U-162 - 1st War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

Click the icon to download a KMZ file displaying the U-boat track, significant events and locations for this patrol.  You must have Google Earth loaded on your computer to view this file.  Download Google Earth here

Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
24 Feb 42	08.35	47°51'N, 38°25'W	WHITE CREST	4.365	British	ONS-67
			Total = 4,365
Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

				K  r  i  e g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
				======================
				of the Unterseebootes    "U  162"
				=======================
				1st Patrol.
				Beginning:     9.9.1941,
				Ending:        18.3.1942.
			Kommandant:	Fregattenkapitän  Wattenberg.
			Distribution:	2 x O.K.M.
				1 x B.d.U.
				1 x 2.A.d.Uboote
				1 x 2.u.-Flottille
		Drafted 20.3.  2.Ufl.
		5 x Copies
				© U-boat Archive 2023 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 2 -
		1941
		09.09.41	Wesermünde	Commissioning of "U-162".
		10.00
		10. - 13.09.41	Wesermünde	Outfitting.
		14. - 15.09.41	Weser, Elbe and Canal	Transit from Wesermünde to Kiel through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
		16.09. - 01.10.41	Kiel	U.A.K. testing.
		02.10.41	Western and eastern Baltic	Transit from Kiel to Rönne.
		03.10.41	Rönne	U.A.G. sound trials.
		04.10.41	Eastern Baltic	Transit from Rönne to Stettin.
		05.10.41	Stettin	Report to the 4.U.-Flottille and established the boat's room.
		06.10.41	Eastern Baltic	Transit from Stettin to Danzig.
		07.10.41	Danzig	Report to U.A.G. I.
		08. - 10.10.41	Gotenhafen and Danzig Bay	T.E.K. testing.
		11. - 12.10.41	Danzig	In dry-dock in the Danziger Werft.  (outer tube door of tube IV).
		13.10.42	Gotenhafen and Danzig Bay	T.E.K. testing.
		14. - 16.10.41	Danzig and Danzig Bay	U.A.G. I. testing.
		17. - 18.10.41		Independent training.
		19. - 28.10.41	Hela and Danzig Bay	Agru-Front training.
		29.10. - 23.11.41	Danzig and Danzig Bay	Shooting training with the 25. U.-Flottille.
		24.11.41	Danzig	Danzig Holmwerft.  Repair of artillery shooting damage.
		25.11. - 05.12.41	Gotenhafen and eastern Baltic	Training with the 27. U.-Flottille.  Tactical training.

	- 3 -
		1941
		06. - 09.12.41	Eastern and western Baltic	Transit to Gotenhafen via Danzig to Wesermünde.
		09.12.41	Wesermünde	Entered the Seebeckwerft for final adjustments and overhaul.
		1942
		17.01.42	Wesermünde	Departed after final adjustments were completed.
		17. - 18.01.42	Weser, Elbe, Kaiser Wilhelm Canal	Transit from Wesermünde to Kiel.
		19. - 30.01.42	Kiel	Final adjustments at Deutsche Werk Kiel.
		31.01. - 07.02.42	Kiel	Outfitting for the Front with the 5. U.-Flottille.
		07.02.42	Kiel
		12.00		Put to sea for 1st patrol in accordance with Outbound Orders of the 5.U.-Flottille (5.Ufl. 289 Gkdos).
		13.30 - 23.00	Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, Brunsbüttel	In tow by "WOTAN" through the icy Canal.
		08.02.42	Brunsbüttel
		08.00		Cast off.  Under ice-breaker and anti-aircraft escort proceeded to Helgoland.
		14.15	Helgoland	Made fast in the East Harbor.  Ice protector handed over.  Outer tube doors and propellers examined by a diver for ice damage.  All normal.
		09.02.42	Helgoland
		08.00		Put to sea for radio direction finder calibration, two-hour full speed cruise and final trim test.
				Results:  radio direction finder was off by 4.
				Full speed cruise showed new piston was fine.
				Trim test attempt showed the boat was 20 tons too heavy.  Therefore during the subsequent fuel supply

	Sun and Moon Data 07.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 08.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 09.02.42

	- 4 -
		continued
		09.02.42		on the instructions of the Helgoland U-boat Base Commander the regulating and reserve fuel oil tank was not filled with fuel.  We will still miss the 30 cbm very much!
		18.10		Put to sea under anti-aircraft escort.
		20.00	Deutsche Bucht	At darkness released anti-aircraft escort and proceeded into the North Sea in accordance with Outbound Orders.
			AN 9567
		10.02.42
		00.00	AN 9371	Speed log out of service.  Damage can probably not be repaired by on board means.
		04.00	AN 6392
		12.00	AN 3849	Day's run:  234.9 nm (from Helgoland)
		16.00	AN 3819
		20.00	AN 3579	Echolot sounder out of service.  The now failed for good speed log and the less than perfect radio direction finder are vexing.
		11.02.42	Norwegian west coast
		00.00	AN 3439
		04.00	AN 3179
		08.00	AN 2896
		12.00	AN 2866	Day's run:  180.5 nm (Total 415.4 nm)
		16.00	AN 2836	The deep echo sounder is in service again.  The shallow sounder remains out of service.  Troubleshooting continues.
		20.00	AN 23936
		21.25		Radio Message (Short Signal):
				Have passed 60°N to the north.
				"U-162".
		12.02.42
		00.00	AN 2336
		04.00	AN 8766	Fishermen at their work.
		08.00	AF 8749
		08.41		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0759 -
				Rostin, Wattenberg, Kölle, Piening:
				1.)  Operation is anticipated in area CA and south therefrom.
				2.)  With report in accordance with Operations Order 50, Paragraph 19 report fuel.  If no observations are at hand report fuel by Short Signal.
				3.)  Conserve fuel.
				Message brings great joy in the boat.

	Sun and Moon Data 09.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 10.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 11.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 12.02.42

	- 5 -
		continued
		12.02.42
			Unfortunately, we will not be able to stay for too long on the American coast with the existing fuel ( at the moment 184.6 cbm), because the considerations in this regard give following picture:
			Range to CA about 3700 nm
			Time to CA about 25 days at average day's run 150 nm
			Fuel consumption in 25 days about 25.3 cbm = 75 cbm
			Range from CA to BF about 3400 nm
			Fuel consumption in 23 days about 23.3 cbm = 69 cbm
			Total consumption on outbound and return transit about 144 cbm
			Therefore available in the operations area about 184 - 144 cbm = 40 cbm.
			Ignored are the wind, Sea State and current which can significantly increase or decrease estimated values.  Operating on an enemy reported during the outbound transit can then mean that the operation on the American coast is no longer possible in terms of fuel.
		11.15	AF 8748	Surfaced briefly to shoot the sun, however dove again before a Sunderland.  Surfaced once more, took an ex-meridian line of position and continued submerged in accordance with Outbound Orders.
		12.00	AF 8746	Day's run:  150 nm  (Total 565.4 nm)
		16.00	AN 2531	U-boat Echolot sounders are apparently very susceptible to failure, Kölle and Rostin have reported their sounders out of service.  Hope that the E-Maschinist can get my sounder in operation, which I now urgently need for a good point of departure to pass the barrier between the Shetland and Faroe Islands.  The backup  - consisting of 60 Elektroloten [explosive charges for echo sounding] - is too little in war, where all beacons are extinguished.  Wanted to take 300 but the shipyard refused.
		20.00	AF 7996	On very long wavelength only surface reception.  Cause?
		13.02.42	Northern North Sea
		00.00	AF 7951
		04.00	AF 7926
		08.00	AF 7673
		12.00	AF 7649	Day's run:  120 nm  (Total 685.4 nm)
			From now on westward!  Hashagen had good luck and success with U-62 [WWI boat] on his cruise around England.  So the "62" is a good number.  May there always be hunting light! [Büchsenlicht - literally rifle light - meaning favorable light for hunting]
		16.00	AF 7644
		20.00	AF 7566
		22.15		Radio Message (Radio Signal) - 1000 -
				Enemy convoy in sight naval square AE 75 (about 75 nm south of Iceland).

	Sun and Moon Data 12.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 13.02.42

	- 6 -
		continued
		13.02.42
				Reported convoy consists of 3 vessels.  Escort ahead.  Course 110°, speed 10 knots.
				U-352.
			Direct range (over the Faroe Island Group) about 550 nm.  Could go to the North Channel, however also to Pentland Firth or Fair Passage.  In the latter case there is the prospect of gaining contact.  Further development situation depends on contact keeper reports.
		22.49		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2202-
				1.)  Varendorf as attack area occupy AM norther half, Rathke area west of AE 4840.
				2.)  . . . . . . . .
				So no operational orders for Rostin, Piening and me.  There is no reason to let go of the intention to continue the advance on Route "Amsterdam" at economical transit speed.
		14.02.42	Northern North Sea
		00.00	AF 7816
		02.47		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0221 -
				Contact lost.  Position of convoy 20.00 hours AE 7675, course 120°, speed 9 knots.  43 cbm.
				U-352.
		04.00	AF 7763
		08.00	AF 7773
		12.00	AN 1122	Day's run:  172.8 nm  (Total 858.2 nm)
		12.33	AN 1122	Dove unseen before a land-based aircraft.  Aircraft bore 0°T, course about 200°.
		13.10		Surfaced.
		13.43		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1010 -
				Rostin, Wattenberg, Piening.
				Head for CA 87.
		16.00	AN 1116
		20.00	AM 3266
		15.02.42	West coast of Scotland
		00.00	AM 3258	Have left the North Sea.  Have reached the entrance to the North Atlantic.
		04.00	AM 3276
		08.00	AM 3334
		12.00	AM 3343	Day's run:  136 nm  (Total 994.2 nm)
		16.00	AM 3347
		20.00	AM 2496
		16.02.42	West coast of Scotland
		00.00	AM 2488
		04.00	AM 2536
		08.00	AM 2557
		12.00	AM 1666	Day's run:  143 nm  (Total 1137.2 nm)

	Sun and Moon Data 13.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 14.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 15.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 16.02.42

	- 7 -
		continued
		16.02.42
		16.00	AM 1683	Passed the line AE 77 - AM 28 (Operations Order 50, Paragraph 19).  By this the boat has arrived in the free Atlantic.
				Intend to head for Point 58°10'N, 14°W (about 50 nm north of Rockall).  From there on the Great Circle (See Steamer Handbook DW 18) to Point 41°30'N, 47°W.
		20.00	AM 1678
		22.57		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2205 - (on Norddeich Circuit) 170 cbm.  Amsterdam once land-based air.  Serial No. 253 missing.  AM 17 rising, 1028 mb, +10°C, S 9, Stratocumulus, Vis. 4 nm.
				"U-162".
		17.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	AM 1733	Radio Message 2205 was not confirmed by B.d.U.  Check showed it was delivered incorrectly, instead should have been transmitted on alternate frequency.
		08.00	AM 1731 (Rockall)
		12.00	AM 1719	Gained ground slowly.  All antenna leads are torn away in large seas.  Temporarily transmitting is not possible except over the rod antenna.
			S 8, Sea 6-7, Vis. 5 nm, overcast, 1032 mb
		16.00	AM 1741	Forward antenna in service again.  The aft one cannot be worked on due to weather conditions.
		20.00	AL 3858
		23.30		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2305 -
				Wattenberg . . . . . . . . .
				On 18 February between 01.00 and 05.00 hours give Short Signal weather report.
				Therefore Leadership did not receive Radio Message 2205.
		18.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	AL 3878
		03.18		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report) on Norddeich Circuit.
				58°N, 18°W, steady 1030 mb, +10°C, SE 7, 10/10 Stratus, Vis. 5 nm, SE-Swell.
				"U-162".
		04.00	AL 3956
		08.00	AL 3986
		09.51		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0935 -  Wattenberg.
				Immediately report position and fuel by Short Signal.
				Therefore Short Signal weather report was not received.
		11.16		Radio Message (Short Signal).
				My position is AL 39.  Fuel 165 tons.
				"U-162".

	Sun and Moon Data 16.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 17.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 18.02.42

	- 8 -
		continued
		18.02.42	North Atlantic	(When delivered, initially a group in cbm was not found, therefore assumed the number would be understood in cbm)
		12.00	AL 3948	Day's run:  126 nm  (Total 1366.2 nm)
		13.13		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1204 -
				Wattenberg reports from AL 39.  Fuel 165 tons  (therefore corrected with the group for cbm found in the meantime.
		16.00	AL 0262
		20.00	AL 0258
		19.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	AL 0247
		04.00	AL 5212
		08.00	AL 5138
		12.00	AL 5153	Day's run:  143 nm  (Total 1509.2 nm)
		16.00	AL 5172
		20.00	AL 4298
		20.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	AL 4526
		04.00	AL 4469
		08.00	AL 4488
		12.00	AL 4712	Day's run:  143 nm  (Total 1652.2 nm)
		16.00	AK 6963
		19.20		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1842 -
				Wattenberg . . . . . . . .  report weather by Short Signal 21 February between 01.00 and 05.00 hours.
		20.00	AK 6983
		21.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	AK 6979
		01.17		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report)
				54°N, 28°W, steady 996 mb, +12°C, SE 6, light rain showers, Cumulus clouds, Vis. 5 nm.
				"U-162".
		04.00	AK 9239
		08.00	AK 9259
		12.00	AK 9276	Day's run:  140 nm  (Total 1792.2 nm)
		16.00	AK 9196
		18.15		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1126 -
				Wattenberg.
				Report weather by Short Signal 22 February between 01.00 and 05.00 hours.
		20.00	AK 9426

	Sun and Moon Data 18.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 19.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 20.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 21.02.42

	- 9 -
		22.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	AK 9446
		01.17		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report)
				52°N, 31°W, rising 1002 mb, +9°C, E 5, Stratocumulus, Vis. 5 nm, E-Swell 4.
				"U-162".
		04.00	AK 8696
		08.00	AK 8923
		09.25		Radio Message (Radio Signal) - 0612 -
				Enemy convoy in sight BD 1428, steers south-westerly course, low speed.    "U-155".
				(First repeated by Radio Control after 3 hours)
		09.28		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0844 -
				Piening.
				Attack free.  Every 4 hours report contact.  Boats operating on convoy request short-term contact keeping reports as soon as necessary.
		09.38		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0828 -
				Tanker 9000 and freighter 6000 GRT sunk.  After shooting forced to submerge.  Depth charges.  In pursuit.    Piening.
		09.44		Radio Message (Radio Message) -0927 -
				Wattenberg and Giessler immediately report position by Short Signal.
			Convoy was about 300 nm ahead of "U-162" on its general course.  Reachable with a 7 knot speed advantage at the earliest in 2 days.  At the moment contact is broken.  Request for position indicates that Leadership wants to reserve the boat's operation.  If a related order does not arrive within two hours, and contact is regained in the meantime, I intend to operate on the convoy.
				At the moment, the boat lies hove to to take advantage of the better weather conditions, both aft antennas have been made operable again. In addition, acetylene soldering work (connection through the over deck) was carried out on the also out of service diesel compressor.
		10.24 - 10.57	AK 8923	Radio Message (Short Signal)
				My position is AK 8923.    "U-162".
		12.00	AK 8941	Day's run:  150 nm  (Total 1942.2 nm)
		12.30		All antennas in service.
		12.19		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0942 -
				Convoy consists of 5 steamers and 3 escort vessels.  Still no contact.  Square BD 6455, SE 4, overcast, Vis. medium, Sea 3, 996 mb.
				Piening.
				(First received after 2-1/2 hours)
		12.40		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1156 - from B.d.U. Control Station.
				At 10.58 hours on 24 meters with Volume 5 Beta Signal heard.  Due to power failure not picked up. Send again.

Sun and Moon Data 22.02.42

	- 10 -
		continued
		22.02.42	North Atlantic
		13.08		Radio Message (Short Signal) of 1057 repeated.
		13.18		Radio Message (Radio Signal) - 1220 -
				Enemy convoy in sight AK 6823. steers easterly course, medium speed.    "U-154" (Kölle).
			New convoy.  About 300 nm behind "U-162".  Course for England (loaded!).  Operating on this convoy would be wrong, because the convoy could first be reached relatively close off England, so a long attack is hardly possible.  Additionally the boat would be pulled away from its assigned operations area, while operation on the Piening-convoy brings the boat closer to its operation area.
		13.47		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1325- from B.d.U.
				Position "U-162" AK 8923 (confirmed).
			In order to have confirmation that Leadership agrees with my assessment, I ask by Short Signal, whether I should operate on one of the two convoys in the form:
		14.29		Radio Message (Short Signal)
				Which is my operations new area?    "U-162".
		15.19		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1438 -
				Wattenberg, head for CA 87.
		16.00	AK 8869
		16.31		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1631 -
				Piening reports, that at 15.00 hours in 2 nm visibility he lost contact with the convoy. (not verbatim)
		17.34		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1644 -  To Kölle.
				To avoid conspicuous radio signals for contact keeping reports use Short Signal or radio message.
				MNO B.d.U.
			The Instruction of the B.d.U. MNO is contrary to previous instruction by Leadership, by which Short Signals were not to be used for contact keeping reports.  I believe the conspicuous "alfa" Signal is also for inappropriate for U-boat warfare because the enemy immediately recognizes that a U-boat has contact on the enemy.  In my opinion these Signals are appropriate in the case of mixed fleet formations, where short-term dissemination of the message is particularly important, as well as in all cases where boat is noticed by the enemy.  The goal should be that all the transmitted messages are completely identical externally.  By a certain identification of the time group (last number) by an hourly or daily changing key, the urgency flagged by "alfa" etc. could be attained as well.
		20.00	AK 8888

Sun and Moon Data 22.02.42

	- 11 -
		23.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	BD 2117
		04.00	BD 1365
		08.00	BD 1388
		10.25		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0536 -
				Kölle reports contact lost after three night attacks with 10 missed shots.
		12.00	BD 1532	Day's run:  180 nm  (Total 2122.2 nm)
		15.42		Radio Message (Radio Message - 1312 -
				12.00 hours BD 6859 convoy, course SSW.
				"U-587".
			Enemy is located abeam to port from "U-152" about on the same course.  Therefore finally huntable game for us.  Boat can be there in 1-1/2 days.  Therefore initially advanced to the SE at 17 knots, later south, so as not to lose too much to weather, incase contact is lost again.
				Reported to Leadership:
		17.18		Radio Message (Short Signal)
				Intend to advance in SE direction.
				"U-162".
		16.00	BD 1552
		17.58		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1747 -
				To "U-162" Short Signal was confirmed.  Report position immediately.
		18.20		Radio Message (Short Signal)
				My position is BD 1580.
				"U-162".
		19.17		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1803 -
				BC 9214 course about 220°, speed about 10 knots.
				Borcherdt-Ullrich
				From this radio message it follows that "U-587" in Radio Message 1212, which led to my advance to the SE, issued incorrect squares [BD instead of BC]. It concerned the re-discovered Piening-convoy.
				Therefore again nothing.  Continued at transit speed.
		20.00	BD 1855
		24.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	BD 1872
		02.30	BD 1795	A shadow bearing 300°T (abeam to starboard)
			NW 1-2, Sea 1-2, medium-long Swell, steady, 1007 mb, 7/10, bright moonlit night (1st quarter), Vis, up to 6 nm, +11°C	A steamer coming up.
				Maneuvered ahead.  Enemy speed 12-13 knots, course about 220°, light zigzags.  Very long ship, fully loaded.
		03.40		Boat is positioned ahead.  Observed for 1/2 hour.  Zigzags and is darkened..  Therefore enemy.
		04.00	BD 4126

	Sun and Moon Data 23.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 24.02.42

	- 12 -
		continued
		24.02.42	North Atlantic
		04.10		Shortly after a zigzag dived to attack submerged because the night is too bright to attack on the surface.  Nothing seen for 1/2 hour, in the moonlight the horizon is milky and obscured.  Sound bearing showed 120 RPM (therefore 12 knots) and shifted slowly to port.  Turned with.  Suddenly recognized the steamer.  Range is large enough.  Target angle is already 90°.
				Shot at target angle 100°.
		04.45		Two-fan from tubes I and III.
				===================
				(I did not want to miss with the first wartime approach and also believed the steamer, whose course and speed I had closely watched, would be caught by a fan.)
				Fan missed.
				Target angle was greater, because the steamer had zigzagged to starboard during the approach.  Not given enough consideration, though I recognized the shift from sound bearings.
		05.07		Surfaced.  Maneuvered ahead again.
		06.32		Boat is ahead, about 5000 meters.
		06.37	Moonset	Though illumination conditions are acceptable for surface attack, I still want to attempt a submerged attack, to determine if illumination conditions with the set moon are better.
				During tactical training even during dark nights there was regular success attacking convoys at night submerged, and with certain data from close range almost always 5-6 torpedoes were shot.  The steamer cannot escape me and reach America. Therefore will take a chance on a second attempt if it brings valuable experience.
		06.54		Dived and initiated attack.  Initially again nothing was seen.  Sound bearing shifted slowly to starboard, turned with.  Suddenly the steamer, with a high bow sea, was in target angle 10° about 10° degrees to starboard.  Range was already 500 meters.  Tried with differential engine use to turn away for a stern shot.  Too late.  Target shifted through, stern tubes were still not locked in.
		07.20		Surfaced, maneuvered ahead again.
		08.00	BD 4148
		08.26	S 2, Sea 2, 7/10, dark night, however Vis. good	Initiated surface attack.
		08.35	BD 4144	Multiple shot from tubes I and III.
				=======================
				2 hits.
				At the shot the target was 1/3 in the UZO.  Range 500 meters, target angle 74°.

Sun and Moon Data 24.02.42

	- 13 -
		continued
		24.02.42	North Atlantic	Capsized after 8 minutes.
				Fast (12-13 knots) four-masted freighter, type probably "ASTRONOMER" 8401 GRT.
		12.00	BD 6369	Day's run:  223.8 nm  (Total 2346 nm)
		16.00	BC 6625
		20.00	BC 6643
		20.57	BC 6644	Steamer in sight bearing 333°T.
				Distance 8 nm.  Own course 240°.
				Attempted to maneuver ahead.
		23.18		Broke off the maneuver ahead as pointless because by plotting the steamer ran at 16 knots and zigzagged strongly (speed 16 knots including zigzags).
		25.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	BC 65 lower-right corner
		04.00	BD 6579
		08.00	BD 6766
		12.00	BD 6794	Day's run:  164 nm  (Total 2510 nm)
		16.00	BD 9116
		20.00	BD 9146
		26.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	BC 8393
		02.28		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2347 -
				Wattenberg.  On 26 February report weather, between 01.00 and 05.00 hours.
		03.17		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report):
				45°N, 44°W, falling 1002 mb, +15°C, SE 5, 10/10, light rain, Vis, 2 nm, low SE-Swell.        "U-162".
		04.00	BC 8631
		08.00	BC 8654
		10.45		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0954 -
				Wattenberg.  Report position immediately.  Four times so far requests for weather reports have not been answered.  Even in the case of weather reports, reception by the Control Center must be ensured and checked by the boat.
			Four times Short Signal weather reports have been sent on ordered Alternate frequency of the Norddeich Circuit, to be precise:
			18.02.42 at 03.18;
			21.02.42 at 01.17;
			22 02.42 at 01.17;
			26.02.42 at 03.17.
			In no case was the prescribed repetition on Greenland Circuit, in accordance with Standing War Order 208, Paragraph 23, determined.  There is no repetition of a Short

	Sun and Moon Data 24.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 25.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 26.02.42

	- 14 -
		continued
		26.02.42
			Signal weather report among the on-board radio transmissions to other boats in the Greenland circuit.  Therefore accepted that these repetitions were not intended by the B.d.U. Control Station.   For this reason refrained from own repetition after "reasonable time" (Standing War Order 200, Paragraph 34, Section d).  Between Paragraph 34, of Standing War Order 22 and Standing War Order 208, according to which such confirmation should not take place, there is obviously a contradiction.
			The Short Signals of the boat, which were given on Alternate frequency, were all received by the Control Station.  Therefore is must be assumed, that the cause of the issue with the Short Signal weather reports lay ashore.
		12.00	BC 8677	Day's run:  135 nm  (Total 2645 nm)
		12.57	SE 8, Sea 6, overcast, 975 mb, falling, +11°C, Water +8°C, confused Swell, Vis. 5 nm	Radio Message (Short Signal):
				My position is BC 8611.
				"U-162".
				(Delayed sending, since first checked, if it was necessary and appropriate to give Leadership an explanation for the issues with the Short Signal weather reports.  I decide to wait, to see if the next Short Signal weather report, which should be sent on several circuits, comes through.  If not, then report.)
		16.00	BC 8834	Weather development suggests aa approaching violent storm vortex.  The barometer has fallen 25 mb since 00.00 hours.  Boat works heavily in the high Swell.  In the good visibility initially attempted to weather the storm on the surface, and hold boat in a suitable position (athwart).
		17.42	S 11, Sea 8-9, Vis. 1 nm, all white spray	Dived, because visibility is reduced to 1 nm.  Proceeded submerged at depth 50 meters (up to 40 meters the seas still seize the boat strongly).  Forward diving plane can only be put down 20° with the motor, by hand only by force.
		20.00	BC 8828
		22.47	W 9, Sea 8, Vis. 3 nm, high W-Swell	Surfaced.  Course south (athwart the wind and sea) to run out of the vortex.  Boat now lies tolerably and works more gently.  Blew only main ballast tanks 1, 5 and 8.
		23.14		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2204 -
				Wattenberg . . . . . . . .
				On 27 February report weather, between 01.00 and 05.00 hours.
		23.50		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1842 -
				1.)  Piening attack area north of the latitude of CS.
				2.)  Rostin, Wattenberg south therefrom.
				3.)  You are reminded of the situation reports of Scholtz of 17 February and Schultze of 21 February.
				4.)  With strong defenses or light traffic change of area is at own discretion.
			By the sinking reports and situation reports a very promising area.

Sun and Moon Data 26.02.42

	- 15 -
		27.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	BC 8852
		01.17		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report) on Norddeich Circuit.
		02.44		44°N, 45°W, rising 990 mb, +5°C, W 9, Stratocumulus, low bad weather clouds, Vis. 3 nm, high W-Swell.
		04.14
		08.00	BC 8882	Same message sent twice more in amended form on radio circuit "Anton" and "Norddeich".  Received neither operational confirmation nor repetition by Control Center
				I am completely puzzled.   Therefore Radio Message to B.d.U. with causative explanation (see remarks of 26 February at 10.45 hours).
				Radio Message was not sent, because:
		09.47		Radio Message (Radio Message - 0924 -
				Wattenberg.
				Justify repeated non-delivery of weather reports on return.
		12.00	BC 8897	Sea and Swell have diminished significantly.  Came to westerly course again.
				Day's run:  95.5 nm  (Total 2740.5 nm)
			Intend to proceed over the southern tip of the Newfoundland Bank  (shallow sounder test) on the Great Circle to the ordered attack area.
			According to the Steamer Handbook Dw 47 a small detour is faster to Hatteras, because one then avoids the strongest Gulf Stream and can exploit the coastal current.  I decided to proceed against the Gulf Stream
			1.)  According to the Scholtz situation report of 17 February and Schultze of 21 February English northeast traffic was observed at Cape Hatteras, therefore steamers proceed with the Gulf Stream.
			2.)  The independents coming from the Florida Straits also do not seem to go north via Hatteras, but rather on the Swedish Route the northeast.  So they come to me as well.
			3.)  According to the Monthly Chart, the exploited coastal current runs so close to shore that I expect to be held underwater by day by air surveillance, so that the hoped for shortcut would turn into just the opposite.
		16.00	BD 1136
		20.00	CD 1152
		23.14		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2204 -
				Wattenberg.
				On 27 February report weather between 01.00 and 05.00 hours.
		28.02.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CD 1141
		02.09		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report)
				43°N, 47°W, falling 998 mb, +8°C, SW 5, 10/10, Altostratus, Vis. up to 5 nm, medium-high SW-Swell.
				"U-162".

	Sun and Moon Data 27.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 28.02.42

	- 16 -
		continued
		28.02.42	North Atlantic	Now sent on Greenland Circuit, to ensure certain transmission.  Was operationally confirmed.
		04.00	CC 3361
		08.00	CC 3345
			From a Radio Message to Ites, Bülow and Vogel (time group 1843 of 27 February) it is clear, south-north and east-west enemy traffic cuts through square CB 61 and in CB 89 and 97 northeast and southwest traffic was observed,  so my route against the Gulf Stream leads through good hunting grounds.
		12.00	CC 3258	Day's run:  139.5 nm  (Total 2850 nm)
		16.00	CC 3272
		20.00	CC 3193
		01.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CC 3177	Dep sunder shows under 400 meters.  Shallow sounder did not indicate.  So more tinkering.
			Southern tip of Newfoundland
		04.00	CC 2632
		08.00	CC 2622
		12.00	CC 2534	Day's run:  147 nm  (Total 2997 nm)
		16.00	CC 2415
		20.00	CC 2435	Tube II floods on its own.  Outer tube door can be opened 7 turns with difficulty, then easily.  Closes the same way.  Suspect ship structural distortion from working in heavy seas.
		02.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CC 2428
		04.00	CC 2441
		08.00	CC 1678
		12.00	CC 1694	Day's run:  140 nm  (Total 3137 nm)
				Tube I also floods on its own over night.  Opening and closing the outer tube doors as with tube II.  Examination showed that the outer tube door fairings have come undone from their forward attachment and are only still attached on the outer tube door arm - hanging free to bang around.  They obscure the shooting field of fire for tubes I and II and hang so far that even III and IV tube are impaired in their freedom to shoot.  At the moment, the boat is only ready to dive to depth 50 meters.  Bow tubes are not ready to fire.  Intention:  remove outer tube door fairings as soon as weather allows.
				To B.d.U. will be informed accordingly after dark.

	Sun and Moon Data 28.02.42
	Sun and Moon Data 01.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 02.03.42

	- 17 -
		continued
		02.03.42	North Atlantic
		16.00	CC 1677
		20.00	CC 1835
		03.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CC 1852	Since I do not consider the current state of the boat, which I do not know if and when I can correct, able to operate in heavily air-monitored coastal areas, I decide to contact the B.d.U. to propose a new operations area along with the notification of the facts.
		04.00	SSW 0-1, Sea 1-2, 1026 mb, steady, Vis. 8 nm, air +14°C, water +13°C
			CC 1843
		00.45		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0005 -
				1.)  Outer tube door fairings tubes I and II are broken, hang on the arms of the outer tube doors.  The later are bent and leaking.  Shooting field of all bow tubes is not clear at the moment.  Intend to remove the outer tube door fairings as soon as possible.
				2.)  Shallow depth sounder out of service.
				3.)  Suggest operation Cäsar Bruno 70.  Stern room still has 5 Etos ready.
				4.)  Fuel oil 120 cbm.
				5.)  Sank Bruno Cäsar 91 fast four-masted freighter, over 8000 GRT probably type "ASTRONOMER", position square CC 18.
				"U-162".
		04.30		Like a present, good weather has come.  Main ballast tank I and main ballast and reserve fuel oil tank V port were flooded, so that the boat can lie with the forestem high out of the water.
		08.00	CC 1844	In 10-hours work the outer tube door fairings were removed.  In so doing, the personnel involved worked almost permanently up to the neck in the water for approximately two hours
		10.00		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0945 -
				To Wattenberg.
				Agree with operating in proposed area..  Report immediately when bow tubes are ready again.
		12.00	CC 1769	Day's run:  72.5 nm  (Total 3209.5 nm)
		16.00	CC 1791
		16.30		Work on the outer tube fairings ended.  Afterwards dived to see if the tubes held tight.  In so doing had difficulty with depth keeping.  (Internal fuel bunker 2 starboard has an air bubble of 3 cbm) so that the intended check of the tubes could not be made at first.
		17.08	CC 1791	Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1442 -
				Freighter CB 6934.  Northeast course . . . . . Schultze.
				Operated on the freighter, which is about 100 nm southwest of me.  Because no speed was reported assumed 12 knots.

	Sun and Moon Data 02.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 03.03.42

	- 18 -
		continued
		03.03.42	North Atlantic
		17.14		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1616 -  To Schultze:
				Hold contact for Wattenberg or Liebe is fuel allows.
		18.08		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1755 -  To Schultze:
				Send bearing Signals.
				Wattenberg.
		20.00	CC 1794
		20.21		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1832 -
				Last enemy position 15.30 square CB 6931, strong zigzags, 14-16 knots.  Pursuing on NE-course until 21.00 . . . . .
				Schultze.
		23.55		B.d.U. asked me to give a Short Signal weather report between 01.00 and 05.00 hours.
		23.59		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2331 -
				For special task immediately head for naval square CD 66.  Position must be reached at 08.00 hours on 7 March.
			Special task? Big disappointment, because that means breaking off of the operation off the U.S.A. coast with 11 torpedoes and all 4 tubes ready.  If only I had reported the four tubes ready again immediately instead of waiting until the tightness and condition of the last two were checked.  But according to the law: transmit as little as possible - a collective message should not be sent until everything was checked.
				Therefore course east, although it's hard.
		04.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CC 4151
		04.00	CC 4254
		04.08		Radio Message (Short Signal weather report)
				40°N, 56°W, falling 1020 mb, +11°C, S 5-6, 9/10, Cumulus, Vis. up to 5 nm, medium-high Swell.        "U-162".
		08.00	CC 4355	Test dive together with examination of tubes I and II.  Held tight at depth 50 meters, the same at periscope depth.
		12.00	CC 5154  Day's run:  223 nm (Total 3432.5 nm)
				Therefore clear to dive without restrictions again.
		16.00	CC 5255	When proceeding on the surface tubes still flood on their own.  The condition of the outer tube doors prohibits further actuation, because by this the now restored unlimited diving readiness could be eliminated again.  Unfortunately, as a result we must forgo tubes I and II.
		20.00	CC 5356	Report to Leadership (deferred due to breaking of radio communications).
		21.21		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1941 -
				All tubes ready except for I and II.  Ready to dive to all depths.  Still 11 torpedoes, 115 cbm.  Position CC 52.  Steady 1018 mb, +15°C, SW 7, overcast, Vis. 5 nm, medium SW-Swell.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 04.03.42

	- 19 -
		continued
		04.03.42	North Atlantic
		22.38		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 2220 -  Wattenberg.
				Report immediately when arrival at ordered meeting point is possible.  Return transit homeland with days run 200 nm via BD 82 must be assured afterwards.
			From ordered point to the homeland is around 3000 nm (Assumed Route "Oslo").  With a days run of 200 nm it takes 15 days.
			Fuel requirement for 15 days at day's run 200 nm:  15 x 4.5 =   67.5 cbm
				Reserve =  12.5 cbm
				Total requirement =  80.0 cbm
				Current inventory = 100 cbm
			For transit to the ordered point therefore still available:          =   20 cbm
				=========
			With 20 cbm I can get the ordered point (distance still around 600 nm) at the ordered time at 13 knots.  Therefore:
		05.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CC 6156
		00.48		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 0048 -
				At ordered point on time.        "U-162".
		04.00	CC 6255
		08.00	CC 6354
		12.00	CD 4145	Day's run:  338 nm  (Total 3770.5 nm)
		16.00	CD 4247
		17.35	SW 7-8, overcast, Sea 7, ship's position inexact	Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1454 -
				Wattenberg.
				1.)  Task is escort home of the German steamer "OSORNO" disguised as M.S. "SVELVIK" see Gröner.  Call sign:  Luzie Gustav Bruno Sophie.
				2.)  Besides Merchant Ship Recognition Signals Special Recognition Signals "OSORNO":  Tarpaulin on the fore stay, clothes line with laundry deployed from the aft mast.
				3.)  Exact meeting point square 6698 upper-center edge.
				4.)  More to follow.
		20.00	CD 4293
		22.40		Radio Message (Radio Message - 1916 -  Wattenberg:
				1.)  Within 200 nm of the meeting point attack and transmitting forbidden.
				2.)  Return transit via BD 82, BF 79.  Further transit in home waters U-boat set off to sea.  At the limit intake by M-Boot.
				3.)  More to follow.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 05.03.42

	- 20 -
		06.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CD 5179
		04.00	CD 5513
		08.00	CD 5612
		12.00	CD 5639	Day's run:  302 nm  (Total 4072.5 nm)
		13.46		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1302 -
				Wattenberg.
				1.)  Wait at meeting point from 7 March 10.00 hours to 10 March 24.00 hours.  If up to ordered time ship not met, begin accelerated return transit.  Report on this as soon as set off 200 nm.
				2.)  Ship has orders, not to arrive at the meeting point before 12.00 hours on 7 March.
		16.00	CD 6453
		20.00	CD 6556
			NW 6, overcast, Sea 6	No evening navigation fix.  The last reliable determination of the ship's position was on 3 March.  The size of the speed loss from the missing outer tube door fairings is unknown and the documents on the direction of current and strength are only very general, a large navigation offset is to be expected.
		07.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	NW 5-6, heavily cloudy, Sea 5, Vis. 5 nm
		00.06	CD 6649	By plotting and three, however unreliable, position lines - the boat will arrive prematurely at meeting point when proceeding on the surface.  Therefore dived to proceed submerged.  Will prevent steaming from the east against the wind and current becoming necessary.
		04.00	CD 6698
		08.00	CD 6918
		09.05		Surfaced.
		10.34		Good morning navigation fix from two stars, Venus and the moon.  Difference between dead reckoning and actual position 225°T, 40 nm.
		12.00	CD 6932	Day's run:  Surfaced and Submerged  = 220 nm  (Total 4292.5 nm)
		14.54	CD 6698 upper-center edge	At meeting point.  Nothing seen of "OSORNO".  Moved back and forth on north-south and east-west courses at the meeting point.  Satisfactory navigation check.
		07.03.42
		to
		10.03.42	Wind W to NW 6, sometimes 9-10/10, Sea 5-8, cloudy to overcast, sometimes rain	Weather unfavorable.  Nothing seen of "OSORNO".
			Instructions established for the execution of the escort and protection task are set forth in the Enclosure.  Convoy Regulations were not on board (should not be expressly provided).

	Sun and Moon Data 06.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 07.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 08.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 09.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 10.03.42

	- 21 -
		continued
		10.03.42	It seems appropriate to expand Standing War Order No. 176 accordingly.
			It is also appropriate to add to the meeting point a position line extending from east to west of about 8 nm length because by day by continuous observation of the sun the latitude can be checked and improved.
		11.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CD 6698
		04.00	CE 4498	Return transit alone, because "OSORNO" was not met.  Initially course east, to get to a hunting area as quickly as possible.  Thereafter transit via CG 24 to BF intended.
		08.00	CE 4575
		12.00	CE 4656
		16.00	CE 5445	Summarized Day's run 7 to 11 March 1942
				536.3 nm  (Total 4828.8 nm)
				====================
		18.20		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1715 -
				Position CE 54.  Return transit via CG 24.  Still 65 cbm.  Replacement diesel compressor and fresh water maker necessary.  Weather:  steady 997 mb, +17°C, NW 8, clear, Vis. good, medium-high NW-Swell.
		18.31	CE 5453	Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1536 -  (Delay 3 hours)
				Smoke clouds BE 7818, destroyer 7841.  Both course 200°, 8 knots.        Schultze.
			Convoy is on converging course about 400 nm northeast of "U-162".  The course of 200° is for the Azores (Sao Miguel).  Therefore only a deceptive course, probably it will change after darkness.  The goal might be:  America, Gibraltar, Freetown, assume Gibraltar of Freetown.  In both cases a south or southeasterly course is in question.
			Intention:  Head for a point at highest speed, where the convoy can be met on convoy course 200° and 8 knots.  Thereafter run to meet on course 20° up to a point, which would be reached at 7.5 knots.  Afterwards operate on a point which the convoy could reach at 7.5 knots on course 180° or 160°.
		20.00	CE 5541
		20.32		Radio Message (Radio Message) - 1803 -
				Smoke clouds last in BE 7847.  Suspect convoy with remote escort ahead to starboard.  Course about 200°.  Speed 7-8 knots.  Continued transit due to fuel . . . . . .
				Schultze.
			Assume that the convoy at 23.00 hours changed course to 180° or 160°.  Despite this continued operation on course 200° because it is still possible, the points for enemy course 180° or 160° can be reached before darkness.

	Sun and Moon Data 10.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 11.03.42

	- 22 -
		12.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CE 5377
		04.00	CE 9255
		08.00	CE 6244
		12.00	CE 6261	Day's run:  340 nm  (Total 5168.8 nm)
		14.30	CE 6336	Ran to meet on course 20°.
		16.00	CE 3949	At 16.30 hours came to course 116°, to operate on enemy course south, when ahead to starboard two mastheads came in sight, bearing 70°T.  Maneuvered ahead.  Steamer steered about 100° and did not zigzag.  Speed 7-8 knots.  Course off the Portuguese coast.  Nevertheless, it is obvious that steamer is related to the presumed convoy in this area.
		16.10	CE 3949
		20.00	CF 1899
		22.00		Boat is positioned ahead, set off 10° to starboard, because we have an oil trace, that I do not want to put before his bow.  At sunset the steamer sets neutrality illumination.  Therefore again nothing.
			NNW 2, Sea 2, from the north over to the east black rain clouds, showers, Vis. low, to the west changing Vis. sometimes a sharp horizon
				Despite this I will close for a look at darkness.  I am in darkness the steamer is easily distinguished on the bright west horizon.
		22.22		Boat had just come to a northerly course, to take the steamer in target angle 0°, when a shadow came in sight bearing 135°T, which a little later was distinguished as a destroyer.  Range about 2000 meters target angle 0°.  It stood out faintly against the heavy rain background as a gray warship, but the forecastle and bridge are fully out, a mast is recognized.  Unfortunately I did not have the sensation "but he can't see me" because I'm positioned against the bright western sky, which is interrupted only by a few rain shower clouds.
				First impression:  Steamer and destroyer belong together.  The later observed the boat maneuver ahead from the dark horizon and now closes in the protection of the rain clouds.  Tubes flooded, ran off to the north, to get a better background.
		22.32		Destroyer passed out of sight in rain while coming up.  Turned to the east then advanced to the south, to get ahead of the steamer to see if the destroyer is ahead of the steamer.  Nothing found ahead.  Let myself fall back, to have a look behind the steamer, he passes by at a distance of 300 meters, is brightly illuminated.  Portuguese markings on the bridge.  Glare is so strong that the smokestack is not distinguished.  Cruiser stem, cruiser stern.

Sun and Moon Data 12.03.42

	- 23 -
		continued
		12.03.42
				About 1500 GRT size tanker.  Also in his wake nothing found of the destroyer.  Took position again.
			Found no confirmation that the destroyer and tanker were working together. Therefore assume that the destroyer belonged to the convoy detected by Schultz (remote escort).  Was either about to join the convoy because of dusk, or made a brief foray in the direction of the tanker.  Whether in fact it saw "U-162" cannot be said with certainty.  However it must be assumed from the range and target angle.  Therefore the convoy must be in this area.  The night is pitch black.  Gaining contact by night is purely a matter of luck.  Hope that it clears again and in the morning can see the smoke clouds at long range.  Assume that the the convoy wants to gain as much ground towards Gibraltar as posible.  Therefore:
				Pursued on corresponding course from the last destroyer position.
		13.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CF 1994
		02.19	CF 5112	Course 120° (direction of the Strait of Gibraltar).
		04.00	CF 5112	At dawn nothing seen.  Low rain clouds.  Low visibility.  Weather improvement is not expected in the next few hours.  Because of uncertainty concerning the deceptive convoy course is too great, and on the other hand fuel inventory no longer allows search courses at high speed, broke off pursuit.
		08.00	CF 5152
		09.00	CF 5166
		12.00	CF 5166	Day's run:  267 nm  (Total 5435.8 nm)
				Tube II leaks again, while cruising submerged full outboard pressure was determined in the the tube.
		16.00	CF 5252
		20.00	CF 5223
		20.59		Radio Message (Radio Message - 2041 -
				For Wattenberg return harbor is Lorient.
		14.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	CF 5312
		04.00	CF 2999	During the test dive announced the order by the Führer of our Befehlshabers to Admiral.
		08.00	CF 3755
		12.00	CF 3825	Day's run:  228 nm  (Total 5663.8 nm)
		16.00	CF 3645
		20.00	CF 3668

	Sun and Moon Data 12.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 13.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 14.03.42

	- 24 -
		15.03.42	North Atlantic
		00.00	DG 1442
		04.00	CG 1437	During a crash dive for training the conning tower latch did not tighten shut.  Broken catch for the dog.  Blew immediately.  New catch welded.  (See KTB Maschine).
		08.00	CG 1512
		12.00	CG 1293
		16.00	CG 1362	Day's run:  215 nm  (Total 5878.8 nm)
		20.00	CG 2131
		16.03.42	Bay of Biscay
		00.00	BF 7894
		04.00	BF 7928
		08.00	BF 7696
		12.00	BF 8491	Day's run:  243 nm  (Total 6121.8 nm)
		16.00	BF 8493
		20.00	BF 8573	At Cabo de Peñas good point of departure for heading to Lorient.
		21.13		Radio Message (Short Signal):
				20.30 hours will be 36 hours off return harbor.    "U-162".
		17.03.42	Bay of Biscay
		00.00	BF 8574
		04.00	BF 8632
		08.00	BF 9143
		12.00	BF 9137	Day's run:  168.0 nm  (Total 6289.8 nm)
		16.00	BF 9137
		20.00	BF 9137	Transit on Route "Uhunest" to Lorient.
		21.36		Radio Message (Short Signal):
				Request Radio Beacon Group 2.
				"U-162".
		22.39		Radio Message (Short Signal) - 2210 -
				Radio Beacon Group Belle Isle and 'Île d'Yeu run for Wattenberg from now until 18 March at 06.00 hours.
		18.03.42	Bay of Biscay
		10.30	Lorient	Entered Lorient.
				Remaining day's run:  142 nm  (Total 6431.8 nm)
				Fregattenkapitän
				and Kmdt. "U-162".

	Sun and Moon Data 15.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 16.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 17.03.42
	Sun and Moon Data 18.03.42

	Comments of the Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote
	-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
	on the Kriegstagebuch of "U-162" from 9.9.41 - 18.3.42.
	-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
	1.)        First patrol of the Kommandant with a new boat.  Broken off due to intended special task.
	2.)        The behavior of the Kommandanten during the attack on the independent was incorrect.  The Kommandant never knows how the situation will develop, so attack at the first best opportunity and do no trials.  All it takes is a suddenly oncoming destroyer, which forces the boat to submerge and thwarts the chance of attack.
		Signed in draft:    D  ö  n  i  t  z  .
		For correctness:
		Leutnant z.S. and Adjutant

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