FROM:  STAFF OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE), GIBRALTAR.

DATE:  3rd June 1945.                                                              REF:  R.S.59/36/1

TO:	DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, ADMIRALTY, LONDON, S.W.1.  (3)
	STAFF OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE), MEDITERRANEAN.  (1)
	STAFF OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE), FREETOWN.  (1)
	UNITED STATES NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER, GIBRALTAR.  (7)

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SUBJECT:  INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM "U.541", "U.485" and "U.963".

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        The following report summarises the interrogation, carried out at Gibraltar between 12th May and 2nd June, of survivors from the above three U-boats.

        2.  Accompanying this report is a nominal role of survivors, as follows:

		Officers	Ratings
"U.541"	. . .	6	38
"U.485"	. . .	5	32
"U.963"	. . .	4	41

        3.  Also accompanying this report (to D.N.I. only) are three packages as follows:

                (a)  Papers ex. "U.485"

                (b)  Papers ex. "U.963"

                (c)  Such personal effects as P.O.W.'s were not allowed to retain on security grounds.

        No papers were recovered from "U.541", all having been destroyed prior to surrender.

        4.  Survivors are taking passage to U.K. in H.M.T. "ORION", segregated as follows:

                (a)  C.O. of "U.541"

                (b)  C.O. of "U.485"

                (c)  13 officers

                (d)  110 ratings

                (e)  1 rating (infectious case)

"U.541"

        5.  This boat surrendered to H.M.S. "MALCOLM" and H.M.S. "LOWESTOFT" on 11 May.  She is a type IXC U-boat of 740 tons, built at FINKENWARDER.  She belonged to a flotilla known as the "FLENSBURG" Flotilla; its original flotilla number was 10, subsequently changed to 33.

/6 . . . . . . . .

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        6.  Unfortunately, both officers and ratings proved extremely security-conscious, and it was only possible to obtain the barest outlines of this, her fourth war-cruise.  

31st March	-	Sailed from KIEL
2nd April	-	Arrived HORTEN
5th April	-	Sailed from HORTEN
?    ?	-	Arrived CHRISTIANSAND, where she remained 1-1/2 days.

        Passed through the Iceland(C) Passage, bound for a patrol area to the West of the Strait of Gibraltar.

        When she received the order to surrender, she was in position 42⁰N., 15⁰W.

        7.  SCHNORCHEL:  It was stated that it was their invariable practice to surface by night, and that the average daily period of schnorcheling was approximately six hours.  The C.O. stated that he could schnorchel in a sea up to Force 6, provided that the boat lay parallel to the sea and not head-on.  He added that "U.541" was the second Type IXC to be fitted with Schnorchel:  the first boat so fitted had not returned from patrol.

 

"U.485"

 

        8.  Interrogation of prisoners was much facilitated by the fact that all papers were recovered intact.  "U.485" was a type VIIC U-boat of 500 tons.  This was her second war-cruise:

25th March	-	Sailed from TRONDHEIM
28th March	-	Sighted one destroyer N.E. of Shetlands, but did not attack.
29th March	-	East of Faeroes.
1st April	-	West of Faeroes.
3rd April		Sighted 2 destroyers 5,000/6,000 metres distant S.W. of Faeroes.
6th April	-	S.W. of Rockall.
8th April	-	South of Rockall.
10th April	-	S.W. of Ireland (R)
11th April	-	South of Ireland (R)
12th April	-	At 0855 aircraft sighted 3,000 metres distant, height 50 metres.
13th April	-	Bay of Biscay.
16th April	-	Bay of Biscay - 2 destroyers sighted, distant 10 miles.
17th April	-	One cruiser sighted bearing 0140 10 miles, lying West of ILE DE RE.  No attack carried out owing to distance and unfavorable position of the cruiser.  Latter assumed to be of "LONDON" class; dark grey hull, light grey superstructure, appeared to have three funnels.
18th April	-	In the entrance to the GIRONDE sighted one destroyer with three funnels.
22nd April	-	West of ILE D'OLERON, awaiting escort to take them into LA PALLICE.
24th April	-	Made fast in the lock at LA PALLICE.  Proceeded the same evening to LA ROCHELLE.

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29th April	-	Sailed from LA ROCHELLE at 0330.  At 0615 course was 2000.  Altered course at 1135 to 1800.  At 1145 echo bearing 2800.  At 1249 sighted one destroyer and about 6 smaller patrol-type craft.  Sounded off action stations.  At 1300 fired one T-5 torpedo from No. 2 tube.  At 1301 dived to 18 metres.  At 1315 came up to periscope depth.  Action stations secured at 1340.  At 1605 continued down the French coast on course 1800.
30th April	-	Course 261 towards Cape FINISTERRE.
5th May	-	Course 180, est coast of Spain about 15 miles distant.
6th May	-	One aircraft flew over without attacking.
9th May	-	Log ends at 1200.

        9.  "U.485" was fitted with German Radar (Fu.M.O.) and with G.S.R. (Fu.M.B.), both in the Schnorchel.  Both were always switched on if schnorcheling or on the surface.  The accuracy of bearing and range of both was entirely dependent on wind and sea.

        10.  The C.O. was very hesitant about giving ranges of his radar, as he stated:

                (a)  He hardly ever used it, due to the short periods that he spent on the surface.

                (b)  Sea and weather conditions made it almost impossible to give a constant range.

        He gave a rough coverage range as follows:

                (a)  Ships:  7,000/10,000 metres.

                (b)  Aircraft with cal, sea:  7,000/10,000 metres, if flying up to 1,500 metres.

                (c)  Aircraft with calm sea:  10,000 metres, if flying above 1,500 metres.

        11.  The C.O. stated that with G.S.R. neither bearing nor range were measurable, as in the case of a radar plot.  The range can only be assessed by the strength of impulses (Strength 1: very distant; Strength 2:  distant; Strength 3:  "getting warm".).  This assessment is based on the experience of the C.O. and of the operator, and sea and weather conditions must be taken into account in assessing the approximate range.  To help in confirming the distance and to obtain a bearing, German D/F (GRUPPENHORCHGERÄT) would always be searching at the same time.  This gives the relative bearing, from which the true bearing is logged; the range is assessed by the strength of the echoes obtained.

        12.  It would appear that the C.O. thought highly of G.S.R., but he continually stressed that its success depended on the individual ability and experience of the officer concerned.  He stated that G.S.R. ranges were approximately the same as for radar.  An example of the way in which G.S.R. impulses were received is taken from the log for 18/4/45:  "8238, Deep sound for 2 seconds, repeated in 30 seconds.  Search pause 2 minutes."  He assumed that the interval of 30 seconds between the impulses was due to our radar aerial completing its turn before coming back onto the bearing of the U-boat again.

/13.  . . . . . . . .

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        13.  The following answers were given in reply to a questionnaire prepared locally:

        14.  "How would you take your U-boat through the Strait into the Mediterranean?"  He would keep in the deepest water possible, making over to the North African shore.  Once through, he would keep to the North African coast.

        15.  "How would you get out of the Mediterranean again?"  Probably the same as for coming in, but he would allow circumstances to decide.

        16.  "Would you ever bottom on the Ridge?"  Definitely not, (a) because he thought it might be mined, and (b) because he always disliked shallows in principle and whenever possible kept in deep water.

        17.  "What are your usual tactics after firing?  Do you try to bottom or to get away by a burst of speed?"  He never made up his mind to follow a set programme and preferred to be guided by conditions at the time.  (See entry for 29/4/45 in paragraph 8 above).

        18.  "What was the object of covering "U.485" with rubber?  Was it a success?"  Rubber covering was against our Asdics.  His was one of the first boats to be so fitted, and he personally had had insufficient experience to be able to assess its value.

        19.  The C.O. stated that his mission on this patrol was to enter the Mediterranean and to operate against merchant and other shipping off the North African coast.

"U.963"

        20.  The crew of this U-boat was undoubtedly the least security-conscious of the three.  Unfortunately, however, the fact that none of the ship's papers were recovered and that the C.O. proceeded direct to U.K., resulted in relatively less information being obtained than from "U.485".

        21.  "U.963" was a type VIIC U-boat of 500 tons.  She belonged to the 11th Flotilla, based at Bergen.  Her field post number was M.50702.  She had made 8 war-cruises previous to her last one, but had never sunk anything.  This was attributed to bad luck in the form of no targets rather than bad management.  The C.O. appears to have been extremely popular with his ship's company.

        22.  "U.963" sailed from TRONDHEIM on 23rd April.  It was believed that her patrol area was to have been the English Channel, but this is by no means certain.  The only known details of her course are that she passed through the Iceland(C) passage and down the West coast of Scotland.  This passage appears to have been without incident except that on 26th April the "RUND-DIPOL" (Schnorchel aerial) packed up.  I was not able to follow the technical reasons, but apparently water was entering through the cable from the aerial to the wireless compartment, with the result that the cable had to be severed and sealed off.  The practical effect of this was that "U.963" could only receive when surfaced.

/23.  . . . . . . . .

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        23.  Some time between 0001 and 0100 C.E.T. (the most accurate times were given as 0040 and 0048) on 6th May "U.963" was attacked by aircraft.  It has not been possible to ascertain the exact position at the time, but one officer stated that they were "West of the Herbrides".  The general impression seemed to be that it was "an ordinary depth-charge".

        24.  As a result of this air-attack "U.963" was seriously damaged, the main items being as follows:

                (a)  A crack in the pressure hull abreast the conning-tower, fairly low down, believed to have been on the starboard side.

                (b)  The port main engine was put completely out of action.

                (c)  The Starboard vents could be opened but not shut.

                (d)  The main aerial was destroyed.  As a result of the loss of the Schnorchel aerial, mentioned above, "U.963" was completely "deaf" from now on.

        25.  The period from 6th May to 19th May appears to have been fraught with difficulty.  There was a continuous inflow of water into the boat in the vicinity of the control-room and a list to starboard, both of which were corrected by pumping.  The amount of water in the boat caused frequent short circuits, however, with consequent failure of the pumps.

        26.  Some time (unspecified) on the evening of 19th May the main pumps failed altogether and were adjudged irreparable.  The boat began to settle, and the order was given to abandon ship at 0300 on the 20th.  It was asserted that no scuttling charges were fired, but that the boat sank of her own accord.

"U.541"

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"U.541"

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