SM U-94 - 3rd War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

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Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
29 Jul 17	08.10	60°16'N, 1°25'E	INGEBORG	1,207	Danish
29 Jul 17	20.55	61°29.5'N, 0°42'E	ADALIA	3,847	British
30 Jul 17	08.31	61°27'N, 0°38'W	MANCHESTER INVENTOR	4,112	British
30 Jul 17	16.30	61°34'N, 0°55'W	SOUMA	2,200	Russian
30 Jul 17	19.40	61°46.5'N, 0°35'W	KILDIN	1,640	Russian
6 Aug 17	23.33	55°28'N, 10°49'W	ARGALIA	4,641	British
12 Aug 17	0x.18	56°05'N, 10°13'W	LYNORTA	3,684	British
16 Aug 17	0x.20	60°10'N, 1°53'E	SVANHOLM	1,400	Danish
			Total = 21,331
Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

	- 1 -
				Control No.   3
			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
				of the
			Command S.M.U-Boot "U 94"
			Kommandant:     Kapitänleutnant Saalwächter
				Beginning:    26.7.17
				Ending:        19.8.17
			Enclosures:
			1)  Torpedo consumption list.
			2)  Artillery consumption list.
			3)  Mechanical consumption list.
				© U-boat Archive 2023 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 2 -
		26.07.17	Borkum Roadstead
		x.40 PM		Test dive with Flottillenchef on board.
		x.50 PM	Misty, Wind 0, Sea 0	Departed through Riffgat, behind torpedo boats with gear steered via Point M, O to P.
			Foggy, scattered heavy fog, N 2, Sea 1	Gear recovered.  Mine.  Anchored.
		[117/118 gamma 7 = 53.34, 4.25]		Gear deployed again.  Steered further up to 117/118 gamma where torpedo boats come about because position buoys were not sighted.  Battery fully charged at anchor.
		0x.55 PM	[067 gamma 7 = 54.25, 3.8]	Went to depth 33 meters; speed 4.2 knots.  Course 285° to 067 gamma.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		27.07.17
		x.50 AM	WSW 4. Sea 3, misty	Surfaced.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 54°16'N
			Long.  = 3°31'E
		x.20 PM		1 Drehebel mine 100 meters to port.
				Course for the meeting area for especially important steamers in the service of the Admiralty.
		x.50 PM	062 beta V. [54.3, 1.75]	4 patrol vessels ahead.  Avoided to the south and west on the surface.
		x.30 PM	033 beta V. [54.25, 1.4167]	5 patrol vessels 5 Strich [56.25°] to port. Avoided to the north on the surface.  Nothing sighted in the meeting area.
			WSW 2, Sea 1, rain
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		28.07.17
		x.50 AM	WSW 3, Sea 2, Vis. changing	Sending of Radio Message to Arcona concerning position, observations and weather conditions put off to the afternoon due to sighting of the patrol vessels.
		x.47 AM	134 alfa V. [55.95, 2.4167]	Submerged U-boat 4 Strich [45°] to port 300 meters; avoided to the east.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 57°01'N
			Long.  = 2°55'E
			WNW 1, Sea 1, overcast
		x.25 PM -		Test dive and depth control training to teach the new personnel.  Course to meeting point of the Norway - England convoys, that should be reached at 06.00 AM.
		x.55 PM
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		29.07.17
		6.08 AM	W 1, Sea 0-1, Vis. clear	Convoy in sight on westerly course 3 Strich [33.75°] to starboard.  4 steamers, 3 destroyers, 6 escort vessels (See enclosure).
		7.00 AM		1 Strich [11.25°] to port 1 yacht and escort vessel on opposite course to the convoy.
		7.14 AM		Initiated submerged attack.  The first two steamers are easily distinguished.  The first Norwegian loaded with wood, propellers partly

	Sun and Moon Data 26.07.17
	Sun and Moon Data 27.07.17
	Sun and Moon Data 28.07.17
	Sun and Moon Data 29.07.17

	- 3 -
		continued
		29.07.17		out of the water.  Therefore initiated attack on the second steamer, Ingeborg Denmark as inscription, because it is deeply loaded and a foodstuffs steamer.  3rd and 4th steamers lay quite high out of the water.
		7.14 AM	068 delta II [60.25, 1.5]	Bow shot C/03.  Depth setting 3.5 meters.  Hit aft cargo hold.  After hit observation - 280 meters away - went to depth 40 meters.  After 10 minutes depth charges quite close.  Fuses in the galley crack.  Course changed once again.  After another 15 minutes depth charges about 150 meters away.  Calm in the boat.  Both motors KF.
		8.10 AM		Surfaced.  Steamer sunk, because otherwise now at 4 nm from the shooting location it must be seen.  Steamer was 2000 tons.
				I intend to go around about 60 nm north of Muckle Flugga, to have more maneuver ahead room on sighting an inbound steamer.
		8.40 AM	Radio Message to all boats concerning sighted convoy.
		x.00 PM		Steamer in sight 4 Strich [45°] to starboard.
		x.30 PM		Initiated submerged attack.
		x.05 PM		Bow shot C/03.  Bubble trail went through under the smokestack.  After the shot first noticed that the propeller of the steamer pounds high out of the water, therefore at depth 3.5 meters depth setting obviously under shot.  Steamer was 2000 tons.
		8.50 PM		A second inbound steamer in sight with course 200°.  Outside submerged attack area.
		8.55 PM		Therefore surfaced for artillery combat.  Steamer forced back to the east.  Steamer made SOS, received communication with 4 steamers and a U-boat destroyer.  Hit in the crew compartment got the crew to leave
				English steamer
				"A  D  A  L  I A  "
				3847 tons, armed with 5 cm cannon, with 1094647 pieces of timber from Arkhangelsk for Newcastle.  Steamer shot on fire with artillery and received 10 hits in the waterline.  Steamer settled deeper quickly, then remained floating with a list of 30°.  The fire is still seen after 2 hours from over 20 nm away.  Took the steamer Captain aboard, because from garbled Radio Message initially concluded the steamer was of Danish nationality . The crew -mostly black- had mutinied after the hit and forced the Captain, despite use of his revolver, to leave the steamer. The Captain had dispensed with steamer's papers.  From statement of the Captain a small unloaded Russian steamer, which explains the missed shot.
			009 gamma II [61.45, 0.7]
				signed in draft Saalwächter.

Sun and Moon Data 29.07.17

	- 4 -
		30.07.17
		x.00 AM	N 3, Sea 2, Vis. good	While trying to transmit a Radio Message with the mast antenna to Arcona, the mast lifting device breaks during erection.
		6.25 AM		Steamer 1 Strich to starboard [11.25°] at the same location where the day before "ADALIA" and the Russian were sighted.
		7.25 AM		Submerged attack.
		8.12 AM		Stern shot C/03, depth 3 meters.  Circle runner.  As determined by observation and later statement from the shot steamer.
		8.25 AM		Surfaced for artillery combat.
		8.31 AM	046 alfa 1 [61.45, -0.5]	English steamer
				"MANCHESTER INVENTOR"
				armed with 4.5 cm cannon.  4247 tons from Arkhangelsk for Newcastle with flax cargo shot to the bottom.  Hit on the bridge prompted the Captain to abandon.  Steamer burned due to the artillery effect forward and aft; had a list of 40°.  Tried to sink him with demolition charge had to be abandoned due to the list.  English Captain of ADALDIA disembarked.
		9.10 AM		Steamer sunk.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 61°32'N
			Long.  = 1°10'W
		13.02 PM	W 3-4, Sea 3, Vis. good	Steamer in sight 5 Strich [56.25°] to starboard.
		13.20 PM		Dived for submerged attack.  Because the steamer lies high out of the water, unloaded, did not fire, to avoid under shooting.
		2.20 PM		Surfaced for artillery combat.
		3.00 PM		Boats leave the steamer.  Russian steamer
				"  S  O  U  M  A  "
				2200 tons, armed with 7.5 cm cannon, modern construction in ballast for Newcastle from Arkhangelsk  Without Radio Message.  Steamer was prompted to abandon by a hit in the engine room (shot illumination rounds because other ammunition had been consumed).
		4.30 PM		Steamer was sunk with demolition charge.
		4 45 PM	008 alfa 1 [61.55, -0.9]	Smoke cloud in sight in 340°T.
				Steamer sunk.
		4.48 PM		Immediately after the sinking of the "SOUNA" initiated a submerged attack.
		6.25 PM	N 2, Sea 2, clear	Stern shot.  C/03, depth setting 2 meters, hit in forward cargo hold.
		6.40 PM		Surfaced.  Sank the steamer with a demolition charge, because it floated on the wood cargo.
				Russian steamer armed with 7.5 cm cannon.
				"  K  I  L  D  I  N  "
		7.40 PM	044 alfa 1. [61.65, -0.5]	1640 tons, without Radio Message, cargo pit wood from Arkhangelsk for Newcastle.  Steamer sunk.

Sun and Moon Data 30.07.17

	- 5 -
		continued
		30.07.17		Thus, according to the statement of the Captain of the ADALIA, all steamers that sailed with him from Arkhangelsk -4 total- could have been shot under without the boat having been disturbed in any way by counteraction despite three
			artillery battles lasting several hours.  The last two steamers did not even sail zigzag courses through the restricted area, although they had instructions from the English Admiralty to do so.  The artillery battles, in which it was almost always possible to fire with 2 8.8 cm guns due to the superior speed of the boat, have shown that if the battle is persistently continued and ammunition is used plentifully, the steamer crew finally lose their nerve and abandon ship, especially if the steamer has a motley crew (ADALIA).  In the end illumination rounds were shot against the steamer "SOUMA" because all other ammunition had been fired.  If the firing had been stopped because there were only star shells left, the steamer, with its good armament, would probably not have given up the fight.  The ammunition consumption for each battle was of course still quite high, around 180 rounds per battle, but success was not lacking. After the shooting, a fairly heavy oil trace appeared from the forward oil bunkers.
			The Captain of the "KILDIN" spoke very pessimistically concerning the Russian circumstances.  Not the slightest thing can be predicted about the development of the revolution, the uneducated Russian people are crying out today like this, tomorrow like that. The food situation was be very bad, Russia needed coal even more than ammunition.  The workers only worked 1.3 as much as before, always in 3 shifts. If the English believed that the Russians would carry out a fourth winter campaign because of them, they were greatly mistaken.  The fact that with the current lack of cargo space two Russian ships in ballast are still going to England seems to indicate that the Russian transport conditions on the Murmansk Railway are very bad.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		31.07.17	NW 4, Sea 4, overcast
		x.33 AM		Apparently a submerged U-boat in sight in 160°T.  Ran off.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 60°38'N
			Long.  = 3°18'W
		x.40 -
		x.00 PM		Test dive.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		01.08.17	NNW 2, Sea 1, Vis. changing	Radio Message mast lifting device repaired, as far as possible with the means at hand.  After repairs, it can be used in an emergency.  Radio Message sent to U-44 in the blind concerning observations and success to transmit to Arcona.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 58°38'N
			Long.  = 9°48'W
			SSW 2, Sea 1, misty
		x.30 PM	076 gamma VII.                      [57.75, -10.1]	2 patrol vessels avoided on the surface.
		x.43 PM -	St. Kilda to port
		x.10 PM		Test dive.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.

	Sun and Moon Data 30.07.17
	Sun and Moon Data 31.07.17
	Sun and Moon Data 01.08.17

	- 6 -
		02.08.17	SSN 2, Sea 1, misty
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 56°20'N
			Long.  = 11°22'W
		x.03 PM		Smoke cloud in sight in 80°T.  Maneuvered ahead on the surface.
		x.45 PM	138 delta V. [55.85, -11.5]	Submerged attack.  Steamer turns out to be a patrol vessel with 3 cannons, 1 bow, 1 before the smokestack, 1 aft.
				Moved off submerged.
		x.08 PM		Surfaced.  Patrol vessel in sight astern.
				Moved off on the surface.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		03.08.17	NE 2, Sea 2, Vis. good, light Swell
		0.45 AM		U-44 in sight in 145°T.  After Radio Message Recognition Signals communicated by flag signal.
		1.00 AM	Tory Island in 155°T.	In sight
		1.12 AM		Steamer in sight with 2 smokestacks and easterly course.  U-44 dived to attack.  Maneuvered ahead at AK, to get even further from U-44.
		1.22 AM		Dove for submerged attack.
		1.55 AM	067 gamma IV. [55.35, -8.7]	Bow shot.  C/03, depth setting 2.5 meters.  Bubble track is easily observed, went through between the smokestack and after mast.  No detonation.  Shot range 350-400 meters.  Gun crew can be seen at the aft 12 cm gun. One points to the bubble track running through in front of the aft mast.  Apparently the steamer was an English auxiliary cruiser.  Clipper bow, about 2000 tons, a passenger deck with many boats.  English war flag on the after gaff, was addressed as such but not with complete certainty, because it was very small.
			I can explain the missed shot only by undercutting, because I had enough time during the approach to determine shooting data.  Ship steered course 60°, 90° and 120°.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 55°23'N
			Long.  = 8°45'W
		x.30 PM		Surfaced.
		x.35 PM		U-44 surfaced 1200 meters abeam to port, also shot, believes he undershot the target due to low range.
				Exchanged experience with U-44.  U-44 can provide no new information concerning traffic.  In Area A has met only traps and destroyers.  Also no traffic observed in Area C.  Agreement with U-44 concerning further operation:  U-44 goes north up to Barra Head, U-94 remains off Tory Island.
		x.x5 PM		Smoke cloud 5 Strich [56.25°] under land.  While maneuvering ahead 3 further beside that, of these one with white oil smoke.  It is clear from Radio Messages that patrol vessels have raised an alarm.  Moved off to the north on the surface because oil smoke is often associated with a destroyer.

	Sun and Moon Data 02.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 03.08.17

	- 7 -
		continued
		03.08.17
		3.20 PM	NE 3, Sea 2, Vis. good except towards land	U-44 out of sight.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		04.08.17	NW 1, Sea 1, light Swell, bright moonshine
		x.13 AM		Vessel 4 Strich [45°].  The boat is positioned against the bright moon.  The vessel appeared to turn towards the boat as it turned.  Submerged.
		x.16 AM
		x.47 AM	089 gamma IV. [55.15, -9.9]	Surfaced after a long all around sweep.  After surfacing a boat abeam to starboard with a U-boat hunter next to it, which was only recognized when it smoked briefly.  U-boat trap.  Ran off at depth 40 meters.
		x.22 AM	N 1, Sea 0, Swell, Vis. good	Surfaced, nothing in sight.
		x.05 AM	071 alfa V.  [55.15, -10.9]	Smoke cloud 3 Strich [33.75°] astern to port.  While maneuvering ahead recognized as patrol vessels.  Avoided on the surface.  Cruised the entire day on inbound courses for Tory Island.  Nothing sighted.
			Mirror flat, light Swell, Vis. very good
		12.00 Noon	NNE 1, Sea 0, Vis. good
			Lat.    = 55°12.5'N
			Long.  = 10°31'W
				During the night lay stopped in a flooded condition.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		05.08.17	E 1, Sea 0, light Swell, Vis. 2 nm
		x.55 AM		In 120°T an inbound large passenger steamer without escort in sight, that passed out of sight in fog multiple times during the pursuit at AK.  Gave up pursuit when the steamer was lost despite AK and despite zigzag course of the steamer.  Continued to run on the course of the steamer for Inistrahull at LF, to possibly still meet another steamer.
			070 gamma IV. [55.35, -8.1]
		x.47 AM	E 3, Sea 2, misty	In 70°T 6 patrol vessels come in sight out of the fog in line ahead formation.  Avoided submerged.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 55°21'N
			Long.  = 8°00'W
		x.15 PM		Surfaced, avoided the patrol or mine search vessels which were still in sight on the surface.
			Since, according to the experiences of 3 and 5 August, incoming steamers are near Tory Island in the morning, and no incoming or outgoing traffic has been observed off Tory Island in the afternoon, I want to use the afternoon to search the North Channel entrances to Barra Head, being there in the evening, where during the last operation 4 large passenger steamers were seen leaving and using the night to proceed back, so that when it got light the boat was back where incoming steamers are to be expected in the morning.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 04.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 05.08.17

	- 8 -
		continued
		05.08.17		Since the fog lasted all day and visibility was only rarely more than 4 nm, nothing was sighted.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		06.08.17	SW 2, Sea 1, Vis. good, sometimes rain showers, Vis. to the SW greatly reduced
		11.06 AM		Multiple smoke clouds in sight in 250°T.  Maneuvered ahead at AK.  It is an inbound convoy, consisting of about 7 without exception large steamers accompanied by 4 destroyers, 1 FOXGLOVE [mine-sweeping sloop] and 8 escort vessels as was determined later during the submerged attack.  The convoy steers a zigzag course, general course 60°-70°, so leads to Tory Island 20-30 nm to starboard.
		11.25 AM		Initiated submerged attack on the 9000 ton steamer positioned furthest aft, which can be identified clearly by its silhouette. (Admiralty Staff Illustrations Page 65.  1 high smokestack, 2 parallel masts forward and aft).  When the boat dived, it was positioned directly ahead of the convoy which made a 20-30° course change to starboard immediately thereafter.  As it turned out after a long submerged cruise, at the same time the 9000 ton steamer turned to starboard and took position at the head of the convoy. As a result, the attack on it had to be aborted, since boat was now too far behind to approach at LF, which in the flat sea is all that can be run without the boat being betrayed by the wake or periscope foam strips. The location of the convoy and courses of the individual steamers are not very clear as a result of the course change, since the very strong screen forces the most economical use of the periscope.
				During the attack U-94 got between the double row convoy formation of the steamers, that had a convoy column spacing of about 600 meters.  Had to go to LF because the boat could not be held at KF, so spacing for a stern shot on one steamer was 400 meters, for a bow shot on a second about 200 meters.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 55°31'N
			Long.  = 10°45'W
		12.33 PM	019 alfa V. [55.45, -10.7]	Stern shot C/03.  Hit. Distance by running time of the torpedo 450 meters.
		12.34 PM		20 seconds later bow shot with undercutting periscope with the same lead angle as with the stern shot, C/03, depth setting 3 meters, no detonation.  Running track

	Sun and Moon Data 05.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 06.08.17

	- 9 -
		continued
		06.08.17		not observed. In any case the steamer was undershot because the shooting data was correct.  Shooting range was probably only 150 meters.
			Lat.    = 55°28'N	The hit steamer was at least 4500 tons, because over 150 meters long, heavily loaded, painted gray, without name of particular markings.
			Long.  = 10°49'W
				After the shots went to depth 40 meters and ran off to the south, to possibly surface soon and try and maneuver ahead again.
			When I fired the bow shot, I was aware of the danger of undershooting given the close range and the bow down attitude of the boat, since, in my opinion, in convoys, torpedoes should not be spared in order to take advantage of every opportunity to shoot more than one steamer out of the convoy.  In my opinion, convoys, with their strong, very skilfully operated screens and thus difficult submerged attacks for the boats, are designed to greatly reduce losses in steamer tonnage.  Reasons: 1) It is less likely for a prowling submarine to spot a convoy of 7 steamers than one or two of 7 steamers sailing individually. 2)  In most cases at a convoy there will probably only be the opportunity to shoot at 1 steamer.  3)  Immediate assistance for the hit steamer. (The morale element, is especially significant for neutral steamers.)  4)  Initiation of attack by maneuvering ahead on the surface is frequently made impossible by the strong flank destroyer screen set off up to 4 nm.  5)  Surface night attack on a strongly protected convoy can only be accomplished by very quick diving small boats.  6)  The lookout is significantly more vigilant and practiced on the escort vessels than on the steamers, making unseen attacks more difficult.  7)  Since after the attack there is always counteraction by depth charges, etc., success will also be less easy to determine, as will the complete annihilation of a steamer that has been hit but is still afloat.  8) A shrewd rearguard of destroyers will often be able to prevent repeated maneuvers ahead of a convoy after having had the opportunity to shoot. See below.
			If the British succeed in consolidating their main convoy traffic, one will have to risk firing torpedoes even when the circumstances are unfavorable in order not to miss any chance of success, i.e. under conditions where torpedo firing against a steamer sailing alone would have been avoided.
		4.05 PM -
		4.45 PM		Looked around.  At the shooting location 2 destroyers, one with 3 smokestacks, the aft stack is painted bright red.  The other with 2 smokestacks and the usual white-painted letter and number designations (C 83) as well as a patrol vessel, that had stopped was blowing off steam.  The patrol vessel picked up the crew of the already sunken steamer and then steamed behind the convoy.  The destroyers ran in strong zigzags.  Ran further away from the shooting location at depth 40 meters.
		5.30 PM		Surfaced.  Convoy is seen by mastheads in 110°T.  Soon after blowing 1, the 2 destroyers come in sight astern. Even though the boat stood in the sun, it was noticed.  Destroyers

Sun and Moon Data 06.08.17

	- 10 -
		continued
		06.08.17		turn at highest speed towards the boat, distance about 9000 meters.  Before diving Radio Message to all boats concerning the sighted convoy.  Course and speed of advance.  Radio Message was sent when the destroyer was about 7000 meters away.  Quick dive. Went to depth 40 meters, then changed course to starboard after the bilges were pumped.
		5.xx PM
		6.04 PM		Destroyer throws 5 depth charges, estimate they lay 300-150 meters to port.  Ran off to the NW, to surface as soon as possible and send a Radio Message again concerning the convoy since catching up with it is now out of the question.  Destroyer correctly holds the boat submerged long enough that catching up before darkness is impossible.
		6.08 PM
		6.09 PM
		6.10 PM
		6.15 PM
		x.35 PM		Surfaced.  Nothing in sight.  Sent Radio Message once again to all boats.
		x.45 PM		Smoke cloud in 40°T.  Despite closing at high speed it passes out of sight again.  Probably a destroyer running at high speed.  Visibility was bad.
		x.x5 PM		3 Strich to starboard two destroyers coming closer quickly.
		x.x6 PM		Dived.  Proceeded at depth 11 meters.  Surfaced when the destroyer was out of sight.  Wind is freshening.
		x.45 PM	SW 5, Sea 4, strong Swell, Vis. changing
		x.35 PM		Steamer with 2 masts and one smokestack in sight, course about 270°.  Maneuvered ahead at AK.  Despite this the steamer passes out of sight in quickly setting fog and rain and remains so despite approaching further.  Visibility 500-800 meters.
		x.45 PM
		x.55 PM		Went to depth 20 meters due to fog and to and to repair the diving plane which has been sticking since this morning with starboard ruder position. (Replaced the defective sliding contacts in the reversing starter.)
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		07.08.17	SE 3, Sea 2, at first misty, afternoon Vis. very good	Surfaced.  Cruised on the entry courses for Inistrahull and Tory Island.  Nothing sighted.
		x.00 AM
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 55°49'N
			Long.  = 12°19'W
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		08.08.17	S 2, Sea 2, Swell, Vis. good	During the entire morning nothing sighted on the entry courses, also nothing today
			Because convoys are hardly expected here every day, I intend to have a look at the inbound and outbound courses for the North Channel.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 55°31.5'N
			Long.  = 14°28'W
			W 1, Sea 1, Swell, Vis. very good

	Sun and Moon Data 06.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 07.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 08.08.17

	- 11 -
		continued
		08.08.17	052 beta 5. [55.65, -14.3]	Passed a raft with shipwrecked.  According to statement of the Captain from the sunken Norwegian sailing vessel "ALEIDES".
		9.25 PM	NW 1, Sea 1, Swell
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		09.08.17	NE 2, Sea 2, Swell	During the night lay flooded down.
		x.xx AM		Large steamer without protection in sight abeam to starboard with N-course.  Blew.
		xx.20 AM		Could not catch up at AK on the surface despite 16.5 knots. Gave up pursuit.
		8.15 AM		Steamer in sight 3 Strich to starboard [33.75°]  with N-course.
				Dived.
		9.18 AM	046 beta V [56.75, -14.9]	Double bow shot from 700 meters, because the steamer was 10000 tons.  No detonation.  Initially observed the running track, probably over-estimated speed at 11 knots, still at least 1 torpedo should have hit, because the aim points lie about 100 meters apart = 5 knots of speed misjudgment.  Attack was unseen.  Upon further consideration, the steamer turned out to be an auxiliary cruiser armed with at least 6 - 15 cm guns, aft a strong towing cable (submarine being towed?) and has 2 strong horizontal spars about 7 meters long on each side at the level of the masts (torpedo nets?)  After the torpedo shots, the steamer made a circle, so running about 7-9 knots, guns aimed in the wrong direction; then proceeded on an easterly course and passed out of sight at 09.50 AM.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 56°54'N	Cruised on the entry courses on an easterly course.
			Long.  = 14°05'W
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		10.08.17	W 3, Sea 2, misty, at times rain
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 56°11'N
			Long.  = 12°09'W
		x.03 PM		Outbound steamer in sight protected by a 2-smokestack destroyer, about 6000 tons.
		x.37 PM		Maneuvered ahead, dived.
		x.27 PM	130 delta V. [55.95, -10.1]	Shot from stern tube with 50° intercept angle, shot went past ahead, because the steamer saw the shot and turned away.  Destroyer does nothing.
		x.24 PM		Surfaced, to pursue on the surface, for a night attack.  Steamer runs about 13-14 knots.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		11.08.17	N 2, Sea 2, clear, later fine drizzle and unusually strong marine phosphorescence	Surface attack had to be given up because of the sudden onset of an unusually strong marine phosphorescence that must betray the boat long before the shot was fired, and suddenly arising black scud lying
		x.25 AM

	Sun and Moon Data 08.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 09.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 10.08.17

	- 12 -
		continued
		11.08.17		just on the water thrown up from the steamer.  It was noteworthy that the protecting destroyer proceeded 800-1000 meters ahead of the steamer even at night.
		x.18 AM		Again sighted a fast steamer protected by 2 destroyers on a N-course, as determined from the shadow "GALEDONTA" 9000 tons, 17.5 knots speed.  Maneuvered ahead.
			117 delta V. [56.05, -11.3]
		x.11 AM		Dived.  Shortly before a stern shot opportunity the steamer changed course 40° away from the boat, so that the shot had to be forgone, because by the time the boat turned 110°, the enemy had already passed through the target line.  As the boat continued to approach, a shot was suddenly fired from a starboard gun of the steamer. Destroyers do nothing. The boat could hardly have been noticed by the steamer in the deep twilight.
		x.10 AM		Surfaced.  Steamer in sight astern, passes out of sight.
				Radio Message to all boats concerning observed outbound traffic.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 56°04'N
			Long.  = 10°04'W
		x.10 PM		Steamer in sight in 30°T on N-course.  Maneuvered ahead.
		x.58 PM	118 delta V. [56.05, -11.5]	Dived for submerged attack.  Steamer turns out to be a patrol vessel, avoided submerged.
		x.18 PM		Surfaced.  Patrol vessel in sight astern.
		x.20 PM		A second patrol vessel in sight in 130°T.  Avoided on the surface.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		12.08.17	ENE 2, Sea 1, overcast, very strong marine phosphorescence
		x.18 AM		Steamer in sight abeam to port with W-course.
				Maneuvered ahead for surface night attack.
		x.00 AM   [10.45 AM]		Stern shot.  G/7.  Hit aft of the smokestack.  Because the steamer had still not sunk in 3/4 hours and showed flickering fire, which could call the patrol vessels, fire a second torpedo -Bronze-, to sink the steamer in any case.  Hit in the aft cargo hold.  Steamer broke apart and sank in 2 minutes.  Both torpedo running tracks were seen exactly up to the steamer at 550 meters as a brightly illuminated trace due to the strong marine phosphorescence.  Closed the boats to determine the steamer name.
			Lat.    = 56°05'N	Steamer
			Long.  = 10°13'W	"  L  Y  N  O  R  T  A  "
[typo 112 delta V = 56.05, -10.3  The position just above is actually in 111 delta V]			172 delta V.	English, 3684 tons, with 6200 tons coal from Liverpool for Italy.  Moved off.  Lay flooded down until lightness.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.

	Sun and Moon Data 11.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 12.08.17

	- 13 -
		13.08.17	NE 2, Sea 2, Swell, except for a few rain showers Vis. good	Because 3/5 of the fuel oil has been consumed, return transit must begin, despite the low results of the operation compared to the shooting opportunities.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 57°52.5'N
			Long.  = 9°51'W
		8.12 PM		Test dive.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		14.08.17	NE 2, Sea 2, Swell, scattered fog, Vis. greatly changing	Submerged due to thick fog.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 59°46'N
			Long.  = 5°31'W
		x.05 PM	[020 gamma I = [60.15, -4.7]	Periscope-like object 5 Strich [56.25°] to port.  020 gamma I.  Turned away.  Ran off.  No torpedo running track.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		15.08.17	ENE 1, Sea 0-1, Vis. changing, light Swell
		x.49 AM	125 beta I [61.45, -1.5]	Avoided 2 patrol vessels on the surface.
		x.00 AM	141 beta I [61.55, -1.3]	3 Strich [33.75] astern to port a submerged U-boat.  No running track.  Ran off.  Cruised on the steamer route observed on the outbound transit, because fuel and torpedoes are still at hand
			Tomorrow morning at dawn I want to be at the meeting point for Norway - England convoys.
				Nothing sighted up to evening.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		16.08.17	ENE 1, Sea 0-1, Vis. good
		x.25 AM	100 delta II [60.15, 2.1]	Convoy in sight on westerly course, consists of 4 steamers, 3 destroyers, 6 escort vessels.  Course determined as 220°.  Maneuvered ahead at highest speed.  The sea is nearly flat, no white caps.
		x.15 AM		Initiated submerged attack, which is made more difficult by the clever behavior of the destroyers, especially since I can't run faster than LF, because otherwise the wake of the boat will be seen in the flat sea.
		10.20 AM	097 delta II [60.15, 1.9]	Bow shot, G/7, 2.5 meter depth setting, because the convoy consisted of small steamers.  At the shot the destroyer 200 meters astern ran at highest speed towards the boat.
				Went to depth 40 meters; so torpedo running track was not observed, also no detonation heard until 60 seconds later a enormous detonation followed, when the boat had arrived at depth 35 meters.  30 seconds later a secondary still stronger detonation, depth charges of the destroyers lie in the immediate vicinity of the boat.

	Sun and Moon Data 13.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 14.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 15.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 16.08.17

	- 14 -
		continued
		16.08.17		Consequences of the second depth charges:  1)  The boat was strongly down by the stern.  2)  Engine telegraphs fail.  3)  Motors stop.  4)  Diving planes and rudders as well as their indicators fail. Were put in manual operation.  5) Lights out in the entire boat.  6)  Gyro-compass failed.  7)  Similarly the drain and trim pumps.  8)  So a pretty uncomfortable situation.  First after a few minutes found as reason for this the jumping out of the automatic battery switch.  Nevertheless, the excellent work of the depth control officer Oberleutnant Schwab succeeds in holding the stopped boat at depth 35 meters (crew sent forward and aft, flooding) until the battery automatic switch was inserted again  and the greater part of the malfunctions corrected.
				The behavior of the crew was correct and deserves all praise.
				Moved off submerged.
		10.53 AM	NNE 3, Sea 2, Vis. good	Surfaced.  Astern at the shooting location a steamer in sight, went back to determine particulars.  Closed submerged.  Danish steamer
				"  S  V  A  N  H  O  L  M  "
				1400 tons with wood as deck cargo.  Steamer is abandoned, has torpedo hit at the after mast, by which the entire deck cargo was hurled up.  Steamer is overspilled aft up to the flag, however still floats.  The torpedo detonation must have happened at the same time as the depth charges, so that nothing was heard in the boat.  Shot the steamer in the waterline with the last 13 rounds of artillery ammunition. 7 hits in the waterline.
			097 delta II [60.15, 1.9]
			Lat.    = 60°10'N	When the sea overspilled the middle deck -the deck cargo aft was already washed away- came to course for the homeland.  Very lively Radio Message traffic enemy patrol vessel in the vicinity.
			Long.  = 1°53'W
		11.55 AM		Radio Message to all U-boats concerning sighted convoy.  As further steamers in the convoy proceeded the Danish steamer "ESTRIO" -1049 tons-, with well visible painted neutrality markings.  The name and nationality of the two other steamers could not be distinguished.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 60°10'N
			Long.  = 1°53'W
		1.x5 PM	60°N Latitude	Crossed inbound.
			N 3, Sea 3, Vis. good
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		17.08.17	N 5, Sea 5, overcast, Vis. 5 nm
		x.14 AM -
		x.x5 AM		Illuminated passenger steamer in sight on an easterly course

	Sun and Moon Data 16.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 17.08.17

	- 15 -
		continued
		17.08.17
		10.30 AM		Headed for Hanstholm submerged.
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 57°15'N
			Long.  = 8°24'E
		x.15 PM	SW 5, Sea 4, Vis. 3-4 nm	Surfaced.  Hanstholm 4 Strich [45°] to starboard 4 nm away, many fishing cutters in sight.
				Headed south at the 3 nm limit.
		0x.55 PM	Lyngvig abeam	3 torpedo boats with U-87, whose departure was known by Radio Message abeam Lyngvig.  Exchanged Recognition Signals.  Because U-94 was to be taken in convoy by these torpedo boats at Harvrig first at 04.00 AM,
		x.30 PM	Lyngvig Lighthouse in 31°T, 3.1 nm away	put the boat on the bottom, depth 21.5 meters.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		18.08.17	SW 5, Sea 4, overcast, Vis. good
		x.30 AM		Surfaced.  Headed for Harvrig.
		x.30 AM		The patrol torpedo boats come in sight astern to starboard.  Exchanged visual Recognition Signals (no stars).
		x.43		Behind the torpedo boats (without gear, in line ahead formation) steered in the channel by the Nordmann and Lister deeps.
		x.05 AM		Patrol steamer "HERRMANN" takes over the convoy from there to the Loreley Objective Buoy
		12.00 Noon	Lat.    = 54°50'N
			Long.  = 8°02'E
			SW 3, Sea 2, Vis. 7 nm
		x.30 PM		S.N.S. "BADEN", "DERFFLINGER" and a light cruiser  with many torpedo boats in sight.  On board "BADEN" His Majesty the Kaiser.
		x.30 PM		Zeppelin in sight astern.
		x.00 PM		Steamer "HERRMANN" released.
		x.30 PM	SW 2 Sea 1, overcast, Vis. good	Morse message from IX.Flottille: His Majesty the Kaiser wishes the boat a warm welcome.
				Steered via the outer Jade, Norderney - navigation buoys.
		x.20 PM		Patrol boats take over escort with deployed gear.
		x.00 PM		Borkum outer beacon requested for 10.30 PM.
		x.40 PM		Ran in with Patrol boats through the Westerems.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.
		19.08.17	SW 1, Sea 1, Vis. good, strong marine phosphorescence, starry clear	Steered up the channel.
		x.00 AM		Made fast alongside RUGIA.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.

	Sun and Moon Data 17.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 18.08.17
	Sun and Moon Data 19.08.17

	- 16 -
				Control No.   3
		Experiences
		S.M.Unterseeboot "U-94" on the operation from 26.7. - 19.8.17.
		1) General.  On the west coast only one freighter without escort was sighted, all remaining were protected by 1 or 2 destroyers.  Auxiliary cruisers sailed without escort.  Fast passenger steamers also sailed with escort, under land, as far as the fog permitted observation, only one fast passenger steamer of more than 15 knots was seen without destroyer protection.  40 nm NW of Tory Island a strongly protected convoy of 7 valuable freighters was sighted.  Patrols on the approach routes and under land significantly reduced compared to before.  Both observations seem to indicate that steamers hardly sail without an escort anymore; all available patrol vessels are apparently on escort duty.  Thus artillery successes against steamers could only be achieved very rarely and submerged attacks were also disturbed by counter action more than before.  The establishment of convoys now also on the west coast will further reduce the number of opportunities for submerged attack, since the probability of sighting a convoy of, say, 10 steamers is less than of hitting 2 or 3 of 10 steamers sailing individually.   From this it follows, in my opinion, that unless the torpedo supply speaks against it, every opportunity to fire a torpedo must be used in the future, even under conditions where firing a torpedo as avoided previously due to the uncertainty of the result.  Since there are fewer opportunities for firing than before, the torpedo consumption will probably increase. 2) Torpedo armament.  One circle runner, otherwise no failures, as far as could be observed. 3) Artillery. The two 8.8 cm have proven themselves very well, but the substructures are still too weak for them.  Both gunners suffered skin abrasions and swelling of their eyes from every battle.  Tough continuation of an artillery battle using the remaining ammunition was used in 3 cases to overpower even a well-armed steamer.  In my opinion two 8.8 cm are more favorable artillery-wise then one 10.5 cm and one 8.8 cm. 4) Technical.  a)  The motors worked faultlessly.  Damage from military impact did not occur.  b) The extendable periscope had multiple failures; separate chain links broke, but could be replaced with spares.  c)  Radio Message mast erection mechanism broke at the weld locations of individual chain links and could only be repaired in a makeshift manner.   The anchor mechanism has the disadvantage that the chain case is too small, so that when hoisting in, the chain is stowed under water in front of the case. 5) Weather.  Consistently very good, only seldom fog, but often the sea is too smooth for attacks.  With strong marine phosphorescence each torpedo track could be seen from afar. Accordingly, the diving point of the boat and its propeller wash must also be clearly visible, which must be considered for enemy counterattack.  Trying to see at what depth the boat trace can still be seen under such circumstances may well be of use to us.
				signed in draft Saalwächter.

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