U-37 - 1st War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with the help of Andi Forster

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Wilhelmshaven	19 August 1939	Wilhelmshaven	15 September 1939	28

 

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Ships Hit

None

Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

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			K  R  I  E  G  S  T  A  G  E  B  U  C  H
				"  U  37  "  .
			Beginning:    19.8. 39
			Ending:        15.9. 39.
				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 1 -
		19.08.39	Deutsch Bucht
		00.00	NE - ENE 1-2, Sea 1, Vis. moderate, lager good	Departed Wilhelmshaven with U-38 - U-41.
		(M.E.Z.)		After leaving the lock reset clocks to M.G.Z. [GMT +0], railing had stanchions stowed, number shield on the bow removed.
				Together transit out the Jade.  At Jade Objective Buoy U-boats released as planned.  Began advance in accordance with Flottillen Order ( 2950L - 2020E - 1380E)
				Course 336°, 9 knots.
		10.15		Test dive, afterwards conning tower number painted over.
		(M.G.Z.)	Noon position
			φ = 55°00.8'N
			λ =   6°59.0'E
		16.00	- 102 nm -	Reached the level of Esbjerg.  From now absolutely must remain unseen.
		16.15		Crash dive for steamer on opposite course.   until 17.53 hours.
		17.55		Crash dive, until 18.05 hours.
		18.37		Crash dive for fishing vessel ahead.
				Until 20.28 hours for additional fishing vessels coming in sight.
		20.28		Surfaced, continued advance at 10 knots.
			Midnight position
			φ = 56°15.5'N	Instructions for the night, avoid steamers with set lights in a timely manor, crash dive for dimmed vessels.
			λ =   5°59.0'E
			- 88 nm -
		20.08.39	NE 2, freshening,to 3-4, evening abating to 1, Sea 1-2, Vis. good	Morning navigation fix:  difference between dead reckoning and actual position 295°T, 10 nm.
		02.55		φ = 56°44'N
				λ =   5°18'E
		04.27		Crash dive, sailing vessel ahead to port.  until 11.07 hours, because vessels came in sight continuously.
		08.30		U-boat of the Flotilla in sight surfaced astern to starboard, out of sight at 09.00 hours.
		11.07		Surfaced.

	Sun and Moon Data 19.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 20.08.39

	- 2 -
		continued
		20.08.39
		12.39	Noon position	Crash dive, smoke cloud astern to starboard.
			φ = 57°02'N
		12.50	λ =   4°49'E	Surfaced, smoke cloud weak, nothing seen of the steamer, smoke cloud shifted out to port.
			- 68 nm -
		13.18		Ahead an own U-boat again (probably the same one as this morning).
				Crash dive steamer to port.
				Boat remained submerged until the beginning of darkness 20.23 hours, because vessels were in sight continually.  Fishermen especially hold us back, they remain nearly in the same position.
				Because the boat gets heavier after diving when beginning to cruise submerged, must assume that a few over deck containers are leaking.
				(Pressure relief valve?)
			Midnight position	Night no particular events- no avoidance necessary.
			φ = 57°56'N
			λ =   4°11'E
			- 57 nm -
		21.08.39	NbyE 1-2, light Swell, Vis. very good, clear.
		02.30		Own U-boat astern to starboard, out of sight 02.50 hours.
		03.20	In the afternoon shifted via NE to E 1-2, lightening - rain.  About evening clear again	Crash dive.  Steamer bearing 40°T.  Due to a 2nd steamer until 07.32 hours.
		07.32		Continued transit , course 340°, 10 knots.
		03.10	Morning navigation fix
			φ = 58°37.2'N	Difference between dead reckoning and actual position 341°T, 12 nm.
			λ =   3°42'E
		11.44		Crash dive.
				Aircraft astern to port flying from west to east athwart our course line (Wal) probably a passenger aircraft (Scotland - Bergen), was not perfectly distinguished.
		12.08	Noon position	Surfaced - aircraft was not seen.
			φ = 59°39.5'N
			λ =   2°50.5'E
			- 112 nm -

	Sun and Moon Data 20.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 21.08.39

	- 3 -
		continued
		21.08.39
		13.30		Crash dive, aircraft astern to starboard flying from east to west athwart our own course line.  The same type as in the morning.  Aircraft flew a straight course.
		13.41		Aircraft out of sight, surfaced.
		14.01		Crash dive, steamer astern to starboard.
		14.21		Steamer out of sight, surfaced.
		14.42		Changing visibility - lightening - rain squalls.  Course 333° - reached Point 2 in accordance with Flottillen Order.
		xx.55		Crash dive, steamer bearing 40°T.
				While cruising submerged another vessel (fisherman) comes in sight.
		20.11		Surfaced.
		20.30	Midnight position	Evening navigation fix:  difference between dead reckoning and actual position 157°T, 9 nm.
			φ = 60°46.2'N
			λ =   1°46.5'E	Received the following Radio Messages in the course of the day.
			- 76.5 nm -
				Radio Message 1330/22/57 (13.12)   1218/22/55 (14.18)   1243/22/57 (14.37)   1301/22/58 (14.22)   1241/22/56 (15.36)
		22.08.39	Initially SE 3, in the morning shifting to W 2-3, in the morning gray lightening, heavy rain, later overcast, in the afternoon shifting to SW 3-4, Sea 2-3, 1/2 overcast, light to moderate Swell	During the night several brief course changes, to avoid lights which came in sight.
		08.32		Crash dive for fishing vessel.
				10.41 hours 1 steamer temporarily in sight.
		12.08	Noon position	Surfaced, course 292°, reached Point 3 in accordance with Flottillen Order.
			φ = 62°02'N
			λ =   0°26.0'E	No particular events by day.
			- 98 nm -
		21.05	Midnight position	Evening navigation fix:  difference between dead reckoning and actual position 73°T, 2.5 nm.
			φ = 62°46.5'N
			λ =   3°25'W	No particular events by night.
			- 117.5 nm -

	Sun and Moon Data 21.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 22.08.39

	- 4 -
		23.08.39	WbyS to W 3-4, Sea 3, light to moderate Swell, overcast, rain squalls, otherwise Vis. good
		03.49		Smoke cloud to starboard (bright horizon) up to 03.57 hours went 90° to port (202°T).
			In the course of the day freshening shifting via SW to S 5, Sea 3-4
		04.55		Crash dive, steamer abeam to port on northerly course.
		06.22		Surfaced.
		09.40		Course 253°, reached northerly point.
				Since tonight the first seas come over the bridge.
			General	The communications link from the homeland on shortwave - on some wavelengths - is already uncertain.  Not all Radio Messages were picked up immediately with the boat .  On very low frequency communications are more certain.  Most certain is very low frequency at night .  The most important reports must come then, because short-wave communications, which are more certain at night, can be hindered by swells, however the weather conditions for F.d.U. in the homeland are not fully known.
				No special significance is attributed to the Radio Messages not received. Probably filler Radio Message since they were not often repeated.
				Radio Message 0650/22/49 unclear (bad M.O.) [meaning unclear] not repeated, therefore probably a key error by the sender.
				Broadcast reception has been progressively worse on medium-wavelengths since 22 August, until there is no longer any reception.  However evening Program Time 22.00 hours (21.00 M.S.Z.) can still be received sufficiently.
				Presently, in transit permanently manned Radio Message reception is not a burden for the radio personnel.
				Prerequisite: 2 independent watch keepers [qualified Radiomen].  By bringing in 2 technical personnel and 1 seamanship person, around 3 men each watch, including 1 watch keeper and 2 encoding people.
				In transit the seamanship personnel work in 3 section duty, the technical personnel 2 section duty..
				The torpedo personnel are fully occupied with maintaining the torpedoes despite the additional ordering [on board] of a 3rd Torp.Mech.Gst.

Sun and Moon Data 23.08.39

	- 5 -
		continued
		23.08.39
			Noon position
			φ = 63°12.5'N	About 14.00 hours the Faroe Islands come abeam, the mountains are out, recognizable as shadows.  Distance 50 nm.
			λ =   6°57'W
			- 104 nm -	13.22 Received Radio Message 1346/23/60   15.24 Received Radio Message 1415/23/77
				In the course of the day no events, nothing seen.
		19.00		Course 196°, 10 knots.
			Midnight position
			φ = 62°10'N
			λ =   9°39'W
			- 109 nm -
		24.08.39	S 4-5, Sea 3-4 in the course of the day freshening to 6-7, Sea 5-6, overcast, isolated rain, changing mostly medium Vis.	Proceeded on the surface the entire day.  The bridge is completely wet, the conning tower hatch was carried closed.  No use of binoculars.  2 knot speed loss estimated.
				At 12.15 hours a fishing vessel came out abeam to starboard, seen occasionally in the swell.  Moved off for half an hour at 150° or 170°, vessel was soon completely out of sight.
			Noon position
			φ = 60°38'N
			λ = 10°38'W	Afternoon a short test dive.
			- 99 nm -
			Midnight position	Night no particular events.
			φ = 59°09'N
			λ =  11°32'W
			- 92 nm -

	Sun and Moon Data 23.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 24.08.39

	- 6 -
		25.08.39	Initially SW 5-7, Sea 5, Vis, moderate, gradually abating, morning SWbyS 3, Sea 3	09.25 hours test dive.
			Sun came out, Vis. medium to good.	Noon position    φ = 57°38'N
				λ =  11°33'W
			Afternoon wind out of the south, abating until night to 1-2, light to moderate Swell, Vis. medium	- 96 nm -
				In the course of the day and the night nothing seen.
		17.15		Incoming Radio Message 1632/25/56.
		20.20		"          "           "        1946/25/66.
		20.00		Course 211°, because the boat was offset too far to the west. [must mean to the east]
			Midnight position
			φ = 55°58'N
			λ = 12°58'W
			- 113 nm -
			So far total distance covered 1132 nm.
		26.08.39	Winds fluctuating around the south 2-3, Vis. medium, morning misty, light to moderate Swell.  Morning sunshine later cloudy, Vis. moderate
				00.12 hours Incoming Radio Message 2351/25/67.
		10.00		Came back to course 196°.
			Noon position
			φ = 54°22'N	Nothing seen by day.
			λ = 14°32'W	17.00 hours Incoming Radio Message 1552/26/68.
			- 112 nm -
		18.00		Test dive.
				Exhaust gas valves leak heavily again.  Boat must surface again, outer exhaust gas valves must be ground in again.  In order with second dive.

	Sun and Moon Data 25.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 26.08.39

	- 7 -
		27.08.39	Midnight position	00.05 hours took a navigation fix, clear, moonshine.  Difference between dead reckoning and actual position 151°T, 8 nm.
			φ = 52°36'N
			λ = 15°13'W
			- 118 nm -
			Night clear, moonshine, around morning clear, morning misty, partly foggy, SE 2-3, Sea 1-2, light Swell, afternoon Vis. changing, evening Vis. good
		xx.53		Dived, lights of a steamer visible - dawn breaking.
		06.03		Surfaced, continued advance.
			Noon position
			φ = 50°56'N
			λ = 16°11'W
			- 105 nm -
		12.35		Main ballast and reserve fuel oil tank 7 empty, converted [for use as a ballast tank] and flushed (2x).
			Midnight position	Nothing seen by day.
			φ = 49°14'N	20.20 hours incoming Radio Message 1906/27/70.
			λ = 17°08'W
			- 108 nm -
		28.08.39	Initially SE until night, shifting S to SW, initially 3-4, later freshening to 5-7, medium Swell, Sea 5, overcast, Vis. medium to good, full moon	From 08.00 hours steered 186°.
				09.40 hours test dive.
				Nothing seen by day.
				01.41 Received Radio Message 0152/28/41 16.27        "          "            " 1534/28/73 17.25        "          "            " 1545/28/72 20.30        "          "            " 1948/28/74 16.10        "          "            " 1604/28/71
			Noon position	The seas are great, the conning tower stays under water.  The boat lies relatively well into the seas, as long as the Swells run regularly.
			φ = 47°33'N
			λ = 17°42'W
			- 105 nm -	The boat yaws heavily at night due to the cross sea.  However no water was scooped with the bridge cladding.
			Midnight position
			φ = 46°11'N
			λ = 17°59'W
			- 82 nm -

	Sun and Moon Data 27.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 28.08.39

	- 8 -
		29.08.39	SW 5-7, slowly shifting W and abating to 3, medium Swell, Sea 5, later 2-3, Vis. good, night moonshine	08.31 hours crash dive for tanker, was positioned exactly in the sun.  Up to 10.18 hours   Closure of the aft rope locker was open.  It was possible to recover the line from the locker, which was slowly getting out on its own. The fasteners of the upper deck closures are too weak. So far 3 covers have opened, although the weather was not too bad.
			Noon position
			φ = 44°32.5'N	Nothing seen by day and in the evening.
			λ =  18°14'W	16.00 hours entered the ordered operations area.
			- 100 nm -	20.35 hours Navigation fix.  Difference between dead reckoning and actual position 153°T, 12.5 nm
			Midnight position
			φ = 42°53'N	Radio Message 1123/29/75 at 13.17 hours Radio Message 1209/29/76 " 16.20 " Radio Message 1335/29/77 " 16.30 "
			λ = 17°23'W
			- 112 nm -
		30.08.39
			Wind fluctuating around west strength 3, later freshening to 4-5 and shifting back to the SW, Vis. good, moderate Swell, Sea 3
				06.24 hours crash dive, steamer ahead on northerly course.
				07.49 hours Surfaced.
		08.00	Noon position	The boat is positioned about upper left in the assigned operations area.  Took up waiting station in this position.
			φ = 42°45'N
			λ = 16°12'W	1/3 of the fuel is consumed (at 100% filling without including a reserve).
			- 56 nm -
			Distance covered so far 2030 nm	Due to the weather conditions held in position into the seas with E-motors (one motor KF, later both KF).  It was not possible with one diesel KF due to the seas.
				Afternoon rudder malfunction.  At the remote starter mechanical malfunction; worked until night, malfunction corrected.
				Incoming Radio Messages.
				1.) 0457/30/78 at 06.03 hours   2.) 1525/30/81 " 16.28 "   3.) 1612/30/82 " 16.35 "   4.) 1305/30/80 " 16.20 "   5.) 1943/30/83 " 20.25 "
				Radio Message Serial No. 4 was often transmitted.
				Day and evening nothing seen.
				Nights charge.
				It is very warm in the boat - little sleep.

	Sun and Moon Data 29.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 30.08.39

	- 9 -
		31.08.39	SW 3-4 afternoon temporarily freshening to 4-5, medium Swell, afternoon high Swell, Sea 3, Vis. good, night moonshine	From 10.00 hours it was possible to hold the boat into the seas calmly with one diesel KF.  Sea State allowed operating with the diesel.  Lowest speed level with diesel is also favorable with respect to the battery, since too much water is lost from the heat due to the more frequent charging and discharging of the battery.
			Noon position	11.15 hours test dive.
			φ = 42°42'N
			λ = 16°27'E
		17.35		Dived before a sailing vessel until 20.00 hours.
		22.34		Crash dive before dimmed steamer, which came in sight abeam to port at about 3000 meters.
				23.08 hours surfaced.
				Incoming Radio Messages.
				1.) 0253/31/84 at 05.56 hours   2.) 0310/31/85 " 05.56 "   3.) 1257/31/86 " 13.40 "   4.) 1207/31/87 " 13.47 "   5.) 1552/31/89 " 16.28 "   6.) 1646/31/90 " 16.34 "
		01.09.39	Wind shifting from SW to W 3-4, afternoon freshening to 4-5, medium Swell, Sea 3-4, Vis. good, night moonshine	Continued to boat in position with one diesel KF as far as possible. Just as yesterday the boat does not lay calmly because the sea and swell were nearly crosswise.
				All day no particular events.
				18.00 hours test dive.
				Incoming Radio Messages.
			Noon position	1.) 1207/1/93 at 13.25 hours   2.) 1610/1/94 " 16.25 "   3.) 1945/1/96 " 20.38 "
			φ = 42°24'N
			λ = 18°21'E
				Night nothing in particular.
		02.09.39
			Wind fluctuating around SW 3-4, afternoon 4-5, evening 2-3, moderate Swell, Sea 2, Vis. good, moonlit	During the midwatch a part of the completely smashed dinghy went overboard.  The swell and the sea state impacted the iron rail at the aft end and opened the closure. It is impossible to enter the upper deck, regardless of the position of the boat

	Sun and Moon Data 31.08.39
	Sun and Moon Data 01.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 02.09.39

	- 10 -
		continued
		02.09.39		in the sea.  Since the boat has been in the Atlantic no preservation work could be carried out on the upper deck (lubricating of linkage - ballast and reserve fuel tank mechanisms - exhaust gas valves - rudder - over deck canisters - torpedo transport gear etc.).  The use of the cannon is very questionable.  Perhaps the gun crew can find the necessary footing if the boat were in the best possible position in the sea, this does not apply to the ammunition handlers, because the railing (the only support) is missing.
				The severe restriction on the use of the gun with the current installation requires testing with the cannon raised at the forward edge of the conning tower (dryer, better preservation options, better ammunition delivery possibilities).
				Even if this inevitably involves enlargement of the silhouette, on the other hand, the new silhouette, which gradually descends from the conning tower forward and aft, will no longer stand out on horizon as the current square conning tower.
				Preservation work on the cannon has not been possible for over a week.  The cannon looks very rusty.  From experience the muzzle stop and after closure have shown they do not hold tight, so that water enters the barrel every time you dive.
		08.00		Came about, came to an east-west course.  In the afternoon the remaining parts of the dinghy were washed overboard by the seas.
				Fuel oil consumption amounts to about 1.5 tons daily including charging, auxiliary machinery etc.  Ventilator must be run continuously due to the high temperatures.
		18.10		Test dive.
				Day and night nothing in particular observed.
				Received the following Radio Messages.
				1.) 0957/2/97 at 13.10 hours   2.) 1049/2/98 " 13.17 "   3.) 1123/2/99 " 13.17 "
		03.09.39
			Noon position	In the morning entered the over deck forward as far as possible so that cleaning the cannon could be carried out.
			φ = 42°23'N
			λ = 17°36'W

	Sun and Moon Data 02.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 03.09.39

	- 11 -
		continued
		03.09.39
			W 3, light Swell, Sea 1	Due to the previous artillery shooting in August, the barrel was heavily copper-coated and not rusted as much as expected on the present trip.
				A large part of the torpedo transport gear has been lost from storage. It could be recovered in places. The aft deck can still not be entered yet (-main ballast and reserve fuel oil tank 3 is still not empty-).
		12.31	Own position	Incoming Radio Message 1214/3/62.
			13.00 CF 3269	Begin hostilities against England immediately - . -
				Announced to the crew - .
				Thus attack initially only against England - see also Radio Message 1701/3/47.
				Boat ran to the east again on course 90°, 10 knots, to get closer to the coast.  Final preparations to the weapons were undertaken (cannon - MG C/30 - ready ammunition - heating torpedoes etc.)
		15.25		Incoming Radio Message 1255/57.
				For North Sea Boats.  Since, according to encoding documents at home, it is difficult to keep your own keys (conversion table).  Open Quadrat Chart K.
		16.25		Radio Message 1558/3/46.
				Report concerning 2 French transports 3 September departing from Casablanca.
		16.59		Radio Message 1644/3/49.
				Report concerning aircraft mother ship "ALBATROS".
				Headed for the center of CG 12 in the assumption the "ALBATROS" heads for England on northerly course.  Assuming a highest speed of advance for the ALBATROS of 20 knots in 15 hours the ship could reach the level of U-37's lay point.
		17.00		To check went to depth 50 meters.  Order:  grind the exhaust gas valves about every three hours if the engines are stopped as far as possible.
				The port exhaust gas valve leaks heavily at deep depths (15 minutes 1/2 ton), because that amount of water can only be pumped with the drain pump, the deep steering of the boat cannot be fully justified in an emergency. The loud sounds of the pump betray the boat.
				After surfacing the exhaust gas valves were serviced as far as possible.
		17.43		Radio Message 1821/3/51.
				Intentions 16.59 hours are therefore settled, because "ALBATROS" steered a southerly course.
				Boat ran on course 90° at KF until the beginning of darkness, light zigzag course, from 20.00 hours KF course 90°.

Sun and Moon Data 03.09.39

	- 12 -
		continued
		03.09.39		Radio Message 1743/3/50.
				Conclusions:  French ships, no matter what type, may only be attacked in self defense.
				Chamberlain's declaration:  "England" considers itself in a state of war with "Germany" is initially not entirely clear.  "State of war" is a new term.  However, since boats receive orders that English ships are to be attacked, the situation is resolved militarily for us.  We now only receive the radio news from the German broadcast on short wave.  It can be received in the evening and at night, but there is no news all day.  A general picture of what was going on at home, which in most cases cannot be broadcast by radio, should be given by Leadership instead of the many filler messages.
		20.28		Radio Message 2021/3/52.
		23.14		Radio Message 2237/3/70.
		04.09.39	Wind fluctuating around NW 1-2, light Swell, Sea 0
		05.52		Incoming Radio Message 0511/4/54.
		07.00		"           "           "       0709/4/55.
		07.22		"           "           "       0733/4/56.
		07.43		Crash dive.  Shadow sighted without more details.
				It must be an illusion, since after a long time cruising nothing seen.  Visibility is good.  Probably it was a water spout of a whale, which were observed several times in the course of the morning or a cloud formation on the horizon.
		08.46		Surfaced.
				On general course 90° one diesel LF and continued to steer on large zigzag courses.
			Noon position
			φ = 42°18'N	All loose aft over deck closures knocked off and thrown overboard.
			λ =  13°19'W
				Merchant warfare and Prize Rules:  an warning area declaration is expected soon because merchant warfare by the Prize Rules takes away the main strength of the U-boats.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 04.09.39

	- 13 -
		continued
		04.09.39
		12.12		Incoming Radio Message 1147/4/80.
		13.15		"           "           "       1202/4/82.
		13.20		"           "           "       1207/4/83.
		13.51		"           "           "       1322/4/60 and
		14.01		"           "           "       1334/4/61.
		17.18		"           "           "       1757/4/62.
		18.21		"           "           "       1746/4/48.
				To last Radio Message.
				The conduct of the trade war by the Prize Rules brings the boat's Leadership into a certain internal conflict, since in the free sea region in which there was hardly any traffic, the ordered rescue of the crew is impossible.
				The first restrictions in the submarine war follow. There is no question that the political leadership has its reasons.  The military conclusion will be drawn from this. The boat will continue to the east until the next morning. Aim: to get close to the coast.
				Encountering the French warships reported in Radio Message 2012/4/69 is likely.  Additionally sightings of steamers can be expected, in the previous area there was no traffic.
		05.09.39
		00.42	SW 1, Sea 0-1, light Swell, Vis. very good, at the beginning of twilight until moon rise (approximately 223°T) very dark, no horizon	Incoming Radio Message 2353/4/65 confirmed the view that political leadership places great value on the fact that restrictions should be imposed on the Prize Rules and even beyond.  With ships sailing alone, provided there is an opportunity, you will look at the lone ship , and determine the nationality etc.  If the boat surfaces as soon as determining what type of steamer it is, it reveals its location, and so must change location afterwards.
				Because U-37 is currently favorably located in the vicinity of the coast, it would be unfavorable to announce our location, especially with regard to the fact that French warships are expected to be here.
		02.45		Lights of a vessel in sight bearing 140°T.  Boat strives to get ahead at 2 x HF, in so doing got the moon between the vessel and own boat.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 05.09.39

	- 14 -
		continued
		05.09.39
				Ran ahead until morning twilight slowly turning to starboard until the bearing to the steamer was 180°T.
		05.22		Crash dive .  Course 120° - torpedo weapons ready - Ato.
				It is reasonable to assume that it is a neutral one, since he has illuminated on lanterns and a multitude of lights can be seen aft (illumination of the name?)
				Boat closed to 700 meters, previously it was recognized that it is the steamer "TYSA" Rotterdamm - Holland.  It is 5400 tons.  Since there is a lot of red waterline visible and the vessel is lurching heavily in the swell, it doesn't seem to have a lot of cargo.  Course of the "TYSA" approximately 30°.
				Let the steamer pass.  Did not halt and surface.
		10.48		Surfaced.
		11.15		Masts in sight abeam to port bearing approximately 60°.  Boat is well ahead, suspected course of the steamer about 180°. Maneuvered ahead on course 150° and HF.
		11.30		Crash dive .  Course 100°.
			Noon position	Steamer was distinguished as a tanker with name "SAINT ROSE" or "OGNE".
			φ = 42°24'N
			λ = 10°40'E	Not recognized with certainty.  The name is, as the exterior shows, probably a new tanker, not included in the documents (Loyd etc).
				This steamer was also allowed to pass, because the boat did not want to betray its position and the tanker was not seen as English.  Due to work on the torpedo installation bow room (Gyro angle spindle tube III broken) and the converter for the fire control system after the steamer passed out of sight still did not surface.
		17.10		Surfaced.
		18.00		Crash dive.
				Steamer (masts and smokestack recognized) on southerly course.  Closed , getting in close range is no longer possible, because the target angle is too great. Proceeded to the approach course (300°), waited for dusk to find out whether the steamer sets lanterns. This was done at 19.30 hours.
		19.58		Surfaced.
				Because today several steamers were sighted by day, the sea area in square 21was seen as favorable.
				Intention, stay in this sea area up to a distance of 70 nm from the coast and move back and forth athwart the suspected course line of the steamers (about course 120° to 300°).

Sun and Moon Data 05.09.39

	- 15 -
		continued
		05.09.39
				The receipt of the following Radio Messages is confirmed:
				1305/4/66 at 13.20 hours     1654/5/70 " 16.59 "     1759/5/71 " 17.29 "     2059/5/72 " 21.03 "     2351/5/44 " 00.25 " (6 September)   1605/5/68 " 16.54 "     1621/5/69 " 16.51 "     2335/5/67 " 13.41 "     2359/5/74 " 23.39 "
				In the darkness until 02.00 hours 6 September general course 270°, one diesel KF.
		06.09.39	S 1, Sea 0-1, light Swell, Vis. very good
		02.00		Came to an easterly course, minor course changes.
		04.30		Light on the horizon, soon passed out of sight.
				The picture that has so far emerged on the basis of the Radio Messages and other news allows the boat's Leadership to make the following statements with regard to the restrictions in the trade war given to the boats:
				1.  All neutrals including French merchant ships are not to be stopped and examined.
				2.  No hostile measure against France except in self defense (Radio Message 2351/5/44).
				3.  In the sea area, in which the boat finds itself at the moment, remain unseen, because on encountering enemy warships is expected on the basis of B-Dienst reports.
				4.  Every merchant vessel was observed by day, if the boat is in a reasonably favorable position in relation to the steamer and can approach submerged .
				5.  In anticipation of clarification of the current situation, the main principle is to save fuel in order to be ready for action afterwards (warning area declaration - convoy formation).
				6.  Therefore independent steamers will not be followed, or maneuvered ahead of, if they come into view in an unfavorable position.
			[O.P. = Op.Pl. Operationsplan?]	7.  Actions are only carried out in accordance with O.P. -Orders then via 1-3 with the limitations in accordance with Radio Message 2353/4/65.
				8.  Nights ships proceeding dimmed will be attacked - see Vanzelow Paragraph 226 i (page 341).

	Sun and Moon Data 05.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 06.09.39

	- 16 -
		continued
		06.09.39
			Noon position	The entire day nothing seen.  Going to an area further west for the following day is suggested.
			φ = 42°05'N
			λ =  11°00'W	The receipt of the following Radio Messages is confirmed:
				1054/6/75 at 13.16 hours   1212/6/76 " 13.26 "   1513/6/77 " 16.27 "   1628/6/78 " 16.32 "   xx54/6/79 " 20.30 "   1815/6/80 " 20.30 "
				From 16.00 hours general course 270°.  Go to a new area in the western part of the O.P.-area.
		18.14		Test dive.
				Evening and night no particular events.
		07.09.39	SW 2, Sea 1, light Swell, Vis. very good
		06.46	In the course of the evening freshening to 3-4, Sea 3, dark night, bad horizon	Dived, smoke feather masts of a steamer in the south, coming closer.
				Boat proceeded towards the steamer to determine nationality.  Nothing distinguished, name, smokestack marking etc. painted over.  When the boat was at about 800 meters range from the steamer, it turned towards the boat.  This movement was taken as an attack on the boat which then shot a stern torpedo.
		08.18		About 12 seconds after the fall of the shot heavy detonation (Torpedo No. 1735, Pistol No. 1841).  Shot was not observed through the periscope, because the boat must have settled deeper.  After about 10 minutes went to periscope depth.  Steamer ran on a northerly course.  Second torpedo could no longer be shot immediately because the boat was not in shooting position.
		10.25		Surfaced at the limit of visibility of the steamer, pursued at 12 knots.  After surfacing occupied the 600-meter wavelength.  Steamer reported itself as DEFENDER, 8300 tons - English-.  Steamer called warship and reported mine detonation.  Steamer ran off at its highest speed to the north.  The boat could not come up at 12 knots.

	Sun and Moon Data 06.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 07.09.39

	- 17 -
		continued
		07.09.39		No one responds to the radio message from the steamer that was given after the boat surfaced (2 hours after the fall of the shot).  The decision to give the steamer an answer with course and speed order at greatly reduced power on 600 meters was not taken immediately, was not realized later because it was too obvious.
				The detonation of the torpedo followed about 12 seconds after the fall of the shot.  Estimated shooting range 300-350 meters.  There is the likelihood that the torpedo detonated before reaching the target, because in the other case the steamer could not have run on at so high a speed.
			Noon position	Any observations about hits, list, etc. could not be made until after the boat was again at periscope depth
			φ = 42°00.6'N
			λ =  11°44.0'W	Set depth 4 meters.
		13.30		Maneuver ahead given up, because there was no bearing change.  At the same time a smoke cloud in sight bearing 170°T.  Boat came to course 170°.
				The smoke cloud passed out of sight, was lost.  Illusion from spouting whale possible.
		14.30		Course 270°, 1 diesel KF.
				Since the fact that a submarine is known to be in the currently occupied area must be expected, a warning to English shipping and relocation of the general routes is possible. Therefore the boat is moving a new operating area further west.
				Radio Messages received so far today:
				1229/7/82 at 13.25 hours 1257/7/83 " 13.31 " 1319/7/84 " 13.38 " 1336/7/65 " 13.49 " 1405/7/86 " 14.12 " 1417/7/87 " 14.12 "
		18.55		Crash dive, vessel to the south on northerly course.
				did not approach before dark to get details.
				Vessel is dimmed.
		20.16		Surfaced.  Course 0°, 12 knots.  Continued advance to the north.
		20.23		Shadow ahead to starboard.  Details not distinguished with the weather conditions.  No smoke cloud, English warship or auxiliary warship was suspected.

Sun and Moon Data 07.09.39

	- 18 -
		continued
		07.09.39		Maneuvered ahead to attack.
				21.41 hours first torpedo shot (Torpedo No. 1975, Pistol No. 2329), passed astern range about 1000 meters, torpedo speed 40 knots, target speed = 10 knots, target angle = 80°, aim point forward mast.
				21.50 second torpedo shot (Torpedo No. 1999, Pistol No. 1893), passed ahead range about 700 meters, torpedo speed 40 knots, target speed = 10 knots, target angle = 90°, aim point bow.
				Both torpedoes broached.  As far as could be observed, the torpedoes did not run properly at the begining of the running track.
				Very strong marine phosphorescence, torpedo running track could be followed up to the target. The same observation by the enemy must be accepted, who carried out evasive maneuvers.
				After the second shot he came to opposite course, the boat turned, but always revealed itself by the marine phosphorescence.
				Went to greater range, in so doing the shadow passed out of sight.  Boat turned to 0°, 12 knots, to be ahead of the vessel and catch it again in the next day when it is light.  This measure was incorrect.  It would have been more correct to stay at the enemy despite the unfavorable lighting conditions and the marine phosphorescence.
			["TANAHA" spelling suspect]	From the subsequent Radio Message use by the vessel - the 600-meter wavelength was observed from here - it is clear it was the English steamer "TANAHA", 6486 tons.
				When delivering the message he is initially interfered with by the boat.
				Over night steered 12 knots, course 0°.  At the break of dawn the visibility is bad, rain, bad horizon.  Nothing is seen of the steamer.
				On 7 September received:
				2621/7/89 at 16.20 hours     2009/7/84 " 21.17 "     2028/7/85 " 21.26 "     2324/7/86 " 23.35 "     1659/7/90 " 05.50 " (8 September)
		08.09.39	SW 3-4, Sea 2, overcast, in places fine drizzle, light Swell, Vis. bad to medium, morning freshening to NWbyN 5, Sea 4, Vis. improving, afternoon abating to NW 2-3	Because up to 09.00 hours the visibility was still not significantly better, began return transit at 12 knots, course 343°.
				Morning, failure of the port diesel.
				Exhaust valve bolts broken.  Cause can be attributed to broken cross stiffeners, since the breaks occurred very often at medium and high speed - as was shown during the last 6-week exercise period at home.
			Noon position
			φ = 44°23'N
			λ = 12°16'W

	Sun and Moon Data 07.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 08.09.39

	- 19 -
		continued
		08.09.39
				During today's check of tube torpedoes it was determined that in the case of the two tube torpedoes that were driven with the open muzzle flap during the chase of the steamer last night, the water flap of the pistol had disengaged and the propellers had turned (about 15 turns could be wound back). Pistols exchanged, torpedoes regulated and cleared for firing.
				At 19.00 hours test dive.
		20.16		Steamer with set lights in sight bearing 325°T.  Because on coming closer it turned out that it was a passenger steamer, no further measures were taken.
				Following Radio Messages were received:
				0938/8/97 at 11.15 hours   0807/8/94 " 13.18 "   1117/8/96 " 13.30 "   1230/8/97 " 13.35 "   1340/8/98 " 13.55 "   1603/8/99 " 16.19 "   1445/8/100 " 16.27 "   1521/8/41 " 16.27 "   1709/8/42 " 16.54 "   2006/8/43 " 20.37 "   2110/8/44 " 21.26 "
		09.09.39	NNW 3, Sea 2, light Swell, Vis. very good
		10.00		Course 0°.
			Noon position
			φ = 49°06'N
			λ = 14°35'E
				From 12.00 hours a heavy smoke cloud was sighted in the NW, was passed to the east at 16.00 hours at about 25 nm. Was probably a burning tanker.
				Nothing seen by day or night.
		21.17		Test dive.
				Exhaust gas valves leak again.
				Following Radio Messages were received:
				1559/9/47 at 16.21 hours     2105/9/48 " 20.50 "     2220/9/71 " 23.12 "     2250/9/50 " 00.40 " 10 September

	Sun and Moon Data 08.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 09.09.39

	- 20 -
		10.09.39	SW 4-5, Sea 3-4, Vis. very bad, drizzle, wind shifting right, noon NW 4, clearing Vis. medium, evening N 3, dark night
			Noon position
			φ = 53°35'N
			λ = 14°36'W
		14.15		Steamer in sight approximate bearing 30°T on westerly course.  Maneuvered ahead at 2 x HF to the west, dived at 14.30 hours  Closed to about 3000 meters.  Steamer flew a flag and a hull marking, steered about 260°.  Because it was recognized as neutral refrained from additional measures and surfaced at 16.15 hours and continued transit.
				In the course of the day nothing seen.
				Following Radio Messages were received:
				0952/10/81 at 11.15 hours     1228/10/53 " 13.24 "     1828/10/55 " 20.20 "     1826/10/54 " 20.24 "     2252/10/56 " 00.32 " 11 September   2128/10/57 " 00.50 " 11 September   2317/10/60 " 01.10 " 11 September   2300/10/59 " 00.59 " 11 September   2133/10/58 " 00.50 " 11 September
		11.09.39	N 4-5, Sea 3-4, medium Swell, overcast, rain, at dawn and in the morning abating to NNE 2, Sea 2, medium Swell, Vis. improving, evening S 1-2
		00.00		Course 20°.
				Because for 2 days there has been no opportunity for an observation, as an indication headed for the Rockall Bank. Exact sea charts as well as Sailing Handbook missing.
				Afternoon multiple empty lifeboats (6) sighted (ATHENIA?).
			φ = 57°29'N
			λ = 13°15'W
		09.00		Course 34°.
		17.30		Test dive.
				Otherwise no particular observations.
				Following Radio Messages were received:
				0147/11/61 at 01.25 hours     1310/11/62 " 13.26 "     1756/11/63 " 17.10 "

	Sun and Moon Data 10.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 11.09.39

	- 21 -
		continued
		11.09.39		1923/11/64 at 20.17 hours     2128/11/65 " 21.00 "     2230/11/67 " 00.27 " 12 September   2254/11/68 " 00.37 " 12 September
		12.09.39	SE 3-4, later S 5, evening abating to SSW 2, dawn Vis. medium, morning-afternoon Vis. bad, rain, misty, late afternoon-evening clearing, Vis. medium
		05.00		Course 65°.
		05.58	Noon position	Crash dive, aircraft from SSE range about 3000 meters.
			φ = 60°27'N	After the boat dived, 2 bomb detonations were heard (great range).
			λ =   8°02'W
		07.48		Surfaced.  Continued transit, very bad visibility, rain, misty.
		15.18		Crash dive.  In rain haze 30° to starboard a fishing trawler (patrol vessel?) due to the Sea State not clearly recognizable if a patrol vessel (red smokestack with contrasting black ring, on the forecastle no cannon was observed).
				While proceeding it cleared.
		19.10		Surfaced.  Smoke cloud of the fishing trawler is still visible on the horizon.  Because soon thereafter light recognized and additional fishing trawlers with set lights were observed, the present case it was take to be a Danish fishing trawler.
				Turned via 140°-110°-90° to course 70°.  Came to 14 knots, to pass through the Faroe-Iceland Strait in darkness.
				Following Radio Messages were received:
				0945/12/67 at 10.06 hours     0950/12/69 " 10.21 "     1538/12/71 " 16.12 "     1712/12/72 " 20.32 "     1724/12/73 " 20.18 "     1431/12/76 " 21.08 "     1920/12/77 " 22.45 "

	Sun and Moon Data 11.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 12.09.39

	- 22 -
		continued
		12.09.39		2300/12/76 at 00.35 hours     2306/12/77 " 00.45 "     2310/12/78 " 01.00 "     2312/12/79 " 01.07 "
				No particular events during the night transit.
		13.09.39	SSW 4, Sea 3, broken cloud deck, isolated rain showers, otherwise Vis. good, evening abating to 2-3
		05.00		12 knots.
		09.00		Course 120°.
		12.00	Noon position	Course 145°.
			φ = 61°09'N	Due to the prevailing weather conditions (spray comes over the bridge) and illumination instead of 11.00 hours first at 12.00 hours turned to course 145° and headed directly for the south Norwegian coast.  There, if it is possible at all, a ship's position could still be got in the coming night r to have a reliable point of departure for entry into the German Bucht.
			λ =   1°11'E
				During the entire day neither north or east of the Shetlands was any patrol (sea - air) determined.  No diving was necessary.
		19.00		2 x HF, to still reach the Norwegian lighthouses in sufficient darkness. Utsire should come out are 23.50 hours.
				The detour associated with determining the location of the ship on the Norwegian coast is very slight (12 nm).
				Following Radio Messages were received:
				0105/13/82 at 01.52 hours     0030/13/81 " 01.20 "     0835/13/88 " 10.06 "     1816/13/92 " 19.07 "     1845/13/89 " 20.55 "     2034/13/87 " 20.45 "     2051/13/88 " 20.45 "     2030/13/98 " 23.25 "     2150/13/99 " 23.35 "     1900/13/96 " 13.45 "     2305/13/93 " 00.50 "     2112/13/41 " 03.50 "

	Sun and Moon Data 12.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 13.09.39

	- 23 -
		14.09.39	SW 2, morning shifting to WbyN 3-4, Sea 2-3, Vis. good, isolated rain showers	Utsire does not appear at the anticipated time. By soundings the boat is to the west therefore at 00.10 hours course east.  At 02.00 hours Utsire was seen.  02.40 hours course 145°, 02.56 hours course 160°.  The boat was 25 nm more to the west.  This corresponds to the track brought forward by yesterday's navigation fix in the course direction.
		05.40		Crash dive, vessel 340°R, aircraft abeam to starboard questionable.  Vessel turned out to be a fishing trawler.
		06.40		Second vessel in sight directly ahead.  It is a Swede, recognizable by the flag aft and the national colors on the side of the hull.  It steers about 330°.  It was not stopped due to the determined nationality.
		08.15		Surfaced.
				Continued transit at 2 x HF, course 160°.  The Radio Message received early today 2112/13/41 encouraged the impression that the torpedo shot on 7 September detonated early after about 200 meters.
				Apart from the E.S.N. cartridge, no Recognition Signals were on board.  The Recognition Signal cipher was not disclosed.  The cartridge was considered sufficient, since instruction of own security forces was assumed.
				Shot the sun several times in the morning to determine the latitude.
		11.40		Crash dive, aircraft ahead 20° to port.  Own remote reconnaissance suspected.  Flight direction about north, northwest.
		11.57		Surfaced.
			Noon position
			φ = 58°00.5'N
			λ =   5°07.6'E
		16.10		Course 136°.  Repeated observations of the sun result in offset in the WSW direction.
		18.45		Course 180°.  Boat is north of the Small Fischer Bank.  Temporarily went to LF, until evening navigation fix results are at hand, thereafter 15 knots.
				Navigation into the channel, which is only 15 nm wide, is favored by the fact that the sun can be observed and by the relatively calm weather.
				Any activity of own security, mine search etc. warships in the Deutsche Bucht is not known.

Sun and Moon Data 14.09.39

	- 24 -
		continued
		14.09.39		Since the channel is steered through at night, unexpected incidents can occur.
				It is not known, to what extent there are already mines in the warning area or for which reason the sea area east of the channel is closed to own U-boats.
				Since it is not easy to navigate the 140 nm long strip in bad weather, especially if a certain departure point is missing, it must be checked whether the incoming U-boat is already reported north of the channel, or whether the boat could request one or more own bearings.
				The route through the Kattegat into the Baltic Sea also seems more reliable.
				Because of the danger of drifting mines proceeded with closed bulkheads.
				Ongoing depth checks.  The Echolot indications are especially valuable here.
				The channel was passed without incident, the southern limit of the channel was reached at 05.15 hours 15 September.
		15.09.39	NW 1-2, light Swell, Sea 1-2, Vis. very good for North Sea conditions extraordinary visibility	It is surprising that no surveillance or inspection vessels could be seen until dawn and no morning reconnaissance by aircraft was observed.
				The morning navigation fix is only 4 nm in a NE direction.
		05.13		Course 137°.  The goal is to have the shallowest water depth in the vicinity of the coast.
				Abeam Langeoog the first patrol vessel in sight.
		07.31		Course 82°, headed for Lightship F.
		09.05		Passed Lightship F.
				Headed up the Jade.
		13.17		Entered the U-boat Base, made fast.

	Sun and Moon Data 14.09.39
	Sun and Moon Data 15.09.39

	- 25 -
				The practical experiences gained during the voyage
				are reported in conclusion.
				1.)  Weapons.
				a)  Torpedo:  The prescribed work could be carried out according to the operating regulations, except for working through the G7a torpedo with oil, as this job, which can only be done with the assistance of boat ventilation, results in a very strong oil mist in the bow (stern) - room.
				One G7e torpedo failed because the acid level had dropped to an invisible level.  Cause:  Failure of the heating panel or temperature controller.  The 1st torpedo fired (No. 1735) detonated before reaching the target.  The cause cannot be specified.
				The 2nd torpedo shot resulted in a miss due to the +3 bow up angle and the observed bayonette.  The shooting data, which could be estimated precisely on the basis of the given situation, was accurate for the short distance and the slow, 140-meter long target.
				The 3rd torpedo shot missed due to the avoidance maneuver and the forward aim point.  The observed the self rotating of the propeller on the pistol does not contribute to trusting the pistol of the torpedoes with absolute certainty, even taking into account the fact that only a few revolutions were made relative to the revolutions required to reach the safety distance.
				After the detonation of the 1st torpedo the 2nd stern torpedo could not be made ready as ordered to shoot because the outer tube door could not be opened.  The shock wave of the detonation undoubtedly caused a jam of part of the outer tube door. The outer tube door could only be opened again in the course of the day.
				No faults occurred in the fire control system. The torpedoes could best have been be reloaded from the upper deck into the interior of the boat during the night on 5 and 6 September.
				The most important influence is the swell, which never gives the boat a completely stable position and which will always prevail to a very slight extent even in very calm weather.  Since the downloading in the open sea could only have been carried out at night during this patrol, the introduction of torpedoes into the interior of the boat would only have been possible at one point at best (aft or fore).  It takes a

	- 26 -
				considerable amount of time to rig up all of the upper deck transport equipment, some of which have to be assembled first, and where jams and stiffness will always occur due to their storage in a freely flooded room.
				Artillery:
				It was not used.
			[Schiebertrommel = slide drum? not sure what this is]	The disadvantage is that no preservation work can be carried out in moderate and bad weather. The range and slide drum showed strong corrosion, the scale was hardly recognizable on the slide drum. The optics, which were kept out continuously on one side, showed no issues.
				Communications system:
				The Radio Message gear worked well.  No faults occurred. Communications could all be received. The radio direction finder system showed defects again after the first few days, and bearings could no longer be carried out with it.  In the evening, the news from the German broadcast could be received well on short wave with the radio receiver. The sensitivity of the G.H.G. system continued to decrease as the patrol progressed.  The cause lies, as has already happened several times, in the leaking of the cable boxes attached at the front of the bow, in which the lines of the individual receivers run together. The leaks short these out.
				The K.D.B. is unusable due to the strong noise of the re-rotating motor. The sounder worked well overall.
				2.)  Engines:
				Fundamental defects occurred in the exhaust gas valves, which are completely unpredictable, sometimes tight, sometimes leaky. Attempts, like more frequent grinding in for longer over water cruise - a measure which may not be possible for the boat, because the respective engine has to be stopped for a short time - did not lead to success.
				On this trip, as in the past, there were several cases in which the penetrating water could only be drained with the main drain pump. Since this pump works very loudly, the boat can be heard easily.  At greater depths, more water entered the boat through the exhaust valves.  This leak is considered a very significant military disadvantage. It does not give the absolute feeling of safety.
				All other faults that occurred, e.g. banging especially the starboard clutch at low speed (stronger noise), a vibration

	- 27 -
				damper leaking and thus oil loss, leaks at the exhaust gas blowing valves.  Cracks in an exhaust valve piston, etc. had no immediate adverse effect on the boat's conduct.
				Due to the given conditions, the entire diesel installation, which was to receive its basic overhaul at this time, showed general signs of fatigue.  A major overhaul seems necessary after a second patrol, especially with regard to the cracks in the transverse stiffeners, which give cause for concern to the boat's Leadership, e.g. if the speed levels are higher, suddenly serious failures can occur in the diesel system.
				3.)  Boat conduct:
				The orders and instructions received from home made it clear that the trade war was to be carried out strictly according to the Prize Regulations.  What led the political Leadership to these this measures could only be presumed because there was no overall view. So the impression was created - also taking into account the information about further restrictions to the Prize Regulations - that any kind of incidents must be avoided that would have adverse political consequences.  As a result, the boat's Leadership incorrectly assumed that neutral steamers should not be searched either, especially since this ban had already been imposed on the French ships.
				This fact of trade warfare according to the Prize Regulations brought the Kommandanten into a certain internal conflict, because with compliance with the provisions of the Prize Regulations in a low-traffic sea area, far from the coast, the crew cannot be rescued.  In the case of a steamer that has been captured [rescue] is more likely where the U-boat believes there are other vessels in the wider area and, if necessary, can be brought up to the sinking location by Radio Message.
				The conduct of the trade war according to Prize Regulations was seen only as a transitional stage, on the basis of the picture obtained and after clarifying the current situation with the early publication of warning areas in which the opportunities for success of the U-boats would have to increase significantly [illegible handwritten word].  In order to be ready for action, fuel had to be saved first and foremost.  For this reason, it was intended to only approach the steamers that were in a relatively favorable position to

	- 28 -
				the U-boat at the moment of viewing.  Although this applied to all steamers that came into view, since their general course direction was N-S, it prevented the boat's Leadership from running ahead of attacked steamers at more than 12 knots (FALL DEFENDER).
				Since at the moment the declaration of war England began bringing in its steamers with a concentration of its ships off its coast, the formation of convoys on the Atlantic route was also to be expected.  Fuel was also saved on this assumption, which was confirmed one day after the recall.  The boat should then, as also orderd in the operations order, be set against the convoys.
				The Radio Message received in the night of 7 September . concerning immediate return came completely unexpectedly and could not be understood until the receipt of detailed explanations. The boat and its Leadership gained experience on the first voyage, which will come into effect on the next patrol.

 

	Enclosures to U-37's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the document
Chart	Track chart for the entire patrol

 

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