön to home dockyards, to shorten duration of final overhaul.
	(ii) Availability of technicians, based on proposal of F.O. U-Boats made in conference with Göring (four year's plan)
	(iii) Concentration of technicians serving in the Navy (outside the U-Boat arm).
	(iv) Exchange between members of the Navy and technicians of the Army to be tried.
	(v) Refitting of warships to be limited to cruisers, old battleships and Gneisenau.
	(vi) Collecting personnel from the Army.

7.08.42.	122. Proposal to Operate U-Boats in South Atlantic
	Chief of Naval War Staff to F.O. U-Boats:
	(a) There were good opportunities for U-Boat attacks against enemy traffic off Capetown, until now undisturbed.
	(b) U-Boats attacking shipping on outward passage south of the Equator would at first score successes, but then the enemy would disperse shipping in this area, and strengthen their A/S measures. Therefore the Naval Staff's proposal on attacking outward bound shipping in the South Atlantic should be carefully considered.
	(c) Naval War Staff were of opinion that, should an operation off Capetown appear promising, forces should be strongly concentrated and should adopt surprise tactics. Hence, when crossing the Equator outward bound, U-Boats should not attack, but should take evasive measures against detection. Battleships and aircraft carriers, which presented a sure target, were the only exception. Complete W/T silence was to be observed by U-Boats, even in an emergency.

10.08.42.	123. F.O. U-Boats in reply, thought that boats should be allowed to attack as far as 15° South, since their purpose was to sink shipping, no matter where, and the sooner the better. He did not think this would prejudice operations off Capetown, since U-Boats had already operated south of St. Helena, and there would be 1,700 miles for the news to travel. The same distance would apply to Madiers and Capetown. He had noticed no dispersal of shipping in the last few weeks off Freetown.
_________________________________________________________________________
	* Engine overhaul after each patrol.
	** Ditto, more through, after each third patrol.
	*** After 15 months (battery overhaul).

(C57405)

11.08.42.	124. U-Boats in South Atlantic Operations Division replied:
	(a) The strategic purpose of sending U-Boats to Capetown was to inflict a blow on the hitherto untouched lifeline of the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean traffic.
	(b) The desired strategic effect would be the greater in so far as the operation was a surprise against defenceless ships, which state would take some time to rectify.
	(c) One could not tell what effect the St. Helena U-Boats had on the enemy, but the presence of U-Tankers, wider range of operations, etc., would make them suspicious now.
	(d) It was unlikely that only partial successes would be scored, in view of the known enemy volume of shipping. If boats had not fired all torpedoes, there would be plenty of opportunity to do so on homeward passage, especially off Freetown.

17.08.42.	125. U-Boats in Mediterranean
	Operations Division to S.O. U-Boats, Italy. The sailing of H.M.S. "Furious" eastward pointed to the necessity of further patrolling of the Western Mediterranean by U-Boats. Therefore, canceling previous arrangements, four boats, with two more to follow, were to be stationed again in the Western Mediterranean.

26.08.42.	126. U-Boats in Black Sea
	Hitler set great store by U-Boats in the Black Sea, because of their potential political reaction on Turkey, and asked for six boats in all to be sent there.

	126 (a). U-Boat Losses Higher
	In June, three boats, in July nine, were lost, and eight others were presumed lost. Part of these losses were due to the strong enemy air activity in the Bay of Biscay.

28.08.42.	127. Table of U-Boat Losses
	See Appendix A, Table 10.

4.09.42.	128. Weapon Development in U-Boats - F.O. U-Boats dissatisfied with Co-ordination
	F.O. U-Boats' representative had visited the Army Experimental Establishment at Peenemunde and had discovered by chance that by order of the Admiralty trials were being made with a new anti-aircraft gun which it was intended to use in battleships for defence against torpedo-bomber attacks. F.O. U-Boats had already asked Admiralty to examine the question of better A.A. equipment of U-Boats against heavy fighters, which improvement he considered vital to the survival of the U-Boat war. He was therefore surprised and annoyed that this new weapon, which would be suitable for U-Boats, was being developed without his knowledge for a purpose which he considered quite secondary to his own requirements.
	He expressed these sentiments in a letter to various departments of Admiralty, and insisted on closer co-ordination for the future.

9.09.42.	129. Lament on Lack of Air Co-operation with U-Boats in the Atlantic
	F.O. U-Boats to Naval War Staff:
	(a) According to Flieger-Fueher Atlantic, the only type of aircraft superior in speed maneuverability and armament to enemy types operating at sea was the He.177.
	(b) Since 14.6.42, the enemy Air Force had five times caused the premature breaking-off of promising U-Boat operations against convoys. All these operational areas lay within range of the He.177, i.e., operations by He.177 would have been possible, and would probably have achieved the following:
	(i) Elimination of enemy air-defence so that U-Boat operations could be carried out in favourable conditions.
	(ii) Diversion of convoys' attention by aircraft bomb attacks, thus helping U-Boat attacks.
	Doenitz held it to be absolutely necessary that He.177's should be supplied at once - not in some months time - for operational use in conjunction with U-Boats.

9.09.42.	130. The Effect of Allied Shipping Losses on the Outcome of the War
	The Intelligence Section of Naval Staff, which dealt with enemy merchant shipping. (von Baumbach) prepared a long report for the U-Boat Division of Naval Staff, on the influence of the sinking of Allied cargo vessels on the outcome of the war.
	The question was, whether random sinkings would have a decisive influence on the economic war, no matter whether the sunk ships carried cargo or not, or whether decisive results could only be obtained by sinking a definite amount of shipping space in a definite area.

	The monthly average of tonnage sunk from January to August, 1942, inclusive, was estimated at 400,000 G.R.T. This had been achieved by:
	U-Boats 78 per cent.
	Air 14 per cent.
	Surface units 5 per cent.
	Mines 3 per cent.
	100 per cent.

	The enemy aimed at a monthly output of about 900,000 G.R.T. shipping space (of which 750,000 G.R.T. was cargo space), beginning 1943.
	The number of vessels sunk per month was the decisive factor in answering the question posed above. If tonnage sunk amounted to about 1.3 million G.R.T., and remained at that figure, then the sinking of shipping, no matter where, and whether laden or not, would achieve decisive results within a measurable time. Even so, a switch-over to targets carrying cargoes was desirable, and would produce a greater effect in a given time.

22.09.42.	131. German-Japanese Spheres of U-Boat Action
	F.O. U-Boats told Naval War Staff that he proposed to use the U-Boats, Type IX D.2, at present in the Capetown area, and off the East African coast, as far as Madagascar, against traffic to and from East Asia and North Africa, also against supply traffic to Madagascar, if any were encountered. The Italian U-Boat "Cagni" was to operate in the same area. F.O. U-Boats assumed that no Japanese forces would be in this area.

24.09.42.	132. U-Boat Intentions
	F.O. U-Boats told Operations Division that he had initiated a situation report on U-Boats, to be produced every ten days.

	132 (a). North Atlantic Convoy Situation
	In the first half of 1942 a dispersal of convoy attacks over a wide area was noticeable. This dispersal was, however, not so wide as in August, 1941, and was kept within certain bounds on either side of the Great Circle. Y. Service reports had made it possible to attack westbound convoys and prospects here were still favorable. Weather conditions were often a decisive factor. Medium boats were bearing the brunt of North Atlantic operations.

	132 (b). Gulf of St. Lawrence and Belle Isle Straits
	The operation by three boats was fully successful. Defence was relatively meager and limited to escorts only. This weakness would be exploited by sending out more U-Boats.

	132 (c). East Coast of North America
	For some time, operations had met with hardly any success, and several losses had been incurred, owing to a strong defence and because shipping was concentrated into convoys along the coast, in shallow water. Air cover was especially good. Therefore, minelaying by single U-Boats only, to be carried out as opportunity offered, was planned in this area.

	132 (d). Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea
	Since vessels no longer sailed independently, the area was no longer fruitful. Strong air cover made approach to convoys difficult, if not impossible, so that boats depended on chance to get into a favorable firing position. The latest successes were attributable to such chances. Moreover, these successes were attended by relatively high losses, presumably caused by air attack. The G.S.R. could protect the boats by night, but did not help in an attack. Therefore, it was proposed to station single boats in this area, to patrol the old Bahama Channel-Windward Passage-Jamaica, which seemed to be principally traversed by convoys. Climatic conditions, and the need for long submerged periods, with their consequent demands on the crews, made it undesirable for the boats to stay long in these waters.

	132 (e). Trinidad
	West of Trinidad conditions were similar to those described above. There was more likelihood of intercepting convoys near their point of departure. The area east of Trinidad had proved especially favourable. Here convoys had not yet been established, there was less air cover, and naval forces (destroyers) had only recently been observed. Spasmodic successes were due to ships sailing independently on constantly varying routes. It was striking that little eastward-bound shipping had been detected. The area east of Trinidad would, henceforth, with the Freetown area, be focal points for large U-Boats. Medium U-Boats could, and would, also operate there so far as they could be supplied by U-Tankers.

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	132 (f). North-South (S.L. and O.S.) Convoys
	It had often been possible to intercept S.L. convoys according to plan, but often so far north that the attack could not be pressed home because of the enemy air defence. The disadvantage of operations against these convoys lay in the fact that if one convoy was missed, the next did not arrive until ten days later. Therefore, these operations were feasible for boats on their way into the Freetown area, that is, for medium U-Boats, only when they could be supplied at sea. Accordingly, the "ILTIS" group (six U-Boats), would go on to Freetown after being supplied.

	132 (g). Freetown
	This area had again been very fruitful. In spite of numerous U-Boat successes, the enemy had not apparently re-routed traffic to any great extent, or reacted strongly to sinkings. It was not possible to interrupt shipping thoroughly near Trinidad or Freetown. After Group "ILTIS" had been supplied, it was hoped that these and other large U-Boats would carry out operations.

	132 (h). Gulf of Guinea
	No practical experience was as yet available about the harbours in the Gulf of Guinea. Two large U-Boats had gone to this area, and two Italian boats would operate there.

	132 (i). Iceland
	THe first attempt at pursuing Murmansk convoys was being made. Light nights and strong air cover prevented successful operations here in summer. In spite of this, it had been possible for single boats to remain a considerable time off Reykjavik. As opportunity offered, it was proposed that single boats should operate again in the next new moon period. On receipt of reliable news of the departure of a P.Q. convoy, several boats were to be sent, as many as were available of those on passage from Germany.

28.09.42.	133. Conference in the Reich Chancellery on U-Boats
	Present:
	The Führer.
	Grossadmiral Raeder.
	Generalfeldmarschall Keitel.
	Admiral Doenitz.
	Admiral Fuchs.
	Vizeadmiral Kranke.
	Vizeadmiral Maertens.
	Konteradmiral Lange.
	Kapitan zur See von Puttkamer.
	Baurat Wass.

	133 (a). Construction
	The Führer opened the conference by stating that he wished to be instructed on the present state of the U-Boat war, and to discover how far developments were keeping abreast of further war demands.
	He was very grateful for the achievements of the U-Boat, and he was convinced that the monthly figures of vessels sunk would remain so high that the enemy would not be able to replace them by new construction. Examining more closely the alleged increase in enemy construction. Examining more closely the alleged increase in enemy construction, he remarked that in his opinion, the building achievements claimed were just propaganda and were not possible. Even if it were possible for the enemy to launch hulls relatively quickly, they would still lack engines, auxiliary engines, further items of equipment, and above all, personnel to man these ships.
	The Führer then alluded to the necessity of exploiting technical developments at the right moment; only thus could the advantage of new inventions be realized to the full.

	133 (b). Battle of the Atlantic
	Admiral Doenitz reviewed the present state of the Battle of the Atlantic. The theatre of U-Boat operations had shifted from the American coast to the central Atlantic because successes in the former area had fallen off. There were still a few "soft spots" on the coast, where the enemy might still be pounced upon successfully. He pointed out that successful German minelaying operations had been carried out near the coast, and that operations in the St. Lawrence River still yielded a certain amount of success.
	Doenitz then mentioned prospects of success in the South Atlantic, especially off the coast of Africa. He demonstrated by charts that the focal point of the struggle lay in combating convoys in the North Atlantic.
	The greater number of boats now operating rendered discovery of the enemy more likely. Enemy convoys were now normally proceeding on direct routes, that is to say, on the Great Circle. It was thought that, to save tonnage, the enemy avoided roundabout routes.
	Convoys were strongly guarded, escort vessels being stationed around the convoy as a close defence, a certain number remaining inside the convoy. Moreover, the enemy had begun to use a distant screen of destroyers, which hampered the approach of U-Boats.

	133 (c). Aircraft Defence
	Doenitz stated that the main difficulty for the U-Boat today was the menace of enemy aircraft. He showed on the chart the distance from the British Isles attained by the enemy's aircraft in the years 1940, 1941, 1942, and the consequent necessity for U-Boats to abandon attacks in the nearer areas. Therefore, the area of intensive attack by U-Boats had to be moved out into the central Atlantic.
	If this extension also developed from the American coast, a considerable diminution of the results from present group tactics must be expected. This proved that the U-Boat war must be supported by the G.A.F. in much greater measure than hitherto. The range of the He.177 still covered the sea area at present threatened by enemy aircraft. This type of aircraft operating with the U-Boats would be able to combine reconnaissance duties with defence of U-Boats against enemy air attack.

	134 (d). Losses
	It had been shown that the actual attacks on convoys had by no means cost Germany high losses; U-boat losses were divided fairly equally between the different sea areas. In the Bay of Biscay, they had temporarily mounted, through aircraft attacks. After the boats had been equipped with G.S.R., losses had dropped sharply.

	134 (e). Technical improvements
	Doenitz announced that the U-Boat and its weapons were undergoing technical improvement, not because losses were so high, but in order to maintain the same success as hitherto, in spite of the increased enemy defence.

	134 (f). Submerged Speed
	Priority was given to measures for increasing the speed of U-Boats when submerged. It was hoped that this increase in submerged speed would be accomplished by the introduction of the Walter U-Boat.
	A U-Boat with great submerged speed would be able to approach a convoy on a suitable bearing, in spite of enemy escort vessels. This submerged speed would make it possible for U-Boats to escape rapidly from pursuers. In the opinion of Doenitz, enemy asdic location had not improved since the beginning of the war.
	The Führer endorsed these statements, and gave it as his opinion that the introduction of a U-Boat with a high submerged speed would produce revolutionary success, because the whole equipment of enemy escort vessels would thereby lose its effect, and the comparatively slow enemy corvettes now under construction would be robbed of their efficacy.

	134 (g). Diving
	Second priority was given to increasing the power of U-Boats to dive to great depths. At greater depths, the U-Boats could evade enemy asdic location, and the effect of depth charges would be minimized.

	134 (h). Introduction of the Acoustic Torpedo
	To counteract enemy defence, it was most important to produce a weapon to eliminate the escorts, who prevented the U-Boat from taking up firing position. Such weapons might be used when surfaced or when submerged. To the first group belonged the acoustic torpedo; Raeder stated that the development of this torpedo had progressed so far that the prospects were favourable.

	134 (i). Non-contact Pistol
	Raeder also stated that considerable progress had been made with the non-contact pistol, so that within measurable time it would be operational.

	134 (j) Surface Combat
	Doenitz then turned to the question of the U-Boat's surface combat with escort vessels, and saw an answer in the experimental remote-controlled rocket shell. In discussing this question, the Führer took the standpoint that for the present, one should not regard the development of these shells too optimistically. Nevertheless, work on the shell ought to continue, if its development would have a decisive effect on U-Boat warfare. Doenitz emphasized the necessity of developing such a shell for the U-Boat.
	The Führer alluded to research in the remote-controlled torpedo, which he considered of great value.

	134 (k). U-Boat Armament
	Owing to the growth of the air menace, it had become necessary to strengthen the U-Boat's A.A. armament. Konteradmiral Lange demonstrated by sketches and illustrations how this defence was strengthened by the 15-mm. M.G., and how the shape of the conning tower was altered to suit this weapon. The Führer had certain doubts whether the 15-mm. M.G. would be very effective against the new and strengthened and armoured aircraft. Konteradmiral Lange

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	and Admiral Doenitz stated that the experience with Italian 13-mm. guns had led to the choice of the German 15-mm. The question of the 20-mm. was discussed; the Führer alluded to the filling of its ammunition with "Hexogenstoff."
	The Führer had a strong prejudice against the 50-mm., because the Air Force was said to have had unfavorable results with this weapon.
	Raeder said that the Navy considered a trial of this weapon worth while.

	134 (l). Influence of Sea-water on Weapons
	The main difficulty of all automatic weapons in U-Boats was their exposure to the action of sea water when diving; on surfacing, the weapons were no longer dependable.
	The Führer mentioned the possibility of testing whether the alloy used in the 55-mm. gun might be improved by the addition of more resistant metal, so as to compensate for the adverse influence of the sea-water. The quantity needed for the small number of U-Boat weapons would be so small that he would have no scruples about ear-marking valuable scrap metal from other sources.

	134 (m). Shells
	Raeder told the Führer that recently shells had been made with "N. Stof." Firing trials had been carried out against oil tanks, containing the heaviest mazout oil. In this experiment, the long flame which arose was stifled. This might be attributed to the specially heavy type of oil. In any case, boats were now being fitted out with this ammunition, to test its effect on the enemy. The Führer personally expected much from the use of such a shell and ordered research for the use of "N.Stoff" in torpedo warheads, to achieve an immediate conflagration in tankers.

	134 (n). Improvements in the Range of Visibility
	Doenitz further explained that a weakness of the U-Boat was its small field of visibility. Chief of U-Boat Division indicated what developments were taking place in this respect.
	(a) The look-out mast had been introduced, but could only represent a makeshift solution, as its 10 metres' height was too little to be of much use.
	N.I.D. Note. Those had been fitted in some of the 1,200-ton U-Boats ("U 177-182").
	(b) The "Bachstelze" helicopter was being envisaged for larger boats. The model was explained with illustrations. The Führer had doubts whether the apparatus would be able to remain in the air, on the grounds of earlier experiments made by the Army. He thought that an electric current was to be sent up the cable. Konteradmiral Lange explained that this method had been tried but rejected, because it was not sufficiently safe, and that the proposed helicopter worked without a motor, solely on wind pressure. Doenitz had seen the experiments in the wind tunnel in Paris, and had been impressed. The Führer inquired about the reaction of the apparatus into the boat, which Chief of U-Boat Division showed him on the drawing.

	134 (o). U-Boat Aircraft
	The question of providing U-Boats with an engined aircraft was discussed. Objectives were chiefly the difficulty of servicing the engine, and secondly, that of stowage.
	The Führer recalled unfavorable experiences of the French. Chief of U-Boat Division instanced the case of the submarine "Surcouf."

	134 (p). Defences against Asdic
	Concerning defence against enemy asdic-location, Doenitz mentioned the two-current methods, which Admiral Maertens had pursued, and stated he was still continuing research on adhesives. The considerable difficulties presented by this method were enumerated; its use could probably be only limited. Nevertheless, a clarification of the problem would be obtained by practical operational trials. The "Bold" procedure and its hitherto favorable results were mentioned, and the Führer stressed especially its good psychological effect on the crews.
	Note. This procedure "Bold" was a German radar decoy consisting of balloons or gas bubbles put out by the U-Boat with the object of registering false locations in British Radar search.

	134 (g). Enemy Radar
	Regarding surface-location by enemy radar, the Chief of Naval Communications Service, reported on the screening procedure, of placing lead on the conning-tower, and the use of the G.S.R.

	134 (r). Simulating Destruction
	In the further course of the discussion, the Führer mentioned the possibility of simulating the destruction of a U-Boat. He instanced numerous aircraft reports which, after sighting an oil track, assumed the destruction of a U-Boat and announced it.
	The Führer had thought of a kind of torpedo which could explode on the surface, eject oil, and cause air bubbles to appear.
	It was objected that the sacrifice if an attack torpedo-tube for such a torpedo would be unfortunate. Chief of U-Boat Division stated that one might consider in its stead the firing of such a body from the boat's upper deck. The question would be followed up.

	134 (s). The Walter U-Boat - Great Expectations
	In conclusion, the Walter U-Boat was discussed. Raeder said that Blohm and Voss and "Germania" were each commissioned to build two boats of the small type, that larger type of the Walter firm was being designed, and that it was intended, as soon as practical knowledge on the engine installations in the smaller type was to hand, to order a series of 24 U-Boats and decide in about two months' time on the serial construction of the larger type. In any case, the serial production of these boats would be pursued as quickly as possible, subject to adjustments in the present U-Boat building programme.
	Admiral Fuchs expounded the Walter boat in a more detailed way with a drawing, showing its departure from present U-Boat type. The Führer was interested in the numbers of torpedoes in these boats, and was told of the introduction of the 5-metre torpedo, which would be 2 metres shorter than the normal 21-in. torpedo.

	134 (t). Importance of U-Boat War
	Once again the Führer emphasized his conviction of the decisive importance of the U-Boat war. In this connection, Raeder told the Führer that the mine menace in the Eastern Baltic might be fatal to U-Boat training, as it was essential to carry out training, especially on new construction, in this area. The enemy's mining of the Bay of Danzig and such areas presented a very serious problem.

	134 (u). Sinking of Spanish Steamer
	After the ending of the discussion, Raeder informed the Führer that unfortunately a Spanish steamer had been sunk by a U-Boat. The Führer decided that the sinking should be admitted, Spain should receive full compensation for the ship, including the wheat lost with her, and that it should also be announced that a court of inquiry would be held on the Commanding Officer, which Doenitz had already ordered on his own authority.
	(End of Discussion)

6.10.42.	134 (v). Increase in Operational U-Boat Numbers
	Report by U-Boat Division of Naval Staff to various Departments of Admiralty:
	On the basis of the planned 40 percent, operational U-Boats in harbour and 60 per cent operational U-Boats at sea from the French and Norwegian bases, the estimate of operational U-Boat numbers had been revised as follows:
	1.10.42 = 180 U-Boats ]
	1. 1.43 = 245 U-Boats ] (Not including 15 Mediterranean Boats.)
	1. 4.43 = 273 U-Boats ]
	The estimate was derived from the following:
	(a) Increase in new operational boats from October to December, 1942, will be 31 boats, and from January, 21 boats monthly.
	(b) A loss of 4 per cent, monthly of the operational U-Boats.
	(c) A U-Boat strength of 15 in the Mediterranean.
	N.I.D. Note. c.f. para. 138, in which 24 U-Boats are stated to be in the Mediterranean. Five of the 24 were stated to have been sunk.

13.10.42.	135. German U-Boat Operations in Indian Ocean
	Operation Division Naval War Staff to Japanese Naval Attache. The German Naval War Staff intended U-Boats to operate off South Africa as far north as the southern tip of Madagascar, thus fulfilling an often expressed wish of the Japanese.

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Oct. '42.

136. Analysis of Causes of Enemy Ship Losses

A situation report of German Naval Warfare, compiled by German Naval Staff, stated that causes of enemy ship losses through German forces in 1942, could be attributed to: U-Boats 78 per cent, Air Force 14 per cent, Surface craft 5 per cent, and Mines 3 per cent.

The present U-Boat situation was summed up as follows:

On 30.9.42 there were--

199 U-Boats operationally available.

112 U-Boats engaged on trials and final tests.

56 U-Boats used for training purposes.

367 Total.

136 (a). Losses since the outbreak of war up to 1.9.42 had been 105 U-Boats. In October, 1942, the number of operational U-Boats in each area was:

Northern Waters	About 10
N. Atlantic	About 30
American coast	About 5
W. Indies.Caribbean Sea	About 5
Central Atlantic/W. Africa	About 10
S. Atlantic/S. Africa	About 5
Mediterranean	About 5
	70

136 (b). Forty-five boats were either returning to base or proceeding to their areas of operations.

(N.I.D. Note. The 45 U-Boats returning to base or proceeding to area of operations added to the 70 already out make a total of 115. Therefore 84 U-Boats were in harbour at this time.)

The U-Boat was was regarded by Naval Staff to be at present a "Tonnage War." on the working principle of "Sink, anywhere, whether laden or unladen." This policy had had great success especially in 1942. The aim of the Naval Staffs of all three Axis Powers must be to attain and keep the figure of enemy tonnage sunk above that which the enemy could build. The tonnage sunk in September, 1942, by Germany, Japan and Italy was estimated at 872,127 G.R.T., and the enemy's building potential was estimated to be 850,000 G.R.T.

136 (c). Naval Staff's Proposals for the Future Conduct of the U-Boat War

(a) Operational and tactical use of the U-Boat to achieve the greatest possible number of sinkings.

(b) Absolute safety to be ensured for the defence of U-Boat bases against blockade by mines, shelling, air attack and invasion.

(c) Aerial protection of U-Boats to be provided as far as possible while entering or leaving ports as well as in the open sea, and also for attack on enemy aircraft and to detect and attack enemy convoys. (See N.I.D. Note below.)

(d) To maintain and increase the U-Boat building programme, including the supply of personnel and material needed for this.

(e) To improve the technical position and the performance of U-Boats as regards their weapons and defence in every way possible.

At present the only way of pursuing the war against England was by means of the Navy, whose best weapon of attack was the U-Boat, and it must be used to the best advantage, but no war in history had yet been won by using only one weapon. It was far more effective to use all available weapons to attack the enemy's weakest spot, and the Air Force and surface vessels must be used to increase and strengthen the U-Boat war.

(N.I.D. Note. Para. (c) is typical of many such declarations of future aims. The fact is that proper air co-operation at this time and for ever after was not forthcoming, partly because of Goering's refusal to appreciate naval needs, and partly because of the heavy commitments of the G.A.F. in other theatres of war, especially in Russia.)

18.11.42.

137. Losses incurred in Mediterranean and off Gibraltar

F.O. U-Boats informed the Naval War Staff that in the Mediterranean in the last 10 days:

Nineteen U-Boats had operated, of which

Five were probably lost.

Eight were heavily damaged.

Three were slightly damaged.

Comment by F.O. U-Boats: "Thus the U-Boats came off very badly."

	137 (a) Gibraltar and Morocco
	Twenty-two boats operated of which
	One was heavily damaged
	Three slightly damaged.
	It was not known whether any U-Boats had been sunk.
	Discussing these losses, F.O. U-Boats gave his reasons for thinking that the Battle of the Atlantic remained the decisive factor, and that boats should not be diverted from it to operate in other spheres. He therefore requested that the orders he had received might be reconsidered.

19.11.42.	138. Disposition of U-Boats, and Intentions
	Twenty-three U-Boats would remain in Northern Waters, and 24 (of which five had since been lost) in the Mediterranean.
	Fifty-seven boats and two U-Tankers were in operational area in Atlantic, 33 outward or inward bound, three operated off the Cape, four in the Gulf of Guinea-Freetown area, seven near Trinidad. Twenty-five were west of Gibraltar to attack enemy supplies coming into the Mediterranean. A group of 14 boats from Germany was in the North Atlantic; attack on North Atlantic convoys was at present very successful owing to weak enemy escort. It was intended to operate shortly a group of 12 boats against supply traffic between the Azores and the Iberian Peninsula-Gibraltar Straits.
	Hitler considered it most important to stop African supplies, and also asked that the number of U-Boats stationed in Norway should be strengthened in case of an attempted landing there. He also wanted more transport U-Boats because he was again considering a sudden occupation of Iceland and the establishment of an air base there.

27.11.42.	139. Results of Activity on Africa Supply Route
	F.O. U-Boats analysed the November record of vessels sunk and drew the conclusion that operations against African supplies offered no substantial advantage, as prospects were smell. Press propaganda on the subject gave a wrong impression, and would be damaging in the long run. December would bring a considerable drop in sinkings.

1.12.42.	140. U-Boat Operations off South Africa
	U-Boat Division to F.O. U-Boats: It was of considerable importance in the present situation to hinder enemy traffic to Western Asia. U-Boat operations round Natal could only partly accomplish this task. Attempts must be made to operate off the Cape harbours. F.O. U-Boats was requested to look into this and report.

2.12.42.	141. F.O. U-Boats told the Naval War Staff that he intended to send one Type IXd2 boat and three Type IXc boats with a U-Tanker to operate in Cape area as far as Madagascar. This would probably mean no U-Tanker in North Atlantic in January.

9.12.42.	U-Boats for Northern Waters
	U-Boat Division to Group North and F.O. U-Boats.
	(a) U-Boats stood less chance of success in Northern Waters because of the bad season, narrowing by ice of the channel between Spitzbergen and North Cape, and because of reports indicating lessening of enemy traffic to Russia owing to African needs. Prospects in North Atlantic were at present specially favorable (escorts weaker owing to African undertaking). But not enough U-Boats were available to exploit this. Besides, Russian supplies could also be hindered in North Atlantic.
	(b) It was ordered therefore that 23 boats be apportioned as before to Group North. Of these, F.O. U-Boats would have 11 for North Atlantic operations, with the proviso
	(i) of the remaining 12 boats, six to be kept ready for operations off Norway,
	(ii) the North Atlantic boats to be so disposed that in case of need they could operate in Norwegian area, as the U-Boat's task in this area was also defence of coast against enemy operations. Exchange of boats with each other or with possible replacements from Germany, etc., at discretion of F.O. U-Boats.

23.12.42.	143. Allies African Supplies - U-Boats watching Gibraltar and Morocco
	The directive concerning 12 U-Boats to be operated against supply traffic to Gibraltar or Moroccan ports was cancelled. The outward and homeward passage of Natal and Trinidad boats was however to be planned so as to cover the areas in which such supply traffic was to be expected.

24.12.42.	144. Disposition and Numbers of U-Boats
	A table showing the disposition and numbers of U-Boats at this time will be found in Appendix A (Table 11). Two hundred and ten boats were operational altogether. Total losses up to 18.12.42 were 147 boats.

24.12.42.	145. Walter Boats
	Twenty-four small type (XVII) serially built Walter Boats should be ready by the end of 1943. Tests would take until the beginning of 1944. Commissioning from August, 1944 at the rate of two boats a month.
	Large Atlantic type (XVIII): two experimental boats would be commissioned April-May, 1945. Serial construction would begin May, 1943, and these boats would be completed from the middle of 1945 onwards.
	Hitler wished the construction of these boats to take place under shelters.

	145 (a). New Torpedoes
	Raeder reported on the operational use in the Mediterranean of the first 103 Pi 2 torpedo pistols (no results yet received) and on the introduction next month of the FAT torpedo.

28.12.42.	146. U-Boat Base in Far East
	Operations Division, Naval War Staff to O.K.W. (Foreign Dept. III) with request to pass to Chief of German Supplies, Toyko:
	(A list of requirements at a U-Boat base was given.) Would he arrange these requirements either at Penang, or preferably at Sabang. After large U-Boats had been at sea three months, it was intended to provide overhaul, re-fuelling and re-provisioning at this base, before they left for a further three months' operations and returned to home base in France. Spare parts, etc., would be sent out. The first U-Boat would probably arrive at the beginning of March.

SECTION IV

_____

JANUARY, 1943--DECEMBER, 1943

27.01.43	147. Planning and Construction of U-Boats - Short Review by Naval Staff
	A document signed by Konter-Admiral Fuchs stated that Type XIV was developed as a supply vessel for U-Boats at sea. Depending on its own consumption, it could supply from 400 to 500 tons of fuel and about 30 to 40 tons of spare parts, provisions, etc., to U-Boats at sea.
	The long distance U-Boats, planned before the war, were discarded, as they did not lend themselves to wartime mass production. instead, Type IXC was increased in length and developed as a long range U-Boat. At the same time, an attempt was made to apply developments in E-Boat engines for U-Boats, in order to attain higher speeds. This resulted in the production of Types IXD1 and IXD2 (with E-Boat type engines). In IXD1 several engines were geared to one shaft; thus for the first time the principle of divided installation and high-speed engines was applied to U-Boats.
	An entirely new type (VII C/42) with greater stability, was under construction, utilizing all the experience gained by wartime production methods. Type XVII was the Walter U-Boat.
	N.I.D. Note. In actual fact there was only one Type IXD1 boat ("U.180") produced, and one IXD2 ("U.195").
30.1.43.	N.I.D. Note. On 30th January, 1943, Doenitz took the place of Raeder as C.-in-C. of the Navy, but still retained his position as Head of the U-Boat service.

8.02.43	148. Enemy's Knowledge of U-Boat Dispositions
	Doenitz showed Hitler by charts that the enemy was aware of U-Boat dispositions; not only their position, but sometimes the actual number of boats in each locality. This surprising fact might, he said, be due to (a) Treason, (b) Location of boats by undetected ASV-aircraft. Everything possible was being done with regard to (a). If (b) were the case, U-Boats must in future be dispersed widely, at considerable distances from each other.

8.02.43.	149. Need for Air Reconnaissance or more U-Boats
	Doenitz also explained that the interception of Gibraltar convoys largely depended upon chance, and how much easier the task would be with air reconnaissance. The lack of this was a most serious handicap, which could be reduced only by greater numbers of U-Boats. But this, in its turn, was dependent upon the boat's spending a very short time in dock and on speeding up the final trials of new construction. Doenitz asked that all U-Boat repair and construction personnel, together with similar personnel for warships which served the U-Boat war, should be completely exempt from call-up for the Army. Hitler agreed, and said he would talk the matter over with Keitel. He would do all that was possible for the U-Boat arm.

26.02.43.	150. Difficulty of Locating Convoys
	Doenitz reported that February had been a typical month for the North Atlantic: 14 days out at sea, nothing sunk because nothing was sighted. There were three reasons: bad weather and therefore bad visibility, possibly of discovery of U-Boats by radio-location, and above all all lack of own reconnaissance. Hitler promised to see whether at least the three Bv.222s could not be stationed in the west for U-Boat reconnaissance.
	N.I.D. Note. The unbusinesslike methods of the higher war direction as regards interservice matters are well illustrated by the two above examples of procedure. It can be deduced from the German Admiralty records (which are very complete for this period) that Hitler usually preferred to discuss important interdependant questions separately, first with one, and then with another leading official; and this method led to serious delays in issuing directives. Often, indeed, there is no decision, and the Navy is left to do its best under the circumstances. Conferences attended by all the higher authorities concerned, at which the pros and cons of proposed new measures could have been discussed with a view to a decision on the spot, are almost unknown.

26.02.43.	151. German U-Boats for Japan
	The Japanese had asked for two German U-Boats, because they now wanted to use their own submarines against merchant shipping. Doenitz thought the transfer would be of no military advantage since, in his opinion, the Japanese could not construct such boats, as they lacked materials. Hitler wanted to give the Japanese one boat in exchange for rubber; he would make a decision when the demand had taken more concrete shape.

4.04.43.

152. U-boat Support from Japan

A letter addressed to His Excellency Vice Admiral Nomura from the German Naval High Command, dated 4.4.43, gave the following information,

Germany was not in the position to provide large U-Boats for operations in the Indian Ocean north of the Equator as far as the Arabian Sea, and the Naval Staff asked if the larger Japanese submarines could not operate in these regions. This was particularly important in view of the present situation in the Mediterranean. As soon as enough larger German boats were free for action in other theatres of war, the Naval Staff would contact the Imperial Japanese Admiralty Staff to discuss co-operation in this area, with Penang as base.

11.04.43.

153. New Constructions

Plan produced by Doenitz, and fully approved by Hitler for increasing new construction.

1943.	1944.		1945.
2nd Half Year.	1st Half Year.	2nd Half Year.	1st Half Year.	2nd Half Year.

Rising to 27	27 monthly in spite	27+ 3 Type XX	27 + 3 Type XX	30 monthly.
monthly	of transfer to	monthly	monthly.
	Type VII C/42

Deficit in iron is:

For U-Boat construction monthly 4,500 tons.

For increase in torpedo manufacture 1,500 tons.

Total 6,000 tons.

11.04.43.

154. Serious U-Boat Losses

The U-Boat losses (19 in February, 15 in March and 6 so far in April) were high. "The U-Boat would be a failure if we did not sink more tonnage than the enemy could build" stated Doenitz. This excess might be very slight, but it must be attained at all costs. Doenitz produced a plan for increasing new construction, which Hitler fully approved. (See para. 153 above.)

154A German U-Boat for Japan

Doenitz announced that the first German U-Boat would be ready for transfer to Japan at the beginning of May.

21.05.43.

155. Review of First Quarter of 1943

The relatively small U-Boat successes in the first quarter of 1943, were attributed by the Germans to various causes; bad weather, young commanding officers (the youngest had joined the Navy after 1.9.39), strength of enemy defences - especially on North Atlantic routes, and above all the ability of the enemy convoys to evade U-Boat groups.

Supply traffic from Britain to Gibraltar - North Africa - Mediterranean wa within range of G.A.F. for several days of the journey, but these convoys could not be effectively attacked owing to lack of bomber aircraft. Attacks by single U-Boats in the central and South Atlantic and off the East coast of Africa were still successful.

31.5.43.

156. Crisis in U-Boat War - Measures Taken and Planned

The present crisis in the U-Boat war was ascribed to the great increase in the enemy's Air force. Aircraft carriers were also operating in the North Atlantic. Not only was the number of Aircraft greater, but they also had a new location-gear, apparently also used by surface craft, which enabled them to detect and attack U-Boats by surprise in thick cloud cover, and at night.

By far the largest number of the U-Boat losses were caused by aircraft. It was true that in the convoy operation on 8th May, a comparatively large number of U-Boats (5) had been surprised by destroyers; but the weather (sudden descent of fog) was particularly unfavorable to U-Boats and the destroyers had located them by search gear in the fog.

65 per cent. of losses had been suffered either on passage, or while in the operational area, and only 35 per cent. when actually engaging the convoy. This was natural, for of the 6-8 weeks' patrol the greater part was spent on passage or waiting. 30 per cent. of the boats at sea in May had been sunk. This was too much. The following measures had been introduced.

156A (a) Disposition

Boats had been withdrawn from the North Atlantic to the area west of Azores in the hope of finding there less enemy air cover and no new type of location gear, and of finding

	and attacking a Gibraltar convoy. However, it was proposed to attack a convoy in the North Atlantic during the new moon period in July, when it was hoped that U-Boats would be fitted with better defensive equipment.
	(b) Defensive Equipment
	(i) U-Boats should be fitted with a G.S.R. capable of receiving the frequency of the locating aircraft. There was nothing of this sort and no knowledge of the wave-length the enemy was using, or whether it was a high frequency or other means of location. Meanwhile Doenitz had ordered U-Boats to proceed at night on one electric motor, which would make it easier to hear the approach of aircraft. Experiments were being made with listening gear on the conning-tower which would withstand the effect of water and diving.
	(ii) The second possibility was jamming or splitting-up enemy radar. As far as jamming was concerned, the range of a jammer from a U-Boat was too small and, anyway, a jammer which did not automatically adjust itself to the enemy's wave-length would be no good. Dispersion was a possibility and as early as June, U-Boats would be equipped with "Aphrodite," which gave the same echo-effect as a U-Boat, and large buoys having this effect would be laid in the Bay of Biscay.
	(iii) They were not yet able to detect the detecting aircraft with their own radar, the beam was very narrow and it took too long to search the sky.
	(iv) It was possible to reduce the echo-effect of the conning-tower by 30 per cent.; that is to say the enemy, instead of detecting it at 9,000 metres, for example, would only now do so at 3,000 metres. Experience would prove whether this was possible for all wave lengths; but they had a long way to go before this camouflage was practicable.
	(v) From July, equipment with quadruple A.A. guns and necessary conning-tower alterations would be speeded up.
	(vi) The Quadruple A.A. guns alone would not be of use unless there were also a weapon against destroyers. In October they would have the "Falke," an acoustic torpedo which would steer itself towards a target proceeding at not more than 12 knots. But this limitation was disadvantageous and everything must be done to get the "Zaunkönig" into operational use in the Autumn; this would be effective against targets proceeding at 18 knots.
	(vii) German Air Force must combat enemy aircraft in the Bay of Biscay. The Me.410 was needed. On this, Hitler said that the four-engined long-range bombers had been, wrongly, neglected by the G.A.F. in favor of Stukas and two-engined bombers. He would enquire whether the Me.410 could do the job. Doenitz said pilots should be trained for 4-5 months in the Baltic with U-Boats, to learn perfect co-operation with them, and then they would be ready for Atlantic operations. Hitler agreed and said they would have to send long-range bombers to the Atlantic.

	Conclusion. In summing-up the prospects of the U-Boat war, Doenitz said these were uncertain. U-Boats in 1940 had sunk about 1,000 tons per sea-day per boat, and in 1942 about 200 tons. Hitler said there was no question of giving up; the Atlantic was his western battlefield and even if he had to fight there on the defensive, that was better than having to defend himself on the coast of Europe. Doenitz wanted the output figure of 30 boats to be raised to 40 per month. Hitler agreed and altered the figure in the directive.

15.06.43.	157. Shortage of Workers for U-Boat Construction
	The raising of the monthly output figure of U-Boats from 25 to 30, and the necessary land and sea protection against enemy air attack, had created a deficit of 20,000 workers in the Navy for 1943 and 1944. The further raising of the output to 40 boats per month and the increased building of light craft would make the shortage even bigger.
	Hitler said he had not the personnel; he must increase flak and night fighters to defend the German cities, and he must reinforce the Eastern Front; the Army needed divisions for defending Europe. Everybody would have to live from hand to mouth as regards allocation of personnel.

19.07.43.	158. U-Boat Losses in Bay of Biscay by Enemy Air Operations
	Third Air-Fleet Command Operations Division reported as follows, on conferences on 7th and 12th July with Naval Group Command West and Fliegerführer Atlantic on the measures to be taken to protect U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay against enemy air attack:
	(a) Present Situation in the Bay
	(i) Between 1st and 15th July, 20 U-Boats were lost in the Bay by enemy air attack.
	(ii) 1-2 enemy cruiser and up to four destroyers were also operating in this area, ostensibly to hunt U-Boats, perhaps also to blockade the Atlantic ports.

	(iii) U-Boats had, since the beginning of June, left bases in convoy as an experiment, but would now travel singly.
	Outbound boats June 48
	July 75
	Incoming boats travelled singly or in small groups at irregular intervals, on varying routes at the discretion of Commanding Officers.
	Incoming boats June 31
	July 45 (estimated).
	(b) Own Forces
	To ensure a close escort for all U-Boats, two heavy fighter groups of three squadrons each, totalling 300 aircraft, would be required. This was impossible to provide. Close escort was only flown for incoming bomb-damaged boats; even for this task the available forces were too small, and getting steadily smaller.
	With the forces available it was not possible to perform close escort duties for damaged boat as well free-lance fighter patrols.
	(c) Conclusion
	The forces of Luftflotte 3 were not sufficient materially to assist incoming and outgoing boats in the Bay. An increase in U-Boat losses in the Bay could not be prevented unless the bomber, heavy fighter and fighter units of Fliegerführer Atlantic were strengthened. (Requirements were listed.)

16.09.43.	159. North Atlantic
	Doenitz was determined to resume attacks in the North Atlantic, as counter-measures against enemy defence had been found, and boats were being equipped with better devices against aircraft, A/S vessels (destroyers, corvettes, etc.) and enemy location. The date of resumption of activity could not yet be given.

19/20.	160. Air Reconnaissance for U-Boats
12.43.	During a conference between Doenitz and Hitler, Doenitz again stressed the need for extensive long-range reconnaissance, which could not be ensured by the Luftwaffe's proposed construction programme. Nothing could come of the new U-Boat war in 1944 without reconnaissance, for the U-Boat was forced by enemy air superiority to remain submerged, thereby considerably reducing its field of vision. Doenitz required that all completed Ju.290s should be used for long-range reconnaissance and not as bombers. Hitler agreed, subject to his discussing this with Goering. The decoy "Thetis" was to be used in the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic.
	N.I.D. Note. "Thetis" was a radar decoy consisting of a float with a vertical rod to which were attached various trappings for reflecting radar transmissions.

SECTION V

_____

JANUARY, 1944--DECEMBER, 1944

1.01.44.	161. Radar
	During a discussion between Dönitz and Hitler, it was mentioned that the enemy was using a centimetre wave for Radar. From prisoners' statements, it was being used by British aircraft in May, 1943. This corresponded with the sharply rising loss of German U-Boats. Doenitz stated that they must now apply all their energies to:
	(a) Preparing a sensitive warning apparatus for centimetre wave.
	(b) Developing German Radar on the centimetre wave.
	(c) Making the U-Boat itself difficult to locate by eliminating the enemy Radar echoes.
	The probability of (c) was small. At present about 50 per cent. of enemy radar could be made ineffective, depending on range.

10.01.44.	162. North Atlantic
	The U-Boat attacks on convoy routes in the North Atlantic had been resumed, the first one, in which a new torpedo and a new countermeasure against Radar were used, was surprisingly successful. The enemy, however, were using new unknown methods of location and aircraft were the U-Boat's principal enemy. Sinking figures did not reach the old totals and enemy A/S defence was strong.

	162 (a). Air Support for U-Boats
	Air reconnaissance was now essential to a successful U-Boat war, because of the enemy's increased powers of location and air cover. Boats to-day were practically immobilised, through being compelled to remain submerged.
	Experience had recently shown that German aircraft had location equipment of inadequate range and that the enemy's fighter protection of convoys had become stronger.

18/19.	163. Disposition of U-Boats
01.44	At a conference between Doenitz and Hitler, at which Konteradmiral Wagner, Head of Operations Division, was present, the following points were mentioned.
	The night attack periscope was being improved.
	The U-Boats, armed with 37 mm. guns, could engage in a contemplated convoy battle in the North Atlantic, but they might not then be available against a possible enemy landing in Portugal. The convoy task would take about three weeks, and reaching the Portugal area would take nine days. Hitler thought that a landing intention would reveal itself in good time and therefore approved the convoy operation.
	Hitler asked about the surface speed of the new type U-Boats on electric motors. Doenitz said they could do 15 knots. Because of their fish-shape, this was less than the under-water speed.

Feb. '44.	163. Shortage of Aircraft for Atlantic Air Reconnaissance
	Typical of a number of reports is one by Kapitan zur See Mössel, Naval Liaison Officer with G.A.F. Headquarters, on air co-operation with U-Boats: "Between 13th and 18th February 1943, strong German reconnaissance forces were used against a convoy west of Ireland; altogether two Ju.88s, 17 Ju.290s, three F.W.200s and two B.V.222s were employed, of which three Ju.290s were shot down, presumably by enemy carrier-borne aircraft. Unfortunately, it was not possible to inform the U-Boat patrol line of the location of the convoy, as shortage of aircraft prevented reconnaissance on the day before the expected meeting between convoy and U-Boats. Once again (says Mössel) has the shortage of reconnaissance aircraft been the cause of failure to exploit an important opportunity."
	It had been agreed between F.O. U-Boats and the Fliegerführer, Atlantic, that, in future, each air reconnaissance was to be followed by a 14 days' pause for resting the air units; only in this way could long-distance reconnaissance be done thoroughly over two to three days and over wide areas.

26/27.	165. Delay in New Types of U-Boats
2.44.	At a discussion between Doenitz and Hitler, it was stated that it was essential to do all that was humanly possible to speed up the building programme of the new U-Boat Types XXI and XXIII. The U-Boat must be able to remain longer under water. The bombing of the Siemens-Schuckert Works (electric motors) had been the main factor in delaying the Type XXIII two months and Type XXI one month. The naval construction programme had also to concentrate on defensive types of vessels to sweep mines and guard the vital approaches to the Baltic.

20/21.	166. Decrease in U-Boat Operations
03.44.	Doenitz and Hitler agreed that, because of high losses, U-Boat operation should be restricted, and only in case of invasion should they be fully employed.

12.13.	167. Allied Aircraft Carriers in Northern Waters
04.44.	During a conference between Hitler, Doenitz, Jodl and Goering, Doenitz stated that enemy carrier-borne aircraft prevented U-Boats from approaching PQ convoys. It would be easy to combat these carriers with Norwegian shore-based aircraft. Goering agreed only to arrange the necessary ground organisation to enable him to send bombers to North Norway when required for each operation. Doenitz, however, thought that permanent bomber forces should be allocated for his purpose.

	167 (a). Walter Boat: Delay in Construction
	A bottle-neck in completion of torpedo tubes held up transition to Walter boats. Delay in Types XXI and XXIII was due to enemy air action (M.A.N., Augsburg) and lack of workers to repair bomb damage.

4/6.05.44.	168. Protection of Section Construction and Assembly of New U-Boats
	The following points were discussed at a meeting between Doenitz and Hitler: Sections were built in eight yards, each building a different section. Assembly could only be done at three yards. Thirty to 40 sections were built at once, so that a bomb-carpet on any yard could effectually wipe off 30 to 40 boats. Only a small percentage of the section building took place under concrete shelters. Doenitz thought that the British would wait for construction to get under way and the obliterate all yards. Hitler would speak to Ministerial Director Dorsch about getting more shelters built.
	Doenitz mentioned the weak A.A. and smoke defence of Hamburg, Danzig and Bremen. Hitler said he would give Goering directions to increase these.

	168 (a). Lack of Workers for U-Boat Construction
	According to the latest estimate only 140 instead of 218 U-Boats would be delivered in 1944, because of the shortage of workers in the steel industry. Hitler said that Speer must carry out his task of delivering the stated number of U-Boats, whatever the circumstances.
	PQ convoys. The weakness of the German Air Force allowed the escorting enemy carriers to remain unmolested. Doenitz suggested that the torpedo flights would be more useful in Northern Waters than in the Mediterranean. Hitler agreed.

24.04.44.	169. Invasion Counter-measures
	(a) Command of Group (Landwirt was code name for U-Boat dispositions against invasion).
	Doenitz announced that in case of invasion, the operational command of U-Boats of Group "Landwirt" would be given to F.O. U-Boats West.

11.05.44.	(b) U-Boats off the Coast of North Brittany. Group West announced the intention of using single U-Boats to attack enemy ships patrolling the coast of Brittany, and expected successes, as the enemy would not expect to find U-Boats in that area, and therefore would think at first that any plots of U-Boats would be false. Besides, enemy aicraft there were not fitted with anti-submarine gear, so, despite shallow water, danger to the U-Boats would not be great. As soon as the enemy realised that U-Boats were active off Brittany, these U-Boats (which were to be supplied by Group "Landwirt") would be withdrawn.

1.06.44.	(c) Doenitz ordered five U-Boats of Group "Landwirt," which were fitted with Radar, to leave port for operations in the Atlantic.

6.06.44.	(d) Doenitz ordered all the 27 U-Boats of Group "Landwirt" not fitted with Schnorchel to leave for counter-invasion operations. Six boat fitted with Schnorchel left Brest for the Channel.
	Five U-Boats were withdrawn from the Atlantic and five (fitted with Schnorchel) from Northern Norway, to join Group "Landwirt," making a total of 43 U-Boats in all, of which 11 were fitted with Schnorchel.

12.06.44.	(e) Group West stated that non-Schnorchel U-Boats of Type VIIC were not to leave port. The U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay were stated to be under heavy enemy attack.

26.04.44.	(f) A chart, attached to operational order Channel No. 1, gives the proposed U-Boat dispositions in the Channel in case of invasion. The patrol lines were in seven groups, ranging from north of Brest to north-west of Dieppe. Those in the Bay of Biscay ran almost continuously from Bordeaux to Brest.

5.07.44.	170. Employment of U-Boats against Invasion
	F.O. U-Boats West issued an "Operational order, Channel No. 2, for U-Boats in the Channel" of which the following is a summary:
	The times and routes of Allied convoys to France were given as far as was known, also the positions of German minefields off the French coast. Ports which U-Boats could use in case of emergency were given, i.e., Boulogne should be used by U-Boats unable to reach Brest, and St. Peter Port, Guernsey, in extreme cases, could be used at night. Le Harve was not suitable for U-Boats, but could be used if absolutely necessary.
	It was the duty of every U-Boat commander to reach the operational area (north of the Seine Bay) despite all difficulties, and the enemy was to be attacked at every opportunity. Navigational difficulties must be accepted. Every enemy ship, no matter how small, was a target for U-Boats and was to be attacked, even if in so doing the U-Boat was lost.
	If opportunity occurred to approach the enemy invasion fleet, U-Boats were to attack without consideration for minefields or shallow water or anything else. Every U-Boat causing loss to the enemy landing forces would have fulfilled its highest duty and justified its existence.
	Entry into the operational area was to be as far as possible unobserved. The line Boulogne-Dungeness was not to be crossed without special orders.
	No U-Boat was to surface in the Channel, except when wireless messages could not otherwise be sent.
	It was estimated that each U-Boat would be able to remain in the Channel about three weeks.
	Those U-Boats who had not received contrary orders would return to Brest.
	Orders for making W/T reports and for torpedoing landing craft followed, as well as details of the tides and currents in the Channel and special orders to "Schnorchel Boats."

9.07.44.	171. Employment of German Naval Personnel
	At a meeting between Doenitz, Hitler and three Generals from the Eastern Front it was stated that 80 per cent. of the total naval personnel were engaged in the defence of Europe. The other 20 per cent. were needed for duties with the Fleet, manning U-Boats, and combat and escort units; therefore none could be spared for the Army. The Navy, in addition, lacked all kinds of weapons which had been handed to the land troops.

12.07.44.	172. U-Boat Force in Atlantic as a Diversion
	In Doenitz's opinion the next step to relieve the invasion Front should be to send a strong force of U-Boats into the North Atlantic, in order to force the enemy to withdraw destroyers and aircraft from the Seine Bay to protect his Atlantic convoys. This U-Boat force could be provided by using the U-Boats at present in the Bay of Biscay, and by reducing the number of those in Northern Waters to 10. Doenitz thought that this reduction was feasible, as PQ convoys had not been sighted for some considerable time.

21.07.44.	173. Anti-Invasion Operations
	Doenitz told Hitler that 12 U-Boats operating against the invasion craft, six had been lost. Successes of the six remaining boats had been 11 destroyers and 12 transports. It was considered that German losses had been high, but that the operations were worth while.

29.07.44.	174. Disposition of U-Boats after the Invasion
	Admiral Wagner and K.K. Hausen-Nootbaar were present at a conference between Doenitz and Hitler, during which it was stated that all the eight U-Boats with "Schnorchel" were operating in the Channel. Seven more were expected in July from the West and from Germany. High losses must be reckoned with, but prospects were promising. Doenitz proposed sending a strong U-Boat group to the North Atlantic shortly, to draw off destroyers and aircraft from the Seine Estuary. This, in effect, would mean taking U-Boats from the Bay of Biscay and weakening the Northern Waters U-Boat group by about 10 boats. Hitler thought these withdrawals unimportant and agreed to the proposal.

10.08.44.	174 (a). Deployment of U-Boats in the Invasion Area
	A report on this subject was issued by C.-in-C. U-Boats and is summarised below.
	On 5th June U-Boats in Group "Landwirt" consisted of:
	Eight Type VIIC fitted with Schnorchel,
	Twenty-eight Type VIIC not fitted with Schnorchel,
	which were divided between the four Biscay ports of Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire and La Pallice. U-Boats could not be transferred to the Channel ports, as these had no U-Boat berths, and, besides, were heavily threatened by air attacks. U-Boats in Group "Landwirt" were later

(C57405)

	reinforced by U-Boats from Group West's command. Only Schnorchel U-Boats could operate in the Seine Bay against the invasion fleet. The U-Boats without Schnorchel were to operate in the Plymouth Bay. As it was expected that the enemy would invade in other areas, non-Schnorchel U-Boats would be stationed as a reconnaissance line in the Biscay area. Schnorchel U-Boats on passage in the North Atlantic would be ordered to Western France directly the invasion began. Seven non-Schnorchel U-Boats operating east of Iceland could be ordered to Norway or Denmark if there areas were threatened.
	By 7th June, 35 of the 36 U-Boats in the West had left port for the following areas:
	Seine Bay 8 Schnorchel U-Boats.
	S. of Plymouth 7 non-Schnorchel U-Boats.
	Scilly Isles-Lizzard 1 non-Schnorchel U-Boat.
	Bay of Biscay 19 non-Schnorchel U-Boats.
	The U-Boats travelled on the surface by night, in order to reach their area of operations more quickly. Heavy enemy air attacks were made on them, and between 6th and 11th June, four were sunk and five returned to port damaged. This left only two of the seven U-Boats bound for the Plymouth area and these were ordered to return, but did not do so, and were presumed lost also.
	The reconnaissance U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay were withdrawn nearer the coast on the appearance of enemy destroyers off Brest, for fear of an invasion. By the 12th, however, this danger had passed and the non-Schnorchel U-Boats in that area returned to port. The question whether to keep these boats in readiness in port or to send them into the Atlantic was a difficult one. Doenitz's decision was: The operational use of western U-Boats in the Atlantic would mean high losses and few immediate successes, and the diversionary effect would be very questionable. It was more important at the moment to have the U-Boats available for operations in case of further enemy landings in the West, whereby their losses would certainly not be smaller but the prospects of success greater and each individual U-Boat success would be valuable. The U-Boats would therefore remain in port.
	Casualties for non-Schnorchel boats to date were:
	Plymouth Bay:
	Losses, 37.5 per cent. Returned to harbour because of damage, 62.5 per cent.
	Biscay:
	Losses, 10.5 per cent. Returned to harbour because of damage, 42 per cent.
	Successes to date:
	Two mining operations off the English coast.
	Seven aircraft shot down.
	Of the Schnorchel U-Boats in the Seine Bay, losses had been 25 per cent; 25 per cent. had reached the operational area, and 50 per cent. had not.
	On 11th June these facts were, of course, not known, and five U-Boats were sent to the invasion area from the Atlantic, so that a total of nine U-Boats were in that area. When, on 18th June, no news had been received from U-Boats in the Seine area, anxiety was felt as to whether any had succeeded in reaching there. The first two U-Boats to reach Guernsey had reported strong enemy A/S defences on a line from Land's End-Brest-Plymouth-Channel Islands. As these U-Boats had been in the southern part of the Channel orders were issued to the succeeding U-Boats to keep more to the north, which proved, as had been expected, to be less strongly guarded. Bombing attacks had been made on Schnorchel U-Boats by night, thus proving beyond all doubt that the enemy could plot Schnorchel Boats.
	The munition supplies for Cherbourg could only be brought by sea, as nothing was yet known of the successes, or otherwise, of the U-Boats in the landing area, four U-Boats were sent to carry these supplies, instead of being sent on offensive operations. The position, however, altered so rapidly that they could not reach Cherbourg, and returned to port.
	On 23rd June the first two U-Boats returned from the invasion area and reported having sunk one and probably two destroyers and one LST. Approaches to the invasion area had been strongly protected, but when there, the U-Boats had not encountered much opposition. Targets were there in plenty and conditions were excellent for boats of Types XXI and XXIII.
	On 30th June the uncertain position in the Seine Bay was shown by the fact that, according to plans, nine U-Boats should have been in the area, whereas in fact there were only four, the other five having been lost. Three U-Boats from Germany, and two from Western France en route for the Channel were recalled, and five already there were ordered to return, to make reports. The first of these boats arrived back on 4th July, and reported that the situation was unchanged, in that Schnorchel U-Boats had scored many successes. The enemy's weak A/S defences in the Seine Bay were explained by the fact that he did not suspect the presence of
	U-Boats there, but only mines and small battle units.
	Conclusion
	(i) Defences had been weaker than had been expected and only strong in the Western Channel. Losses, in relation to successes, had not been too high, apart from in the Bay of Biscay.

	(ii) U-boats from Germany could not be sent to the Channel except by way of the French Atlantic coast ports. From a total of eight such U-Boats, two had been lost in the Biscay area and four in the Western Channel; probably these high losses had been due to inexperienced Commanders, as out of 18 other U-Boats operating in the same area, only two had been lost.
	(iii) Investigation had been made of the possibility of sending U-Boats from Germany to the invasion area by way of the North Sea and Straits of Dover, but this wa proved impracticable owing to the enemy defence and the inexperience of the U-Boat crews.
	(iv) Successes up to the end of July had been encouraging, but not decisive. In the past three months the effectiveness of U-Boats in the invasion area had been greater than in the Atlantic. It must be remembered also that only a short time ago it was thought impossible for U-Boats to operate in the Seine area, so that without Schnorchel no U-Boat attacks could have been made on the invasion fleet.
	N.I.D. Note. Nothing further has been found in the German Admiralty records of U-Boat counter-invasion operations.

3.08.44.	174 (b). Withdrawal of U-Boats from the West
	All sea-worthy U-Boats in French ports were ordered to be ready for operations by 5th September. All other were to be prepared for destruction. Withdrawal of further U-Boat personnel from French ports was not proposed.
25.08.44.	C.-in-C. U-Boats, ordered that U-Boats in west French ports should be put to sea and go to Norway and from there carry on operations. The loss of the U-Boat bases in France followed on 2.9.44.

13/14.	175. Dates for New Types of Boats
10.44.	Doenitz stated at a discussion with Hitler that he hoped to operate with the first boats of Type XXIII in January, 1945, and in February, there should be about 40 boats of Type XXI ready for operations. The chief danger to this new weapon would come from enemy air attacks on harbours. Shelters were therefore urgent.

31.10-	176. Norwegian Waters
2.11.44.	At a discussion between Doenitz and Hitler, at which Admiral Wagner and Adj. Klt. Luedde-Neurath were present, it was agreed that the operation of U-Boats with aircraft against enemy aircraft carriers off the Norwegian North Coast was pointless in present circumstances.

3.12.44.	177. U-Boats Against Enemy Carriers
	Doenitz spoke to Hitler of his decision to station U-Boats - the only "Schnorchel" boats available in this area - off Scapa Flow, to attack incoming aircraft carrier groups. Hitler asked whether it was known that Scapa was a base for aircraft carriers, and Doenitz replied that there were no sure indications, but that it was probable.

3.12.44.	178. Hope of Success with "Schnorchel"
	Doenitz showed Hitler a report by Klt. Nollman on the success of his "Schnorchel" boat off the East coast of Scotland. He and his crew were convinced that the old efficiency of the U-Boat had been re-established. Doenitz stated that this promised well for the new U-Boat types which were even better fitted for underwater combat. But the great difficulty lay in maintaining the building programme. For the time being, the enemy was to be lulled into a sense of security over the U-Boat war.

1.10.44.	179. U-Boat War. Situation and Prospects. Review by U-Boat Section of the Naval Staff
	(a) Atlantic
	(i) Invasion Area. The focal point of the U-Boat War in the past two months lay naturally in the Channel and the Bay of Biscay. An average of four to six U-Boats were operating at a time in that area, resulting in the sinking of 10 destroyers, one frigate and 92,000 G.R.T. of shipping, as well as 34,100 G.R.T. damaged. Schnorchel U-Boats, especially the newer types, were mainly responsible.
	A few months ago it would have been thought impossible to use U-Boats in such narrow and shallow waters with a concentration of enemy a/c, mines and surface craft attacking them, but all U-Boats have reported good attacking conditions despite the enemy defence. This picture has altered radically in the past fortnight. For various reasons high losses, even of all the U-Boats operating in the area, must be expected, without any successes having been scored in mitigation. Whether this is as a result of increased A/S measures, or because the enemy is using new methods (e.g., towed submerged explosive charges) or because the Channel supply route has been flanked with A/S mines, is entirely unknown. The position points to the advisability of withdrawing all U-Boats from the Channel.

(C574005) 1*

(ii) Rest of the Atlantic. Sinkings in the Caribbean Sea have been 40,000 G.R.T. Encouraging reports have been received of sinkings amounting to 40,000 G.R.T. from Type IX D boats operating in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean last month.

(b) Northern Waters

Although no Russian convoys have been running for some time, one was sighted at the end of August by U-Boats, which attacked, sinking one auxiliary aircraft carrier, one cruiser of the "Dido" class and five destroyers, besides damaging one battleship or heavy cruiser. The U-Boats were strongly attacked but managed to break through the defences to fire their torpedoes. It seems remarkable that U-Boats in Northern Waters have not yet been fitted with Schnorchel, in view of these successes.

(c) Mediterranean

The greater part of the U-Boats in this area were put out o action by air attacks on their bases. At present only three U-Boats are operational in the eastern Mediterranean.

(d) Black Sea and Gulf of Finland

Successes in these two remaining small theatres of war have been mainly scored on small vessels. In the Gulf of Finland U-Boats have been attacking the Russian small battle units, despite strong air defences. However, as the enemy does not use Radar the U-Boats have found evasion of the defences fairly easy. Only one U-Boat has been sunk in this area, and that probably as a result of hitting a mine. U-Boats have been engaged in artillery exchanges several times, and once two U-Boats attacked 12 enemy minesweepers with 8.8 cm. guns.

(e) Conclusion

The western area is no longer the focal point of U-Boat operations. The fortresses still holding out will fall shortly for lack of supplies. This means that at the beginning of the enemy advance, all U-Boats had to be withdrawn from the western bases. A large number of U-Boats had to be left for repairs in La Pallice and Bordeaux harbours. While on passage to these ports they suffered heavy losses as the enemy was able to use destroyers, aircraft and minelayers even close inshore, without interference. In the meantime nearly all the U-Boats had left for Norway or for operations. Only a few boats undergoing lengthy repairs had to be destroyed and their crews had mostly returned to Germany. The U-Boat War will be carried on from bases in Norway or Germany (Hamburg, Kiel, etc.). Preparations for this are in progress. The possibility of continuing operations from this area will depend on how far the expected enemy concentration of defences can be countered. The loss of the western bases will be felt most heavily if the U-Boat was has to be continued from Norway using the same types of U-Boats as before, being, as they are, so slow in under-water speed. The ability to use the newer types would, for the most part, defeat enemy counter-measures. Besides, the range of the new Type XXI U-Boats is so great that the would be able to operate in the same areas even without the use of the western bases.

11.11.44.

179 (a). Falling Strength of German Naval Forces - Gloomy Prospects

A report signed by Doenitz is summarizes below:

The development of the war at sea made it necessary in Spring, 1943, to consider which types of war craft were essential and to what extent these should be built. On 11.4.43, Hitler approving Doenitz' request for an annual output of 480 U-Boats, and to ensure the highest possible output, handed over the responsibility for construction to Speer with the following commission, dated 31.5.43, from the Führer-

"The development of the war at sea requires an accelerated increase in the construction of the U-Boat and light naval forces for defence and escort duties including escort duty for Armed Forces supplies and transports.

I therefore order:

U-Boat construction is to be increased rapidly to a figure of at least 40 U-Boats per month. Depending on the growth of the U-Boat fleet, the construction of the other craft mentioned is to be pursued according to the 11.4.43 programme. New construction and repair facilities, as well as training, supply and base installations, which this programme entails are to be created immediately. The Minister of Armaments and Munitions will ensure the allocation of raw materials, man-power, etc., in relation to the whole task of armament."

This was an emergency programme and comprised only essential naval craft which could be built in a short time. Output of the new U-Boat types had been planned as follows on 1.1.44:

U-Boat Type
1944
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.
XXI	-	-	-	3	9	18	27	31	31	33
XXIII	-	2	6	12	21	21	21	22	20	15

	But in October, 1944, the situation was.
	Type XXI Type XXIII.
	Planned 150 140
	Delivered 40 25
	Discrepancy 110 115

	Difficulties at the yards, in the supply industries, and recently transport delays through enemy air action, also shortages in men and materials, had the result that the requirements of the 1.1.44 plan could not be fulfilled, with the sole exception of R-Boats. Construction and preparation of small battle units (midget U-Boats, etc.) had been carried through with exemplary speed, but this had meant holding up building of destroyers.
	In the last few months the numbers of escort vessels had fallen, while construction of offensive vessels, above all the U-Boat, had not progressed with the hoped for speed. Thus the Navy was to-day considerably weaker than when the programme was drawn up.
	It was urgently necessary to have more escort vessels to defend coastal waters and war and merchant ships, which were increasingly threatened by enemy air power. The present strength was stretched to the utmost and losses on the sea routes could not be avoided.
	The enemy air forces apart from their bombs, torpedoes and guns, presented a special threat through extensive mining of the German sea-routes and U-Boat exercise areas. The mines were difficult to sweep.
	If this weakening of our forces developed to the extent that we were no longer masters of our own coastal waters, the following dangers would arise:
	(a) The supply and defence of Norway would be inadequate. In the long run we could not hold the country.
	(b) The war on shipping, our most important and at present our sole offensive weapon, would be rendered ineffective, because the new U-Boats could no longer be tested and trained in the Baltic and would have no safe outward and inward routes.
	(c) Supplies to Army Group North in the Baltic would be inadequate; Russian sea power threatens the whole German Baltic coast by landings.
	(d) Transport of raw materials and food from Norway and Denmark would be strangled; our internal supply situation would rapidly deteriorate by restriction of sea traffic to the German coast.
	These dangers threatened the whole conduct of the war; it would be necessary to use other forces as substitutes to fulfil those tasks hitherto performed by the Navy. For example forces of the other Armed Services would have to be used to strengthen coastal defences, above all on the defenceless Baltic coast, and existing shipping along the coast would have to be replaced by land traffic.

(C57405) X*2

SECTION VI

_____

JANUARY, 1945--APRIL, 1945

Jan. '45.	180. Development of U-Boat War between 1.7-31.12.1944 Review by Naval Staff
	The general withdrawal of all U-Boats from the Atlantic to home waters was made when the Western bases were lost. Considerable congestion resulted in dockyard repairs, and as a result few boats left home ports to go on patrol after September. The number of U-Boats at sea during October and November was thus far below the average for previous years, though actual losses were also less. It was not until December that boats left home ports in large numbers for operations. The first of the U-Boats formerly based at Western ports were sent on patrol from the beginning of January, 1945, on completion of repairs.
	It was discovered that Type VIIC boats fitted with "Schnorchel" could operate successfully close to the British coast, and even in the Channel.
	From November, 1944, the following operational areas were covered: Channel, Bristol Channel, Irish Sea, North Channel, Minch, the area round Scapa Flow and the North-East coast of England. These had not been covered since 1940.
	It was clear that shallow water was more suitable for operations than deep water - thus bearing out the results of experiments made in summer of 1944. Currents and density layering greatly hindered the efficiency of the detecting and hydrophone gear of A/S patrol vessels, so that the rarely made successful attacks on the U-Boats. Moreover, the shallow water off the English coast, with its concentration of shipping routes, offered the U-Boats greater chances of success.
	The U-boat successes reported during the most recent months were scored almost exclusively in these shallow waters, mainly in the Channel, the Irish Sea, the approaches to Halifax and Gibraltar.

	180 (a). Future Outlook - Baltic Threat
	The present developments on the Eastern Front threatened any extension of the U-Boat war. The Baltic - especially the eastern part containing the harbours of Danzig, Gdynia and Pillau - was the main area for training and fitting of U-Boats.
	Generally, the last few months had proved that attack was fully possible and successful, even with the old type of U-Boat, when fitted with the Schnorchel." The new (Walter) types of boat which should come into active service in the next few months, offered greater prospects.

	180 (b) Co-operation with German Air Force
	Reconnaissance by fast reconnaissance aircraft off the coast of Britain would have saved many fruitless sorties by U-Boats, and would certainly have increased successes.
	Boats of the "large" Type XXI were to be used mainly outside British coastal waters, and reconnaissance by G.A.F. would be essential.
	(End of Review by Naval Staff.)

3.01.45.	181. "Schnorchel" U-Boats
	Doenitz explained to Hitler that the "Schnorchel" U-Boats had proved capable of successes in areas which U-Boats had not been able to enter for over three years (Cherbourg area, Irish Sea, off Scapa Flow, Peterhead).
	Enemy counter-measures must be expected against U-Boat bases and yards, and approach routes.

17.01.45.	182. Insufficient Air Reconnaissance for U-Boats
	Section IL of Operations Division, Naval Staff, reported the result of a conference on the provision of aircraft for reconnaissance. The East coast of England was covered.
	At present it was not possible to cover the West coast.
	Aircraft were being built for reconnaissance in the Atlantic.
	The Chief of Technical Air Armament considered that C.-in-C., Navy, should speak to Goering and Speer on the need for Do.635 type aircraft.

18.01.45.	183. Operations with the "Schnorchel"
	Doenitz stated that VIIC "Schnorchel" boats would shortly be sent into the Channel against Thames-Antwerp supply traffic, although the area was dangerous.

21.01.45.	184. Operations off Gibraltar - "Schnorchel" again
	Doenitz told Hitler that the recent success of a U-Boat off Gibraltar gave impressive proof of the operational capabilities of the Schnorchel U-Boat, and the new types. In attempting to break through this area, U-Boats had previously incurred losses of 60 to 80 per cent.; now, one single boat could remain there 10 days and be very successful.

21.01.45.	185. Fuel Shortage - Immobilizing of Big Ships
	Doenitz mentioned to Hitler the serious Naval oil situation. To ensure U-Boats being ready to sail on 27th January, he had already had to encroach on the fuel of "Sheer" and "Luetzow," which would thereby be immobilsed.

22.01.45.	186. Proposal to allocate U-Boat Personnel to Land Warfare
	In view of the desperate situation, Doenitz offered to Hitler to send the U-Boat Training Division from Gdynia (about 900 non-commissioned officers and 600 men) to the land front to defend Danzig.
	Hitler declined, on the grounds that these men were valuable specialists, and every U-Boat in action against the enemy would mean more than any action at the front by them.

23.01.43.	187. Danzig Bay - Anxiety
	Doenitz told Hitler that it was essential to the continuance of the U-Boat war that the Bay of Danzig be held.

26.01.45.	188. Worries about Loss of Silesia (U-Boat Production)
	After discussion with Speer, Doenitz reported to Hitler on the position of new U-Boat constructions, in view of the threat to the Upper Silesian industrial area. If lost, only 170 Type XXI boats and 70 Type XXIII boats, including boats already delivered, could be completed. Doenitz asked Hitler that the new U-Boat construction programme should be placed on an equal footing with the emergency armament programme (in which U-Boat repair was already included). Hitler approved and said Speer would see to it.

28.01.45.	189. U-Boat Operations
	In the presence of Doenitz and Hitler, Kapitan zur See Assmann reported on the present state of U-Boat operations. Doenitz said that four U-Boats returning from patrolling British waters were now expected in Norway.
	Although it was hoped that they would return, the loss of these boats would not lead to an alteration of the operational areas. From Y-Service reports, it appeared that in these areas a number of successes had been scored, which encouraged intensive operations, especially as shipping losses so near their coast must be very unpleasant to the British.
	It could be assumed that the enemy would combat the U-Boat chiefly by deep-set mines, which, however, would affect shipping (high tides, breaking away of mines by currents, ineffective control of areas). To counter this danger the U-Boats would work in an operational area quite near the coast of Britain, or on known convoy routes. Unless further serious damage was done to yards in the near future, another 60 U-Boats would be ready to sail by the end of February. The first Type XXIII boat was due to sail to the East Coast of England from Oslo on 29th January.

28.01.45.	190. Fuel Oil Position
	The serious oil situation was emphasized and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces promised to do all in his power to see that the 60 U-Boats due for operations in February had the oil they needed.

11.02.45.	191. U-Boats Operating off the English Coast - Performance
	At a discussion with Hitler, Doenitz stated that in recent U-Boat operations off the English coast, seven U-Boats had been lost, but it was estimated that for each U-Boat an average of 4.4 ships, mostly steamers, had been sunk, and he considered the losses justified. The cause of the U-Boat losses was not yet clear; he did not consider that the enemy had found some new method of conducting attacks on submerged U-Boats.

16.02.45.	192. Prospects of the U-Boat War
	In connection with U-Boat successes in the Arctic against PQ convoys, Doenitz reported to Hitler that the sinkings in all operational areas per boat per month, namely 9,000 tons in December, 1944, and 11,000 tons in January, 1945, equaled the achievements at the peak of the U-Boat war. The total sinkings, however, were considerably lower, because of the small number of U-Boats at present in operational areas and because of the long periods submerged

(C57405) z*3

	on passage to and from these areas. These periods would be greatly shortened when the "Walter" types of U-Boat came into commission. In the next few months the number of operational boats would increase by about 60 per month. At present 237 U-Boats were being prepared for operations, of these 111 were old type, 84 of Type XXI and 42 of Type XXIII. The present total number of 450 U-Boats in commission was the highest that Germany had ever possessed.

17.02.45.	193. Advantages of the "Schnorchel"
	Doenitz reported to Hitler the result of recent operations round the coast of Britain by seven U-Boats. These boats had operated in narrow waters close to the shore in calm weather, and all reported enemy anti-submarine defence to be weak. Doenitz's opinion was that the introduction of the "Schnorchel" had greatly reduced the enemy's superiority in A/S measures.

	193 (a). Numbers
	Since the beginning of February, 1945, 35 boats had proceeded to the operational areas, with another 23 to follow by the end of the month. Two boats of Type XXIII were at present operating off the East Coast of Britain and the first boat of Type XXI should start for the American East Coast at the beginning of March.
	Doenitz explained the new policy of operating the old type U-Boats (with low submerged speed) for patrols off enemy harbours.

17.02.45.	194. Doenitz still Optimistic for the Future
	Hitler wanted the U-Boat offensive to be resumed at once to relieve the general situation. Doenitz pointed out that the intensification of attacks by U-Boats was now largely a question of dockyard capacity. It was essential that allocation of coal and electricity to the yards should be given absolute priority.
	Doenitz again vaunted the Walter boats, which "would be able to go from Germany to Japan without ever appearing on the surface." Their capacity to remain unseen would "revolutionize naval warfare." Hitler was impressed.

20.02.45.	195. Baltic - Russian Advance Threatens U-Boat Training
	When discussing with Doenitz the future conduct of land warfare on the Eastern Front, Hitler asked him to assess the importance to the naval war of the harbours of Stettin and Swinemünde.
	Doenitz stated that these ports were vital to the Navy's supply tasks in the Eastern Baltic, and if lost, the time for turn around of supply ships would be doubled, as they would have to use the ports of the Western Baltic.
	It would no longer be possible to use the deep water east of Bornholm as a U-Boat training area, and the boats would have to use the shallow and therefore unsuitable waters of the Western Baltic for training. The loss of these ports would also seriously impair the already reduced repair facilities, and make the overcrowded bases in the Western Baltic more than ever vulnerable to air attacks. The ports must therefore be held at all costs; Hitler therefore issued orders to the Army in this sense.

23.02.45.	196. Defense of U-Boat Building Yard at Bremen - Anxiety
	Doenitz was worried about boomerang air attacks on the Deschimag building yards, and asked for better protection by provision of more night fighters and jamming transmitters. It wa agreed to do this.

23.02.45.	197. State of U-Boat Building and Repairs
	At this date there were 177 operational U-Boats, 237 boats in training and undergoing trials (of the latter 111 were old boats). Also 114 building and 23 boats being refitted; total, 551 boats. Doenitz pointed out that within a few months there would be 350 operational boats, but he was worried about the shortage of repair facilities.

24.02.45.	198. Effect of "Schnorchel" on the U-Boat War
	In Doenitz's review of the whole U-Boat war, he stated that before the "Schnorchel," the U-Boat was not a "submarine," but a "Diver," that is to say, the boat spent only part of its time submerged. Now U-Boats were in fact pure submarines and powerful weapons.

26.02.45.	199. Serious Loss of New Boats at Bremen
	Doenitz said that the air attacks on the Wesser Werft on 25th February had been the fifth since 17th February, and that so far five boats of Type XXI had been lost there. More night fighters were being sent to protect the area.

1.03.45.	200. U-Boat Policy
	Concentration of U-Boat operations is one area was undesirable, in that it enabled the enemy to concentrate A/S measures. But as Germany could not operate the VIIC anywhere else, because its low speed when submerged, an extension of operational areas to split up enemy A/S measures could only be made with the introduction of Type XXI. If Germany had still posessed the Biscay coast, the VIICs would be able to operate in more distant areas, e.g., off the American coast. It did not appear that the enemy, as yet, had any new means of detecting or combating U-Boats, but would do all in their power to fight them in their home waters. The fact that "situation reports" were not received from U-Boats until shortly before, or even after, their return to base, made it very difficult to form a current picture.

2.03.45.	201. Expectation of Results with New Type U-Boats
	Doenitz reported to Hitler that bigger U-Boat losses must be expected with the old type U-Boats operating off the coast of Britain, as enemy defence measures were very concentrated. He suggested that the announcement of tonnage sunk by U-Boats should be limited to amounts of about 50,000 tons on each occasion. This would lull the enemy against bigger results to be expected from the new boats, which would not operate in any numbers until April.

16.03.45.	202. Disposition of U-Boats - Last Minute Hopes
	The first Type XXI boat would sail on operations "in the next few days," and six more in April. Doenitz intended a group of 8 to 10 Type IXC boats to be ready for operations at the end of March - beginning of April to intercept convoys between America and Britain. According to reports from German U-Boats, there was no longer any enemy air cover west of 15° West. It appeared desirable therefore to penetrate this area as soon as possible, firstly to achieve surprise, and secondly to cause the enemy to weaken his A/S defence, at present concentrated in British coastal waters. Experience pointed to recent German U-Boat losses being substantially caused by enemy mines. The best remedy was to operate in shallow water (where the enemy could not lay mines because of his own shipping). Departure of the first Type XXI U-Boat took place on this date. Good reports were received of the performance of the Type XXIII boat; she had escaped an attack at nine knots, later, at silent running speed, and had not been detected.

28.03.45.	203. Doenitz's Views on Pre-War Building Programme
	With the Third Reich on the point of collapse, Doenitz and Hitler were involved in a detailed discussion of the appropriateness of naval construction before the war. Doenitz thought the building of battleships instead of more U-Boats had been a mistake; "for, in battleships we could never have caught up with our opponents, while a superior U-Boat Arm would have given us the chance of winning the war quickly."

8.04.45.	204. Re-disposition of U-Boats
	Twenty-five U-Boats were in operational areas, 37 outward bound, 23 returning home, 16 more lay in Norwegian ports ready to sail. Total 101. Even the strong concentration of enemy A/S defences in British coastal waters did not ensure location of German U-Boats, but when a U-Boat had revealed her presence by an attack, her underwater speed was too low to allow her to escape. Doenitz therefore intended to operate Type VII in the open sea west of the British Isles and Type IX to comb out the area on the Great Circle route towards America. By this surprise disposition of U-Boats, Doenitz hoped to evade the enemy's defence.
	Doenitz asked the Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces to put at his disposal another 3,000 tons of Diesel oil from the O.K.W. reserve for the first 10 days of April, otherwise the U-Boats required for operations would be immobilized. Chief of Staff, O.K.W. would do all he could to help.

10.4.45.	205. Grave Losses of New Boats through Air Raids
	Doenitz was convinced that the long-awaited systematic air attacks by the enemy on German ports and U-Boat yards had begun. Since 30th March, 24 24 U-Boats had been destroyed in ports and yards and another 12 damaged. Of the sunk U-Boats, nine were the precious Type XXI,. of which four were to have sailed in April.

	______________

	On this note of gloom the record ends.

(C57405) x*4

APPENDIX A

TABLE I

PLAN FOR U-BOAT BUILDING - 22.11.39

Raeder gave Hitler a review of planned U-Boat construction figures, as follows:


Date.	Increase.	Total at beginning of Month.	U-Boats Employed in Training.	Boats at Disposal of F/O U.	Opera-tional U-Boats	All over 10 per cent Losses.	Total at End of Month.

11.39	1	57	12	45	15	3	52
1.40	2	52	18	34	11	3	49
4.40	3	51	24	27	9	3	48
7.40	5	51	37	14	5	1	50
10.40	6	63	42	21	7	2	61
1.41	13	88	55	33	11	3	85
4.41	18	113	55	58	19	6	107
10.41	26	191	75	116	39	12	179
3.42	27	253	75	191	64	19	245
10.42	29	312	75	237	79	24	288
3.43	29	334	75	259	86	26	308
7.43	29	347	75	277	91	27	320

TABLE 2

REVIEW OF U-BOATS IN COMMISSION SINCE SEPTEMBER, 1939

U-BOAT FIGURES - 1.11.40


Date.	Total U-Boats	No. of U-Boats Used in Operations.	New Construc-tions.	Losses.	Estimated Sinking Successes

					G.R.T.
9.39	57	45	2	2	171,000
10.39	52	31	-	5	134,000
11.39	53	31	2	1	66.000
12.39	55	25	3	1	125,000
1.40	54	30	1	2	139,000
2.40	50	37	1	5	258,000
3.40	51	30	2	1	101,000
4.40	49	34	3	5	52,000
5.40	52	24	3	-	77,000
6.40	52	27	3	3	470,000
7.40	54	19	3	1	277,000
8.40	57	21	5	2	421,000
9.40	64	23	7	-	292,000
10.40	69	23	7	2	350,000

TABLE 3

STATE OF U-BOATS ON 26.1.41

	U-Boats
Total of	379
On operations	48
On training	48
With U-Boat Acceptance Command (U.A.K.)	52
Under construction	231
Total	379

TABLE 4

DISPOSITION OF OPERATIONAL U-BOATS - 10.11.42

Of operational U-Boats 57 at sea
	(a)	N. Atlantic	38
		of which in operational area	22
		Greenland	8
		N.E. Azores	9
		Iceland Area	3
		Newfoundland Area	2
		Outbound	3
		Incoming	13
	(b)	S. Atlantic	5
		(of which 1 outbound).
	(c)	Arctic	4
		E. Mediterranean	6
		On way to W. Mediterranean	4
Further boats to make up the number of 9 in Eastern and 12 in Western Mediterranean will as ready.
Twenty-seven operational boats were in harbour
of which:
		At Kiel	5
		At Lorient	10
		At St. Nazaire	7
		At Brest	5

		Total losses up to 10.11.41	51

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL U-BOATS IN 1941

16.1.41	North Channel	(+ 1 en route)	7
	At Lorient		9
	At Kiel		5
		Total	22

1.6.41	Northern Area		11
	Southern Area
	Off Freetown		4
	Off Cape Verde		3
	At Lorient		7
	At Kiel		6
	At Wilhelmshaven		9
			1
		Total	41

Thirteen more U-Boats would become operational by June 15th.

TABLE 6

U-BOAT NUMBERS AND DISPOSITION ON 11.2.42

The following data were prepared by Naval Staff for Raeder's conference:
Number of operational U-Boats			106
of which:
	1. In Harbours. Total		32
		(a) In western French harbours	29
		(b) In Kiel	3
	2. In Mediterranean. Total		21
		(a) In operational area (coast of Cyrenaica)	5
		(b) Returning from patrol	4
		(c) In Italian harbours	12
	3. Norway - Scotland/Iceland. Total		18
		(a) In North Sea	6
		(b) In Trondheim	1
		(c) North Scotland/Iceland	7
		(d) Northern North Sea outward bound-
		Bound for N. America	4
	4. American Coast. Total		35
		(a) In operational area	9
		(b) Returning from patrol	14
		(c) Outward bound (of which 6 to West Indies	12

Losses. Total to date, 73. Losses in January, 5; of which 4 in Mediterranean. Monthly overall average since September, 1939, is 2-5 boats per month.

TABLE 7

U-BOAT BUILDING PROGRAMME, 1940-1942


	1940									1941												1942			Total

Month	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	I	II	III

Type II C
250 tons	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	1	1														18

Type VII B/C
517 tons	2	1	-	1	2	3	3	3	6	9	9	14	9	17	14	13	14	16	12	15	14	9	5		191

Type VIID
Torpedo-mining U-Boat																	1	2	3						6

Type IX B/C
740 tons	-	2	1-	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	3	4	4	4	6	5	6	6	5	3	2	-		65

Type IX D
Long-distance U-Boat																					1	1	1	1	4

Type X B
1,060 tons Mining U-boat													1			1			1			1			4

Type XIV
1,670 cu.m. U-Boat tanker																				1	1	1	1		4

Total of all Boats	3	4	3	2	6	7	6	8	10	13	12	17	14	21	18	20	20	24	22	21	19	14	7	1	292

N.I.D. Note. In addition to the above programme, 20 U-Boats of type VII were built without using the material set aside for that programme.

TABLE 8

U-BOAT CONSTRUCTION PLAN FOR 1942 AND 1943 - DATED 12.3.42


		Original Plan.	Limited Plan.	Curtailed Plan.


	I	58	53	53
1942{	II	61	57	50
1942{	II	68	51	45
	IV	76	62	45

	I	66	62	45
1943{	II	72	58	45
1943{	III	61	50	45
	IV	65	49	45

Total		527	452	373

The difference between the original and the curtailed plan -- 154.


	Original Plan.		Plan Proposed in December		Curtailed Plan (dated 2.42).
	Original Plan.		Plan Proposed in December		1942.		1943.		1944.

	Monthly.	Yearly.	Monthly.	Yearly.	Monthly.	Yearly.	Monthly.	Yearly.	Monthly.	Yearly.

Large U-Boats	6	72	5	60	3	36	3	36	3	36

Medium U-Boats	19	228	15	180	12	144	12	144	12	144

The number of 15 U-Boats a month was so small in view of the increased enemy A/S measures it would soon not replace losses. It should also be noted that only Types VII C and IX C were catered for; U-Tankers , etc., would be necessary and these required more raw material, so that in effect the numbers were more like 12-13 a month.

TABLE 9

STATE OF U-BOATS ON 12.6.42

Operational:
At base
French ports	24
Germany, Norway	25
Mediterranean	18
	--	67
On Patrol		64
Training boats		55
Building		137
Total		323	boats.

Losses (total)		82
Scrapped		5

TABLE 7

SURVEY OF U-BOAT LOSSES PER MONTH FROM SEPTEMBER, 1939, AUGUST, 1942 (DATED 24.8.42)


	1939				1940												1941												1942
Month	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

(a) Total number of boats operational each month	40	40	40	40	33	45	44	46	32	29	27	27	26	27	22	23	21	22	30	32	36	60	64	75	75	81	86	90	101	111	122	124	128	141	153	168

(b) Number of boats lost per month (all areas)	2	5	1	1	1	4	3	4	2	1	1	3	1	0	3	0	0	0	5	1	2	4	0	3	3	1	4	10	5	2	5	4	3	2	9	10

(c) Percentage loss	5	12.5	2.5	2.5	3	8	7	8	6	3.5	3.5	11	3.5	0	14	0	0	0	17	3	5.5	6.5	0	4	4	1	5	11	5	1.8	4.1	3.3	3.4	1.4	5.9	6.0

BOAT LOSSES

1.	Total of boats put into operation since beginning of war	304	boats.
2.	Total losses since beginning of war	105	boats.
3.	Monthly average loss	2.9	boats.
4.	Monthly average ratio of losses to number of operational boats	4.9	boats.

PERSONNEL LOSSES


	Officers	Warrant Officers of Commissioned Rank	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Ratings.	Total.

Dead	185	184	515	1,075	1,959

P.O.W.	112	113	323	600	1,148

Missing	63	59	192	382	696

Total losses	360	356	1,030	2,057	3,803

TABLE 11

STATE OF U-BOATS ON 24.12.42

Operational:
At base	100
On passage to and from operational areas	47
In operational areas	63
Total	210	boats.
Training boats	53
Working up trials	119
Total	382	boats.
Losses (monthly average 3.8)	147
Scrapped	9

N.I.D. Note. Tables 12-19 inclusive are an approximate six-monthly report on the state of U-Boats from 1942-44. These tables were extracted from monthly reports given by Doenitz during this period.

TABLE 12

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.1.42


Type:	II.	VIIa.	VIIb/c.	VIId.	IXb/c.	XB.	XIV.	Total.

In commission	--	--	71	--	19	--	--	90
Trials	--	--	64	4	27	3	2	100
Training	40	4	12	--	2	--	--	58

	40	4	147	4	48	3	2	248

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS ON 1.1.42

	In Area.	En Route.	Returning.
North Atlantic	6	13	3
South Atlantic	--	--	--
Mediterranean	9	1	1
Northern Waters	3	1	--
	18	15	4

Total 37. Remainder in port.

TABLE 13

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.6.42


Type:	II.	VIIa.	VIIb/c.	VIId.	IXb/c.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XIV.	Total.

In commission	--	--	71	--	--	--	--	1	1	128
Trials	--	--	64	4	27	1	4	3	5	124
Training	40	4	12	--	2	--	--	--	--	59

	40	4	147	4	48	1	4	4	6	311

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.6.42

Atlantic	88
Mediterranean	19
Norwegian Area	21
	128

TABLE 14

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.12.42


Type:	II.	VIIa.	VIIb/c.	VIId.	IXb/c.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XIV.	Total.

In commission	2	--	140	3	48	--	3	2	5	203
Trials	--	--	82	--	20	2	5	1	--	110
Training	35	4	21	--	2	--	--	--	--	62

	37	4	243	3	70	2	8	3	5	375

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.12.42

Atlantic	154
Mediterranean	24
Norwegian Area	23
Black Sea	2
	203

TABLE 15

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.2.43


Type:	II.	VIIa.	VIIb/c.	VIId.	IXb/c.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XIV.	Total.

In commission	3	--	153	3	52	--	4	2	5	222
Trials	--	--	93	--	21	2	6	2	1	125
Training	35	4	21	--	2	--	--	--	--	62

	38	4	267	3	75	2	10	4	6	409

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.2.43

Atlantic	178
Mediterranean	23
Northern Waters	18
Black Sea	3
	232

TABLE 16

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.4.43


Type:	II.	VIIa.	VIIb/c.	VIId.	IXb/c.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XIV.	Total.

In commission	3	--	166	3	50	2	7	3	6	240
Trials	--	--	89	--	18	--	6	2	3	118
Training	33	4	28	--	2	--	--	--	--	67

	36	4	283	3	70	2	13	5	9	425

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.4.43

Atlantic	194
Mediterranean	17
Northern Waters	21
Black Sea	3
	235

TABLE 17

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.12.43


Type:	II.	VIIa.	VIIb/c.	VIIf.	VIId.	IXb/c.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XIV.	XVII.	Total.

In commission	6	--	115	--	2	29	--	7	1	1	--	161
On Trials	--	--	130	4	--	25	--	7	1	1	--	168
Training	33	3	49	--	--	3	--	--	--	--	2	90

	39	3	294	4	2	57	--	14	2	2	2	419

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.12.43

Atlantic	129
Mediterranean	14
Northern Waters	12
Black Sea	6
	161

TABLE 18

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.6.44


Type:	II.	VII.	VIIb/c.	VIId.	VIIf.	IXb/c.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XIV.	XVII.	Total.

In commission	6	--	128	2	3	28	2	9	2	1	--	181
On Trials	--	--	135	--	--	27	--	8	1	--	4	175
Training	31	3	49	--	--	4	--	--	--	--	--	87

	37	3	312	2	3	59	2	17	3	1	4	443

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.6.44

Atlantic (including 40 of Group Landwirt)	108
Mediterranean	11
Northern Waters	56
Black Sea	6
	181

TABLE 19

NUMBERS OF U-BOATS OF DIFFERENT TYPES - 1.12.44


Type:	II.	VII.	VIIc.	VIId.	VIIf.	IX.	IXc.	IXd1.	IXd2.	XB.	XVII.	XXI.	XXIII.	Total.

In commission	--	--	96	1	1	--	34	1	6	1	--	--	--	140
On Trials	--	--	88	--	--	--	10	--	5	1	4	40	22	170
Training	28	2	66	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	101

	28	2	250	1	1	2	44	1	11	2	4	43	22	411

DISTRIBUTION OF U-BOATS - 1.12.44

Atlantic	92
Mediterranean	0
Black Sea	0
Gulf of Finland	16
	140

TABLE 20

U-BOAT LOSSES IN THE BALTIC, MEDITERRANEAN AND THE ATLANTIC

FROM SEPTEMBER, 1939, TO OCTOBER, 1943


Date.		Total Losses.	Baltic.	Mediterranean.	Atlantic.

1.9.39-	30.09.42	112	9(3)	10	93
	3.11.42	130	9(3)	12	109
	31.12.42	144	11(4)	16	117(1)
	31.01.43	150	11(4)	16	123(1)
	31.03.43	177	11(4)	21	145(1)
	30.04.43	187	11(4)	23	153(1)
	31.05.43	225	13(6)	23	189(1)
	30.06.43	247	13(6)	27	207(1)
	31.08.43	305	13(6)	31	261(1)
	30.09.43	326	16(9)	32	278(1)
	31.10.43	334	16(9)	34	294(1)

(The figures in brackets indicate losses other than by enemy action.)

TABLE 21

TABLE SHOWING ESTIMATED MONTHLY SINKINGS OF ALLIED SHIPPING BY U-BOATS FROM DECEMBER, 1939 TO FEBRUARY, 1944


Month.	Number of Operational Boats.	Average Number of Days at Sea per Month.	Total Tonnage Claimed Sunk.	Average Tonnage Sunk per Boat per Day.

			G.R.T.	G.R.T.
1939
December	19	10.6	125,325	6,600

1940
January	--	--	--	--
February	34	13	258,317	585
March	28	15	101,018	240
April	37	19.6	52,000	585
May	24	10	77,073	321
June	28	19.7	469,599	851
July	17	19.4	276,765	840
August	21	19.2	421,557	1,045
September	24	16.3	376,684	963
October	25	15.3	492,354	1,287
November	--	--	--	--
December	16	19.0	345,125	1,135

1941
January	16	15.6	111,473	447
February	21	14.2	224,605	659
March	23	17.0	350,988	898

1942
March	73	19.2	510,992	354
April	79	18.0	464,600	327
May	80	22.5	683,701	380
June	93	19.1	778,231	438
July	99	19.9	504,480	356
August	129	19.5	652,395	280
September	139	20.2	643,869	229
October	159	20.2	728,265	220
November	145	18.5	801,446	329
December	149	19.5	403,742	139

1943
January	147	19.1	364,441	128
February	173	17.5	447,810	148
March	171	19.8	779,533	230
April	177	18.3	410,272	127
May	181	18.5	324,126	95
June	122	18.6	66,822	29
July	115	20.9	272,802	113
August	84	19.3	71,269	44
September	94	17.8	78,470	47
October	122	20.6	106,955	43
November	112	18.7	49,000	23
December	93	20.4	97,388	51

1944
January	98	19.6	57,797	30
February	101	18.9	133,685	70

APPENDIX B

N.I.D. Note. Only the principal German officers and officials are mentioned in this report. The following is a list of the names that occur, and the positions held between 1939 and 1943.

ASSMANN, Heinz.
1939.		Korvettenkapitän, with seniority dating from 1.4.38.
1.4.42.		Fregattenkapitän.
1942.		Operations Division, Naval Staff.
1.6.43.		Kapitan zur See.
1944.		Admiralstabsoffizier, Group East.
20.7.44.		Wounded in attempt on Hitler's life.

von BAUMBACH.
1909.		Fregattenkapitän, with seniority dating from 1.4.38.
1.1.40.		Kapitan zur See.
1942.		Was in the Intelligence Section, Naval Staff; Naval Attache, Moscow, Special duties in Black Sea.

DONITZ, Karl.
1939.		Konteradmiral. Senior Officer, U-Boat Command.
27.9.40		Vizeadmiral.
15.3.42.		Admiral
30.1.43.		Grossadmiral. Replaced Raeder as C.-in-C. of the navy, but retained direct control over U-Boat operations.
1.5.45.		Assumed position of Führer and Reich Chancellor; in succession to Hitler.

von FISCHEL, Hermann.
1939.		Vizeadmiral, with seniority dating from 1.4.38. Head of General Naval Office, Supreme Command of the navy
1940.		Head of New Constructions Trial Command
1.9.41.		Promoted Admiral.
1941-42.		Reported to be Admiral, Channel Coast.
30.6.43.		Retired.

FRICKE, Kurt.
1939.		Konteradmiral.
1.6.41.		Vizeadmiral, Chief of Naval Staff.
1.4.42.		Admiral.
3.43.		Appointed C.-in-C., Naval Group South, in succession to Admiral Schutter. Was succeeded as Chief of Naval Staff by Vizeadmiral Meisel.
1945.		Retired. Succeeded as C.-in-C., Naval Group South, by Löwisch.

FUCHS, Werner.
1939.		Konteradmiral, with seniority dating from 1.10.38.
7.39.		Director of Operations.
8.39.		Head of Naval Construction Section.
1.12.40.		Vizeadmiral.
7.41.		Chief German Naval Liaison Officer with Italian Navy (Heindisi).
1.4.42.		Admiral. C.-in-C. German Naval Command, Italy.
1944.		Head of "Marine Rustung/K Hauptamt Kriegsachiffbau" (Naval Construction Dept. Okm, H.Q., Warship Construction). Attached C.-in-C., German Navy, for special duties.
8.1.45.		Awarded Ritterkreuz of Kriegsverdienstkreuz with Swords "for his exceptional services for the expansion of our naval forces and in particular of the U-Boat arm in five years of war."

KRANCKE, Theodor.
1939.		Kapitan zur See, with seniority dating from 1.4.37.
1941.		C.O., "Admiral Scheer."
1.4.42.		Vizeadmiral. Quartiermeister, Head of Adm/Qu., and C.-in-C. navy's representative at Hitler's Headquarters.
1.3.43.		Admiral.
6.43.		C.-in-C., Naval Group West.
4.45.		C.-in-C., Norway. C.-in-C., M.O.K. West.

LANGE, Werner.
1939.		Kapitan zur See. C.O., "Emden," until July, 1939.
21.4.41.		Konteradmiral.
17.10.42.		On staff of Flag Officer, U-Boats, Berlin.
1.4.43.		Vizeadmiral. From February, 1943 until October, 1944, Admiral, Aegean H.Q., Athens.
1945.		Admiral, Western Baltic. Relieved april, 1945, attached OKM/M for special duties.

MAERTENS.
1939.		Kapitän zur See.
1.7.40.		Konteradmiral.
1.9.42.		Vizeadmiral.
1943.		Reported to be "General Director of Communications Dept. of the Waffenamt"(Amts=gruppe Technischen Nachrichtenwesen der Kriegsmarine Rüstung).
1944.		C.O. Naval Arsenal, Kiel.
28.2.45.		Dismissed.

MEISEL, Wilhelm.
1939.		Kapitan zur See, with seniority dating from 1.8.38.
1941.		C.O., "Admiral Hipper."
1.9.42.		Konteradmiral.
1.4.44		Admiral.
1944.		Chief of Naval Staff until May, 1945.

von PUTTKAMER, Karl Jesko.
1939.		Fregattenkapitän, with seniority dating from 1.11.39.
4.10.39.		Naval Aide to Hitler.
21.4.41.		Kapitan zur See.
1.9.43.		Konteradmiral.
7.44		Wounded in explosion at Hitler's H.Q.

RAEDER, Erich.
1939.		Grossadmiral, with seniority dating from 1.4.39. C.-in-C., German Navy.
30.1.43.		Doenitz replaced him as C.-in-C., German Navy. Appointed Admiral-Inspector.

Reichsminister SPEER.
		Born 19 March, 1905
		Before the war - Architect.
1942.		Appointed by Hitler as head of the Organisation Todt; Reichsminister for Armaments and War Production; Chairman of the Central Planning Office.

WAGNER, Gerhard.
1916.		Entered German Navy.
1.4.35		Korvettenkapitän.
1937.		S.O. Torpedo Boats.
1.1.39.		Fregattenkapitän, from April was Director of Operations at Admiralty.
1.4.40.		Kapitan zur See.
1.3.43.		Konteradmiral, Head of Operations Division, Admiralty.
28.6.44.		Admiral for Special Duties with C.-in-C., Navy, attended all meetings with Hitler.

____________________________

APPENDIX C

_______

LIST OF SOURCES FROM WHICH THIS REPORT HASA BEEN COMPILED

KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft IV 1940 (1939-1940) U-Bootskreigsführung		P.G./332,011/N.I.D.
Teil C Heft VII Uberlegungen des Chefs der Skl und Niederschriften über Besprechungen mit dem Führer. 1939/40.		P.G./32,183/N.I.D.
B.d.U. Befehle und Absichten 1939-40		P.G./32,419a/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil C/1941 Heft VII Niederschriften Chef Skl. Pruf Nr. 1		P.G./32,185/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft IV 1941 U-Bootskrieg Pruf Nr. 1		P.G./32,173/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft VII Uberlegungen des Chefs der Skl. Pruf Nr. ii 1941 and 1942		P.G./32,186/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft IV 1942 U-Bootskrieg Pruf Nr. 1		P.G./32,174/N.I.D.
Lagebetrachtung der Skl vom 20.10.42 mit Anlagen		P.G./32,621/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl TEil C Heft IV 1943/44 Niederschriften Schef Skl, Vortäge beim Führer. Pruf Nr. 1.		P.G./31,744/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft IV 1943 (1943-44) U-Bootskreig Pruf Nr. 1		P.G./32,175/N.I.D.
Chefsachen Lagen U-Boote Band 3 1943		P.G./33,330/N.I.D.
Denkschrift des Chefs der Skl vom 8.6.43		P.G./33,964/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft VII 1943 (1944) Heiderschriften Chef Skl. Vortäge beim Führer, Pruf Nr. 2.		P.G./32,188/N.I.D.
Hauptamt Kreigsschifbau (1943)		__
KTB 1 Skl Teil C Heft IV 1944, U-Bootskrieg Pruf Nr. 1		P.G./32,176/N.I.D.
1 Skl Iu Akte Invasion. Gruppe Landwirt		P.G./33,339/N.I.D.
1 Skl Iu Akte Landwirt		P.G./33,340/N.I.D.
Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkrafte Anfang Nov., 1944		P.G./31,778/N.I.D.
KTB 1 Skl Teil IV 1945		P.G./31,752/N.I.D.
Niederschriften des Admiral a.b.V. beim Ob.d.M. 1945		P.G./31,802/N.I.D.
B.d.U. Logs 1939-1945		__
1 Skl Iu U-Bootsoperationen (3 Vols.)		P.G./33,325-7/N.I.D.
1 Skl Iu Chefsachen. 1 Aligemeines		P.G./33,416/N.I.D.
Minensicherung Polarküste. Op 14-3p. pp. 186 et seq		P.G./33,293/N.I.D.
1 Skl Seekriegslagen Luftlagen		P.G./33,971/N.I.D.
Loose letter from Hauptamt Kreigsshiffbau, signed Fuchs		__
Ob.d.M. Persönlich Heft I 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942. Akten Raeder		__

(C57405) 100 3/46